




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Constable of the Tower 1881-1886.*



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Master Gunner of St. James Park, 1840-1864.*




THE HISTORY OF THE
ROYAL ARTILLERY



THE HISTORY OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY (CRIMEAN PERIOD)

BY COLONEL JULIAN R. J. JOCELYN

WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS



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PREFACE

IN January, 1909, the Royal Artillery Institution did me the honour to request that I should continue the History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery from the end of 1853, the point to which it had been brought up by Lieutenant-Colonel H. W. L. Hime, to 1862, the year in which the amalgamation of the Royal with the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay Artilleries was completed. The present volume is the first instalment of the work.

I have received valuable help from General Sir Robert Biddulph, G.C.B., Colonel-Commandant, from Major-Generals C. H. Owen, H. T. Arbuthnot, C.B., and A. K. Rideout, C.B., and other officers who served in the Crimea; also from Major-General R. Oldfield, Colonel-Commandant, Colonel G. A. Crawford, late R.A., Major J. H. Leslie, late R.A., Mr. James A. Browne, late Bandmaster R.H.A., and others whose names will be found in the List of Authorities. Throughout I have had the cordial assistance of the Committee of the Royal Artillery Institution and their Secretary, Colonel A. J. Hughes, late R.A.

For the illustrations I am indebted to Major-General C. H. Owen, Colonel G. A. Crawford, late R.A., Major H. G. Lloyd, R.A., and Captains A. F. U. Green, R.A., and W. V. Nugent, R.A.

During the progress of the work I have had the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel H. W. L. Hime, late R.A., who has read and corrected every proof. Whatever merit the book possesses is due, in no small degree, to his never-failing and untiring assistance.

JULIAN R. J. JOCELYN.

LONDON,
September, 1911.

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² General Auger was killed at the battle of Magenta, and did not live to see the production of this book, of which he was the principal author.


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
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In Part I. a number in brackets before an officer's name indicates his position in "List of Officers of the Royal Regiment of Artillery," commonly known as "Kane's List."

In Part II. the Companies that were converted into Field Batteries are called "A Battery," "B Battery," etc., without the word "Field," except in certain lists where the complete designations, "A Field Battery," "B Field Battery," etc., are made use of.



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¹ These photographs were taken in April, 1910, by Major G. H. Arbuthnot, Royal Berkshire Regt., while accompanying his father, Major-General H. T. Arbuthnot, C.B., on his recent visit to the Crimea (see "Journal of the R.A. Institution," vol. xxxviii., 1911). The General has assured the author that, except that the wood superstructure has been renewed, the bridge over the Alma is the same to-day as it was in 1854.

MAPS, ETC.


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ARMS OF THE BOARD OF ORDNANCE, 1854.

The Arms of the Royal Artillery at present in use were granted by
 H.M. King William IV. in 1832.

(See Cover.)

THE HISTORY OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY

PART I *THE INNER HISTORY OF THE REGIMENT,* 1854—1858

: CHAPTER I THE REGIMENT IN 1854

I. ORGANISATION

Introduction.—In his “History of the Royal Artillery from 1815 to 1853” Colonel Hime has shown how, in common with all the military forces of the Crown, the Regiment suffered from the retrenchment necessitated by national exhaustion and from the blind parsimony that succeeded the years of dearth. He has related also how, towards the middle of the century, the nation after a protracted sleep at length awoke to a sense of its military weakness and, in spite of the belated opposition of the Peace Party, to a practical recognition of its responsibilities as a Great Power. Years of trial were in store, during which the short-sighted policy of the past had to be paid for by tears and treasure. It is the purpose of the

following pages to describe the part borne by the Royal Artillery in those troubled times, and to show how, under the stress of war, its organisation was shaped and developed.

The Master-General and Board of Ordnance.—

It is only lately that the Ordnance Office has disappeared from Pall Mall. The building¹ had long been applied to other uses, but the passer-by could still see the old shield and old motto—a motto appropriate alone to its original possessors—“*Sua tela tonanti.*” In 1854 its long lease of power was drawing to a close, and the last Board of Ordnance was in being. It was composed of the Master-General of the Ordnance, who was always a distinguished soldier, the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, the Principal Storekeeper, and the Clerk of the Ordnance, who was the official mouthpiece in the House of Commons. There were also parliamentary and private secretaries.² General Lord Raglan was Master-General.

The Board held a very wide responsibility: it was charged with the administration of all funds allotted to the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers, the two Ordnance Corps; it supplied gun-carriages to the Navy, and barrack accommodation for the whole Army; the upkeep of fortresses at home and abroad was in its hands; and it purchased

¹ The Ordnance Office in Pall Mall, when the Board was abolished, became the War Office. This building was demolished in 1909, but three of the lamp-posts, with the Ordnance arms upon them, are in the new War Office at Whitehall.

² For a complete account of the Board of Ordnance, see Clode, ii. ch. xx.

or provided the means of manufacture of arms, powder, and military stores of almost every kind. The duties of its members were restricted in practice to questions of finance, and over these the Master-General exercised a supervisory control; but in his own person he was military chief of the Ordnance Corps, which as yet held a position apart from the rest of the Army, and as *ex-officio* Colonel of the Royal Artillery he was in executive command of such portions of the Regiment as were quartered at Woolwich and Sheerness. He administered the whole artillery service of the United Kingdom and the Colonies through his Deputy-Adjutant-General and his Director-General of Artillery.¹

The Deputy-Adjutant-General dealt with questions affecting *personnel*, recruiting, reliefs, movements, etc., and all reports touching field ordnance were rendered to him as well as to the Director-General of Artillery. The latter was concerned with the provision and maintenance of warlike stores, though the Manufacturing Departments were not directly under him; but all reports on ordnance went through his office.

Finally, to provide for free communication between the staff of the Master-General and officers commanding artillery distributed over the various

¹ This appointment, which had been allowed to lapse, was resuscitated in 1843 by Sir George Murray, who was then Master-General. At the same time he created a new appointment, that of Assistant-Director-General of Artillery. An Assistant-Adjutant-General, at first known as "Assistant to Adjutant-General," had been provided since 1806, and in 1854 there were two—one at Woolwich, and one at Dublin.

military districts, other than Woolwich and Sheerness, the Queen's Regulations provided that all orders transmitted from the Ordnance Office were to be considered as having obtained the previous sanction of the Commander-in-Chief.

Composition of the Regiment.—In 1854 the Regiment consisted of seven troops of Royal Horse Artillery and twelve battalions of Royal Artillery, each battalion being made up of eight companies. There was also an Invalid Battalion.¹ Each troop or company was commanded by a captain, who had under him a second-captain and two or three lieutenants. The Royal Horse Artillery had four lieutenant-colonels,² and on an average there was one for every two companies of Royal Artillery. Each battalion had two full colonels and a colonel-commandant,³ as had also the horse artillery. The

¹ This consisted of old soldiers, usually employed in the forts, castles, and martello towers, under the orders of the master-gunners. There was an adjutant and a detachment at Woolwich (see Kane, p. 154).

² The rank of regimental major was abolished in 1827. First-captains were promoted to lieutenant-colonels, but the juniors only got major's pay.

³ At this period, until 1881, the colonels-commandant received £1,000 a year; their duties were not onerous—they merely interested themselves in the general welfare of their command, and the horse artillery and battalion adjutants were nominated by them. Their position was similar to that of full colonel of a regiment. After July 1, 1881, any officer who attained general's rank before that date got the option of going on half-pay, from the completion of his army service until appointed a colonel-commandant, when he received the old pay (called unattached pay). These officers, on the other hand, if they elected to go on retired pay on completion of their army service, when they became colonels-commandant still continued to draw retired pay and no other. With the exception of such officers as attained general's rank before 1881, no subsequent colonels-commandant received

troops usually possessed their full complement of officers, as any one accepting an outside appointment was at once removed to the general list of the Regiment: they never left the United Kingdom, except to go on active service, but all the subaltern officers were first-lieutenants who were not appointed until they had served abroad.

The officers of the companies were often not all present with their units. Officers in employments of various kinds were not seconded, nor was any staff provided except at Head-quarters. The subaltern officers of the companies included all the second-lieutenants.

A varying number of the companies were from time to time designated "field batteries."¹ In that case they were either attached to "instruction batteries" at Woolwich, or were quartered, for the most part in the United Kingdom, with field equipments of various kinds.² The instruction batteries consisted of the horses, guns, and equipments of several field batteries, and these were taken over in turn by different companies for instruction purposes. The other field batteries were called "batteries of service." The rest of the Regiment were garrison companies, and were stationed in the

¹ A field battery was formerly styled a "brigade of guns," and a company of artillery was attached to it, forming the *personnel* (Dickson MSS., i., preface, p. x.). The original battalion guns were grouped in pairs, and when three such pairs were grouped in one command they were called a "brigade." The term "field battery" was introduced by the Committee of Revision in 1819, but the term "brigade" remained in common use for years afterwards.

² Field guns horsed at the station were manned in the Cape and also in Canada by the companies serving there.

United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Mediterranean, and the Colonies.

No mountain or siege artillery units organised as such existed, but equipments for both services, as well as that for position artillery, were ready in store.¹

The Head-quarter Staff.—Though the office of the Board of Ordnance was in Pall Mall, Woolwich was in every sense the Head-quarters of the Regiment: here were to be found the residences and offices of the Deputy-Adjutant-General and Director-General of Artillery; here were the head-quarters of the seven troops, and the twelve battalions; here were concentrated practically all existing means of instruction, and all the regimental institutions. Woolwich was the head and the heart of the Regiment.

The Head-quarter Staff were composed as shown in the following table:

TABLE I
THE HEAD-QUARTER STAFF

The Commandant . . .	The Brigade-Major. The Deputy - Assistant - Quartermaster-General.
Officers Commanding Royal Horse Artillery . . .	The Adjutant R.H.A. The Quartermaster R.H.A.
Battalions R.A. (12) . . .	12 Adjutants R.A. 12 Quartermasters R.A.
Officers Superintending Riding Establishment . . .	2 Assistants (graded as Lieuts.).
Field Battery Instruction . . .	The Adjutant of the Field Batteries.
Drills and Recruits. Heavy Ordnance Instruction. Royal Military Repository . . .	2 Instructors in Military Exercises.
The Director of Artillery Studies. The Purchaser of Horses.	

¹ Hime's "History of the Royal Artillery," pp. 95-99.

Command at Head-quarters.—When a captain was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel he was usually posted to some home district and placed in command of two or more companies; if no vacancy existed, he joined Head-quarters. Lieutenant-colonels returning from abroad after a tour of service were also brought to Woolwich, where they waited until they obtained a fresh command or were promoted or retired. No matter for how short a period he could hold it, the senior officer of the battalion present at Woolwich was given the command, and if there happened to be two lieutenant-colonels of the same battalion on the spot, the junior was placed in command of some other battalion which had no lieutenant-colonel present. Several of the latter were always in employment, and as they were not seconded it occasionally happened that a battalion was under a captain. At all times the system involved continual change of commanding officers.¹

The battalion commander was nominally responsible for such companies of the battalion as were serving at Woolwich, but they were frequently removed from his control. If they were attached to the instruction batteries there, during the hours of drill and work they were entirely under the Colonel-Superintendent; if they were going through a course in the Royal Military Repository, they

¹ In 1857 it was recognised that these frequent changes were a source of inconvenience, and by G.R.O. of May 8, officers were definitely appointed to command battalions and were not to be removed except by the authority of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. The horse artillery command was similarly treated.

were in like manner under the Superintendent there. Furthermore, these two Colonel-Superintendents, although nominally under the Commandant of the garrison, communicated directly with the Deputy-Adjutant-General and Board of Ordnance concerning their respective duties; nor had the Commandant any control over the equipment and stores in their charge. Thus the vicious practice existed of separating training from command, though possibly no other system was practicable in view of the frequent changes already referred to. The duties of the battalion commanders were in fact restricted to regimental routine, promotions of non-commissioned officers, returns from different stations, etc. The Officer Commanding the Royal Horse Artillery had similar duties, but his men were only exceptionally removed from his control.

The adjutants held permanent appointments and were provided for in the regimental establishments. In addition to the ordinary field and office duties of the post, they performed those of an adjutant of a recruiting district, and were in executive command of the adjutant's detachments, which consisted of recruits, non-effectives, and men kept at headquarters for various reasons.

Out-stations.—The troops and companies at out-stations were quartered in various artillery districts, under colonels or lieutenant-colonels, but, owing to the influence of the roster and the procedure already detailed, the occupants of these commands were always liable to removal. Each had to choose an acting and unseconded staff from the units under

his command, and as the latter were also in a state of movement, the staff as well as the commanding officer had no permanent connection with the men under them. As the captains of troops and companies had only the powers of the similar rank in the cavalry and infantry, the administration of discipline was continually changing hands. In this respect the Royal Artillery was at a great disadvantage compared to the rest of the Army, whose units were provided with permanent commanders and permanent staffs. The real artillery units were necessarily the troops and companies who moved about quite independent of any higher organisation, while their captains only held such delegated powers as the ever-shifting commanding officer decided to bestow.

The Field Train Department.—In addition to the Assistant-Director, the Director-General of Artillery had on his staff a Commissary and one Assistant-Commissary. The extensive Field Train which existed in 1815 had entirely disappeared.¹

The Manufacturing Departments.—The heads of the Manufacturing Departments received a general supervision from the Board of Ordnance, with whose members they corresponded. The staff are shown in Table II., on the following page.

¹ This state of affairs provoked frequent comment in essays and in the press, e.g.: "Where are the drivers and conductors, where the horses, supposing the equipage to be in store? Echo answers, Where? During the war (in the Peninsula) there was also a Wagon Train under the Quarter-Master-General, which the clamour for reduction at the Peace caused to be disbanded. In short the fact is that our Army has no organization at all strictly speaking, beyond that of regiments and battalions" ("Vigilans" in *Woolwich Journal*, May, 1852).

TABLE II
MANUFACTURING DEPARTMENTS

DEPARTMENT.	STAFF.
Proof Department ; afterwards Royal Gun Factories . . .	{ The Inspector of Artillery. The Assistant-Inspector of Artillery.
Royal Carriage Department . .	{ The Inspector. The Assistant-Inspector.
Royal Laboratory	{ The Director. The Firemaster.
Powder Mills, Waltham Abbey .	The Inspector.

The provision of small arms was still practically in the hands of civilians, but supply was subject to Government inspection.¹

The Artillery Select Committee.—The Artillery Select Committee² had been formed in 1805, with

TABLE III
THE ARTILLERY SELECT COMMITTEE

<i>President.</i>	
The Director-General of Artillery.	
<i>Members.</i>	
The Deputy - Adjutant - General R.A.	Officer Superintending Drills and Recruits.
The Assistant - Adjutant - General R.A.	The Inspector of Artillery.
Officer Superintending Royal Military Repository.	The Inspector Royal Carriage Department.
	The Director Royal Laboratory.
<i>Secretary.</i>	
The Assistant-Director of Artillery. ³	

¹ Clode, ii. app. cxxiv.


² See Clode, ii. p. 233.

³ In the absence of the Director of Artillery the Assistant-Director became a Member of the Committee.

the Director-General of Artillery as President *ex-officio*. It existed for the purpose of assisting the Master-General with professional advice, and was composed exclusively of artillery officers, but from time to time naval and engineer officers were associated with it for specific purposes: it sat about once a week. Its constitution in 1854 is shown in Table III.

2. MATÉRIEL AND TRAINING

Although the year 1854 was the last of a long peace, the organisation of the *matériel* was good, and would bear favourable comparison in general with that of other countries. This was due to the



A 9-POUNDER GUN AND LIMBER, 1856.

old artillery traditions, still carefully preserved, which distinguished batteries and ordnance of various kinds by their respective uses—field, position, siege, mountain, and garrison. It was in later times that these traditions were forgotten for a period.

Field Artillery Matériel.—The field artillery ordnance is shown in Table IV.¹ (see page 12).

The howitzers had a dispart sight; the guns, till

¹ "Handbook for Field Service, 1854," pp. 8 etc.

1856, were cast plain and had a series of notches cut on the base ring which, in connection with the single notch on the swell of the muzzle, admitted of elevation up to three degrees being given by the "quarter sight," as the arrangement was called. Wooden tangent scales were used with the howitzers, and when in 1856 guns were also cast with dispart patches, metal tangent scales were provided for them. Quill tubes, portfires, and slow match were in use until the general issue of friction tubes in the summer of 1855.

TABLE IV
WEIGHTS, ETC., FIELD ARTILLERY

Piece (bronze).	Gun or Howitzer.	Limber.	Carriage.	Rounds with Gun.		Weight behind Team.
				No.	Weight.	
6-pr. Gun (3·6-in.)	cwt. qrs. 6 0	cwt. qrs. 8 0·05	cwt. qrs. 8 3	46	cwt. qrs. 4 2	cwt. qrs. 27 1·5
12-pr. Howitzer (4·5-in.)	6 2	8 1	9 3·5	36	4 2·5	29 1
9-pr. Gun (4·2-in.)	13 2	8 1	11 3	32	4 3	38 1
24-pr. Howitzer (5·7-in.)	12 2	8 1	12 0	24	5 3	38 2

Piece.	Wagon Limber.	Wagon Body.	Rounds with Wagon.		Weight behind Team.	Charge.
			No.	Weight.		
6-pr. Gun	cwt. qrs. 8 0·05	cwt. qrs. 10 2·5*	148	cwt. qrs. 14 2	cwt. qrs. 33 1	lbs. 1·5
12-pr. Howitzer	8 1	8 4	100	14 1·5	31 2·5	1·25
9-pr. Gun	8 1	10 2·5†	96	15 0	34 3·5	3
24-pr. Howitzer	8 0	9 0	60	15 0·5	32 0·5	2½

* With spare wheel (light).

† With spare wheel (heavy).

The carriages were made of wood, with the block trails introduced by Sir William Congreve¹ in 1792; the wheels had streak tires, and drag shoes, copied from the French, had just been introduced. The harness, which was formerly of black leather, was made of brown after December, 1853.

The guns fired round shot, common shell,

¹ [260] Lieutenant-General Sir William Congreve, 1st Baronet.

shrapnel,¹ and case shot; the howitzers common and shrapnel shell, case shot, and carcasses. Up to the end of 1853 the time fuses in use were very rough, and they were intended to be used with common as well as shrapnel² shell; but before the expedition sailed for the Crimea in 1854 Boxer's improved fuses were issued for field service.³ Congreve rockets were also carried.

In heavy marching order, tents and camp kettles were carried on the wagons, and there were

¹ These shells were originally called spherical case shot. In 1852 the Artillery Select Committee adopted the term shrapnel in response to an appeal from the Shrapnel family ("R.A.I.P.," iii. p. 398, n.).

The original shrapnel shells had the powder of the bursting charge mixed up with the bullets. It was found, however, that the shells sometimes could not resist the shock of discharge, and prematures resulted. To meet this defect the powder charge of the 9-pr. gun was diminished by half a pound. In the proposed improvements put forward by Captain Boxer the first was to enclose the bursting charge in a central cylinder, but later on he introduced the diaphragm shrapnel, which held the field till the introduction of rifled ordnance. Boxer was [1943] Captain, afterwards Major-General, E. M. Boxer, F.R.S.

The persistent claims of German writers as to the invention of shrapnel shells have been completely refuted in "Gunpowder and Ammunition," p. 212, by Colonel H. W. L. Hime.

² When common shell "are fired against troops, the fuses should be regulated so that the shells may explode immediately before reaching the ground, etc." ("Owen and Dames," p. 617).

³ The fuses before Boxer's time were rude in construction; they had one central channel of fuse composition, were marked on the exterior in rings, and had to be sawn off to the required length. Thus the fuse composition had no support, and prematures were often the result: furthermore, as there was no fuse-hole gauge adopted, fuses often had to be scraped to fit, and their priming was also defective. Preparation was a matter of time, and, to meet the exigencies of field service, fuses used to be carried in sets of three different lengths. Boxer in 1849 proposed graduated side channels filled with mealed powder, and the substitution of boring for cutting. He also suggested an improved method of priming; but at first he met with little encouragement. The field artillery, however, were supplied with his fuses before the war, and were instructed in their use before going to the front.

certain spare carriages in which stores of all sorts were packed, the aim being to make the battery in the field as independent as possible. (See Table XVII., p. 103.)

Following the general custom of the day, all batteries¹ were mixed batteries, and comprised four guns and two howitzers. The 6-pounder gun was associated with the 12-pounder howitzer, and the 9-pounder gun with the 24-pounder howitzer, the object being to make a battery independent as far as possible and capable of suiting its fire to the accidents of the ground and the exigencies of the moment.² The system, however, had the obvious drawback of complicating equipment and leaving either nature of piece at times unemployed. It lingered on in the service until the introduction of rifled ordnance.

In January, 1854, the horse artillery were all armed with the 9-pounder gun and 24-pounder howitzer, instead of the lighter equipment; but a reaction almost at once set in, and the two troops that sailed for Turkey in March took with them 6-pounder guns and 12-pounder howitzers. Later on further changes were made, so that during the war both the light and the heavy equipments were used by the troops. The field batteries³ at the front

¹ A change had been made abroad by the Emperor Napoleon III. by the introduction of the 12-pounder gun into the French service, and by thus getting rid of "one carriage, three natures of ordnance, and nine natures of projectiles" ("Modern Artillery," p. 378). This was the field gun the French used in the Crimea. ² See p. 220.

³ The batteries of service in Ireland and elsewhere occasionally had 6-pounder guns, but these were gradually replaced by 9-pounders in 1854-1855.

were all armed with 9-pounder guns and 24-pounder howitzers.

Position Artillery Matériel.—The ordnance used as position artillery ¹ in 1854 is shown in the following table : ²

TABLE V
WEIGHTS, ETC., POSITION ARTILLERY

Piece.	Gun or Howitzer.		Limber.		Carriage.		Ammunition or Stores.		Weight behind Team.		
	cwt.	qrs.	cwt.	qrs.	cwt.	qrs.	Rounds Carried.	cwt.	qrs.	cwt.	qrs.
6·3-in. 32-pr. Howitzer (brass) . . .	17	3	9	3	12	3	14	6	1	46	2
5·2-in. 18-pr. Gun (iron) . . .	38	0	7	1	17	2	None	2	1·5*	65	0·5
8-in. Howitzer (iron) . . .	20	0	7	2	24	0	None	2	3*	54	1
4·6-in. 12-pr. Gun (iron) . . .	18	0	8	3	12	3·5	24	4	3	44	1·5

Piece.	Wagon Limber.		Wagon Body.		Ammunition or Stores.			Weight behind Team.		Charge.
	cwt.	qrs.	cwt.	qrs.	No.	cwt.	qrs.	cwt.	qrs.	lbs.
32-pr. Howitzer . . .	8	2	13	0·5†	54	18	2	40	0·5	3
18-pr. Gun . . .	8	2	11	1	60	{ 12 4 }	{ 3 3* }	37	1	6
8-in. Howitzer . . .	8	2	11	1	28	{ 13 4 }	{ 0 3* }	37	2	4
12-pr. Gun . . .	8	1	11	1†	80	16	0	35	2	4

* Stores.

† With spare wheel (heavy).

The carriages for the 12-pounder and 32-pounder howitzers were, in general construction, similar to field carriages, except that they were provided with two sets of trunnion holes, one for travelling and the other for firing. The 8-inch howitzer and the 18-pounder gun had carriages of siege construction, and the projectiles were similar to those in use with

¹ [846] Sir Alexander Dickson formed a battery of 18-pounders in 1812, and 18-pounder guns and 8-inch howitzers were used in the Peninsular War on several occasions (Dickson MSS., 1812, p. 666).

² "Handbook for Field Service, 1854," pp. 16 etc.

field batteries. The 18-pounders employed at Inkerman were position guns sent to the Crimea for general service, without being allotted to any specific company. In 1855 two companies were formed into position batteries and were armed with four 18-pounders and four 32-pounder howitzers respectively. (See Tables XVIII. and XIX., pp. 105 and 107.)

Gunnery and Practice in Field Artillery.—In considering the gunnery of the Field Artillery it is necessary to bear in mind the infantry weapons of the period. In this respect the country had been well served by the Board of Ordnance. In 1851 the regulation rifle musket had been introduced, and 28,000 ordered.¹ It was sighted to 1,000 yards, was effective at that distance, and was in every way far superior to the weapons with which the Russians were armed.² But the power of the rifle had yet to be recognised.

¹ This rifle had four grooves, and was almost in general use in the early part of the Crimean War. It was gradually superseded by the Enfield pattern of 1853, which had three grooves ("Handbook for Field Service," 1854 and 1857).

² The Russians had a few rifles of the Liège pattern, sighted to 900 yards; but the bulk of their infantry carried the old-pattern musket, which was not a deadly weapon in the hands of individual marksmen. During the flank march after the battle of the Alma, when I Troop came suddenly on the tracks of the Russians, Captain Maude relates how several of the enemy took particular aim at him from a distance of thirty yards and neither touched him nor his horse ("Letters from Turkey and the Crimea," by Captain G. A. Maude). As a matter of fact the Russians were trained to act in masses. "Tandis qu'en occident," says Todleben, "toute attention était fixée sur la précision du tir et sur l'instruction individuelle du soldat. . . les troupes chez nous étaient surtout exercées à agir par masses" (Todleben, i. p. 204). At short ranges, however, it was possible to develop a considerable volume of fire; "the first rank having discharged their muskets passed them over their left shoulders to their comrades behind

"When the Crimean War broke out, we had not been at war, as a nation, for forty years, and were governed altogether by the traditions of the mighty struggle in the Peninsula. The few grey-haired officers still serving, who had taken part in the great war with France, based their military ideas, naturally enough, on their experience during the time they had last taken the field."¹

And in some respects events justified this feeling.

"A la bataille de l'Alma," says Todleben, ~~le~~ notre infanterie armée de fusils lisses ne pouvait atteindre l'ennemi au delà de 300 pas, tandis que de son côté, l'ennemi ouvrait le feu contre nos troupes à une distance de 1,200 pas et plus. . . . L'artillerie exposée au feu d'une épaisse nuée de tirailleurs, à une distance dépassant la portée de la mitraille, n'avait d'autre moyen, pour activer son feu, que de lancer des obus à balles dont nous possédions que quinze par batterie légère et dont le tir ne pouvait s'effectuer avec toute la promptitude désirable. Les obus ordinaires étaient presque sans résultat contre les tirailleurs des alliés."²

Thus, as far as the Russians were concerned, it was still the era of the round shot and the musket, and for the time being our field artillery had little use for scientific gunnery. No special department of instruction in artillery practice, such as the Ecole de Tir in France, existed in our service; for such a

for re-loading, and took others all ready loaded and at full cock, which their comrades had passed over their right shoulders . . . if the men were 8 or 10 deep those behind did all the loading and capping" ("Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 234).

¹ "Guns and Cavalry," p. 81.

² Todleben, i. p. 205.

universal gun as the 9-pounder no authorised range table had been issued, and the formation of practice tables was left entirely to individual exertions.¹ Colonel R. Burn² had compiled a number of range cards, and Captain E. M. Boxer had lectured and had written on the science of artillery ; but at the time of the war it cannot be said that either had made much impression on the regimental officer, though Lefroy's "Handbook for Field Service," first published in 1854, eventually found its way to the front, and was not unappreciated in many quarters.³

The annual grant for practice had lately been increased to 140 rounds for each field piece, usually apportioned into 80 rounds of shot and 60 of shrapnel. The methods of practice were crude, range parties were not always employed, and interruptions from passing shipping were so frequent that when the range was clear a rapid and uninstructional fire was generally opened. For most of the practice used to take place at Plumstead, and sometimes whole days were wasted in waiting for a clear range. In 1849 the first purchase of land was made at Shoe-buryness, and companies were sent there for the purpose of carrying out practice, but nevertheless the ranges in the Plumstead marshes, with all their disadvantages, had often to be resorted to.

¹ "R.A.I.P.," i. p. 249.

² [1563] Lieutenant-Colonel, afterwards General, R. Burn.


³ This handbook was compiled, and the first edition published in 1854, by [1854] Captain Lefroy, afterwards General Sir J. H. Lefroy, C.B., K.C.M.G., LL.D., F.R.S. It contained amongst other information range tables for the guns in use. Some of these had been compiled by Colonel R. Burn and others in H.M.S. *Excellent*.

The shrapnel of the 6-pounder had a remaining velocity of 470 f.s. at 1,100 yards, and the latter was practically the outside limit of this projectile: the 9-pounder shrapnel was, of course, more powerful, but, in general terms, 300 yards to 1,200 yards was the shrapnel zone in 1854. Round shot, especially 9-pounder, ranged farther. The use of this projectile in ricochet fire was very common, and at times very effective.¹ When great precision in laying was not required, two rounds of shot or three of case could be fired in a minute. The service of shell was necessarily slower. The limit of case was 350 yards. But the column formations prevalent on the continent were wide and deep, and the round shot, like the shrapnel of a later date, was regarded as the projectile *par excellence* for field artillery.

The rockets in use were 6-pounders and 12-pounders. Against troops they had effective limits from about 600 to 1,000 yards, according to their weight. Their heads were cast hollow, so that bursting charges and, if desired, a fuse could be inserted, to enable them to act as shell which were considered effective at short range. The rockets, about 100 per battery, were carried in the rocket

¹ To apply ricochet fire effectively it was necessary that the guns should not be placed on too high a site. Thus it was noted at the Alma, that the Russian shot fired from the heights either bounded over our men's heads or buried themselves in the sand. A notable shot from one of our guns was recorded there. "An ammunition wagon had been broken up, and there was one remarkable group of 14 or 15 men who had been killed by the one shot going right through their bodies near the waist, as if a rank of men had just turned, and, when in perfect covering, had been caught in the back in that position by the shot; for they all lay partly one over the other with faces downwards" ("Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 107).

wagons, and were usually fired from a tube, but they were also intended to be fired from the ground either singly or in volleys, especially against cavalry.¹



Congreve's Rocket

Field Artillery Training.—As far as gunnery was concerned, there was little difference between the troops and field batteries, but when the questions of general training and readiness for war are approached, a very notable divergence is at once apparent. The troop had a fixed constitution: gunners and drivers were separately enlisted, and, once appointed to a troop, they remained horse artillerymen as long as they were efficient. The troop was also better supplied with non-commissioned officers than the company, the officers were selected, and the full complement present. Before the advent of the rifle the supremacy of the gun was undisputed, gunnery was simple, and mobility—the power of getting to the right place at the right time—developed to the highest possible pitch of perfection, was the acme of the horse artilleryman's desire. The horse artillery held the place of pride in the Regiment: its turn-out, riding, driving, its discipline and *moral*,

¹ See "Handbook for Field Service, 1854," pp. 36-38.

"The wallets at that time were a combination of wallet and rocket pipe made of stout hard leather: each mounted gunner carried two rockets" ("Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 119).

were each and all of them of a high order. Its men and horses being picked, it was a *corps d'élite*, and to ride in its ranks was the ambition of many a smart young officer.

Far otherwise was it with the field batteries. Ever since 1821 every recruit for the Royal Artillery had been enlisted as a "gunner and driver,"¹ and a field battery was called into being by handing over guns, carriages, horses, harness, and stores to some captain who, by the mere exchange of receipt and delivery vouchers, found himself suddenly in command of a field battery—

"As from the stroke of the enchanter's wand."

What did it matter if, in the words of Sir Robert Gardiner,² he had to seek for drivers amongst men "with their limbs stiffened from the influence of climate, useless for any purpose of a driver's duty"; it was the system. Now this system, notwithstanding its illustrious parentage,³ was organically unsound, and a starvation policy⁴ effectually nullified any utility it might have possessed. Yet for years it was regarded in high places with a complacency which, in the light of present knowledge, can only be explained on the score of expediency. To arguments

¹ As this cumbersome term leads to much confusion, "gunner-driver" will henceforth be employed.

² See Gardiner's Report, 1856. [979] General Sir Robert W. Gardiner, G.C.B., K.C.H., Colonel-Commandant.

³ In Hime's "History of the Royal Artillery," p. 61, will be found an account of the part the Duke of Wellington took in creating the gunner-driver system.

⁴ Lord Hardinge makes it quite clear that it was impossible to work the system without more horses for training purposes (see his minute in "Crimean Correspondence," vi., paras. 78-80, March 1856).

in favour of a change of system it was answered, that the Driver Corps had failed, that colonial reliefs must be provided for, that the system worked well, etc., etc. But the vital question was, Would the gunner-driver system stand the stress of war? This question was soon to be answered in the field.¹



THE GUNNER-DRIVER. FROM AN OLD PRINT (*circa* 1835).²

A few years after the introduction of the gunner-driver, efforts were made to improve the facilities for training. In 1827³ an establishment that included 215 horses and was known as the "Reserve of Instruction" (or the "Reserve Battery") had been formed at Woolwich, in order that recruits might be taught to ride and drive, and the equipments of several field batteries (the instruction batteries before referred to) were kept at headquarters to be taken over by companies in rotation. It was thus thought to provide for the training

¹ In this discussion and elsewhere it has been thought advisable for the sake of clearness to go over ground already thoroughly dealt with in Hime's "History of the Royal Artillery." In regard to the present question, see chs. iii. and iv. of that work.

² The No. 1 commanded from the off-limber box. The blinkers disappeared with the black harness, but were retained for some time in India.

³ "R.A.I.P.," i. pp. 173-174.

of the individual and of the unit. But it so fell out that the Board of Ordnance had a good deal of public works in hand, and as military labour was to be had for the ordering, the field batteries were directed to undertake fatigues in rotation. These fatigues by a natural process were soon entirely relegated to the unfortunate Reserve, which, made up, as it eventually was, of the dregs of the horses of the Regiment and employed constantly on mere carters' duties, soon ceased to have any military significance. Thus economy blighted training in the very bud. The instruction batteries also were not entirely successful. It was too often found that a company new to field duties only attained to a very modest standard of efficiency before it was replaced by another ; while the batteries of service quartered in the United Kingdom had sometimes no horses at all.

In 1849 the field artillery was in a poor state. "There is not a 9-pounder gun horsed in the United Kingdom," wrote Sir Robert Gardiner in that year.¹ It was only two years later, under the fostering hand of Lord Hardinge, then General-Commanding-in-Chief, that the batteries began to gather strength ; more horses were then provided, so that more men could be trained, and full equipments of 9-pounder guns were got ready and stored in the Grand Dépôt. Finally, in 1853 the camp at Chobham was formed ; the training of artillery with other arms was attempted, and two troops and four field batteries took part—the first time for many years—in the manœuvres of a mixed force.

¹ See Gardiner's Report, 1849.

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¹ See Gardiner's Report, 1849.

Tactics of Field Artillery.—A sharp and in some respects logical dividing-line separated the accepted tactics of the field batteries and troops. The chief *raison d'être* of the latter was to support with their fire the shock action of cavalry; that of the former, to identify themselves with, and increase the volume of fire of, the infantry to which they were attached; but the great results in warfare consequent on the independent employment of masses of artillery were ignored. The axioms of the Napoleonic wars were doubtless known and possibly studied, but “means did not exist for turning these contemplations to account—they were matters of theory only.”¹ In general terms it may be said that but little independence of action was contemplated for field artillery, except that the tardy introduction of the rifle, and its own splendid mobility, still permitted the horse artillery to dream of its eagle swoop and sudden outburst of case.²

In truth the regulation method of coming into action tied the field batteries closely to the infantry. Even after the experience of the Alma, where staff officers and divisional artillery commanders had

¹ See Chesney's “Observations on the Reconstruction of the Royal Artillery,” and Gardiner's Report, 1849. Chesney was [1239] Lieut.-Colonel, afterwards General, F. R. Chesney.

² “In the old days of round shot and case a good horse-artillery range was 400 yards; 200 yards was even a better. The horse-artillery guns were comparatively useless unless they galloped right into a fight, and their whole energies were concentrated on getting to close quarters as soon as possible. Even on the battlefield itself they might gallop up to within a few hundred yards of a mass of infantry, unlimber and come into action without excessive loss, and then a pitiless storm of case was often more than a match for the musketry fire which clumsy flint locks could bring to bear” (“Guns and Cavalry,” pp. 37-38).

to throw themselves from their horses to serve the guns until the arrival of their panting detachments, the field batteries were warned that the practice of mounting gunners on the limbers could only be sanctioned for driving drill and marching past at the trot. When acting with other troops, "order of march" was to be used.¹ Their recognised immobility was crystallised, as it were, in the aphorism the text-books were fond of repeating :

"The flanks of a line to be defended are the ordinary positions for guns, in which case the infantry line may represent the curtain and the batteries the bastions of a front of fortification."²

In view of the foregoing, the highest praise is due to the field batteries which so efficiently fulfilled their rôle at Alma, Balaclava, and Inkerman. The *matériel* was good and the men were good, and there happily was a long pause between the departure from England and the first battle. This interval gave the much-needed opportunity for training. But non-commissioned officers and officers of devotion and ability must have been present to have made such good use of their opportunities.³

¹ G.R.O., August 19, 1856.

² Another precept ran :

"When troops are in column, artillery should be on the flank : when a line of troops wheels backwards into column, the artillery breaks into column and closes to the reverse flank, so as not to interrupt the line of pivot" (see "Owen and Dames," Griffiths' "Artillerist's Manual," etc.).

Old ideas stick fast ; the present writer remembers taking part in manœuvres such as these, as late as 1875, in India, under a Brigadier of the old school.

³ The 1st Company, 11th Battalion, went out to the Crimea as a

Siege Artillery Matériel.—The more important siege ordnance is shown in the following table :

TABLE VI¹
SIEGE ORDNANCE

Piece (cast iron).	Calibre.	Weight.	Charge.	Total Weight of Shell.	Bursting Charge.	Type of Mounting.	Weight of Travelling Carriage.
	in.	cwts.	lb.	lb.	lb.		cwts.
68-pr. Gun . . .	8.12	95-112	16-18	49 $\frac{1}{16}$	2 $\frac{9}{16}$	Naval	..
68-pr. (Lancaster) Gun	8.78 by 8.08	85-95	?	56-90	10 lb.	"	..
10-in. Shell Gun . .	10	86	12	84 $\frac{1}{16}$	6 $\frac{1}{8}$ (max.)	Travelling carriage	?
8-in. Shell Gun . .	8	65	10	49 $\frac{1}{16}$	2 $\frac{9}{16}$	"	24
8-in. (Lancaster) Gun	?	?	?	49 $\frac{1}{16}$	2 $\frac{9}{16}$	"	24
32-pr. Gun . . .	6.35 to 6.41	42-58	8-10	23 $\frac{1}{16}$	1 $\frac{3}{8}$	"	?
24-pr. Gun . . .	5.8	48-50	8	16 $\frac{1}{8}$	1	"	24
10-in. Howitzer . .	10	42	?	84 $\frac{1}{16}$	6 $\frac{1}{8}$	"	31 $\frac{1}{8}$
8-in. Howitzer* . .	8	22	3	49 $\frac{1}{16}$	2 $\frac{9}{16}$	"	24 $\frac{1}{4}$
13-in. Mortar . . .	13	36	9	207 $\frac{1}{16}$	10 $\frac{1}{8}$	Bed	..
10-in. Mortar . . .	10	18	4	93 $\frac{1}{16}$	5 $\frac{1}{8}$	"	..
8-in. Mortar . . .	8	9	2	47 $\frac{1}{8}$	2 $\frac{9}{16}$	"	..
5 $\frac{1}{2}$ -in. Royal Mortar (bronze) . . .	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 oz.	16 $\frac{1}{8}$	1	"	..
4 $\frac{3}{8}$ -in. Coëhorn Mortar (bronze) . . .	4 $\frac{3}{8}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	5 "	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{3}{8}$	"	..

* Also used for Position Artillery.

The Lancaster rifling had just been introduced, and the 68-pounder and 8-inch guns, converted on this principle, were the first rifled pieces ever used in war. Special wrought-iron elongated shells were made for the former, but the latter fired service projectiles. The 68-pounder smooth-bore gun, though mounted in garrison, had not been regarded as a reserve battery and had no horses. Whilst in Bulgaria, it was mounted called W Field Battery, and had to train its horses as best it could. At first, when a route march was attempted, it was no uncommon occurrence for the leading subdivision to find its way back to camp, before the rear of the battery had been able to start ("Records of 62nd Battery, R.F.A.").

¹ From "Modern Artillery," pp. 525 and 526. Weights of travelling carriages from "Handbook for Field Service, 1854," p. 185. For Lancaster guns, see "Modern Artillery," p. 487 and p. 27, n.

siege piece. Those used at Sebastopol were landed from the fleet, as were also the 10-inch shell guns. Both were worked on naval carriages, though a siege carriage for the latter existed. All the cast-iron guns were provided with Millar's sights, consisting of a hindsight on the breech and a gun-metal dispart or foresight usually placed on the second reinforce. The hindsight was of brass and fitted into a gun-metal block, screwed behind the base ring. It could be used until the clearance angle was reached or that elevation where the line of sight was intercepted by the muzzle. For elevations from this angle up to 8 degrees a wooden scale was provided which was used in connection with a notch on the muzzle. Guns having no dispart sight were laid by line of metal,¹ and for higher elevations, by use of a wooden scale and a notch on the muzzle. Quarter-sights were cut on the 32-pounders and lower natures.


Mortars were fired at a constant elevation, usually 45 degrees, the charge being proportional to the range required. A chalk line was struck by means of a string from vent to muzzle, parallel to the axis of the bore, and the piece was layed for line, by the Number One,² standing in rear, who, being supplied with a plumb-bob, gave such orders as brought the chalk

¹ The "line of metal" is a visual line joining the notches cut on the highest points of the base ring and swell of the muzzle when the trunnions are horizontal. If laying is carried out by this line, then, owing to the conical form of the gun, elevation will be given. In field guns the amount varied from 1 degree to $1\frac{1}{4}$ degrees, in cast-iron guns from $1\frac{1}{2}$ degrees to $2\frac{1}{4}$ degrees (see "Modern Artillery," p. 278).

² It was the common practice in the Crimea for a subaltern officer to perform this duty.

line on the piece, the plumb-bob, and two pointing-rods, planted on the parapet in front, into the same vertical plane.

A land-service lock existed, but it was usually naval guns that were actually provided with them. Locks were used in connection with a detonating quill tube;¹ otherwise siege guns usually, and mortars always, were fired by means of portfires and common quill tubes, until the introduction of friction tubes.²



A 10-IN. HOWITZER ON SIEGE CARRIAGE.

Siege travelling carriages were provided for the 32-pounders and 24-pounders. The body consisted of parallel brackets connected by three transoms, the trail thus formed being termed a bracket trail.

¹ See "Owen and Dames," pp. 84 etc.

² Portfires were a source of danger. A terrible accident occurred on June 10, 1855, in No. 11 Battery, Left Attack, before Sebastopol. It is thus described by [2438] Lieutenant Geary, now General Sir H. L. Geary, K.C.B.:

"About 11 o'clock we had a very heavy fire upon our battery from several of the enemy's, to which we were of course replying as quickly as we could, and firing in rapid succession from left to right. Owing to the locks of two of the guns (naval 8-inch guns) being disabled and having no friction tubes we were obliged to use portfires and common tubes, and had but one portfire between the two guns. As one of the detachment was rushing round the traverse after having fired one gun to fire the other, with the lighted portfire in his hand, he ran against another man bringing up about 80 lbs. of powder from the magazine, in sandbags. The portfire ignited the powder, blowing up and killing one man and wounding four others" (Geary's "Diary").

The wheels were specially strong, and two sets of trunnion holes (for travelling and for firing) were provided. The 10-inch and 8-inch shell guns had travelling carriages, but of stronger and heavier construction. In these, the body was composed of a perch trail with two short brackets, the former limbering up to a straight pintail on the top of the limber, and there was only one set of trunnion holes, as it was considered undesirable to shift the gun far back on the carriage, on account of the strain that would be thrown on the perch. Special apparatus to check recoil was also provided.¹ The limbers were all similar and weighed $7\frac{1}{2}$ cwts.

The guns were fired from common ground platforms or Madras platforms. The former were laid with a slope to the front, which conveniently checked recoil: the latter were of skeleton construction, and consisted of side pieces for the wheels and a trail plank. Mortars were mounted on beds and fired from platforms similar to the common ground platforms, but shorter and laid horizontal.

The ammunition for the guns consisted of round shot, sometimes fired hot,² common and shrapnel shell, case shot, and grape. The shell guns fired

¹ Probably the first instance of a mechanical contrivance of its kind for a wheeled military carriage. Two friction levers were employed: one end of a lever was attached to the front of each bracket, and a part of the lever hollowed out so as to fit over the nave of the wheel. The lever was compressed tightly on the nave by bolting the other end down to the rear of the bracket. The friction thus produced reduced the extent of the recoil very considerably (see "Owen and Dames," p. 55).

² Junk wads of oakum, bound round with spunyarn, and previously soaked in water, were placed between the charge and the hot shot.

common shells and various incendiary projectiles, as also did the mortars. The shells were occasionally fired empty, as hollow shot, or were filled with Valenciennes composition. Carcasses were shells with comparatively thick walls, in which were three vents or fire holes in the upper hemisphere. They were filled with incendiary composition. Light and smoke balls also existed.¹ Shells for guns and howitzers and all projectiles for field and position pieces had wood bottoms called "sabots" riveted to them, in order to keep the fuse in the axis of the bore when loading, and to prevent the shot from rebounding. Mortar shells were not so provided. Sabots for field service were "end" not "plank,"² so as to break up and not annoy friendly skirmishers.

Boxer's fuses had not yet been introduced for siege equipment: the fuses in use had all the defects before noted,³ defects which were emphasised in the case of mortar shells. There were no percussion fuses employed in the land service at this time, but Freeburn's and Moorsom's concussion fuses were supplied for sea service.⁴ Twenty-four-pounder con-


¹ Neither were sent to the Crimea: the want of light balls was felt, and a supply was obtained from Constantinople. For details of the various laboratory compositions, see Table XX., p. 108.

² These terms were used as explanatory of the direction of the wood-fibre. The "end" sabot was cut across and the "plank" sabot parallel to the grain.

³ See p. 13, n. 3.

⁴ "The distinction between a percussion and concussion fuse has been thus defined: 'A percussion fuse is one which is prepared to act by the shock of discharge, but put in action by the second shock on striking the object; a concussion fuse is one which is put in action by the shock of discharge, but the effect of that action is restrained until it strikes the object.' A footnote to the above says: 'This definition is not very satisfactory,'" and a description of Freeburn's concussion fuse follows (see "Modern Artillery," p. 133).

greve rockets were used in siege service. They were effective at 2,000 yards.



SMOOTH-BORE AMMUNITION.

Wagons and carts were provided for transport purposes. The wooden six-ton sling wagon consisted of an axle-tree and bed, over which a windlass and a perch hooked on to a limber, so that a four-wheeled carriage was formed, under which a gun could be slung. This wagon has since been superseded by iron sling wagons of seven and ten tons. The platform wagon had no sides, and was fitted to take guns, mortars, or their beds by means of wooden brackets ; it would carry one 10-inch mortar and its bed, two 8-inch mortars and their beds, or a gun and its carriage. This wagon practically is still in use, only some small alterations having been made in it. Flanders wagons, forge and store wagons similar to those used on field service, were also provided, as well as trench and hand carts.

Siege Artillery Training.—The Royal Military Repository, which had been founded by the first Sir W. Congreve in 1778,¹ was the head-quarters of instruction in siege artillery and repository work,

¹ [260] Lieutenant-General Sir William Congreve, 1st Baronet, was in 1778 a Captain in the Regiment.

the latter being rightly considered of very great importance at a period when casualties to *matériel* were so common. Here were to be found the military machines in use, examples of various types of batteries and emplacements, and facilities for military bridging. Companies were attached to the Repository, just as they were to the instruction batteries, and went through organised courses under the Superintendent. Drills and the mounting and dismounting of heavy ordnance were brought to a high standard of excellence, as the work done by the siege train before Sebastopol effectually demonstrated.


Practice at siege targets proper did not exist, but training in the service of siege pieces was included with the general practice with heavy ordnance. A rate of fire of about one round a minute could be maintained for a time, say ten rounds in ten minutes.

But the means of draught did not exist. In 1819 a Committee¹ had laid down, "With regard to the transport of shot, shell, and ammunition in general, the resources of the country in which the siege is laid must, on all occasions be depended on"; and when Sir Hew Ross² was examined before the Parliamentary Committee of 1855 he admitted that this comfortable doctrine had been subscribed to by the authorities.


Garrison Artillery Matériel.—A very large number of different kinds of cast-iron guns, shell guns, carronades, and mortars was in the service at this time. Ordnance of old type was still mounted and in store. It consisted of carronades of various calibres, cast-

¹ Hime's "History of the Royal Artillery," p. 97.


² D.A.G., R.A. (see p. 43).




SIEGE ARTILLERY AT DRILL IN R.M. REPOSITORY, WOOLWICH.
(From an old print.)



SIEGE ARTILLERY AT SEBASTOPOL.
(After Simpson.)



iron guns from 24-pounders to 56-pounders, some of these being of the congreve construction, and mortars of all kinds.¹ During recent years, progress had been made by reaming out guns and by the introduction of Millar's 8-inch and 10-inch shell guns and by



A CAST-IRON S.B. 68-POUNDER CARRONADE, APPROXIMATE SCALE $\frac{1}{16}$.

Dundas'² 68-pounders, and these pieces were also mounted in the various garrisons. The guns, etc.,

¹ Carronades were short trunnionless pieces, first cast at the Carron Factory, Scotland, in 1779. They projected shot of large calibre with accuracy to ranges from 400 to 600 yards, the fighting ranges of the day ("Modern Artillery," p. 45).

Early in 1813 the Admiralty requested Sir William Congreve, 2nd Baronet, to consider the armaments of frigates. He at once furnished a design for a medium 24-pounder of shorter length and less weight than the service pattern, but with more metal round the seat of charge ("The Royal Navy," by Laird Clowes, v. 16, vi. 275; also "Modern Artillery," p. 40).

The practice of reaming out guns and boring them up began in 1830, and afterwards was much extended. It was a temporary expedient to project a greater weight of metal ("Owen and Dames," p. 30).


[651] Major-General, afterwards Lieutenant-General, W. Millar was Inspector of Artillery, 1827-1835. His first design was put forward in 1820. These guns were designed for firing large-calibre hollow-shot or shell. No great saving of weight was sought in their construction, but a projectile of comparatively greater powder capacity was obtained. In a *howitzer* weight is saved in the piece, but at the expense of a lower charge, less range and accuracy than was the case with a *shell* gun (see "Modern Artillery," ch. III.).

For a full list of Garrison guns, see "Modern Artillery," pp. 525 etc.

² [1150] Colonel, afterwards Major-General, W. B. Dundas, C.B., Inspector of Artillery, 1839-1852.

were sighted and fired, as already detailed, for siege artillery.

Garrison carriages were of two classes. The "Garrison Standing Carriage" and "Rear Chock" were made of wood¹ and composed of two brackets connected by a transom, two bolts, and two axle-trees. In the Rear Chock the second axle-tree was replaced by a transom and it only had trucks in front;



A CAST-IRON S.B. 8-INCH SHELL GUN (54 CWT.), APPROXIMATE SCALE $\frac{1}{16}$.


the Garrison Standing Carriage being on four trucks. Elevation was given by means of a screw and one or more quoins. These carriages were fired from ground platforms. The second and more modern type of mounting consisted of carriages of somewhat similar make but mounted on traversing platforms, moving over racers. The platforms were known as dwarf or casemate and differed mainly in height.

The ammunition was the same as that detailed above for siege artillery. The red-hot shot was considered a very important projectile, and furnaces for heating them were a matter of special study at this time.

Garrison Artillery Training.—The garrison-gunner of 1854 had the advantage over his comrade in the field battery inasmuch as he was never without the

¹ "Owen and Dames," pp. 56 etc.

means of training. The companies abroad and at home were very carefully drilled, and enjoyed a deservedly high reputation for steadiness on parade, a reputation that, since the siege of Sebastopol, bears the hall-mark of history.



A GARRISON STANDING CARRIAGE.

All garrison companies carried out annual practice, the usual target being a barrel moored in the sea.¹ Each garrison gun was allowed 140 rounds and each mortar 40 rounds, but it is not quite clear upon what number of guns the allowance was based. With good detachments, and each gun being laid, the following rate of fire was expected :

Heavy guns on dwarf platforms: ten rounds in fifteen minutes.

Heavy guns on casement platforms: ten rounds in thirteen minutes.

Guns on standing carriages, ground platforms: ten rounds in twenty to thirty minutes.

Many companies practised annually at Shoe-buryness under the Colonel Superintending Heavy

¹ This class of target was the only one in use till quite recent times. The earliest towed target was the "Hong Kong" invented by [2450] Colonel G. A. Crawford, whilst C.R.A. in China and the Straits Settlements in 1882. This target is, as is well known, still in use.

Ordnance, who was sent from Head-quarters for the purpose. In carrying out heavy-gun practice, serious accidents were not uncommon.¹

The Field Train.—As already stated, the Field Train was practically non-existent. As long as peace lasted and stores were kept in storehouses the want was not felt ; but since, in war, large reserves of field and siege equipment have to be issued, a trained staff becomes a necessity, as the experience gained in the Peninsula abundantly demonstrated. There, Conductors of Stores carried on office routine and superintended the minor charges of the department. Assistant Commissaries had charge of depôts and reserves of ammunition, the equipment of siege trains, and all field ordnance. Commissaries of higher class had charge of the supply and expenditure of all ordnance and military stores. But no such staff was on the books in 1854, and training in the very important duties now known as ordnance store duties, was impossible.

¹ In July, 1853, as No. 8 Company, 3rd Battalion (Captain J. W. Fitzmayer), were firing 32-pounders at Shoeburyness, a gun burst at the second shot and a man's leg was broken ; but practice was continued until the number of rounds originally intended was fired. In the following July a hot shot occasioned the destruction of a gun at Malta when ladies were looking on. The breech was broken into pieces, one man was killed, and others wounded. In September, 1854, the bursting of a 56-pounder caused three deaths in No. 8 Company, 4th Battalion (Captain A. Oldfield). None of the detachment were injured, but a piece of the breech broke down some brickwork and, sweeping along, mutilated three sergeants, who died from the effect. Here again ladies were present and the pieces of the shattered carriage flew about in all directions, but no one else was hurt (*Jackson's Woolwich Journal*).

About a dozen British guns burst during the siege of Sebastopol.

3. PERSONNEL

Officers: Education.—Up to 1854 the only entry into the Artillery had been for years by the Royal Military Academy, whither the cadets went from fourteen to fifteen-and-a-half years of age on nomination by the Master-General of the Ordnance. There they were drilled and instructed until they joined the Practical Class in the Arsenal. Recently a great amelioration in cadet life at Woolwich had taken place, mainly owing to the influence of Captain F. M. Eardley-Wilmot,¹ who became head of the Military Branch in January, 1847. Not only did he effect much-needed reforms, but he impressed somewhat of his own strong and upright personality upon the institution. At a time when an obnoxious change of system was threatened he found in his senior corporal—Richard Oldfield²—a reliable and efficient subordinate, and through their joint efforts government by corporals and heads of rooms was preserved and not replaced by what would have been virtually a system of espionage by non-commissioned officers.³

¹ [1773] Afterwards Major-General F. M. Eardley-Wilmot.

² [2246] Afterwards Lieutenant-General R. Oldfield, Colonel-Commandant.

³ "I drew up a manifesto stating I believed the Academy was in much better order than it had been for years, and that if we (the Cadets) were thoroughly trusted, and had a six months' trial (retaining the system that was then in being), the Master-General would have no reason to alter that system. I got that signed by all the corporals and heads of rooms, and the manifesto reached the Master-General, who acceded to the request. Eardley-Wilmot always said Oldfield was the cause of the offensive order never having been carried into effect" (From General Oldfield's MS., in the author's possession. See also "Memorials of F. M. Eardley-Wilmot," pp. 105 etc.).

At the completion of their course the cadets¹ appointed to the Royal Artillery joined at Woolwich, where they went through drills of various kinds. But this part of their instruction frequently lapsed on account of the dearth of men, from which the Regiment suffered since the reductions. "After a cadet joins from the Academy," wrote Sir Robert Gardiner in 1848, "his military education ceases." Nevertheless, owing to the thorough grounding he received at the Academy and the influences he came under when he entered the Artillery—for the Fathers of the Regiment dealt very faithfully with the young officer while at Woolwich—the second-lieutenant joined his company well equipped for the duties of his rank.

There had been, however, for some years a feeling abroad, fostered by many officers of distinction, that the training of the second-lieutenant during his cadet's course was insufficient, and that suitable opportunity was not provided for that higher education of officers generally, which would preserve the tradition that the Artillery was a scientific corps. The latter idea had produced fruit in 1839, when the Royal Artillery Institution² was founded with a

¹ A cadet had to work his way from the 4th or Junior Academy to the 1st or Senior Academy by passing satisfactorily rather severe examinations at the end of each six months' term. From the 1st Academy he had to pass a strict examination to get into the Practical Class; after a year there he passed his final examination and received a commission in the Engineers or Artillery.

² The Institution was founded chiefly owing to the exertions of Lieutenant F. M. Eardley-Wilmot, R.H.A., and Lieutenant J. H. Lefroy, R.A. (see "R.A.I.P.," i. pp. i.—xxxii.; also "Two Regimental Institutions," "R.A.I.P.," xxxi. pp. 130 etc., where the Military Society is also dealt with).

view to resuscitate the aspirations of the old Military Society of 1771. But the years that followed were not conspicuous for military effort of any kind. It was not until 1854 that the Institution began to profit by the general movement that was taking place. In that year a suitable building—its present home—was provided for it by Government, and henceforth it was hoped it would form a centre of intellectual life and professional advancement. Two years previously the Department of Artillery Studies¹ had been established, though on a very modest scale. The staff consisted of one officer and his clerk, and the department was comprised within two small barrack-rooms, where the young officers were instructed, when they first joined, under conditions far from satisfactory. As a condition of the assistance afforded by Government, educational accommodation was provided in the new buildings, where the Director of Artillery Studies was provided with offices and a class-room, and had the use of lecture-rooms, laboratory, etc. It therefore might be claimed that adequate provision had now been made for the further technical education of the second-lieutenants, and that, for officers generally, extensive means of study were at hand. In addition to lectures given in the Institution, confidential relations were established with the Arsenal departments and the Select

¹ While the Royal Artillery Institution came into being in one end of a borrowed shed in the Royal Military Repository, the first locale of the Department of Artillery Studies was in No. 11, Subalterns' Quarters, Royal Artillery Barracks, "of which even the use of the kitchen as an office was denied" (see "Two Regimental Institutions," "R.A.I.P.," xxxi. pp. 150, 154).

Committee, and consequently experiments and interesting manufacturing operations could be witnessed by those at Woolwich, or studied by those elsewhere; for permission was given for the dissemination of professional literature to the Regiment in general.

Officers: Age and Prospects.—At this period, which may well be designated as the “epoch of the old soldier,” the age and promotion of artillery officers were burning questions. “Everything comes to those who wait,” says the old adage, and military advancement came to those who lived.

“With few exceptions,” wrote Lieutenant-Colonel Chesney in 1849, “the colonels of artillery are only fit for ease and retirement. The present lieutenant-colonels are fast approaching the same conditions.”

Sir Robert Gardiner expressed the same idea. Writing of a certain type of the old officer, he says:

“Zeal and attachment bind him to his country’s service; neither age, infirmity, nor suffering health can drive him from it.”¹

It was recognised from early days that the position of officers in seniority corps like the Royal Artillery involved necessary disabilities as compared with that of officers in purchase corps, of which the bulk of the Army consisted. A warrant was actually signed in 1812 which would have conferred brevet rank on artillery officers after a certain number of years’ service, but it was (not unnaturally) allowed to lapse

¹ Chesney’s “Observations on the Reconstruction of the Artillery,” p. 3, and Gardiner’s Report, 1848, p. 50.

to avoid the anomaly of a captain's duty being performed by a major-general. The method of augmentation pursued in the Regiment also tended to aggravate the difficulty, for there was a relative increase of companies to battalions, whereas the necessity of a seniority corps is an increased number of battalions and a reduced number of companies, so as to offer more frequent casualties amongst senior officers or removals from the duty roster by brevet. Even when permission was given for four colonels and four captains to retire annually upon full pay,¹ it was generally officers recently promoted and at the bottom of their rank who availed themselves of the privilege. The following comparative table shows how matters had progressed up to 1854:²

TABLE VII
AVERAGE YEARS' SERVICE OF THE JUNIOR OF EACH RANK

Rank.	1818.	1838.	1851.	1853.	1854.	1855.	1856.	1857.	1858.
Colonel	36	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	48	46	47	42	37	32	30
Lieutenant-Colonel .	24	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	35	29	29	24	22	22	22
First Captain . . .	17	30	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	16	16	12	11	11	12
Second Captain . .	11	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	9	9	8	7	2	9

Note.—The four years 1855–8 are included to show the influence of war.

But surprises were in store: when Lord Raglan met Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. Dacres, R.A., in the Crimea, he, in his kindly fashion, asked him how he was getting on.

“My Lord,” replied Dacres, “when a man has

¹ Recommended by a Commission in 1840.

² Gardiner's Report, 1856, and Riddell's "Remarks," 1852.

been twenty-one years a subaltern he can never get on.”¹

Before a year had passed, Dacres was a major-general, and he died a field-marshal.

Prospects.—The army prospects of the Royal Artillery were not good, either in respect of employment on the General Staff or in command. In 1833 Lord Hardinge had said :

“ I consider the impossibility of artillery officers being employed in the highest branches of the service not only prejudicial to the individual, but also to the country at large ; as although science alone will not make a general, it can never prove an unprofitable adjunct to genius, and the officers of artillery of all other nations have stood conspicuous in the highest commands.”

And yet some latent suspicion must have lingered in his mind, for, in giving evidence before the Parliamentary Committee of 1855, he expressed an objection to the presence of an artilleryman on the Board of Ordnance, as he would be sure to favour his own service.²

“ No, never ! ” said another distinguished veteran, when it was proposed to place one engineer and one artillery officer on the General Staff ; “ no, never ! If you place an artilleryman or an engineer on the General Staff of the Army it is the thin end of the wedge ; they will never rest until they have driven out everybody else but themselves.”

¹ “ Recollections of a Military Life,” p. 61.

² See Gardiner’s Report 1848, and Evidence before Parliamentary Committee, 1855.

Professional jealousy undoubtedly existed between the Horse Guards and the Board of Ordnance. The former looked askance on the corps that were not their children, while the latter sometimes favoured their own in such matters as barrack accommodation and quarters. Dual control had its inevitable evils.¹

Prominent Officers in 1854.—Lingering round the list of the colonels-commandant could still be found memories of the past century's campaigns in Flanders and the West Indies, and amongst those of lower rank were many officers who had served in the Peninsula and at Waterloo. Of the senior officers, perhaps the most distinguished was Lieutenant-General Sir R. W. Gardiner, K.C.B., Colonel-Commandant, Governor and Commander-in-Chief at Gibraltar. He was seventy-five years of age and had had a most distinguished career, which included extensive artillery experience of all kinds. In 1848 he had commenced a series of plain-spoken essays on the state of the Royal Artillery, in which he placed his varied knowledge at the disposal of the Government; and doubtless it was in a measure owing to him that certain reforms were carried out.

The following officers held the principal appointments in the Regiment:

Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple Ross,²

¹ [2292] Lieutenant, now General Sir Edwin Markham, K.C.B., received severe censure from a lieutenant-colonel of artillery during the Crimean War, for having explained and shown to a staff officer, a quartermaster-general of a division, the different descriptions of projectiles, fuses, etc., and was informed he was making public secret scientific information which should be known only to artillery officers (Markham's "Notes").

² [890] Field-Marshal Sir H. D. Ross, G.C.B., Colonel-Commandant.

K.C.B., Colonel-Commandant Royal Horse Artillery, was Deputy-Adjutant-General: he had held that post since 1840, and was in his seventy-fifth year. In his youth he had had a distinguished career and seen much service with the horse artillery in the Peninsula and at Waterloo.

The Assistant-Adjutant-General was Lieutenant-Colonel H. Palliser,¹ who had been appointed in 1852. He had served in the Peninsula, and was in his sixty-third year.

Colonel William Cator,² likewise appointed in 1852, was Director-General of Artillery. He had served at Walcheren and in the Peninsula, and was sixty-nine years of age. •

The position of Commandant at Head-quarters was one of the most important in the Regiment. It was held by Colonel E. C. Whinyates,³ K.H., an officer who had seen much service, his last active employment having been in command of the 2nd Rocket Troop⁴ at Waterloo. He was Director-General of Artillery in 1852, and when Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Downman⁵ died in command of the garrison, in his eightieth year, Whinyates was

He was the first artillery officer who received a baton. He commanded the Chestnut Troop in the Peninsular War, which was attached to General R. Crawford's Light Division. The officers of that troop, now become A Battery, R.H.A., are permanently honorary members of the messes of the 43rd, 52nd, and Rifle Brigade, three regiments which formed the division, as a memento of the troop's services.

¹ [1523] Major-General H. Palliser.

² [1134] General Sir William Cator, K.C.B., Colonel-Commandant.

³ [1003] General Sir E. C. Whinyates, K.C.B., Colonel-Commandant.

⁴ Disbanded in 1816.

⁵ [742] Lieutenant-General Sir T. Downman, K.C.B., K.C.H., A.D.C., Colonel-Commandant.

appointed to succeed him, and was himself in his seventy-second year.

Since 1848, Captain Charles Bingham¹ had been Brigade-Major at Woolwich, and was destined to be closely associated with the administration of the Regiment during the critical times and drastic changes that were in store. His colleague, the Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General, was Captain C. J. Buchanan Riddell,² who had been Secretary of the R.A. Institution.

Amongst the Superintending Colonels, Colonel N. T. Lake,³ in charge of the heavy ordnance instruction, was the only one under sixty. He was fifty-four years of age, and about to command the artillery of the Light Division in the Crimea. Of the others, Lieutenant-Colonel Browne Willis,⁴ Superintendent of Drills, was in the sixty-seventh year; Lieutenant-Colonel R. Hardinge,⁵ K.H., Superintendent Royal Military Repository, was in his sixty-fifth year; and Lieutenant-Colonel W. C. Anderson,⁶ Superintendent of Field Battery Instruction, in his sixty-third year. Even the officer commanding the horse artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel T. Fox-Strangways,⁷

¹ [1807] Colonel Charles Bingham, D.A.G., R.A.

² [1855] Major-General C. J. B. Riddell, C.B., F.R.S.

³ [1690] Major-General N. T. Lake, C.B.

⁴ [1348] Lieutenant-General Browne Willis.

⁵ [1315] Major-General R. Hardinge, K.H. He was brother to Viscount Hardinge, the General-Commanding-in-Chief.

⁶ [1394] Major-General W. C. Anderson. He was for years a well-known personality at Woolwich. He had commanded a brigade of guns at Waterloo and was a long time in charge of the instruction batteries. He was a typical Scotchman.

⁷ [1365] Brigadier-General T. Fox-Strangways. Killed at Inkerman.

was in his sixty-fourth year. He fought with distinction at Leipsic, and was dangerously wounded at Waterloo.

In the Arsenal the veteran officer was the rule : Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloh,¹ Inspector of the Carriage Department, was only fifty-six, but he had just succeeded Colonel Colquhoun,² who had died at his post at sixty-three : the Director of the Laboratory, Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Wilson,³ was a Waterloo veteran of sixty-four ; and Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Chalmer,⁴ Inspector of Guns, was sixty-seven. It was the epoch of the old soldier.

In addition to the foregoing, who formed the military hierarchy of the Regiment, there was another group of officers who by their scientific attainments were successfully preserving the reputation of the artillery as a scientific corps, the most notable being Colonels Sabine and Chesney.⁵ Amongst the younger officers were several who had received or eventually

¹ [1673] Lieutenant-General Alex. T. Tulloh, C.B.

² [1427] Colonel James Nisbet Colquhoun, F.R.S.

³ [1543] Colonel John Alexander Wilson.

⁴ [1223] Major-General J. A. Chalmer.

⁵ [1180] Colonel, afterwards General, Sir E. Sabine, K.C.B., Colonel-Commandant, had, in 1854, been for thirty-six years a Fellow of the Royal Society and was then its Vice-President. Later he occupied the chair of President, being the only soldier who has attained that dignity. In connection with the magnetic survey of the globe, he had a European reputation.

[1239] Lieutenant-Colonel, afterwards General, F. R. Chesney, Colonel-Commandant, was an intrepid explorer, and will always be remembered for his advocacy of a railway route to India and his early survey of the Isthmus of Suez. On one occasion M. de Lesseps generously referred to Chesney as the "Father of the Canal." He was a D.C.L., and F.R.S., and Gold Medallist of the Royal Geographical Society.

received the honour of fellowship of the Royal Society.¹

Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.—The Artillery has always possessed excellent non-commissioned officers. Those of 1854 had an opportunity of demonstrating this fact to the world at large. Even our allies, the French, who especially prided themselves on their artillery, admitted that our non-commissioned officers were as good as their own, and certainly they were second to none. They were excellent men, well up to their work, and able to replace their officers on occasion; above all they had experience. Practically no sergeant had less than six years' service, the great majority had over ten, and in due proportion similar conditions existed amongst the corporals and bombardiers.

The men were of that excellent type now passed away, the long-service man, unknown to the present generation of regimental officer—a type often the reverse of exemplary, often hard-drinking, and sometimes with defaulter sheets of portentous size, but

¹ The list is as follows :

[1773] Captain, afterwards Major-General, F. M. Bardley-Wilmot.

[1844] Captain Smythe, afterwards General W. J. Smythe, Colonel-Commandant.

[1854] Captain Lefroy, afterwards General Sir J. H. Lefroy, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonel-Commandant.

[1855] Captain Riddell, afterwards Major-General C. J. B. Riddell, C.B.

[1907] Captain Younghusband, afterwards Lieutenant-General C. Younghusband, C.B.

[1917] Captain, afterwards Major-General, H. Clerk.

[1943] Captain, afterwards Major-General, E. M. Boxer.

[2211] Lieutenant, afterwards Brevet-Major, R. W. Haig.

[2243] Lieutenant, afterwards Captain, Sir A. Noble, Bt., G.C.B.

who would follow their officers anywhere and face with stolid endurance the furious heat of Lucknow or the ice-bound trenches of Sebastopol. It was this type who produced the steadfast squares of Waterloo, who wielded the sabres of Uxbridge and of Scarlett, who stood behind the guns at Albuera and at Inkerman—a type that had grown accustomed to the smiles of Victory, and who, even in defeat, could pluck a laurel from her brow. With other times come other manners. In some of its aspects military life has greatly improved in the last half-century; but the people of this country, so long as they deserve their imperial heritage, will never forget the uneducated, hard-living, stout-hearted, gallant old soldiers of the Peninsula, the Crimea, and the Mutiny.

At the outbreak of the Crimean War the standard in the Royal Artillery was 5 ft. 7 in., and the gunners were of fine physique; until a man had some four years' service he was looked upon almost as a recruit, and setting up and physical drill were continually going on, though want of men sometimes interfered with training. Guards and fatigues were very numerous at Woolwich, and the men were worked so hard that they seldom got three nights¹ a week in bed; but it was a well-drilled and well-knit force that received the summons to action. As the war progressed, the augmentations and inevitable wastage brought down the average length of service, and of those who went to the front some were weaklings. Many had had no instruction as gunners, and had never laid a gun or fired a shot;


¹ Gardiner's Report, 1858.

but the leaven of the old soldier was present, and the gracious mention¹ of "that noble Artillery, which under all circumstances, had maintained its high character for perseverance, endurance, and courage in siege and field," placed the seal of the Queen's approval on the men of 1854.²

4. STATIONS

Quarters in General.

—In 1854 all the troops of horse artillery and more than half the companies were in the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands. The mounted portion of the Regiment had already encroached on the old cavalry quarters of Brighton, Canterbury, Christchurch, Norwich, etc. There were field batteries at Bristol, Leeds, Manchester, Leith, Ballincollig, Limerick, Charlemont, Athlone, etc.; and



Citadel Gateway Plymouth.

¹ Order issued by Adjutant-General, Horse Guards, July 14, 1856.

² An interesting sidelight is thrown on the high state of discipline of the Royal Artillery by that keen observer, Mr. Delane, then Editor of the *Times*. He happened to be present at the landing in the Crimea, and in one of his letters he criticises the general turn-out and appearance of the troops; but he remarked that as a contrast the batteries of artillery turned out as if they were on Woolwich Common ("Delane: his Life and Correspondence," i. p. 90).

two or three troops and a score or so of companies were always at Woolwich; while Dublin usually had a troop and some field guns. Portsmouth, Plymouth, Dover, Chatham, and Sheerness, with their old-fashioned fortifications, were then, as now, important stations; but the regimental distribution also extended to such strongholds as Fort George and Fort Augustus, the Castles of Edinburgh, Stirling, and Dumbarton, the Pigeon House and Duncannon Forts, Martello Towers like that at Eastbourne and the Castles of Chester and Carlisle.¹ Eleven companies were in the Mediterranean, twenty companies in Canada, Bermuda, and the West Indies, and ten at the Cape, Mauritius, St. Helena, Ceylon, and Hong Kong.

In outward appearance many of the stations of 1854 have changed but little in the last half-century,

¹ The following stations were the "Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel Commands" in the Regiment in 1854. Some of these commands were occasionally exercised by Captains:

TABLE VIII
ARTILLERY COMMANDS

HOME

Woolwich.	Pembroke.	Portobello.
Sheerness.	Manchester.	Charlemont.
Dover.	Jersey.	Ballincollig.
Leeds.	Guernsey.	Pigeon House Fort.
Portsmouth.	North Britain.	Kilkenny.
Devonport.	Dublin.	Magazine Fort.
Landguard Fort.	Limerick.	Phoenix Park.

ABROAD

Gibraltar.	Montreal.	Cape of Good Hope.
2nd in Command, Gibraltar.	Quebec.	Ceylon.
Malta.	Nova Scotia.	St. Helena.
Ionian Isles.	Kingston, Canada.	Bahamas.
West Indies.	Bermuda.	China.
Jamaica.	Mauritius.	New Zealand.

and regimental life flows along the well-worn channels; but time will take its toll, and interesting landmarks must be swept away or buried under new growth. It may be well to pause over some of them before they are entirely forgotten. What then of Woolwich, the Alma Mater of the Regiment?

The Woolwich of 1854.—The Woolwich of 1854 presented something of the features of to-day. The Barrack Field, indeed, was bare of trees, except for a few clumps like "The Seven Sisters"; the Basilica of St. George had yet to be built; the site of the "Memorial to the Dutiful and Brave" was vacant; but though many structural alterations have taken place inside, the striking façade of the Barracks is unchanged, and the squares of Richmond and Chatham still display the armorials of past Master-Generals. The Parade has been untouched¹; the Head-quarter Offices and the Guard Room² occupy their original positions; in Chapel Passage there is a reminiscence of the former uses of the Recreation Room, and the stately Mess Room has suffered no violation of its beautiful proportions. The Mortar Battery, whence practice over the Common used to be carried out, has disappeared and been replaced

¹ The central drain still recalls the *sobriquet* of "Gutter Jumper" applied to the battalion adjutant. The horse artillery usually paraded in the "Squares." The Garrison Chapel was closed in 1863 on the consecration of St. George's, and after being kept closed for two or three years the Recreation Rooms and Theatre were built on its site. The Memorial was erected to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the Royal Artillery who fell in the years 1854-6. It was cast from captured cannon.

² The guard has been removed and the military police occupy the guard room. The officers' room has been converted into a mess quarter.

by other buildings ; the Green Hill is almost hidden ; and the nymphs and dryads with which a poetical imagination might have peopled the lake and groves of the Royal Military Repository, have been driven forth by the wants of a more utilitarian age. But the enclosure is still guarded by its bastioned ¹ front, and the umbrella roof that was made for the allied Sovereigns in 1814 still emerges from its sheltering oaks. On the east the Army Service Corps has absorbed the old Garrison Hospital, but the Grand Depôt still reminds us of the great storehouse of Crimean times.

Nightingale Vale only exists in name, and the vista of fields and woods once visible from the southern limits of the Common has now been completely cut off by the advancing tide of bricks and mortar. The fine Herbert Hospital was commenced in 1865, the Shrapnel Barracks ² were completed in 1896 ; but in November, 1853, the garrison races were held on this ground and the tents of the field batteries under orders for the Crimea formed the first camp on Woolwich Common. Later on huts replaced the tents, to be in their turn superseded by the permanent buildings which now exist.

In 1854 Woolwich Dockyard ³ was an important establishment and employed many hands, and the *Royal Albert*, 121 guns, was launched there in May,

¹ This is now being altered (1910).

² At the present time (1910) these barracks are occupied by Cavalry Depôts.

³ It was closed by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1869, and the Premier in consequence lost his seat for Greenwich on the first opportunity.

by H.M. Queen Victoria. Prison hulks were moored in the river, where they remained until the end of 1856.¹

The Arsenal buildings covered but a fraction of the space now occupied, and important additions were about to take place. A captain's guard used to be supplied by the Artillery, the river frontage was patrolled, and the visiting of sentries in the dark or in fog was a matter of difficulty and sometimes of danger.² Garrison theatricals were held in the Theatre Royal, Beresford Street, just outside the Arsenal wall in 1854.

Woolwich and Plumstead Commons had for years been practically the only training grounds for field artillery, and the periodical field days held on the former demonstrated how close were the ties that existed between the component parts of the undivided regiment. On such a day might be seen the troops and batteries parading with their guns in marching or review order, and beside them the garrison companies drawn up in two battalions. Coatees and epaulettes were worn, and every lip

¹ A burial ground for convicts, who were much employed in the Arsenal, existed on the present site of the Royal Gun Factories. During the building operations of 1859 many bodies were found which were reburied behind the proof butts. Evidence was not wanting to show that "body snatchers" had been at work (see "Warlike Woolwich").

² In May, 1855, the Royal Artillery ceased for a time to find the Arsenal guard: the general care was handed over to the police, and the main gate had a militia guard. At the conclusion of the Crimean War the Royal Artillery resumed this duty.

³ Field days used to take place in the Phoenix Park, Dublin, and also at Chatham, but only a small proportion of the Regiment could benefit by them.


was clean-shaven.¹ Then the Commandant of the Garrison, or haply the Master-General himself, would carry out the inspection of the whole to the music of the band.² While the troops and batteries were being exercised in manœuvres one battalion perhaps would march off to the Repository by the "South-west Gate," there to be broken up into squads of instruction under the Superintendent, whilst the other returned to barracks through the "Blue Gate," and, after detaching a company to man the mortars, would be drilled with field guns on foot. Each squad would pile its arms and accoutrements in rear of its respective work, and resume them at its completion, previous to re-forming battalions; showing that, though they might be differently employed, the whole force was looked upon as one body.

Before the establishment of an Aldershot Camp, Woolwich field days usually entered into the programmes for foreign visitors of distinction, the rapid movements of the horse artillery being a source of unfailing attraction. These personages were often seen at the Royal Artillery Mess, sometimes in company with members of the Royal Family, or possibly with the Queen herself.³


¹ Some of the braid was removed from the dress jackets of the Royal Horse Artillery and the pelisse was given up during the Crimean War, whilst the Royal Artillery exchanged the coatee for the tunic. Epaulettes were, at the same time, given up generally, and in July, 1854, the moustache became optional and the famous "two-finger" rule as to beards was introduced.

² The band of the Royal Artillery had already an excellent reputation and in the spring of 1854 gave two high-class concerts in Brighton ("England's Artillerymen," p. 319, and "History of the Royal Artillery Band," by Bombardier H. G. Farmer, 1904).

³ The King of Hanover was present at a field day in July, 1853,



ROYAL ARTILLERY BARRACKS, WOOLWICH.
(From an old print.)



VIEW IN MALTA, 1911.
(From a photograph.)



But the military glories of the Common are things of the past, and Woolwich has changed its character. It is now the centre of instruction and technical training. The R.A. Institution is there, and the Mess still possesses the regimental Penates; the largely extended Arsenal and the lately founded Ordnance College are in its embrace; but it no longer holds its old place in the life of the Regiment. Once the centre of artillery thought and movement, with pulses throbbing with energy, it has lapsed into the quietude and impassiveness of old age—

“ ’Tis Greece, but living Greece no more.”

Out-stations.—Of the other stations in the United Kingdom occupied by the field artillery nothing need be said. The great changes that have taken place in organisation, training, and distribution have obliterated some of them, but neither these nor those that are left possess any salient point of regimental interest.


With regard to the garrison companies and their quarters, the most noticeable point is the changes in the aspect of the armaments. In 1848 there were —

and on this occasion an accident occurred whilst the manoeuvre of masking the guns for action front was being carried out. A cartridge was fired whilst the sponge was still in the bore, and a gunner named Moffatt lost his hand. The King was much affected, and gave the maimed gunner a pension of £20 a year for life.

In November, 1853, Lord Raglan, in company with the Duke of Brabant and Count of Flanders, was present at a field day; probably the last time a Master-General of the Ordnance appeared on parade as Colonel of the Artillery.

During 1854 the Kings of Portugal and Sardinia were at Woolwich, and H.M. the Queen and the Prince Consort were present on various occasions previous to the great review at the end of the Crimean War (*Jackson's Woolwich Journal*).

4,812 guns mounted in battery and only 9,000 gunners to man them—less than two men per gun. Little had been done in coast fortification since Waterloo,



The "Pepper-box" Watchtower^a

and (though consideration was about to be given to the subject¹) the conditions of 1854 differed but slightly from those of 1848. It was a time when guns were multiplied so that a fort resembled the broadside of a ship; when "frowning castles along the steep," like St. Elmo at Malta or Fort Constantine at Sebastopol, carrying

tier upon tier of guns, stood like gigantic sentries at the harbour mouths; while land fronts, showing the cunning devices of the great engineers of the con-

¹ In 1852 a Committee on Coast Defence had been assembled by Lord Hardinge, who, with his usual clear insight into artillery matters, furnished them with terms of reference of a very enlightening kind. The Committee's Report is in the Public Record Office (No. 282), and, read in the light of to-day, appears very far-seeing and in advance of its time. It advocated high sites, quick service of guns, earthworks, and barbettes, and condemned stone. It recommended also the use of record targets. At this period there was a suspicion that there might be war with France and £200,000 was taken up, in the Army Estimates, for home fortifications. Up to the period of the Crimean War certain improvements in the defences of the coasts were carried out, and in January, 1853, the "Joint Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer Reports" were instituted.

² At Malta.


tainent, crept round strong places which still maintained somewhat of the ceremonial of a former age. Traces of the past can still be seen, but year by year they are becoming more rare.

The Lost Stations.—Apart from this change of aspect, there is little to notice in the garrison stations, except that there has been a noticeable improvement in barrack accommodation. Life follows the old lines, and many of the stations are in the changeless East. Some, however, have gone from our possession, and these call for passing remarks.

Corfu.—The Ionian Isles are no longer ours. In 1854 this romantic region had a considerable garrison including three companies of Royal Artillery.¹ The Sept-Insular Republic was under the protection of the United Kingdom, and was governed by a Lord High Commissioner. Cocyra, called by the Venetians Corfu, was the largest island, with which may be associated its satellite Vido. It presented the picturesque appearance of successive ranges of lofty hills, rising out of the water, covered from their summits to the sea with vines and olives. At its north-east end it terminated in a lofty bluff of granite,

¹ During the greater part of the Crimean War, these companies formed the bulk of the regular garrison, the Line being replaced by Militia. The state of militia musketry can be gauged from the following: "On the 1st August, 1854, the men fired blank cartridges for the first time, to their great amusement, having been long anxious to make trial of their new weapon. On the 28th targets were erected and the men exercised with ball at distances of 80 to 150 yards" ("The Militiaman," p. 40). A few weeks later this regiment was part of the garrison of Corfu, and the author gives a spirited account of life there in 1854. Amongst other things he described the great exodus of guns and ammunition transferred to the Crimea.

which commanded the excellent harbour. On this coign of vantage the Venetian engineers had built the Citadel, whose stone embrasures, untouched by the hand of their new possessors, held for a time the guns of the Royal Artillery. The barracks were in the vicinity, and "perched here and there amongst the cosiest nooks of the rocks were pretty cottages and neat gardens, the fond and well-favoured retreats of the Staff and Ordnance." Neuf and Abraham,



THE CITADEL, CORFU.

both Venetian forts, were in other parts of the island. Across the harbour lay the small island of Vido, fortified by us at the cost of about half a million sterling. By treaty with other nations we had to leave the islands as we found them, so that all the forts of Vido were eventually blown up—a very literal manner of throwing money into the sea. Next to Corfu came the island of Paxo, which lay opposite the Gulf of Orta, where the battle of Actium was fought, and it was here that the prow of a Roman

galley, a possible relic of the great fight, was washed ashore in 1857. Paxo carried no guns. To the southward lay Santa Maura, with a compact old Venetian fort that usually had a garrison of forty gunners and a company of infantry. It was separated from the shores of Greece by the lagoon down which Cleopatra fled while the issue of the battle of Actium was yet doubtful. Ithaca, with its landlocked harbour and deathless name, and Cephalonia came next, but were unfortified. Zante, famous for its currants, possessed a good harbour, and a detachment was generally stationed there. This island, with the small Cerigo, completed the group.¹

The Ionian Islands were given up by us to the King of Greece in 1864.


St. Helena.—Another island of historic name with which are linked some unhappy memories, passed out of the list of artillery garrisons in 1906, when the 53rd Company R.G.A. was withdrawn from St. Helena.

West Indies.—Though we still have a few guns mounted in the Atlantic, the shift of the centre of gravity of the Royal Artillery that has taken place since 1854 has effected considerable changes in what

¹ Two rather remarkable personages were at Corfu in 1854. Major Daniel, the barrack-master, was a Waterloo veteran, and the actual hero of the episode made use of by Charles Lever in his novel, "Confessions of Harry Lorrequer" (ch. xxix. p. 219), where adequate treatment was meted out to a French bully. The principal medical officer was one Barry, an eccentric character who, when dead, was discovered to have been a woman (see "A Modern Sphinx" by Colonel E. Rogers, 1894).

The account given of the Ionian Islands is based on notes kindly supplied by Colonel G. A. Crawford, Royal Artillery, who was quartered there about 1854, and on extracts from the "Militiaman."

was once a familiar quarter. Readers of Duncan's "History of the Artillery" will remember how closely the western possessions of the Crown entered into the life of the young Regiment, and how many places there have come to be regarded as landmarks in its annals. Out of a much smaller regiment in 1854, twenty companies were quartered in Canada, Bermuda, and the West Indies, where three are now



held to be sufficient. The conditions of life, therefore, as they then existed at Jamaica, Barbados, etc., had to be faced by a considerable portion of the Royal Artillery.¹


The West Indies possessed two deadly enemies of the soldier—epidemic sickness and rum. In the absence of the former the islands were healthy enough: a company returned to England in 1852, which had

¹ The notes on the West Indies are based on information kindly supplied by General R. Oldfield, who was quartered there about 1854. In the West Indies the same clothes were worn as at Woolwich; for officers a double-breasted frock coat, cap with oilskin, and thick cloth trousers. White clothing was unknown.

been quartered there for five years and only lost five men. But when cholera or yellow fever broke out, the mortality was terrific. In Barbados in 1853 out of a population of 36,000 there were buried at one time as many as 360 a day; and the officer in command of the artillery had not only to visit his sick and bury his dead, but had also to conduct divine service on Sundays, and on week-days superintend the construction of coffins.¹

Of the West Indian islands, Jamaica alone retains its artillery garrison. We still garrison Bermuda; but the pleasant quarters of Halifax, Montreal, and Quebec know us no more.

¹ Rum, which of course was always present, took its annual toll in death or evil effects: when it was said of a man that he had been a long time in the West Indies everybody knew what was implied.



CHAPTER II

PROGRESS AND CHANGE, 1854—1858

1. DEFECTS IN ORGANISATION DISCLOSED BY
THE CRIMEAN WAR

The Strain of War.—The Crimean War placed an enormous strain on the resources of the country—enormous because the country was quite unprepared for war. Many wants in our military system were brought to light, and the Ordnance Département was an object of much hostile criticism. It is proposed now to examine how the artillery service was carried on during the war, and to trace the effects of the Crimean experience on the future constitution of the Regiment.

The Gunner-Driver System.—The more striking incidents in the field operations fell to the lot of the field batteries. The horse artillery, while taking an honourable share in the work of the campaign and maintaining its high reputation for horse-mastership and discipline, had but small opportunities for the display of its special tactics. Its organisation remained unchanged since 1815, and no defects were disclosed in it during the war. As a machine it worked perfectly and no doubt arose of its complete efficiency. In the case of the field batteries the Gunner-Driver system broke down.

The field batteries generally earned the highest encomiums in the war. Todleben wrote in their praise.¹ Before the Parliamentary Committee of 1855 Sir John Burgoyne said that the artillery was very effective and very good,² and on the same occasion the Commander-in-Chief summed up the matter as follows :

“ At this moment (May, 1855) we have in the Crimea ³ 78 guns as field batteries, horsed and manned in perfect order ; the gunners are well drilled and trained, the horses good, and the artillery admired by the French. It is reported of them on every side that nothing could be more admirable than our artillery in the field. . . . At this time I should say the artillery service of Great Britain is equal, if not superior, to any other.”

How then did the Gunner-Driver system fail ? In order to supply the answer it is necessary to look behind the scenes.

Early in the year, when the Expeditionary Force was being organised, the companies first for service were assembled at Woolwich, to be formed into field batteries ;⁴ men and horses were transferred to them, and by the end of August the United Kingdom

¹ Todleben i. p. 490.

² This opinion concerned not only the field batteries, but the whole artillery service.

³ So stated in the text of the report : the actual number of guns organised in field and position batteries appears to have been seventy-four.

⁴ Of the eight companies at the top of the roster, six went out as field batteries, one as a reserve company and one as a ball-cartridge brigade. Before landing in the Crimea, the reserve company was armed with 9-pounders etc., and the ball-cartridge brigade broken up.

was able to place forty-eight pieces or eight field batteries in line of battle. This procedure naturally meant ruin for those who were left behind. The distribution of the battalion horses during the period under review is given in the following table :

TABLE IX¹
BATTALION HORSES

Station.	Jan. 1854.	April 1854.	July 1854.	Dec. 1854.	June 1855.	May 1856.	Aug. 1856.	Dec. 1856.
Woolwich (fit for service) . . .	439	919	395	361	541	587	2,299	1,319
Woolwich (ineffective) . . .	63	53	82	102	149	17	..	12
Shoeburyness	5	5	5	7	7	7
Sheerness . . .	86	1	..	87	..	90	99	104
Shorncliffe . . .	86	48	50	118
Ipswich and Norwich	271	92	390	251	219
Weedon, Northampton
Leeds and Manchester . . .	90	86	101	328	372	354
Bristol . . .	84	45	49
Topsham and Devonport	80	192	104
Hilsea and Portsmouth	103	107
Aldershot	387	379
Leith and Hamilton . . .	85	6	92	85	86	209	198	239
Ireland . . .	468	111	291	378	418	245	686	933
Turkey or Crimea	423	1,281	1,497	2,429	3,150	33	..
TOTAL . . .	1,401	1,513	2,146	2,965	3,920	5,103	4,627	3,895

An inspection of its earliest columns will show how the out-stations were denuded of horses and how the greater part of the batteries of service were practically dismounted. More horses were purchased in time, as the gradually increasing totals show, but the stock of men who could drive and look after horses was easily exhausted and could not be made good without special steps being taken. After all, to place

¹ W.O. 17
2672, Public Record Office.

forty-eight guns in the field was no great feat for a great empire. As time went on, the standard for the artillery began to sink. In July, 1854, it became 5 ft. 6½ in., in October 5 ft. 6 in., and in January, 1855 (by the special authority of the Lieutenant of the Ordnance¹), an order was issued for the enlistment of a limited number of men 5 ft. 4 in. in height, who were accustomed to horses. To issue this order was obviously to haul down the flag of the Gunner-Driver system. During the same month, moreover, when it was determined to form a dépôt of 400 horses in the East, a special company of 200 men "accustomed to horses" had to be got together to take charge of them on board ship and at the dépôt; for the two companies² then under orders were made up from trained gunners and included very few men fit for the charge of horses. Finally, Lord Hardinge's minute may be said to settle the question :

"The Government must not imagine," wrote he, "that because early in 1854, six field batteries were sent out, having been trained at Woolwich and Chobham, that this effort could have been sustained. It

¹ When Lord Raglan went to Turkey the post of Lieutenant of the Ordnance, which had been in abeyance since 1831, was resuscitated in the person of the D.A.G., Sir Hew Ross, who was also made Colonel-en-Second of the Royal Artillery.

² One of these companies was the 7th Company, 5th Battalion, that had been a field battery at Manchester, in January, 1854: all its horses and "drivers" had gone by the following April. The other company was the 5th Company, 9th Battalion, which had for some years previously been doing garrison duty in Jersey.

The quotation is from a letter written by Captain C. Bingham, Brigade-Major, R.A., Woolwich (Letters in possession of Major J. H. Leslie).

is a well-known fact that when in August, 1854, a seventh field battery was ordered to be formed, and was sent out to the Crimea, it was admitted to be inferior to the six batteries that had preceded it, in spite of the most zealous exertions of its officers, simply because we had exhausted the supply of drivers trained in 1853. It would have been difficult to have supplied a larger number of field batteries, however much they had been required. There was no want of trained gunners or of horses, but of artillerymen trained to ride and drive.”¹

Finally, the Commander-in-Chief made a proposal which practically admitted the futility of the system.² When once special enlistments were countenanced, the passing bell of the Gunner-Driver system commenced to toll; but it must be confessed that the moribund took an unconscionable time to die.³

The field operations of the Crimean Campaign were soon over—they practically ended as far as field batteries were concerned on November 5, 1854

¹ See Lord Hardinge's minute of March, 1856, paragraph 74, in "Crimean Correspondence," vol. vi. In this minute it will be noticed Lord Hardinge speaks of the "sixth" and "seventh" companies. This arises from his not including the reserve company amongst the field batteries.

² This proposal (see paragraph 79 of above minute) practically amounted to a resuscitation of a permanent Driver Corps. Sir Hew Ross, however, following in the footsteps of his predecessor, Sir Alexander Dickson, upheld the Gunner-Driver system to the end of his career. The lessons of the Crimean War taught him no more than the collapse of the field batteries in Portugal in 1827 had taught Sir Alexander (Hime's "History Royal Artillery," p. 67). In both cases the Deputy-Adjutant-General followed his bent in opposition to the thinking officers of the Regiment, led in the first case by Sir Augustus Frazer, and in the second by Sir Robert Gardiner.

³ The system was finally disposed of by G.R.O. February 2, 1858 (see p. 88).

—and the necessity for reinforcements of men who could drive never became a pressing anxiety.

Staff and Command of the Siege Train.—The siege artillery bore the brunt of the campaign, but, while nothing could have been better than the company organisation, there was much to criticise in that of the staff and command. On the last day of the siege the Siege Train in *personnel* reached twenty-eight companies, and in *matériel* comprised many tons of stores; but no officer of higher rank than that of lieutenant-colonel ever held the command. During the most critical period this command fortunately fell to an excellent officer;¹ but this is beside the question. The rank was too low for the position, and was in direct contrast to the practice of our allies. By some good fortune the command of the Right Attack remained in the same capable hands² for the greater part of the siege, but the Left Attack showed up plainly the faults of the existing system. There the commanding officer during the greater part of the siege was under field rank and was frequently changed. Thus it came about that the senior captain in the trenches for the moment had occasionally to relinquish his duties with his company and assume command of the Attack. As there was no continuity of command, “no standing orders existed, and there was an absence of system and management which threw additional burdens on the over-taxed officers, whose spirits, however,

¹ [1751] Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Warde, afterwards General Sir E. C. Warde, K.C.B., Colonel-Commandant, commanded the Siege Train from January, 1855, till August, 1855.

² [1874] Major Collingwood Dickson, afterwards General Sir C. Dickson, G.C.B., V.C., Colonel-Commandant.

from first to last, were most excellent.”¹ The whole Siege Train, as matters then stood, should at least have been commanded by a colonel, with a lieutenant-colonel and proper staff for each Attack; but the existing organisation took no heed of this.

Want of Transport and Field Train Personnel.—The Siege of Sebastopol had hardly commenced when it was roughly brought home to the authorities that a siege-train organisation which took no heed of the transport of siege *matériel* was faulty in the extreme. The lack of transport led us perilously near disaster, after entailing terrible sufferings upon men and horses and for a time practically demobilising the field batteries. This was a great blot on the artillery organisation. National parsimony was much to blame. Before the war Sir R. Gardiner and other writers had pointed out the lamentable condition of our transport, but the fact remains that the state of affairs was known to, and acquiesced in, by Sir Hew Ross and his staff. The want of *personnel* at first was also serious, but the small staff of the Director-General of Artillery rapidly grew.² At the end of 1854 some twenty-two Commissaries of Ordnance had been added to it, but many of them were quite ignorant of stores, and it was evident that if ordnance-store duties were to be smoothly carried out in war

¹ Private correspondence from the front to Captain C. Bingham, R.A. (Letters in possession of Major J. H. Leslie).

² Colonel W. Cator, the Director-General of Artillery, was appointed to command the artillery of the expedition, and his appointment was not filled up when he left England. In a few months his health broke down, and he returned to England and resumed his office.

officers would have to learn their business in time of peace.

2. BEHAVIOUR OF THE MATÉRIEL IN THE CRIMEA

Field and Position Guns, etc.—While the above defects of organisation revealed themselves, the behaviour of the *matériel* was on the whole satisfactory. Discussion for a time raged round the vexed question of whether the equipment of the horse artillery should be 6-pounders or 9-pounders, the dilemma being that the latter, on occasion, might prove too heavy for the necessary mobility, while the former might be found too weak in ballistics. The experience of the Crimea might be quoted in support of either plea, and a compromise was the final result: both natures were kept in the equipment until replaced by rifled guns.

The field-battery armament gave complete satisfaction, and the position artillery can never be forgotten so long as Inkerman is remembered.

The carriages were strong and good.¹ The small-arm ammunition carts proved too heavy for use and were left behind at Varna. During the short-lived field operations of the campaign the cartridges were

¹ At Balaclava a limber wheel of C Troop was struck, and partly split, by a large shot which struck the upper portion of the felloe that was next the ground. The wheel nevertheless "did service for many months and showed the stability of English material and workmanship" ("Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 168).

Spare wheels were carried lashed to the perch of the wagon. Considerable inconvenience arose from this at Inkerman, and later the arm with lynch-pin was introduced. Store carts were fitted with rising tops and inside seats to enable the captains of batteries to use them as offices. Spring locks were given to axle-tree boxes (see "Report on Stores").

carried on pack-horses.¹ In the following year fully equipped ball-cartridge brigades, or small-arm ammunition reserves,² were sent to the front (see Table XXI. p. 109). The field ammunition was quite satisfactory.

Siege Matériel.—With the exception of the Lancaster guns the ordnance proved very good, the 13-inch mortars being especially efficient. The land-service field carriages with large wheels were trustworthy, not only because they were convenient in transport, but because the men were less exposed than with those of the naval type. It was, however, determined to replace the iron bracket trails by block trails of wood similar to those of field guns. The Madras platforms proved useless, and a new pattern of Captain H. Clerk's³ invention was introduced, but was not issued before the completion of the siege.

Much trouble was at first experienced in the trenches by the premature bursting of shells owing to bad fuses. At the commencement of the siege, Boxer's fuses for mortars and the heavier shells had not yet been provided. Telegraphic orders to bore, instead of cutting, mortar fuses were first sent out, and later on fuses of the new pattern were provided, after which there was no more

¹ The artillery of each infantry division was made responsible for the carriage of the small-arm ammunition. One officer (a second-captain), one non-commissioned officer, and one man looked after some two hundred ponies and their leaders—a heavy responsibility for a battery on service (Markham's "Notes").

² This cumbrous title came into use in 1855. It is explained by the fact that companies so employed were regarded as reserve companies in charge of ammunition which could be (and sometimes were) converted into field batteries. They were more correctly called Gun and Small Arm Ammunition Reserves.

³ [1917] Major-General H. Clerk, F.R.S.,

trouble. As the war progressed, friction tubes commenced to supersede quill tubes and port-fires, and were used with the 32-pr. howitzers at the battle of the Tchernaya. General Dacres considered these tubes and Boxer's fuses to be the greatest improvements in artillery stores that had appeared during the war.

3. AUGMENTATIONS, 1854-1856

Establishment, January 1, 1854.—Before the transports sailed from the Dockyard, it was apparent that the numerical strength of the Regiment was insufficient, and during the next two years continual augmentations were made to the establishment. In January, 1854, the strength and distribution were as follows :

TABLE X¹

STRENGTH

Troops and Companies.	All Ranks.	Horses.
Royal Horse Artillery	1,108	954
Royal Artillery	13,859	1,388
Total Royal Regiment of Artillery . .	14,967	2,342

DISTRIBUTION

Stations.	Troops.	Companies.
United Kingdom	7	55
Mediterranean	11
Colonies	30
7 Troops R.H.A. and 12 Battalions R.A. .	7	96

Note.—Five companies were attached to the instruction batteries, and there were some batteries of service in the United Kingdom.

¹ Tables X. to XV. are based on the Returns in the Record Office, W.O. 2527, etc. The Royal Artillery strength includes the Cadet and Invalid Battalions and the Riding House Establishment, and, from 1854 to 1857, some 50 medical officers.

Establishment, January 1, 1855.—In February, 1854, the 13th Battalion was formed, sundry additions made to those already existing, and four companies were withdrawn from colonial service. During the summer further small augmentations were carried out and more men drawn from the colonial garrisons. On January 1, 1855, the strength and distribution were as follows :

TABLE XI
STRENGTH

Troops and Companies.	All ranks.	Horses.
Royal Horse Artillery	1,337	1,242
Royal Artillery	16,185	3,197
Total Royal Regiment of Artillery .	17,522	4,439

DISTRIBUTION

Stations.	Troops.	Field. Batteries.	Siege. Companies.	Garrison Companies.
United Kingdom	5	15	..	36
Mediterranean	12
Colonies	19
Crimea	2	8	14	..
7 Troops R.H.A. and 13 } Battalions R.A. . . . }	7	23	14	67
		104		

Establishment, January 1, 1856.—In the Ordnance Estimates for 1855–1856 an augmentation of the existing troops and the formation of the 14th Battalion Royal Artillery were provided for. In the early summer an extra half-troop was added to the horse artillery, and in August a further augmentation was sanctioned, including non-commissioned officers and drivers for the horse artillery, for the field batteries in the Crimea and for certain field batteries serving at home. This was followed in

November by a further increase of artificers to the battalions. On January 1, 1856, the strength and distribution were as follows :

TABLE XII

STRENGTH

Troops and Companies.	All Ranks.	Horses.
Royal Horse Artillery	1,678	1,410
Royal Artillery	19,468	5,573
Total Royal Regiment of Artillery . .	21,146	6,983

DISTRIBUTION

Stations.	Troops.	Field Batteries.	Ball Cartridge Brigades.	Siege Companies.	Garrison Companies.
United Kingdom	4	13	17
Mediterranean	12
Colonies	22
Crimea	3½	13	5	30	..
7½ Troops R.H.A. and 14 } Battalions R.A. . . . }	7½	26	5	30	51
					112

Note.—By March, 1856, there were five more companies (taken from the 17 in the United Kingdom) converted into ball-cartridge brigades.

The Army Estimates for 1856-1857 were very heavy. They included further augmentations of men and horses, and presented the novel feature of the inclusion of the Estimates of the Ordnance Corps, for the Board of Ordnance had ceased to exist. In March the D. A. General of the Artillery reported the Regiment as consisting of 8 troops ¹ Royal Horse Artillery and 14 battalions Royal Artillery,

¹ The half-troop which had been sent to the Crimea for the transport of ammunition was expanded during the year into a complete troop and became B Troop, R.H.A.

each battalion formed of 8 companies consisting of 5 officers and 177 men ; 36 companies were mounted, 26 being field batteries with 156 guns, and 10 being allotted to the transport of ammunition (small-arm ammunition reserves).

Growth of the Field Batteries.—As the Regiment gradually increased, the field batteries increased with it. On April 1, 1854, the Woolwich batteries of instruction were broken up and their horses transferred to the batteries under orders for the front. To each of these a letter was assigned and eventually thirteen letters were absorbed by the Crimean batteries. Meanwhile large purchases of horses were effected, special enlistments of drivers carried out, and every effort made to bring new field batteries into being. The remaining letters of the alphabet were assigned in rotation to these field batteries as they were completed, but at first with no absolute fixity of tenure as field batteries, to avoid deranging the roster for colonial service. The increase of horses is shown by Table IX., p. 64. In March, 1856, the twenty-six field batteries mentioned by Sir Hew Ross had absorbed the letters of the alphabet, and the ten gun and small-arm ammunition reserves were designated by the numerals 1 to 10. When the instruction batteries were broken up, Colonel Anderson, the Superintendent, was retained in command of such field batteries as might happen to be quartered at Woolwich. By the autumn of 1855, however, it became apparent that there was not a sufficiency of well-drilled and instructed men to fill up vacancies as they occurred in the mounted

portion of the Regiment, and to meet this want an "Adjutant's Detachment of the Field Batteries" was formed at Woolwich. The horses of the Reserve were recalled from the public works, and the Reserve itself was definitely broken up. These horses formed the nucleus for this new adjutant's detachment, which was supplied with a 9-pounder equipment,¹ and to it were attached (from the various battalions) non-commissioned officers and men who were to be trained and instructed in riding, driving, and stable duties.² The training of trumpeters and artificers was also provided for. A small instructional dépôt had already been formed at Dublin, and in November an instructional battery, with fifty horses, was installed at Sheerness³ under Captain Desborough,⁴

¹ The pressure for horses caused this battery to be of little use (Anonymous pamphlet, 1855, p. 25).

² This detachment was made a definite and separate establishment of the Regiment by R.O. August 27, 1856. It held an analogous position to the adjutant's detachments of the horse artillery and battalions. It consisted of the sergeant-major, quartermaster-sergeant, the drill-master of the field batteries, 3 rough-riders, 20 non-commissioned officers, 100 gunner-drivers, 6 trumpeters, and 100 horses, with harness, saddlery, etc., for a 9-pounder field battery of 6 guns. All artificers not belonging to field batteries at Woolwich and all men under instruction for artificers were attached to it. Colonel W. C. Anderson was permitted to retain such non-commissioned officers and men of the reserve battery as he wished to keep; the others were sent to units. Officers commanding battalions were directed to draw up lists of men under ten years' service whom they proposed should be attached for instruction; once so attached, the men were not to be removed without special authority.

³ Some 650 gunner-drivers were stationed there in January, 1856. *Jackson's Woolwich Journal* of that date says, "About 100 are over at Shoeburyness, practising; some are at Purfleet; some days they are sent out in exercising order, sometimes the guns and wagons are taken out with four horse teams."

⁴ [1884] Afterwards Major-General John Desborough, C.B.

who had for some time been adjutant of the field batteries at Woolwich. Thus the ephemeral units of 1853 gradually took definite shape and substance. Before the close of the war, field batteries may be said to have become permanent, and, as occasion offered, were brigaded into lieutenant colonels' commands.¹

The Supply of Officers.—The augmentations that had taken place and the wastage of war made too heavy demands upon the resources of the Academy, and special measures had to be taken to keep up the supply of officers. Young officers on joining the Regiment were at once sent to their companies without passing under the Director of Artillery Studies, and the course at the Academy was in some instances very much curtailed. Cadets of March, 1855, who had joined the Practical Class without having been at the Upper Academy got their commissions in the following August.² Public examination was then instituted, and successful candidates either joined the Practical Class or else were commissioned direct into the Regiment: the first officer to be so commissioned was Francis Duncan.³ These officers at

¹ In July, 1856, those at Woolwich were formed into four divisions, each under a lieutenant-colonel, the whole continuing under the command of Colonel W. C. Anderson.

² The innovation began with [2465] Gentleman Cadet, afterwards Major, J. R. Dyce. The cadets were obtained by nomination by the Board of Ordnance and the great public schools. They were regarded somewhat askance by the real "children of the sanctuary," and were nicknamed the "Forty Thieves." One of them, [2470] Lieutenant J. W. J. Dawson, was killed by a magazine explosion in the Crimea, just nine months after he had joined the R.M. Academy (see p. 409).

³ [2492] Colonel F. Duncan, C.B., Sirdar in Egypt, and author of the "History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery." He was the first

first had only provisional commissions, and were for a time placed under the Director of Artillery Studies, to whose staff two military instructors were added.¹ In June, 1856, revised regulations were issued for these open examinations for the Practical Class, it being provided that successful candidates should remain under instruction until they were sufficiently advanced in scientific knowledge to pass a satisfactory examination. The direct commissions were discontinued in August, 1856.²

With the increase of the numbers under training, the Lower Academy in the Arsenal was found too small, and the cadets were therefore removed to the barracks of the Sappers and Miners, who were sent from Woolwich to Chatham.

4. ABOLITION OF THE BOARD OF ORDNANCE

Successful Military Arrangements.—The Board of Ordnance had met the military difficulties of the situation with determination and success. Starting with the advantages of a well-trained and excellent

"Person," so called from the wording of the public advertisement calling for candidates, which appeared in the *Times*, June 8, 1855:

"Early in July next, FORTY PERSONS between the ages of 17 and 19 will be appointed to the Senior or Practical Class in the Academy at Woolwich, and twenty other Persons will be provisionally commissioned, and placed under the Director of Artillery Studies at Woolwich.

"These appointments will be made by the Secretary of State for the War Department after a competing examination by examiners named by him."

The applicants were to be British-born subjects and to furnish the usual certificates.

¹ [2186] Brevet-Major W. H. R. Simpson. [2245] Second-Captain G. K. Taylor.

² This method of supply was next resorted to in 1886.

personnel and reliable and sufficient *matériel*, they had faced the terrible losses of the winter of 1854 with resource and energy, and had lost no time in correcting the cardinal blunder of the absence of siege transport. Men and horses were quickly obtained and sent to the front, and, though every mistake in war demands an inevitable penalty, the military organisation did not fail under the heavy strain placed upon it. "Nothing could exceed the military arrangements of the Ordnance Department," said Lord Hardinge in 1855.¹

Troubles in the Arsenal.—But while on the military side the machinery worked smoothly and well, it was not so on the civil. When Lord Raglan went to Turkey, the office of Lieutenant of the Ordnance was resuscitated in the person of Sir Hew Ross, the Deputy-Adjutant-General, an old man already overburdened with work, who naturally could not exercise the same authority as his late chief. Trouble soon began to brew. Even before the landing in the Crimea, serious defects were discovered in the Arsenal. The Gun Inspection Department was satisfactory enough and the Carriage Department had been brought up to a high pitch of perfection by its late talented chief, Colonel J. N. Colquhoun; but the state of the Laboratory was lamentable, and "if in the summer of 1854 any general action had taken place, this country would, for the want of projectiles, have been in the worst possible position."² The Secretary of the Board of Ordnance, Mr. Monsell, M.P.,

¹ Evidence before Parliamentary Committee, 1855.

² Monsell's evidence before the Parliamentary Committee, 1855.

was a man of action, who knew Captain E. M. Boxer and had gauged his ability. "If there is any one in the world who can get us out of our difficulties," said he to Boxer, "I am sure you can." Boxer pledged himself to place the Department in five weeks in a position to supply any number of shells that might be needed, and also to save expense generally—a pledge which he amply redeemed.¹ He was appointed second in charge of the Royal Laboratory in May, 1854. Now the chief of this Department was an old and courteous gentleman, thoroughly versed in routine, but wholly incapable of grasping the exigencies of the situation or of recognising worth under a somewhat rough exterior. Boxer was a mechanical genius endowed with a nervous energy that must move forward, fully impressed with the vital importance of his work and grimly determined to trample on everything and everybody that interfered between him and his output; a man of unpolished manners withal and impatient of delay. The result may be foreseen.

For a time routine prevailed. Boxer's lapses from discipline were noticed, and he was reprimanded by the Director-General of Artillery, in the presence

¹ Mr. Monsell told the Parliamentary Committee that in the year 1855 alone Boxer had saved the country £40,000 "by his great ability, great scientific knowledge, and great energy." Lord Panmure, who became Secretary of State for War in February, 1855, affirmed that it was owing to Boxer that the supply of ammunition for the siege of Sebastopol was maintained; and when Lord Palmerston, as Premier, visited the Arsenal, he bore high testimony to the efficiency of that establishment in a letter to Lord Panmure, unpublished, but quoted on the authority of Sir George Ramsay, C.B., co-editor of the "Panmure Papers."

of the heads of the three Arsenal Departments, by order of Sir Hew Ross. The reprimand would, in ordinary circumstances, have led to Boxer's resignation; but Monsell, who had found a treasure in Boxer, stepped in; insisted that he had saved the situation; stoutly maintained that he, and he alone, could extricate the Department from its troubles and at the same time save the country expense; and in short practically forced the Lieutenant of the Ordnance and the Director of Artillery to eat their words. The reprimand was withdrawn. Thenceforward Boxer was supreme in the Laboratory and eventually he became its titular chief, although this was not accomplished without leaving a bitter feeling behind. There were other causes of quarrel. For instance, the Chief Storekeeper, Sir Thomas Hastings, disagreed with Monsell on the policy of establishing a shell foundry in the Arsenal, and in the absence of the Master-General anything but concord reigned in the offices of the Honourable Board.

Excitement in the Country and Abolition of the Board.—After the victory of the Alma the prospects of the Allies appeared very bright. The *Times* in its largest print announced the Fall of Sebastopol, and persisted in the statement for several days. But the doubtful battle of Balaclava, the terrible struggle on the Inkerman heights, and the failure of the first bombardment were followed by news of ever-increasing gravity. The utter breakdown of the transport, and the temporary paralysis of our military power, added to a knowledge of the great sufferings of the troops, caused feelings of the deepest anxiety

amongst all classes, and at last popular clamour outside the House of Commons and determined efforts within, led to the appointment of a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry and the fall of Lord Aberdeen's Government.

The Committee (often called Mr. Roebuck's Committee, after its energetic president) sat in the spring of 1855 and took a great deal of evidence, which appeared in five Reports. They had nothing but praise to bestow on what they described as "the admirable equipment of the Corps of Artillery attached to the Army,"¹ but they animadverted with some severity on the general conduct of the Board of Ordnance. One of Lord Raglan's last despatches deprecated its abolition, and the Commander-in-Chief was of the same opinion;² but the feeling in the country was too strong to be controlled, and in May, 1855, the letters patent were

¹ See Report of the Parliamentary Committee, 1855.

² In this action these officers followed in the steps of the Duke of Wellington, who always upheld the Board. See Clode, ii. p. 763. Clode himself enters on an elaborate defence of the Board of Ordnance in ii. ch. xx. He says, "The Civil Administration of the Army broke down during the Crimean War; but as the Ministers of the Crown—and not the Generals in command of the suffering Army—were first heard in Parliament the blame was attributed to the Military Department (ii. p. 391). He further stigmatises the Consolidated War Office, that came into being, January, 1856 (ii. p. 771), as a Hybrid Department charged with functions vast, miscellaneous, and undefined" (i. Preface vi.). In this view he is confirmed by the opinion of Lord Hardinge. "As a former Master-General, Lord Hardinge could hardly be expected to look upon this reform with unmingled feelings. He always maintained that the consolidated departments would be too cumbrous for efficiency and that the change would never have been made if it had not been for shortcomings in the Crimea, which could be traced to other causes" ("Life of Viscount Hardinge by his Son and Successor, 1891," p. 19).

withdrawn and the old historic Department was dissolved.¹

The Royal Artillery placed under the Commander-in-Chief.—Lord Panmure, the new Secretary of State for War, was of opinion that a General Officer of Artillery directly under the Commander-in-Chief should be appointed to be at the head of the Regiment ;² but this course did not recommend itself to Sir Hew Ross, who advocated the creation of an Adjutant-General. This was accordingly done, and Sir Hew himself was appointed to the post, with two Assistant-Adjutants-General under him, so that for a time the work of his office suffered little derangement. His ostensible chief was in the Horse Guards and not in Pall Mall, but he himself was independent of the Adjutant-General of the Army.

The civil administration of the Ordnance was placed under the Secretary of State for War,³ and the office

¹ Confirmed by Act of Parliament, 18 and 19 Vict. cap. 117.

² This information was given to the author by Sir George Ramsay, who was Lord Panmure's private secretary.

³ A Clerk of the Ordnance was appointed as chief of the Civil Staff of the War Office, to act as executive officer and to direct all the ordinary business of the Departments. The following officials were included in the new scheme : Inspector-General of Fortifications (civil duties) ; Director-General of Artillery ; Naval Director of Artillery ; Director-General of Stores ; Director-General of Contracts ; Director-General of Army Clothing ; Accountant-General. The duties of the D.G. of Artillery were defined as follows : (1) Charge of reserve and depôts of artillery. (2) To advise on nature of artillery for any particular service. (3) To advise, in concert with the Inspector-General of Fortifications, as to armament of works. (4) To be *ex officio* President of the Ordnance Select Committee. (5) To digest returns of practice, experimental or otherwise. (6) To examine all demands for ammunition and stores made by districts. (7) To digest half-yearly reports on the general state of the armaments. (8) To advise on novelties and improvements. The duties of the Director-General of Stores were thus

of the Director-General of Artillery, who was now placed under that Minister, was removed to London.

The Departments in the Arsenal received their present designations, and Captain-Instructors were added to their Staffs. A military superintendent¹ was placed over the Small Arm Factory and the Experimental Department at Shoeburyness was definitely organised.²

The Ordnance Select Committee.—One of the last acts of the Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for War in Lord Aberdeen's Government, had been to reorganise the Select Committee of Artillery Officers. This Committee was in future to be known as the Ordnance Select Committee and was given more elastic conditions of membership. Engineer and naval officers and civilians of scientific reputation were to be included in its composition. A Secretary, and (afterwards) an Assistant-Secretary, were definitely appointed. The Assistant-Director-General of Artillery was released from secretarial duties, but the Director himself remained *ex-officio* President.

H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge and the Royal Artillery.—On the abolition of the office of the Master-General of the Ordnance, Lord Hardinge, the

defined: (1) To superintend the receipt, survey, and arrangement of all stores consigned to his custody. (2) To receive and control all demands for stores. (3) To take proper steps to meet such demands. (4) To superintend the issue and shipment of stores. (5) To examine accounts of all officers in charge of stores. (6) From time to time to take stock of all stores (see Clode, ii. pp. 770 etc.).

¹ [1870] Captain Dixon, afterwards Major-General W. M. H. Dixon, C.B. (Clode, ii. p. 681).

² Under [1742] Lieutenant-Colonel, afterwards Major-General, J. W. Mitchell, R.A.

Officer-Commanding-in-Chief, was appointed Colonel of the Artillery by H.M. Queen Victoria. This gallant veteran was soon afterwards promoted to the rank of Field-Marshal, but lived only a short time to enjoy the honour. He died in July, 1856, and was succeeded by H.R.H. General the Duke of Cambridge, who then commenced those long years of association with the Regiment, where his memory is still kept green.¹

5. REDUCTIONS AND AUGMENTATIONS, 1857-1858

Proposed Reductions in the Army.—When the Army Estimates of 1857-1858 were being prepared, it was natural that the Government should pay the utmost attention to economy. For the two previous years the annual military expenditure had amounted to nearly twenty-four millions sterling, and it was now determined to reduce this by one half. Many expensive items, such as the cost of transport, had disappeared, but a saving of some twelve millions of money called for further reductions of a very serious kind. However, though the Foreign Legions and the Land Transport Corps were drastically dealt with, and though the Manufacturing Departments suffered extensive retrenchment; in the Army generally the officers were spared, and it was decided that no unit was to be destroyed. The suicidal policy pursued after Waterloo was not to be repeated, and though

¹ The Regiment came under the command of his Royal Highness when he became Officer Commanding-in-Chief, but he was not gazetted as Colonel until May, 1861.

establishments were to be cut down, no battalion, troop, or company would on this occasion disappear from the Army List.¹

Establishment, January 1, 1857.—On January 1, 1857, the strength and distribution of the Regiment were as follows :

TABLE XIII

STRENGTH

Troops and Companies.	All Ranks.	Horses.
Royal Horse Artillery	1,747	1,300
Royal Artillery	19,262	3,506
Total Royal Regiment of Artillery	21,009	4,806

DISTRIBUTION

Stations.	Troops.	Field Batteries.	S.A.A. Reserves.	Garrison Companies.
United Kingdom	8	28	3	47
Mediterranean	14
Colonies	20
8 Troops R.H.A. and 14 } Battalions R.A. . . . }	8	28	3	81
			112	

Note.—During the previous year five S.A.A. Reserves reverted to garrison duty and two were converted into field batteries.

Proposed Reductions in the Royal Artillery.—It was now proposed to make a reduction of some 5,000 non-commissioned officers and men by the discharge

¹ "In carrying out a reduction of troops two general principles ought to be adhered to as closely as circumstances will permit. First, following the plan pursued by Nature, we ought to select for reduction the weakest and worst elements, retaining those best fitted for war. Secondly, except from sheer necessity, we ought never to destroy a unit" (Hime's "History of the Royal Artillery," ch. ii.—The Reductions, 1816-23).

of those medically unfit (or below the standard) and those of doubtful character. At the same time many horses were sold. The number in the depôts at Woolwich and Dublin and in the adjutant's detachments of the horse artillery and field batteries was reduced, and those of the three remaining small-arm ammunition reserves and of five field batteries were sold or absorbed, the eight mounted units in question reverting to garrison artillery duty.

Peace again Broken.—But fate decreed that the economical schemes of the Government should not be realised in the year 1857. As early as January a force from British India was operating on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and presently trouble began to brew in China. In spite of the opposition of the Manchester school, the Government had been taking measures to uphold the power of the United Kingdom in the Far East when the first mutterings of a great storm in India reached this country. Misunderstood for a short time, the horrors and dangers of the great Mutiny were fully realised as the year wore on, and in August a force of 20,000 men left these shores, while reinforcements were hurried to the scene of action from the Cape, Ceylon, and China.

Establishment, January 1, 1858.—After an absence of many years the Regiment was to be employed in India, and join its comrades of the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay Artilleries. The batteries which had been hurriedly unhorsed were as hurriedly rehorsed, fresh ones were formed here and in India, and in December two new troops were added to the Royal Horse Artillery. The

strength and distribution of the Regiment in January, 1858, were as follows :

TABLE XIV

STRENGTH

Troops and Companies.	All Ranks.	Horses.
Royal Horse Artillery	1,939	1,220
Royal Artillery	20,392	2,586
Total Royal Regiment of Artillery	22,331	3,806

DISTRIBUTION

Stations.	Troops.	Field Batteries.	Garrison Companies.
United Kingdom	6	23	32
Mediterranean	14
Colonies	1	17
China	2
India	4	17	6
10 Troops R.H.A. and 14 Battalions } R.A. }	10	41	71
		112	

6. INTRODUCTION OF THE BRIGADE SYSTEM

Progress of the Field Batteries.—When autumn came, the United Kingdom was once more at peace. General Outram had been successful in Persia, the Chinese difficulty had seemingly been settled, and the Indian Mutiny was quelled ; but the field batteries were no longer in danger of reduction. Indeed, the establishment of this branch of the Regiment on a new and permanent basis was one of the drastic changes that were about to take place. The shifts and expedients resorted to in 1854 to supply the field batteries with men who could groom and drive, have

already been related, and the want of drivers was felt as keenly during the Mutiny as it had been felt during the Crimean War; but the necessity of providing the Indian reliefs gave the *coup de grâce* to the gunner-driver system.¹

Abolition of the Gunner-Driver.—In February, 1858, it was enacted that the duties of the drivers should be separated from those of the gunners. All gunner-drivers under 5 ft. 6 in. serving with field batteries were to be transferred to the books of the Adjutant's Detachment of the Field Batteries, and henceforth they were to be mustered as "drivers," and administered by the Officer Commanding the Field Batteries,² who had the power to make "driver" non-commissioned-officers. Sixty drivers and nine driver non-commissioned-officers were to be attached to each company employed as a field battery (special regulations being made for those on Indian and Colonial Service), and the remainder of the men of the Regiment were to be mustered as "gunners." It was at the same time strictly enjoined that in every field battery the gunners were to be instructed in mounted duties, so that on emergency they could perform the duties of drivers.³ Only a short step was now required to bring the field batteries into a definite and assured position, and this step was taken when the battalion gave way to the brigade organisation.

¹ See Hime's "History of the Royal Artillery," p. 71.

² The nomenclature of this epoch is cumbrous and liable to be misunderstood. It is well to state that the officer here referred to is the Officer Commanding the Field Batteries at Head-quarters, who held a position somewhat analogous to a battalion commander's.

³ R.G.O., February 2, 1858.

The Brigade Organisation.—The successive augmentations of the Regiment having caused the assembly at Woolwich of an unwieldy regimental staff, it was determined early in 1859 to distribute this staff amongst the various districts and garrisons at home and abroad, and to adopt a new nomenclature for the troops and companies, together with a new grouping for the latter. The terms “battalion,” “troop,” and “company” were to be replaced by “brigade” and “battery”; the ten troops of Royal Horse Artillery were to become Batteries A to K of the Horse Brigade, and the 112 companies of Royal Artillery were to be divided into six Field and eight Garrison Brigades. Various stations at home and abroad were assigned as brigade head-quarters, and the companies to form each brigade were selected from their present proximity to the station in question, without any regard to their old battalion connection. Each brigade was to be commanded by a colonel with a brigade staff similar to that of the old battalions, and the lieutenant-colonels of the Regiment were distributed amongst the brigades. The Adjutant’s Detachment of the Royal Horse Artillery became the Depôt of the Horse Brigade, and a Depôt Brigade for the Royal Artillery was formed from the adjutant’s detachments of the field batteries and battalions. It was organised in eight divisions, each under a second-captain. The Invalid Detachment formed the nucleus of the Coast Brigade.

It was the intention to carry out all reliefs by brigades, and before a brigade proceeded on service

to keep it at Woolwich for a period of twelve months. Woolwich was still to be the Head-quarters of the Regiment, and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief was careful to express his anxiety "that this station, which had been during so many years the seat of scientific knowledge and professional instruction, should still be so considered," and his desire, "to make this time-honoured depôt of the Royal Artillery still more efficient as the great centre of instruction for the whole of the Corps of the Royal Artillery."

It was further notified that this new organisation was not to be looked upon as fixed ; that brigades and batteries were liable to be changed at any time from field to garrison and *vice versa* ; and that every man in the Regiment was to be acquainted with the whole duty of an artillery soldier, commanding officers being held responsible that drivers were instructed as gunners, and gunners as drivers.¹ Thus it was still sought to preserve those old and cherished artillery traditions, the centralisation of Woolwich and the interchangeability of the component parts of the Regiment. Looking back over the half-century which has now elapsed, with our knowledge of the events that have since taken place, it is almost with a sigh that we acknowledge the futility of those pious ideals and realise that they were only a beautiful dream.

Establishment, January 1, 1859.—On January 1, 1859, the strength and distribution of the Royal Artillery were as follows :

¹ G.R.O., April 1, 1859.

TABLE XV
STRENGTH

Troops and Companies.	All Ranks.	Horses.
Royal Horse Artillery	2,370	1,200
Royal Artillery	22,399	2,606
Total Royal Regiment of Artillery	24,769	3,806

DISTRIBUTION

Stations.	Troops.	Field Batteries.	Garrison Companies.
United Kingdom	6	23	31
Mediterranean	15
Colonies	16
India	4	19	6
China	2
10 Troops R.H.A. and 14 Battalions R.A.	10	42	70
		112	

The New Organisation.—In the following April the proposed change was introduced and the Brigade Organisation shown in Table XVI. was published.

TABLE XVI
ORGANISATION OF THE ROYAL REGIMENT OF
ARTILLERY BY BRIGADES
THE HORSE BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, WOOLWICH

Designation Jan. 1859.	Designation April 1859.	Station April 1859.	Designation 1911.
A Troop, R.H.A.	A Battery, H.B.	Aldershot	A Battery, R.H.A.
B " "	B " "	Woolwich	B " "
C " "	C " "	Cahir	C " "
D " "	D " "	Mhow	E " "
E " "	E " "	Cawnpore	D " "
F " "	F " "	Meerut	G " "
G " "	G " "	Portobello	H " "
H " "	H " "	Secunderabad	I " "
I " "	I " "	Woolwich	O " "
K " "	K " "	Aldershot	AA " "

Note.—A lieutenant-colonel's command in field artillery is now known as a brigade, and consists either of two batteries R.H.A. or three batteries R.F.A.

FIELD AND GARRISON BRIGADES

Designation in Jan. 1859.	Compy.	Battn.	Designation when in Field Battery, 1854-1859.	Designation April 1859.	Station when formed into Brigades.	Designation 1911.

FIRST BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, WOOLWICH

4	7	..	1 Btty., 1st Bgde.	Woolwich	9th Battery, R.F.A.
2	1	..	2 " " "	"	2nd " "
1	7	..	3 " " "	"	3rd " "
4	2	..	4 " " "	"	5th " "
8	4	..	5 " " "	Shorncliffe	17th " "
1	5	..	6 " " "	Sheerness	26th " "
5	8	..	7 " " "	Woolwich	39th " "
4	4	..	8 " " "	"	52nd Compy., R.G.A.

SECOND BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, DOVER

1	8	..	1 Btty., 2nd Bgde.	Dover	37th Battery, R.F.A.
3	5	..	2 " " "	"	7th Mountain Battery.
4	5	..	3 " " "	" ¹	35th Company, R.G.A.
3	6	..	4 " " "	" ¹	102nd " "
7	2	..	5 " " "	" ¹	37th " "
6	1	..	6 " " "	"	32nd " "
3	1	..	7 " " "	Shorncliffe	1st Mountain Battery.
3	4	..	8 " " "	Dover ¹	9th Company, R.G.A.

THIRD BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, DEVONPORT

2	7	..	1 Btty., 3rd Bgde.	Devonport	4th Battery, R.F.A.
5	9	..	2 " " "	"	Reduced 1906.
6	5	..	3 " " "	"	2nd Company, R.G.A.
4	3	..	4 " " "	Portsmouth	101st " "
8	6	..	5 " " "	Devonport	3rd " "
2	4	..	6 " " "	"	6th Mountain Battery.
6	3	..	7 " " "	Portsmouth	3rd " "
5	2	..	8 " " "	Devonport	100th Compy., R.G.A.

FOURTH BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, WOOLWICH

1	3	E	1 Btty., 4th Bgde.	Woolwich	12th Battery, R.F.A.
1	11	W	2 " " "	"	62nd " "
2	8	A	3 " " "	Shorncliffe	38th " "
8	3	B	4 " " "	Woolwich	14th " "
3	11	F	5 " " "	Shorncliffe	7th " "
5	11	H	6 " " "	Woolwich	64th " "
4	12	P	7 " " "	Shorncliffe	63rd " "
4	11	G ²	8 " " "	"	19th " "

¹ These companies were on passage home for Dover.² No. 4 Company, 11th Battalion, was G Field Battery during the Crimean War. It was dismounted in 1856, and No. 7 Company, 8th Battalion, became G Field Battery and possessed this designation in January, 1859.

FIFTH BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, GIBRALTAR

5	5	..	1 Btty., 5th Bgde.	Gibraltar	39th Company, R.G.A.
7	7	..	2 " " "	"	45th " "
4	1	..	3 " " "	"	46th " "
7	1	..	4 " " "	"	41st " "
8	5	..	5 " " "	"	48th " "
2	6	..	6 " " "	"	40th " "
8	11	..	7 " " "	"	78th " "
3	12	..	8 " " "	"	Reduced 1871.

SIXTH BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, MALTA

6	4	..	1 Btty., 6th Bgde.	Malta	51st Company, R.G.A.
8	12	..	2 " " "	"	8th Mountain Battery.
5	7	..	3 " " "	"	99th Company, R.G.A.
3	13	..	4 " " "	"	Reduced 1882.
7	13	..	5 " " "	Corfu	" "
8	13	..	6 " " "	"	49th Company, R.G.A.
1	2	..	7 " " "	"	84th " "
1	13	..	8 " " "	Malta	Reduced 1871.
6	12	..	9 " " "	"	17th Company, R.G.A.
7	12	..	10 " " "	Corfu	104th " "

SEVENTH BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, QUEBEC

8	8	..	1 Btty., 7th Bgde.	Jamaica	68th Company, R.G.A.
4	13	..	2 " " "	Bermuda	73rd " "
7	3	..	3 " " "	Quebec	66th " "
1	4	..	4 " " "	"	72nd " "
1	14	..	5 " " "	Halifax	76th " "
2	14	..	6 " " "	"	81st " "
2	12	..	7 " " "	Barbadoes	80th " "

EIGHTH BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, DEVONPORT

8	7	N	1 Btty., 8th Bgde.	Devonport	28th Battery, R.F.A.
4	6	5	2 " " "	Northampton	32nd " "
5	6	R	3 " " "	Aldershot	33rd " "
2	5	2	4 " " "	"	27th " "
2	9	12	5 " " "	"	42nd " "
6	6	11	6 " " "	Christchurch	85th " "
6	2	U	7 " " "	Hilsea	6th " "
7	8	G ¹	8 " " "	Aldershot	87th " "

NINTH BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, DUBLIN

7	5	M	1 Btty., 9th Bgde.	Ireland	29th Battery, R.F.A.
5	4	Z	2 " " "	"	16th " "
7	6	I	3 " " "	"	24th Company, R.G.A.
6	8	O	4 " " "	"	40th Battery, R.F.A.
8	9	S	5 " " "	"	45th " "
1	1	L	6 " " "	"	1st " "
1	9	16	7 " " "	Leith	41st " "
7	10	10	8 " " "	Ireland	61st " "

¹ See footnote ² on previous page.

FIELD AND GARRISON BRIGADES (*Contd.*)

Designation in Jan. 1859.	Compy.	Battn.	Designation when in Field Battery, 1854-1859.	Designation April 1859.	Station when formed into Brigades.	Designation 1911.

TENTH BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, GUERNSEY

1	10	..	1 Btty., 10th Bgde.	Alderney	1st Company, R.G.A.
2	10	..	2 " " "	Portsmouth	8th " "
3	10	..	3 " " "	"	Reduced 1905.
4	10	..	4 " " "	Guernsey	21st Company, R.G.A.
5	10	..	5 " " "	"	11th " "
7	4	..	6 " " "	"	14th " "
3	2	..	7 " " "	Alderney	7th " "
7	9	..	8 " " "	Jersey	Reduced 1871.

ELEVENTH BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, BENGAL

3	8	D	1 Btty., 11th Bgde.	Bengal	18th Company, R.G.A.
5	13	13	2 " " "	"	66th Battery, R.F.A.
6	13	14	3 " " "	"	67th " "
3	14	15	4 " " "	"	83rd " "
4	14	3	5 " " "	"	68th " "
7	14	4	6 " " "	"	84th " "
6	7	C	7 " " "	"	18th " "
3	9	T	8 " " "	"	43rd " "

TWELFTH BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, MAURITIUS

8	10	..	1 Btty., 12th Bgde.	St. Helena	59th Company, R.G.A.
2	2	..	2 " " "	Mauritius	62nd " "
3	7	..	3 " " "	Sydney	70th " "
6	10	..	4 " " "	Mauritius	63rd " "
1	12	..	5 " " "	Ceylon	67th " "
4	9	..	6 " " "	China	77th " "
4	8	..	7 " " "	Cape of Good Hope	57th " "

THIRTEENTH BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, BOMBAY

2	13	K	1 Btty., 13th Bgde.	Bombay	43rd Company, R.G.A.
5	14	6	2 " " "	"	69th Battery, R.F.A.
8	14	7	3 " " "	"	64th Company, R.G.A.
8	1	X	4 " " "	"	11th Battery, R.F.A.
2	11	..	5 " " "	"	42nd Company, R.G.A.
7	11	..	6 " " "	"	74th " "
2	3	Y	7 " " "	"	54th " "

FOURTEENTH BRIGADE. HEAD-QUARTERS, BENGAL

8	2	..	1	Btty., 14th Bgde.	Bengal	20th Battery, R.F.A.
6	11	..	2	" "	"	65th " "
5	3	J	3	" "	"	13th " "
1	6	V	4	" "	"	25th " "
5	12	Q	5	" "	"	8th " "
3	3	9	6	" "	"	65th Company, R.G.A.
5	1	1	7	" "	"	Reduced 1907.
6	9	..	8	" "	"	44th Battery, R.F.A.
6	14	8	9	" "	"	33rd Company, R.G.A.

Defects of the Brigade System.—The distribution looked very well on paper,¹ and the success of the new scheme in certain cases—for example, the 5th Brigade at Gibraltar—appeared perfect; but, on carrying out the necessary reliefs, the batteries of a brigade became hopelessly scattered, and the idea that the colonel commanding the brigade should hold a position analogous to that of an officer commanding a regiment was found, as the years went on, to be utterly impracticable. Returns proved a constant source of friction. Under the battalion system all reports, etc., were rendered by the captains commanding troops and companies to the officers commanding the horse artillery and field batteries at Woolwich and to the battalion commanders, by whom also all promotions of non-commissioned officers and transfers were governed. But in December, 1856, it was ordered that captains in command should communicate direct with the Adjutant-General, Royal Artillery, on the latter subjects, while reports and returns should be sent to the officers commanding

¹ So acute an observer as the late General F. Eardley Wilmot, writing in May, 1859, says: "The new organization has come to pass . . . it looks as if it would work well, and of course has the great principle we have fought for so long—the independence of the colonels in command of brigades" ("Memorials of F. M. Eardley Wilmot," p. 156).

artillery in the various districts, to enable these officers to obtain a more perfect knowledge of the state of the Royal Artillery under their command. The district artillery commanders then forwarded these reports to the Adjutant-General, Royal Artillery, who transmitted them to corps head-quarters at Woolwich, but for record only. When the brigade system came in, colonels commanding made their own non-commissioned officers, and captains in command of batteries no longer corresponded direct with the Horse Guards; but certain reports and returns had to be rendered both to the brigade office (wherever it happened to be) and also to the district head-quarters. In an early edition of his "Soldier's Pocket Book," Lord Wolseley remarked that the "Royal Artillery seemed to revel in complicated returns," and under the brigade system they were certainly a weary weight for captains commanding batteries. Friction was unavoidable, and matters were not improved by the fact that brigade commanders could not select their own adjutants, that post being in the gift of the colonels-commandant, who had been transferred to the brigades from the battalions. Time disclosed the evils of the brigade system,¹ but it had one salutary and far-reaching result: the field batteries were firmly and properly planted, and thenceforward would have liberty to grow and develop.

¹ "Many of us can remember that the brigade system was ushered into the world with a whispered warning, that 'any change, however small, was to be deprecated'; yet that pretentious edifice fell to the ground of its own weight, after a precarious existence of 16 years" ("Artillery Reform," p. 12, by Lieutenant-Colonel H. W. L. Hime; Longmans, Green & Co.).

The Medical and Veterinary Services.—The relations of the medical and veterinary services with the regiment were also closer drawn. When the Board of Ordnance was abolished in 1855, the Ordnance Medical Department became practically merged in the Army Medical Department, but by an order issued in May, 1856, the officers concerned were in future to be considered as forming part of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. In the following December they were definitely posted and taken on the strength of the various adjutants' detachments.¹ On the introduction of the brigade system they were posted to brigades, and soon became associated as regimental officers with the various batteries, especially in the case of the mounted units.

Veterinary surgeons were originally attached to the Corps of Royal Artillery Drivers. On the disbandment of that Corps in 1817 the few kept on the strength of the Royal Artillery were attached to the Veterinary Establishment at Woolwich, but after 1854, veterinary surgeons were appointed to the Royal Artillery as to other mounted regiments. When the brigade system was introduced, these officers were appointed to brigades and, like the medical officers, were often associated as regimental officers with particular batteries.

Changes in Head-quarters Staff.—In August, 1857, the office of the Assistant-Adjutant-General, Royal Artillery, was removed from Woolwich to London; and on the break-up of the head-quarters battalion staff, though the General at Woolwich still commanded

¹ Regimental Circular, December 18, 1856.

all batteries stationed there, the Brigade-Major and Deputy - Assistant - Quartermaster - General were in future relegated to purely garrison duties, so that the last vestige of regimental administration disappeared from Woolwich. In the spring of 1858 Sir Hew Ross, who was now nearly eighty years old, resigned his post as Adjutant-General of Royal Artillery, and the appointment was not filled up. Colonel C. Bingham, who had succeeded Colonel H. Palliser as Senior Assistant-Adjutant-General, became Deputy-Adjutant-General, with an Assistant-Adjutant-General and a Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General under him. The higher grade of staff officer was thus lost to the Regiment.

War Office Changes.—In May, 1859, the appointment of Director-General of Artillery was abolished, and the military duties of the office were transferred to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. General Cator, on ceasing to be Director-General, was appointed President of the Ordnance Select Committee, which was again given a new constitution, from which all but military officers were excluded. The introduction of rifled ordnance was the burning question of the hour, and out of a crowd of competitors Mr. W. Armstrong emerged triumphant. Colonel F. M. Eardley-Wilmot was Superintendent of the Gun Factories, a post he had held with distinction since 1855, and in November, 1859, he was requested to resign¹ in order that Mr. Armstrong should have control of the Factories. Next year a battery of 12-pounder Armstrong breechloading rifled guns were sent on service to China.

¹ "Memorials of F. M. Eardley-Wilmot," p. 158.

Camps of Instruction.—As the status of the field batteries became more definite and the necessity for combined training of the three arms was recognised, a modification came about in the distribution of the Regiment in the United Kingdom. During the Crimean War Shorncliffe became an artillery station under a lieutenant-colonel, and a camp of instruction was established there, and also at the Curragh. The importance of the Irish command was recognised in October, 1856, when it was assigned a Major-General of Royal Artillery on the Staff of the Army. But the great step in the improvement of combined training was taken when Aldershot Camp was formed. The first ground there was bought in 1855. When the Crimean War was drawing to a close, several troops and field batteries were generally quartered there, and in November, 1856, a Colonel of Royal Artillery on the Staff of the Army was appointed to command them. At these three camps the battery allowance of practice ammunition was increased on November 1, 1858, from 140 to 300 rounds.

Regimental Instruction.—The instructional staff at Woolwich underwent considerable modification. With the break-up of the Adjutant's Detachment of the Field Batteries the field battery-school disappeared, but means were provided in the newly formed Dépôt Brigade for the preliminary instruction of recruits, which took more definite shape when the Field Dépôt became one of the regimental establishments.

Colonel Bloomfield¹ became Superintendent of

¹ [1516] Afterwards General Sir John Bloomfield, G.C.B., Colonel-Commandant.

Drills in December, 1854, and in March, 1857, this appointment was merged in that of Second Commandant at Woolwich.¹ After the introduction of the brigade system the appointment of Superintendent of Drills disappeared, and in May, 1859, Colonel Bloomfield was made Inspector-General of Artillery, the first incumbent of the post.

No one appears to have succeeded Colonel Lake as Superintendent of Heavy Ordnance Instruction when that officer went to the Crimea in April, 1854, but the staff of the Royal Military Repository was maintained during the war. In May, 1859, the technical instruction of the Regiment was placed on a sound basis by the establishment of the School of Gunnery at Shoeburyness. The Superintendent of Experiments, Colonel Mitchell, was appointed Commandant in addition to his other duties, the Royal Military Repository was placed under his orders, and he was provided with an establishment of seven officers and fourteen non-commissioned officers and men.

—The Riding House Establishment staff, which, in 1859, consisted of a Superintendent and four Riding-Masters,² was on April 1 of that year increased by a second-captain and two lieutenants. It was intended that classes of non-commissioned officers (one from each field battery) should be formed there to qualify men as instructors, and the remount horses were also attached to the Establishment for preliminary training.

¹ R.G.O., March 12, 1857.

² The term Riding-Master was introduced into the Artillery in 1858.


When direct commissions ceased in 1856, the Department of Artillery Studies suffered temporary eclipse. In September, 1857, the Director was transferred to the Royal Military Repository as Superintendent, and the two Military Instructors returned to duty. The appointment of Director remained vacant until the return of Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. Smyth from abroad on May 19, 1858, when he was for the second time installed in the post. For a time, however, he had practically no staff, and his sphere of usefulness was somewhat restricted.

The Royal Military Academy.—After the war the Royal Military Academy resumed its normal functions, and open competitive examinations, partially introduced in 1855, eventually became the rule. When direct commissions ceased, a scheme which met with a certain amount of favour was proposed. There was to be no more direct entrance to Woolwich, where practical instruction only would be given for the future. All army candidates were to go first to Sandhurst for theoretical instruction, and periodic competitive examinations were to be held there for those cadets who wished to enter Woolwich. This scheme was strongly opposed by those who wished to see the high standard of technical knowledge of the officers of the old Ordnance Corps still preserved. The matter was discussed in Parliament in April, 1858, and the House of Commons, by a majority of forty, presented a petition to the Crown praying that the system of open competitive examination for Woolwich should not be discontinued. Open ex-

amination thenceforward was the rule, the age of entrance being fixed between seventeen and twenty years.

After the Crimean War a Council of Military Education was appointed. The first constitution did not include an officer of Royal Artillery, but in June, 1858, Lieutenant-Colonel T. Elwyn¹ was appointed an additional member.

¹ [1816] Lieutenant-General T. Elwyn.



THE ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY, WOOLWICH, KENT.

(After an Old Print.)

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II

TABLES

TABLE XVII¹

DETAIL OF A 9-POUNDER TROOP, ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY, FOR ACTIVE SERVICE

No. of Carriages.	Equipment.	Men.			Horses.			Sets of Appointments N.C.O.'s. and Men.	Harness Sets Double.	
		Gunners.	Drivers.	Total.	Riding.	Draught.	Total.		Wheel.	Lead.
4	9-Pounder Guns . . .	40	16	56	40	32	72	40	4	12
2	24-Pounder Howitzers . .	20	8	28	20	16	36	20	2	6
6	Gun Ammunition Wagons	12	18	30	4	36	40	4	6	12
5	Howitzer Ammunition Wagons . . .	10	15	25	2	30	32	2	5	10
1	Store Limber Wagon	3	3	..	6	6	..	1	2
1	Spare Gun Carriage	3	3	..	6	6	..	1	2
1	Forge	3	3	..	6	6	..	1	2
1	Rocket Carriage	4	4	..	8	8	..	1	2
1	Store Cart	1	1	..	2	2	..	1	..
1	Medicine Cart	1	1	..	2	2	..	1	..
2	Forage Wagons	4	4	..	8	8	..	2	2
3	Water Carts	3	3	..	6	6	..	3	..
	Officers' Horses	12	..	12
	Bat Horses	6	6
	Horses for 2 Staff-Sergeants, 2 Trumpeters, 1 Farrier, and 3 Shoeing-Smiths	8	..	8	8
	Spare Horses	6	16	22	..	4	4
	Spare Men, Officers' Ser- vants, and Batmen . .	15	44	59
28	Total Carriages. Total	97	123	220	92	180	272	74	32	55

¹ "Handbook for Field Service," 2nd ed., 1857, pp. 6 etc.

Officers :

Captain	1
2nd Captain	1
Lieutenants	3
Assistant-Surgeon	1

Non-Commissioned Officers and Men :

Staff-Sergeants	2
Sergeants	8
Corporals	4
Bombardiers	6
Gunners	97
Drivers	123
Trumpeter	1

Artificers :

Farrier	1
Shoeing-Smiths	6
Collar-Makers	3
Wheelers	2
Total	<u>259</u>

AMMUNITION

9-Pounder Gun :

4 Gun Limbers (Round Shot, 72 ; Shrapnel, 24 ; Common Case, 32).

6 Gun Ammunition Wagons (Round Shot, 444 ; Shrapnel, 84 ; Common Case, 48).

Total : 516 Round Shot, 108 Shrapnel, 80 Common Case.

24-Pounder Howitzer :

2 Howitzer Limbers (Common Shell, 16 ; Shrapnel, 24 ; Common Case, 8).

5 Howitzer Ammunition Wagons (Common Shell, 120 ; Shrapnel, 150 ; Common Case, 20 ; Carcasses, 10).

Total : 136 Common Shell, 174 Shrapnel, 28 Common Case, 10 Carcasses.

Rockets :

12-Pounder, 100.

Note.—The equipment of a 9-pounder Field Battery was practically the same as that of a Troop, except as regards the numbers of horses. ("Handbook for Field Service," 2nd ed., 1857, p. 2.)

TABLE XVIII¹DETAIL OF AN 18-POUNDER FIELD BATTERY, ROYAL
ARTILLERY, FOR ACTIVE SERVICE

No. of Carriages.	Equipment.	Men.			Horses.			Sets of Appoint-ments.		Harness Sets Double.	
		Gunners and Drivers.		Total.	Riding.	Draught.	Total.	Officers.	N.C.O.'s.	Wheel.	Lead.
4	18-Pounder Guns .	56	24	80	..	48	48	8	16
12	Gun Ammunition Wagons .	24	36	60	..	72	72	12	24
2	Store Limber Wagons .	..	6	6	..	12	12	2	4
1	Spare Gun Carriage .	..	4	4	..	8	8	2	2
1	Platform Wagon .	..	4	4	..	8	8	2	2
1	Forge .	..	3	3	..	6	6	1	2
1	Store Cart .	..	1	1	..	2	2	1	..
1	Medicine Cart .	..	1	1	..	2	2	1	..
2	Forage Wagons .	..	4	4	..	8	8	2	2
3	Water Carts .	..	3	3	..	6	6	3	..
	Officers' Horses	6	..	6	6
	Bat Horses	6	6
	Horses for Staff-Ser-geants, Mounted Non - Commissioned Officers, 2 Trumpet-ers, 1 Farrier, and 1 Shoeing-Smith	14	..	14	..	14
	Spare Horses	2	20	22	..	1	3	3
	Spare Men, Officers' Servants, and Bat-men .	15	24	39
28	Total Carriages. Total	95	110	205	22	198	220	6	15	37	55

¹ "Handbook for Field Service," 2nd ed., 1857, p. 18.

Officers :

Captain	1
2nd Captain	1
Lieutenants	3
Assistant-Surgeon	1

Non-Commissioned Officers and Men :

Staff-Sergeants	2
Sergeants	7
Corporals	5
Bombardiers	6
Gunner-Drivers	205
Trumpeters	2

Artificers :

Farrier	1
Shoeing-Smiths	6
Collar-Makers	3
Wheelers	2
Total	<u>245</u>

AMMUNITION

18-Pounder Gun :

12 Gun Ammunition Wagons (Round Shot, 504 ; Shrapnel, 144 ;
Common Case, 72).

TABLE XIX¹DETAIL OF A 32-POUNDER HOWITZER FIELD BATTERY,
ROYAL ARTILLERY, FOR ACTIVE SERVICE

No. of Carriages.	Equipment.	Men.			Horses.			Sets of Appoint-ments.		Harness Sets Double.	
		Gunners and Drivers.	Total.	Riding.	Draught.	Total.	Officers.	N.C.O.'s.	Wheel.	Lead.	
4	32-Pounder Howitzers .	48	16	64	..	32	32	4	12
12	Howitzer Ammunition Wagons	24	36	60	..	72	72	12	24
1	Store Limber Wagon	3	3	..	6	6	1	2
1	Spare Howitzer Carriage	..	4	4	..	8	8	1	3
1	Forge	3	3	..	6	6	1	2
1	Store Cart	1	1	..	2	2	1	..
1	Medicine Cart	1	1	..	2	2	1	..
2	Forage Wagons	4	4	..	8	8	2	2
3	Water Carts	3	3	..	6	6	3	..
	Officers' Horses	6	..	6	6
	Bat Horses	6	6
	Horses for Staff-Sergeants, Mounted Non-Commissioned Officers, 2 Trumpeters, 1 Farrier, and 1 Shoeing-Smith	14	..	14	..	14
	Spare Horses	2	20	22	..	1	3	3
	Spare Men, Officers' Servants, and Batmen .	15	24	39
26	Total Carriages. Total	87	95	182	22	168	190	6	15	29	48

¹ "Handbook for Field Service," 2nd ed., 1857, p. 19.

Officers :

Captain	1
2nd Captain	1
Lieutenants	3
Assistant-Surgeon	1

Non-Commissioned Officers and Men :

Staff-Sergeants	2
Sergeants	6
Corporals	5
Bombardiers	6
Gunner-Drivers	182
Trumpeters	2

Artificers :

Farrier	1
Shoeing-Smiths	5
Collar-Makers	2
Wheelers	2

Total	219
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AMMUNITION

32-Pounder Howitzer :

4 Howitzer Limbers (Common Shell, 24 ; Shrapnel Shell, 24 ; Common Case, 8).

12 Howitzer Ammunition Wagons (Common Shell, 360 ; Shrapnel Shell, 264 ; Common Case, 24).

Total: 384 Common Shell; 288 Shrapnel ; 32 Common Case.

TABLE XX¹
LABORATORY COMPOSITIONS

Nature of Store or Composition.	Saltpetre.	Sulphur.	Mealed Powder.	Antimony.	Pitch.	Resin.	Turpentine.	Tow.	Linseed Oil.	Sea Coal.
Port-fire . . .	66·6	22·2	11·2
Fuse . . .	48·1	14·8	37·1
Carcass . . .	49·0	19·6	..	6·9	..	14·7	4·9	4·9
Valenciennes ²	56·73	22·7	..	5·67	..	11·35	3·55	..
Light Ball . .	56·3	22·5	17·0	4·2	..
Smoke Ball . .	10·0	..	50·0	..	20·0	5·0	..	15·0

¹ " Handbook for Field Service," 2nd ed., 1857, p. 272, and " Notes on Ammunition," by Captain V. B. Majendie, R.A., 1867.

² This composition was formed into stars and was packed in a common or mortar shell, a bursting charge of gunpowder being added. The name is said to be due to the Austrians having first used the composition at the siege of Valenciennes in 1794.

TABLE XXI¹DETAIL OF A RESERVE OF GUN AND SMALL-ARM
AMMUNITION FOR ACTIVE SERVICE²

No. of Carriages.	Equipment.	Men.			Horses.			Sets of Appointments.		Harness Sets Double.	
		Gunners and Drivers.		Total.	Riding.	Draught.	Total.	Officers.	N.C.O.'s.	Wheel.	Lead.
30	Ammunition Wagons :										
	Gun, 4	8	12	20	..	24	24	4	8
	Howitzer, 2	4	6	10	..	12	12	2	4
	Small Arm, 24	24	72	96	..	144	144	24	48
I	Store Limber Wagon	3	3	..	6	6	1	2
I	Forge	3	3	..	6	6	1	2
I	Store Cart	1	1	..	2	2	1	..
I	Medicine Cart	1	1	..	2	2	1	..
2	Forage Wagons	4	4	..	8	8	2	2
3	Water Carts	3	3	..	6	6	3	..
	Officers' Horses	6	..	6	6
	Battalion Horses	6	6
	Horses for Staff-Sergeants, Mounted										
	Non - Commissioned										
	Officers, 2 Trumpeters, 1 Farrier, and 1										
	Shoeing-Smith	14	..	14	..	14
	Spare Horses	2	18	20	..	1	1	2
	Spare Men, Officers' Servants, and Batmen	12	27	39
39	Total Carriages. Total	48	132	180	22	234	256	16	15	40	68


¹ "Handbook for Field Service," 2nd ed., 1857, p. 17.² Formerly Ball Cartridge Brigade.

Personnel :


Captain	1
2nd Captain	1
Lieutenants	3
Assistant-Surgeon	1
Staff-Sergeants	2
Sergeants	6
Corporals	5
Bombardiers	7
Gunners and Drivers	180
Trumpeters	2
Farrier	1
Shoeing-Smiths	6
Collar-Makers	3
Wheelers	2
Total	220

AMMUNITION

9-Pounder Gun : 4 Gun Ammunition Wagons (Round Shot, 296 ; Shrapnel, 56 ; Common Case, 32). *24-Pounder Howitzer* : 2 Howitzer Ammunition Wagons (Shrapnel, 60 ; Common Shell, 48 ; Common Case, 8 ; Carcasses, 4). *Small-Arm Ammunition* : 24 Wagons, each containing 32 boxes, and each box 560 rounds of Enfield Rifle ball cartridges ; total, 17,920 rounds per wagon.




THE GIBRALTAR GIN FOR USE IN CASEMATES.



Quarries.


Redan.



Fort Catherine.

Malakoff.


Fort
Paul.



Major C. H. Owen, R.A., del.

The City.

Fort Constantine.




Fort
Nicholas.

Barracks.

Malakoff.

Little Redan.

Mamelon.



SECOND PARALLEL, RIGHT ATTACK.

PART II

THE ROYAL ARTILLERY IN THE CRIMEA

CHAPTER III

THE ALMA

1. OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

The Expeditionary Force.—The close of 1853 found Russia and Turkey at war and France and Great Britain in alliance. The fleets of the two Western Powers already lay in the Bosphorus, and early in the new year war seemed inevitable. The British Government prepared to send an expeditionary force to Turkey, and in the middle of March a body of troops left these shores and disembarked at Scutari.

On March 28 war was declared against Russia by France and Great Britain, and our army moved to the neighbourhood of Varna in Bulgaria, where the French forces and the Turkish contingent also assembled. During the summer the invasion of the Crimea and the attack of Sebastopol were determined on, and a combined flotilla assembled in the Black Sea on September 7. A week later the allied forces landed unopposed near Eupatoria on the Russian coast.

In 1854 the “Battalion Rollster” was a sacred

thing, and in detailing the expeditionary force the companies at the head of the list were taken in rotation.¹ The first for service happened to be in garrison at Tilbury Fort, and on the approach of war it was hurried to Woolwich to be converted into a field battery. Table XXII. shows the companies that were at first placed under orders for service :

TABLE XXII
COMPANIES UNDER ORDERS FOR SERVICE

Company.	Battalion.	Designation in Expeditionary Force.	Company.	Battalion.	Designation in Expeditionary Force.
2	8	A Field Battery	6	11	Siege Train.
8	3	B " "	7	11	" "
1	3	E " "	8	11	" "
1	11	U Reserve Battery ²	1	12	" "
2	11	Ball Cartridge Brigade ³	2	12	" "
3	11	F Field Battery	3	12	" "
4	11	G " "	4	12	P Field Battery.
5	11	H " "	6	12	Siege Train.
			7	12	" "

¹ The following was the first Regimental Order on the subject :

"DEPUTY-ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

"WOOLWICH, *February 14, 1854.*

"*Memo.*

"Captain Paynter's Company with A Field Battery, Captain Fitzmayer's Company with B Field Battery, and Captain Thomas' Company with E Field Battery, to be completed to 170 horses each, and the following detail to each company to be held in readiness for service, viz. : 2 captains, 3 lieutenants, 1 medical officer, 15 non-commissioned officers, 9 artificers, 2 trumpeters, 158 gunners and drivers, 4 9-pounders, 2 24-pounder howitzers, 6 9-pounder ammunition wagons, 5 24-pounder howitzer wagons, 1 forge, 1 store limber wagon, 1 store cart, 1 spare gun carriage unhorsed.

"(Signed) H. PALLISER,

"Lieut.-Col., Assist.-Adj.-Gen."

² The Reserve Battery was designed to act as a sort of dépôt. The Head-quarter Staff, servants, clerks, horses, etc., were borne on its books. It had no guns.

³ The following Memo. was issued from the office of the Assistant-Adjutant-General, Woolwich, February 14, 1854 :

"Captain Cheetham's Company will be held in readiness for foreign service in charge of an Infantry Ball Cartridge Brigade: 2 captains, 3 subalterns, 14 non-commissioned officers, 150 gunners and drivers,

C and I Troops were selected for service, and when they left England both were armed with 6-pounder guns and 12-pounder howitzers; but when C Troop was attached to an infantry division its armament was altered, and before it left Varna it was given an equipment of 9-pounder guns and 24-pounder howitzers, similar to that of the field batteries. All the gunner-drivers of the latter, except those engaged in driving, were armed with field-battery swords,¹ which were carried in a frog on the waist-belt.

For the conversion of companies into field batteries, horses, and men to drive them, were laid hands on wherever they could be found. The instruction batteries at once ceased to exist, and the field batteries quartered in various parts of the United Kingdom were practically dismantled to supply horses to those ordered to the East. The time before embarkation was utilised to the utmost in exercising the newly formed bodies under their own officers, and all ranks were instructed in the Boxer time-fuses, which had just been issued to the field artillery.

18 artificers, 2 trumpeters, 200 horses, 45 ball cartridge wagons (36 horsed, 9 unhorsed), 2 forges, 2 store limber wagons, 2 store carts.

“(Signed) H. PALLISER,

“Lieut.-Col., Assist.-Adj.-Gen.”

¹ The musket was given up by the artillery in 1845 and the Victoria Carbine introduced in its place. This carbine had an infantry bayonet for general use, but in the field batteries the men had a special sword, which, in the case of those driving, was attached to the saddle. In 1853 the Victoria Carbine was replaced by the Enfield-Pritchett Artillery Carbine, to which a sword bayonet was attached. The latter was known as a “field battery sword,” but was not issued to men employed in driving (see “R.A.I.P.,” i. p. 186, n.). It was known as “the cheese-knife” among the gunners.

In March, Woolwich was humming with excitement, and late on the 17th orders came for the first embarkation. Early next morning C Troop and half the Ball Cartridge Brigade paraded in front of the Royal Artillery Barracks and marched to the Dockyard, where six transports awaited them. By evening the six vessels, fully loaded, were moored off the Arsenal, where they were objects of the highest interest. The wharves were crowded with onlookers, with whom the men on board¹ exchanged many a hearty cheer as the transports were towed down-stream.

In all the embarkations of the campaign the principle of putting a complete division² of a battery in each vessel was adopted as far as possible, and the officers were grouped in pairs—the captain with the junior lieutenant; the second-captain with the second senior lieutenant; the senior lieutenant with the assistant-surgeon. Moreover seven wives per troop or company were also permitted to embark.³

On March 20 the six transports sailed for the East, and before the end of the month A and B Batteries followed. On March 1 the Director of Artillery, Colonel Cator, was appointed to command the artillery of the expeditionary force, with the rank of Brigadier-General. The Staff⁴ sailed on April 7, and were

¹ White jerseys and red caps were issued to men on embarkation.

² It was not until 1889 that the term "Division" was replaced by "Section."

³ An account of the embarkation is given in *Jackson's Woolwich Journal*, April, 1854. The permission to embark wives was either withdrawn or fell into abeyance, as none were embarked with any of the Siege Train companies.

⁴ Captain J. M. Adye was appointed Brigade-Major, Captain the Hon. E. T. Gage Aide-de-Camp, and Captain G. T. Field Acting-

followed during the month by I Troop, E Battery, the remainder of the Ball Cartridge Brigade, and U Reserve Battery.

The destination of all the foregoing was Scutari, where they arrived between May 4 and 19, with the exception of I Troop, which only left England at the end of April and proceeded direct to Bulgaria. During May and the early days of June other embarkations took place, and by the middle of July two troops and seventeen companies were assembled in the neighbourhood of Varna.

Bulgaria.—While the army was still in Bulgaria, it became apparent that the ball cartridge wagons were too cumbersome for service; and some 400 pack horses or ponies, mostly from Syria, were provided for the ammunition. The Ball Cartridge Brigade was broken up, its horses were transferred to the field batteries, and eventually No. 2 Company, 11th Battalion, became a portion of the Siege Train. The Reserve Battery was also converted into a field battery, with the usual equipment, and was designated W Battery.

Before the expedition sailed for the Crimea, there had been one death amongst the officers of artillery. Captain G. C. R. Levinge, who commanded C Troop, died from an accidental overdose of opium. Brigadier-General Cator became so ill that he was obliged to return to England, and was succeeded by Colonel T. Fox-Strangways, who commanded the horse artillery.

Adjutant and Quartermaster-General. The latter fell ill, and his duties were, for a time, performed by Captain J. C. W. Fortescue.

Up to the middle of July the British army had been in excellent health, but cholera occurred amongst the French troops during the voyage from Marseilles. It followed them to Bulgaria and eventually reached the British camps, and even the warships off the coast. The Artillery did not suffer to the same extent as some other regiments, yet its strength was reduced by 156 men before it left Varna for the Crimea. Some 70 or 80 horses were lost on the passage out from England, and others died afterwards, the total loss amounting to 187.¹

Invasion of the Crimea.—On August 24 the embarkation for the Crimea commenced.

The British army was composed of five Divisions and a Light Cavalry Brigade. Each Division was formed of some 5,000 Infantry and 12 field guns; the Cavalry Brigade numbered 1,000 troopers with 6 guns. General Lord Raglan was Commander-in-Chief, and the Divisional Generals were: Light Division, Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown; 1st Division, Lieutenant-General H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge; 2nd Division, Lieutenant-General Sir De Lacy Evans; 3rd Division, Lieutenant-General Sir Richard England; 4th Division, Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir George Cathcart; Light Cavalry Brigade, Major-General the Earl of Cardigan. In addition to some 300 Royal Sappers and Miners and the Siege Train, the British contingent consisted of 26,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 60 field guns. A Heavy Cavalry Brigade was in process of formation to complete the Cavalry

¹ Assistant-Adjutant-General's return, compiled for Mr. Roebuck's Committee, May 4, 1855.

Division, which Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan was appointed to command.

The artillery were distributed as shown in Table XXIII. :

TABLE XXIII
ARTILLERY DISTRIBUTION

Commanding Officers and Adjutants.	Troops and Batteries.	Distribution.
Lieut.-Col. N. T. Lake .	I Troop, Capt. G. A. Maude .	Cav. Brigade.
Adj.-Capt. J. F. L. Baddeley {	C Troop, " J. J. Brandling }	Light Division.
Lieut.-Col. R. J. Dacres .	E Btty., " J. R. Anderson }	
Adj.-Capt. E. B. Hamley .	A " " D. W. Paynter }	1st "
Lieut.-Col. J. W. Fitzmayer {	H " " E. Wodehouse }	
Adj.-Capt. H. W. Patton ¹ .	B " " C. T. Franklin }	2nd "
Lieut.-Col. J. E. Dupuis .	G " " J. Turner . }	
Adj.-Capt. M. S. Biddulph .	F " " W. Swinton . }	3rd "
Lieut.-Col. D. E. Wood .	W " " G. R. Barker . }	
Adj.-Capt. G. L. Tupper .	P " Major S. P. Townsend	4th "

The French army was composed of four divisions ; its total strength was some 27,000 men and 68 guns, but it was practically without cavalry at this period. Marshal St. Arnaud was in command, and the four Divisional Generals were Generals Prince Napoleon, Canrobert, Bosquet, and Forey.

The Turks, who were attached to the French, numbered 7,000 men, but they had neither guns nor cavalry. They were commanded by Achmet-Pasha.

The total allied field force consisted of some 60,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 128 guns. (See App. No. 1, p. 150.)

The British troops were conveyed in large steamers, each of which towed two sailing transports, generally East Indiamen of the largest class. The flotilla was under the command of, and escorted by, Admiral

¹ This officer never landed in the Crimea. He died on board ship at Balaclava, September 27, 1854.

Lyons in H.M.S. *Agamemnon*. Admiral Dundas, with the British fleet, protected the expedition. The French and Turks were unprovided with transports, and utilised their warships and a number of small sailing vessels to carry their troops.

The journey across the Black Sea was safely carried out, but the cholera clung to the vessels and followed the troops on shore. On September 14 the landing of the combined armies began at Old Fort, near Eupatoria in the Crimea, and was completed by the evening of the 18th. The *matériel* of the Siege Train was left on board ship ; but some of its officers were attached for temporary duty with the artillery of the field army, and the non-commissioned officers and men took part in the landing of the horses, stores, and guns, which was successfully carried out with the assistance of the Royal Navy.

2. THE THEATRE OF WAR

Coast and Harbours.—The part of the Crimea with which we are concerned here is a triangle which may be defined by three points on the Black Sea—namely, Eupatoria on the west, Cape Laspi on the south, and Aloushta on the east. From Eupatoria to the Alma the shore is low and sandy, but at the mouth of that river, cliffs begin to rise and, with little exception, characterise the rest of the coast-line. The northern shore of the Chersonese plateau slopes gently to the sea and is indented by several small bays, including the twin inlets of Kamiesch and Kazatch, where there is safe and abundant anchorage ; there are bays also at Yalta and

Aloushta, but elsewhere the line of rocks is unbroken except by river mouths and harbour entrances. The Sebastopol Roadstead is one of the finest harbours in the world ; it is 4 miles long and nearly a mile wide. Farther to the south the narrow harbour of Balaclava lies in a cleft in the rocks ; it is not more than 230 yards wide, but it is three-quarters of a mile long and from 30 to 90 feet deep.

Mountains and Rivers.—The heights situated to the south-east of Balaclava may be considered as the starting-point of the principal range of mountains which from that point extend along the south-eastern coast for over 46 miles, at first presenting the appearance of a narrow chain and later that of a mountain plateau, the Yaïla, which gradually falls to the little valley in which Aloushta lies. North of Aloushta the ground again rises, and reaches a height of 5,000 feet. From the principal chain numerous lesser chains branch off, throwing out spurs in all directions. The Tchernaya river rises above Cape Laspi and, running through the Baidar Valley, enters a defile in the hills, passes between the Tartar village of Tchorgoun and Mount Hasfort, and, skirting the Fidioukine Hills and the Sapouné Ridge, falls into the upper end of the Sebastopol Roadstead. The Belbek, the Katcha, and the Alma all rise in the Yaïla and run westwards to the Black Sea. Their upper waters rush down precipitous slopes in close and broken country, but as they approach the sea, though they still run along ravines or between banks more or less steep, their flow is more gentle and they are

separated by open and undulating slopes, which sometimes rise to a height of 800 feet.

Towns and Roads.—Sebastopol is built on classic ground, the ancient Chersonese, now known to us as the Plateau. With its magnificent roadstead and strong position it was dowered by Nature with every advantage for commerce and defence, and, as city and fortress, was the pride of Russia. The only inland town of note was Simferopol, which was an important place on account of the roads which radiated from it. The Woronzoff Road was the best in the Crimea. Leaving Sebastopol it crosses the Plateau in a south-easterly direction, descends the abrupt cliffs which are the eastern boundary of the Sapouné Ridge, and passes along a chain of low hills, the Causeway Ridge, which divides the plain of Balaclava into a north and south valley ; then, continuing its course to the east, it reaches the hilly country north of the village of Kamara and enters the Baidar Valley, whence, turning northwards and following the coast-line, it reaches Aloushta, and after another abrupt turn runs to Simferopol. The direct road to Sebastopol from Simferopol goes through Baktchi-seraï, crosses the Inkerman Bridge at the mouth of the Tchernaya, and joins the military road that leads into the fortress. Two branch roads connect this road with the Woronzoff Road. The one runs through Otarköi, McKenzie's Farm, and the Traktir Bridge ; the other, starting just west of the Inkerman Bridge, mounts the Plateau and runs parallel to the Sapouné Ridge. From Simferopol also runs the direct road to the mainland of Russia, which is

gained by means of the narrow isthmus at Perekop. Simferopol is also connected with Eupatoria and the important sea-port of Theodosia and the Kertch peninsula. The post-road from Eupatoria to Sebastopol runs along the coast to Old Fort, where the Allies disembarked, and proceeds through open, undulating ground to the Boulganak, a small stream rising south of Simferopol, and in early autumn but a muddy rivulet; thence it goes through similar country to Bourliouk on the Alma, and, ascending the hills, leads to the northern suburb of the city.

3. THE ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES

Russian Plans.—When the Allies landed, Prince Menchikoff, who was in supreme command of the Russian land and sea forces in the Crimea, possessed a force of 76,000 fighting men, who, however, were not all immediately available.¹ He was informed in Sebastopol, on the evening of September 13, that the hostile armada was casting anchor off Eupatoria.

¹ The following nomenclature is that employed by Kinglake, and the numbers are based on Todleben i. pp. 137-143, and are as follows :

The Army	51,500
Local Companies	1,000
Stationed Marines	2,666
Seamen of the Black Sea Fleet	18,501
Coast Artillery	2,708
	<hr/>
	76,375
	<hr/>

With regard to the troops of the field army, Todleben says : " Le total des troupes de terre qui se trouvaient en Crimée le 1-13 Septembre, ne dépassait pas 51,500 hommes ; et, ces troupes étant dispersées sur toute l'étendue de la presqu'île, il en résulte que le prince Menchikow ne pouvait concentrer dans les environs de Sebastopol plus de 30,000 hommes, au moment de l'apparition de l'ennemi " (Todleben, i. p. 140).

Knowing that for the moment his forces were numerically inferior to the Allies, he determined to accept battle in a defensive position, in the hope of checking the advance of the enemy, until his reinforcements (already on the march) had time to arrive.¹ With this view he assembled his field army on the hills south of the Alma and reconnoitred the ground across that river.

Advance of the Allies.—On the morning of September 19 the Allies formed their order of march. The left being the exposed flank, and the British alone having cavalry, the French were placed upon the right. Their four divisions were “ranged in lozenge form, the apex heading for Sebastopol, the four points each marked by a division with its guns; and in the space thus enclosed were the Turks and the convoy of provisions and baggage.”²

The British marched in double column of divisions. On the left, the Light Division led, followed by the 1st and 4th. On the right, the 2nd Division

¹ Todleben, after referring to the numerical superiority of the Allies on land, and their command of the sea, remarks as follows on Prince Menchikoff's difficulties: “Il ressort de tout ce que nous venons de dire, que la défense de la côte occidentale de la Crimée, accessible sur presque tous ses points à la flotte ennemie, était complètement impossible. . . . Quelque différence qu'il y eût entre les renseignements fournies par les prisonniers, il en résultait, en tous cas, sous le rapport du nombre des troupes, l'ennemi avait une grande supériorité sur nous. Cette circonstance . . . confirma dans la pensée du Commandant-en-Chef l'opinion que, vu la faiblesse numérique de l'armée qu'il avait à sa disposition, il lui était impossible de prendre l'offensive; qu'il ne lui restait conséquemment qu'à accepter une bataille défensive dans le but d'arrêter la marche de l'ennemi, et de gagner du temps pour recevoir de renforts, en donnant aux troupes qu'on attendait de Pérékop, de Kertch et de Théodosie la possibilité d'arriver” (Todleben, i. pp. 156, 159).

² “War in the Crimea,” p. 42.

marched level with the Light Division, and was followed by the 3rd. Each division had a front of two companies ("grand divisions"), so that line could be formed rapidly, either to a front or flank. The artillery marched in column of batteries on the right of the divisions to which they belonged, the leading battery being in line with the leading companies. The batteries on the inner flank were followed by the reserve ammunition and the Sappers and Miners. The double column was enclosed by the Rifles on the front, rear, and left flank. The 11th Hussars, the 13th Light Dragoons, and I Troop R.H.A. led the advance. The 8th Hussars and 17th Lancers covered the left flank and the 4th Light Dragoons brought up the rear.

The Affair of the Boulganak.—Soon after noon Lord Cardigan crossed the Boulganak with his two leading regiments.

"South of this stream the ground rises for some hundreds of yards, then dips a little, then rises again, then dips rather deeply and then rises again up to the summit of the ridge which bounds the view of an observer in the valley of the Boulganak."¹

On these boundary slopes strong bodies of the enemy's cavalry were visible, who presently advanced and threw out skirmishers. Lord Cardigan formed line and also threw out skirmishers, and after some desultory firing it became evident that Russian infantry were present. Lord Raglan, who was with Lord Cardigan, ordered up the 8th Hussars and

¹ Kinglake, ii. p. 211.

17th Lancers, and directed the Light and 2nd Divisions to advance. At this moment, while C and I Troops, R.H.A., were watering their horses, Captain J. M. Adye, the Brigade-Major, rode hurriedly up with orders for the horse artillery to advance.¹ A smart gallop over the hilly ground somewhat tried the horses fresh from board ship; but both 9-pounders and 6-pounders surmounted the high ground in time for the two troops to witness the progress of the cavalry skirmish. Support now being at hand, Lord Raglan determined to withdraw his cavalry, for with his army still on the march it appeared undesirable to bring on a general engagement. Retirement by alternate squadrons had hardly begun when some Russian guns suddenly appeared on the ridge in front of us, and the first round shot of the campaign emptied a few of our cavalry saddles. I and C Troops came at once into action and were subsequently joined by E Battery. The Russian guns were soon withdrawn, followed by their cavalry, which had suffered some loss. The Russian infantry had already disappeared from view.² Our infantry did not advance beyond the cover of the ridge on

¹ "Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 89.

² With regard to the Russian force present at the Boulganak, Todleben says, "Le prince Menchikow, pour les appuyer [referring to his advanced posts] et afin de pouvoir apprécier les forces et découvrir les intentions de l'ennemi, fit avancer, sous le commandement de Lieutenant-Général Kiriakow, une brigade de hussards avec la batterie légère à cheval, No. 12, et 9 sotnias de cosaques, les faisant soutenir par les régiments de Chasseurs de Borodino et de Taroutino avec la batterie légère de la 17^{me} brigade d'artillerie" (Todleben, i. p. 171). This was the equivalent of 6,000 infantry, 12 light guns, a brigade of regular cavalry, and 9 squadrons of cossacks. Their casualties appear to have been 35 killed and wounded.

our side, and they were not engaged. Thus concluded the "Affair of the Boulganak."

The British, with the exception of the 4th Division and 4th Light Dragoons, who were left on the north side, bivouacked on the south side of the river in order of battle. The right wing faced south, the left wing east, and the troops thus deployed formed with the river a kind of three-sided enclosure, in which the principal part of the cavalry, artillery, and the baggage were enfolded.¹

4. THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA

The March to the Alma.—In the early hours of September 20 Lord Raglan commenced to draw his troops from their bivouacs. The operation took up much time, not only on account of the broad defensive arc that had been occupied, but also because the position of the reserve ammunition and baggage trains had to be assured and adjusted. General Bosquet, with the 2nd French Division and the Turks, had marched off at half-past five with colours uncased, but some hours elapsed before the long distances our troops had to cover were surmounted, and the French were obliged to halt. It was half-past eleven when

¹ Being on the exposed flank, and the enemy known to be near, great care had to be exercised by the British General; and the position he felt bound to occupy during the night prevented his getting his troops in order for next day's march as quickly as the French were able to do. Colonel Lagondie, a French officer attached to Lord Raglan's head-quarters, was requested to suggest to Prince Napoleon whose Division was now more than a mile from the British right, "the expediency of his drawing his Division somewhat more near to the English right." The Colonel fulfilled his mission, but was taken prisoner on his return journey (Kinglake, ii. p. 217 and n.).

the British right came into alignment with the left of their allies. The formation employed in the previous march was again adopted, except that Lord Raglan placed the main body of the Cavalry Brigade on the left of the Army, while the 2nd Battalion of the Rifles covered the advance.¹

As the day wore on, the enemy's position on the heights beyond the Alma became plainly visible, and near one o'clock a final halt was made about a mile and a half from the river. Presently Marshal St. Arnaud approached our lines, and Lord Raglan rode out to meet him across the front of Prince Napoleon's Division. The Generals then held a short conference and adopted a simple plan of action. The French were to turn the enemy's left, and, as soon as their success became apparent, the British were to attack in front.² The allied forces, now spread out to the view of the Russians, amounted to 58,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 128 guns, of whom 23,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 60 guns were British troops.


The Russian Position.—Prince Menchikoff determined to await the invaders in a commanding position south of the Alma. It extended from the West

¹ The Light and 2nd Divisions were headed by small bands, which played occasionally. Lord Raglan rode in front of C Troop R.H.A., with a large Staff. Amongst them was Mr. A. W. Kinglake, the historian of the war. [1258] Colonel Brereton, afterwards Major-General Sir William Brereton, K.C.B., K.H., in plain clothes and tall hat, was there as a spectator. He subsequently directed the rockets fired from H.M.S. *Britannia* during the attack on Sebastopol, October 17 (see "Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 94).

² See "Letters from Headquarters," i. pp. 161 etc., and Kinglake, ii. pp. 250, etc. It is most important that the plan of attack agreed upon by the allied generals should be understood, as it has been much misrepresented.

Cliff, on the extreme Russian left, to the eastern slopes of the Kourgané, above the village of Tar-khanlar, on the extreme right—a distance of about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

In summer the Alma is fordable for men almost anywhere: pools exist in places, but in general it is only knee-deep. At Bourliouk, a village of some fifty houses, the post-road from Eupatoria to Sebas-



BRIDGE OVER THE ALMA AT BOURLIOUK.

topol¹ crosses the river by a wooden bridge with a central pier of masonry, and ascends the pass between the Kourgané and Telegraph Hills. Below the bridge are two fords practicable for guns; the one close by, the other at the hamlet of Almatamak, where a road from the north leads

¹ A semaphore turret, unfinished, was placed on the commanding ground south of the Alma and west of the Kourgané. This ground has been called the Telegraph Hill or the Telegraph Heights, and the turret is known as the Telegraph.

to the village of Hadji Boulat. North of the river the country is flat and open, the banks are low, and a fringe of village enclosures, etc., borders the stream. On the south, the ground at once rises up to peak and plateau. Between Tarkhanlar and the bridge the northern slopes of the Kourgané terminate in steep banks, 8 ft. to 15 ft. high, which have only a narrow strip of standing room between their sides and the water. West of the bridge the high ground recedes somewhat from the river, which is bordered by a strip or ledge of cultivated land as far as the White Homestead, where steep rocks begin to rise abruptly from the stream. As the sea is approached, these rocks become cliffs.

Prince Menchikoff had at his disposal 33,000 infantry, 3,400 cavalry, and 122 guns. His infantry force, therefore, was greatly outnumbered by the Allies, who, furthermore, were better armed, and had the support of their fleets. The Prince had the advantage of ground and the possession of some guns of superior power.

The Russians did not occupy the extreme left of their position. A battalion of the Minsk Regiment with four guns was at Akles when the battle began, and the ledge of land between the White Homestead and Bourliouk was occupied by four militia¹ battalions, with the Taroutine Regiment in support; while in the rear, on the upper slopes of the Telegraph Hill, were the Moscow Regiment and two batteries of artillery. These troops formed the

¹ The term " militia " was adopted by Kinglake for certain reserve troops, fully described by Todleben, i. p. 177.

Russian left wing, and were under the command of General Kiriakoff.

The post-road runs through ground which is broken into hillocks and hollows, and rises up to the high plateau on which the Telegraph was placed. In this region, commanding the bridge,¹ were posted the Borodino Regiment, a battalion of rifles, a battalion of sappers and two batteries, called by Kinglake the Causeway Batteries. This was the Russian centre.

The Russian right was posted on the Kourgané, whose smooth slopes are only interrupted by a high, flat-topped knoll, about 1,000 yards due east of the bridge. Along the summit of this knoll was made a breastwork with short flanks, for fourteen guns of position,² known as the Great Redoubt. A field battery was placed in rear to support and command it. Nearly a mile to the eastward, facing north-east, was another breastwork, the Lesser Redoubt, to hold the guns of a field battery, and two other field batteries were in reserve close by. On either flank of the Great Redoubt were two battalions of the Kazan Regiment, with skirmishers lining both banks of the river. The Vladimir Regiment occupied the hollow ground directly behind the Great Redoubt, while the Sousdal was in the vicinity of the Lesser Redoubt. On the high ground in rear of the two redoubts were the Ouglitz Regiment and

¹ For some unexplained reason this bridge was not rendered impracticable—probably its central pier was too strong. The flank company of the Grenadier Guards filed over it when the rest of the regiment forded the river in line.

² Two of these pieces were captured, and were found to be a 32-pounder brass howitzer and a 16-pounder gun (Adye's Order Book).

two battalions of sailors. The Russian centre and right were under the command of Prince Gortchakoff.¹

The reserves were drawn up across the post-road, about 2 miles south of the bridge, and consisted of three battalions of the Minsk Regiment, the Volhynie Regiment, and two batteries of horse artillery.

The cavalry, with whom were three batteries of horse artillery, were spread out on a wide arc on the eastern slopes of the Kourgané.

During the battle the forces at General Kiriakoff's disposal amounted to 12,000 infantry, 400 cavalry, and 36 guns; those under Prince Gortchakoff to 21,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 86 guns.²

Opening of the Battle.—After the short conference between the two allied commanders General Bosquet moved off to his right front, followed by the greater portion of the Turkish Division;³ and soon after the guns of the leading vessels of the fleet could be heard as they opened fire on the Russian left and on the guns visible at Akles.⁴ The rest of the allied army moved onwards to the river.

The British were the first to come under fire. About half-past one some range marks, poles with pieces of canvas attached to them, were encountered; spent rifle bullets began dropping about, and a round shot from the Great Redoubt bounded over the heads

¹ Prince Peter Gortchakoff; he took no part in the war after the Alma.

² For Russian numbers, see Todleben, i. pp. 177 etc. For Allies, see Kinglake, ii. pp. 237 etc., and "War in the Crimea," pp. 52 etc. A Russian regiment had 4 battalions, each nominally 750 strong.

³ Two battalions of Turks were left as baggage guard.

⁴ They had previously tried their range against the western slopes of the Telegraph Hill, about 10.30 a.m.

of the Staff. Immediately afterwards the village of Bourliouk burst into sudden flame, and dense smoke obscured a portion of the front. The Light and 2nd Divisions were ordered to deploy, C Troop advanced towards the enclosures on the river bank, opened fire on the Russian infantry in the vicinity of the Great Redoubt, and remained in action until the subsequent advance of the Light Division masked their fire. When the deployment of the Light Division was completed, E, G, and B Batteries moved forward and came into action.¹ B Battery, on the right, was subsequently moved to the left flank of G.² The range being found to be beyond the reach of our 9-pounders, their fire was reserved and the first line lay down.³ Then, awaiting the effect of the French turning movement, Lord Raglan's forces remained under the fire of the Great Redoubt, and it was during this pause that B Battery lost their Second-Captain, Armine Dew, who was killed by the splinter of a shell.

The French Attack.—Meanwhile General Bosquet directed General Bouat's Brigade and the Turks to the bar, at the mouth of the river, while he himself, with General d'Autemarre's Brigade, prepared to cross at Almatamak. Bouat's infantry passed over, but

¹ It is claimed in the Records of this battery, now 12th Battery R.F.A., that the first round fired by the British at the Alma came from E Battery, before C Troop opened fire.

² This was done because an aide-de-camp was sent from Prince Napoleon's Division to point out that its fire was considered dangerous to the French troops on its flank, and also on account of the smoke from the burning village, which obscured the view (Arbuthnot's Notes).

³ "The enemy's artillery was powerful and the range long, and at the commencement we were rather at a disadvantage" ("Recollections of a Military Life," p. 21).

he was unable to get his guns across, and he directed them to follow the march of d'Autemarre's Brigade. He himself with 10,000 infantry reached the plateau above the West Cliff by narrow and circuitous paths, and found it unoccupied. He was far from the scene of action and his force exercised practically no influence in the battle. The Russians had neglected to block the Almatamak road, and, about 2.15 p.m., Bosquet, accompanied by his divisional artillery, ascended to the crest without difficulty; his Zouave battalions nimbly scrambling up the rocks in his front.¹ No hostile infantry were in sight, but half a Russian battery from Akles, pushing up towards Orta-kessek, opened fire upon him. Hearing the guns, Kiriakoff at once moved two battalions of the Moscow Regiment down to the slopes under the Telegraph, and, behind them and higher up the hill, placed one of his batteries to sweep the plateau. Later on, these guns were joined by three other batteries,² and a long-range artillery combat ensued between 36 Russian and 12 French field guns. Bosquet, however, managed to maintain his somewhat isolated position on the fringe of the plateau.

On hearing with surprise of the attack on his left, Prince Menchikoff proceeded from the Great Redoubt to the flank in question, and formed for counter attack a strong body known as the "Column of

¹ Our sailors, looking from their ships, were loud in their praise of the briskness with which the Frenchmen rushed up and "manned" the cliff (Kingleake, ii. p. 273).

² These three batteries were Kiriakoff's own second battery and two batteries, one from the cavalry and one from the reserve, sent to the left by Prince Menchikoff as soon as he was aware of the French attack.

the Eight Battalions," consisting of the Minsk and Moscow Regiments which he concentrated near the Telegraph.¹ But by this manœuvre he made a gap in the Russian line; for the French guns soon compelled the Militia and Taroutine battalions to retire to their left rear, and when the two Moscow battalions sent forward by Kiriakoff were withdrawn to rejoin the other wing of the regiment at the Telegraph, the ledge of cultivated land between the White Homestead and Bourliouk was left unoccupied.

General Bosquet now asked for support, and Marshal St. Arnaud ordered his 1st and 3rd Divisions to support him. General Canrobert immediately pushed across at the White Homestead, but, finding his guns could not accompany the advance, directed them to cross by Almatamak. He established his infantry on the slopes fringing the plateau, and determined to await the support of his artillery before proceeding farther. Prince Napoleon's Division advanced, but remained in the valley, astride of the river, with the exception of his Zouaves, who, having pressed up the slopes to their right front, ranged themselves alongside their comrades under Canrobert.² Though the French columns in front were somewhat congested, Marshal St. Arnaud further directed d'Aurelle's

¹ At first the Prince held this force under his own orders, but about the time of the first onslaught on the Kourgané he handed over command of the "Column of the Eight Battalions" to Kiriakoff and proceeded to his right flank, from which time he is said to have lost personal control of the battle (Kinglelake, ii. pp. 276 etc., and pp. 471 etc.).

² The Zouaves were a *corps d'élite*, and two battalions or a regiment were attached to each of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd French Divisions (Kinglelake, ii. p. 394).

Brigade of Forey's Division to support Canrobert ; while Forey himself, with Lourmel's Brigade, was sent to join Bouat, thus eliminating another 3,000 Frenchmen from the actual combatants.

General d'Aurelle, in his efforts to carry out his orders, got wedged in front of Prince Napoleon, and for a time there was a deadlock. Though the heads of the divisions were under cover, the plunging fire of the Russian guns near the Telegraph took effect on their rear. The French Marshal was himself present with Prince Napoleon's Division, and, witnessing the demeanour of his troops,¹ he despatched an officer to Lord Raglan requesting his co-operation in the advance. It was now about three o'clock.

The British Attack.—Lord Raglan at once gave the welcome order to advance. The Light Division, supported by the 1st Division, was ordered to attack the Kourgané ; the 2nd Division, supported by the 3rd, was to force the pass between that hill and the Telegraph.

The 2nd Division.—During the deployment of the first line some over-lapping had occurred between General Codrington's Brigade of the Light Division and General Pennefather's Brigade of the 2nd Division, and this confusion resulted in the latter's left regiment, the 95th, attaching itself to Codrington. The right of the Light Division just then nearly rested on the post-road, and the burning village of Bourliouk cramped the available space. General Evans therefore found it necessary to separate his command. He directed his brigadier, Adams, with the 49th and

¹ See "Letters from Head-quarters," i. p. 170, and Kinglake, ii. p. 288,

41st Regiments and G Battery, to the right of the village, and he retained the 47th Regiment under his own hand, as well as the two remaining battalions of Pennefather's Brigade. Adams for a time was independent of his Divisional General.

As the advance proceeded, Captain Wodehouse, with H Battery, and Captain Anderson with E Battery, finding their ground for action curtailed, formed on the left of B Battery, which was on the right of the post-road. Evans had thus the support of eighteen guns.

Adams soon succeeded in clearing away the Russian skirmishers from his immediate front; he did not, however, press beyond the river, but established himself near the ford at Bourliouk.¹ G Battery, having covered his advance, was drawn up on his right rear out of action, and this portion of the British force was for the time in a fairly sheltered position.

When General Evans reached the village enclosures, his three batteries came into action behind the burning village and opened fire on the pass and the slopes of the Kourgané. Immediately opposed to them were the Causeway Batteries and the guns in the left flank of the Great Redoubt, while the river banks were lined with the Russian sharpshooters. Men and horses began to fall,² and it was here that

¹ The 41st Regiment crossed at the ford and lined the farther bank.

² The position near the post-road "was probably the hottest of the cannonade. Many of the 55th fell here before advancing into the village. . . . Captain Dew, of Franklin's battery (B), was killed early in the action, near a large painted post beside the road" ("Campaign of Sebastopol," p. 28).

Lieutenant R. H. Cockerell of E Battery was killed by a round shot.

In spite of their gallant efforts, during which serious losses were incurred, Evans' three battalions were unable to push beyond the banks of the river under the fire of the Causeway Batteries.

The Light Division.—To attack the Kourgané meant the assault of the Great Redoubt; and Sir George Brown at once took the bull by the horns. The Light Division, Codrington's Brigade on the right, Buller's on the left, forced its way through the village enclosures, forded the river, scrambled up the steep bank, and formed a long, irregular line at the foot of the Russian slopes. The enemy's cavalry were at striking distance, and General Buller considered it prudent to take up a defensive attitude to cover the left flank. This was accordingly done by the 77th and 88th Regiments, but his right-hand battalion, the 19th Regiment, was carried away in Codrington's advance, whose immediate following was thus raised to five battalions.


As the Light Division advanced to the enclosures C Troop retired to a position more to the left, whence it carried on a brisk fire against the Great Redoubt, and succeeded to some extent in attracting the attention of the Russian gunners; but, the further advance of the infantry again masking its fire, the troop retired to replace ammunition.¹ E Battery, on the left of the guns behind Bourliouk, supported the advance as far as possible,² though its position in rela-


¹ "Corunna to Sebastopol," pp. 99 etc.

² "Anderson (Captain J. R. Anderson of E Battery) threw a great

Great
Redoubt.

Peak of the
Kourgané.





tion to the infantry was not good ; while, on the Russian side, the guns in the Great Redoubt were supported by the Causeway Batteries.

The advance began. The 19th Regiment and the left companies of the 23rd forced the Kazan battalions which were in front to retire, while on the right the other half of the Kazan was held in a steadfast grip by Colonel L. Yea and the 7th Fusiliers. Through these two bodies the rest of the attackers, joined by the Rifles who had been skirmishing on the left front, headed straight for the muzzles of the guns that were visible above them, until the smoke of a salvo hid the prospect. The Redoubt was carried, and two guns were captured ;¹ but a heavy price was paid for victory.²

many rockets, and I have just heard that eight men were killed, one rocket going through a Russian column" (Letter from Captain J. M. Adye to Captain C. Bingham, B.M., in the possession of Major J. H. Leslie).

¹ One gun was found abandoned. A pair of horses was being used to carry off the other, when Captain Bell of the 23rd Regiment, rushing forward, presented his capless pistol at the head of the driver, who hurriedly dismounted and fled. Bell, recalled to other duty, started the horses off downhill, and they were subsequently absorbed in E Battery (Kinglake, ii. p. 334). The captured piece, a 32-pounder howitzer, after many vicissitudes, found its way to Wrexham, where it now stands in the barrack-yard of the Depot, Royal Welch Fusiliers. The author is unable to state what became of the second piece, the 16-pounder gun.

The captured horses were black, in thoroughly good condition, and well groomed ; the harness was of black coarse leather, well preserved, and pliable, the girths being slit in rows lengthways to prevent galling. Russian horses were considered superior to the French, Sardinian, or Turkish animals ("Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 107).

² "On arriving at its (the hill's) foot the four regiments and four companies of the Rifles were less in number than when they went up by 47 officers, 50 sergeants and 800 rank and file killed and wounded." The 7th Fusiliers had 12 officers and more than 200 men amongst the casualties, but they inflicted far heavier loss upon the enemy ("War in the Crimea," p. 59).

Repulse of the First Attack on the Kourgané.—

The immediate arrival of strong reinforcements was absolutely necessary to enable our men to hold the captured work, for the covering field battery opened fire upon them, the Vladimir Regiment emerged from its cover in rear, and the Ouglitz Regiment commenced to descend the hill ; but the supports were not at hand, and the victorious troops were forced to retire. There had been all along a want of cohesion between the attacking and supporting divisions, and it was not at first realised by the Duke of Cambridge how seriously his support was needed. After some most unfortunate delay the 1st Division approached the river, and the Scots Fusilier Guards, the centre regiment of the Guards Brigade, were the first to advance up the hill. But by this time the retreat of the Light Division had become a rout, and the left companies of the Fusilier Guards were broken and disordered by the rush of fugitives who tore through their ranks. Yet the battalion steadied itself and moved forward until it was encountered by the Vladimir Regiment, a formidable column some 3,000 strong, by which it was forced back in confusion to the bottom of the slope. In this part of the field Colonel Yea alone was able to maintain his position. The 7th Fusiliers were still confronting the Kazan battalions ; but to his left the line was only represented by the broken regiments that had fought and bled in vain. Such was the unhappy state of things when suddenly the Russians were smitten by artillery fire coming from the very heart of their position.

Lord Raglan's Movements.—When Lord Raglan had issued his orders for the attack, he himself, followed by his Staff, passed through Evans' troops and rode to the ford below the bridge. In the dangerous zone of cross fire which he had entered, two of his Staff were struck down. "If they can enfilade us here," said he, "we can certainly enfilade them from the rising ground beyond. Order up Turner's battery." Captain J. M. Adye rode off with this order. Lord Raglan then pushed forward, and, after passing through some of the skirmishers of the 3rd French Division, pursued his adventurous course up the eastern slopes of the Telegraph Hill and entered unscathed into what ought to have been Russian ground. But by the retreat of the Militia and Taroutine, and the withdrawal of the Moscow battalions, as before mentioned, a gap had been left in the Russian line, and Lord Raglan, unchallenged, reached the key of their position. He found himself upon the summit of a knoll whence he could look down upon the Causeway Batteries and survey the Russian reserves within easy cannon range. But he could also see the slopes of the Kourgané and the struggle at the mouth of the pass, where Evans was barely holding his own, and as he gazed an aide-de-camp from the French army arrived with news of grave import. The Column of the Eight Battalions had descended from the Telegraph, moved across the front of d'Aurelle's Brigade, and, by its presence, alone had forced back Canrobert to the shelter of the river heights. Thus all along the Allied line affairs were going badly. Lord Raglan gave the messenger

a reassuring answer, but at the same time he cast many an anxious look to the left, for G Battery still tarried.¹

Advance of G Battery.—When Captain Turner received his orders to advance, he at once made for the ford in front of him. Lieutenant H. P. P. Phelips, with the left division, was in advance, but the horses at first refused to take the water. Captain D. Lysons, 23rd Regiment, who was carrying a message to General Evans, saw the difficulty, and, being on a steady old hunter, gave the guns a lead over the river.² A further delay was now caused by a wheel horse being shot, and one of the howitzers under Lieutenant A. Walsham upset while going down the bank of the river. This delayed the rest of the battery; but Turner, with his leading division, pressed forward and came into action just as the Fusilier Guards were driven back. In the rapid advance uphill the detachments were outstripped, and when the guns did arrive they were short-handed. General Strangways at once directed Colonel Collingwood Dickson and Captain S. E. Gordon, his aide-de-camp to dismount and aid in the working of the guns, and these officers worked in the detachment until the

¹ Details of these incidents will be found in "Letters from Headquarters," i. pp. 172 etc., and in Kinglake, ii. pp. 383 etc. The following (from an eye witness) marks the time of arrival of Turner's first two guns: "Lord Raglan had been looking on all this time, having arrived on the high ground before alluded to just as the Light Division advanced up the hill. When he saw the 1st Division coming up in support he said: 'Look how well the Guards and Highlanders advance!' An aide-de-camp came up at this moment and reported the arrival of two guns of Turner's battery. Thank God, the guns at last!" ("Letters from Headquarters," i. p. 177).

² See "The Crimean War from First to Last," p. 99.

arrival of the gunners.¹ The other four pieces subsequently joined the left division.

The Causeway Batteries formed the first target, and the second shot found its mark—a limber was struck and two horses killed. The Russians, finding their guns taken in flank, as well as battered in front by General Evans' artillery, immediately withdrew their batteries to a position higher up the pass, whence they produced small effect. The Volhynie Regiment, all that now remained of the Russian reserve, was next attacked by Turner, and its dense columns were an easy target. The range was found after two shots, and round shot were seen to plough through the solid mass of the regiment, which, however, effected its retreat in good order.

Fire was next directed on the Vladimir battalions hovering over the slope, down which our men had been driven. The range proved too long for material results, but this mattered little. The moral effect of artillery was plainly demonstrated. The defenders of the pass, who had successfully endured frontal attack, succumbed when the first projectiles flew over their flank. Their guns were withdrawn and their infantry followed. Deprived of the support of the Causeway Batteries, the infantry action on the Kourgané was paralysed, the triumphant advance of the Vladimir was stayed, the Ouglitz battalions were recalled, and the retreat of our beaten troops was not pressed.²

¹ Letter from Colonel Collingwood Dickson published in the *Times*, February, 1855.

² See Kinglake, ii. pp. 404 etc.

Movements of the 2nd Division.—The road up the pass now lay open before Evans. As soon as the Causeway Batteries ceased fire, the 47th Regiment pressed forward and lined the south bank of the Alma; the 30th, which had already crossed, pushed uphill; and the 55th followed. E Battery had for a time ceased firing, its limber ammunition being expended, and B Battery had lost many of its horses; but H Battery, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Dacres himself, dashed forward in advance, and came into action on the right of the 30th Regiment. Again the detachments were left behind. Officers aided in working the guns, and Dacres himself laid the first shot fired at the Kourgané. Later, E and B Batteries came up, and Captain Paynter with A Battery crossed the river.¹ The massed batteries eventually occupied a position in the pass close to the site vacated by the Causeway Batteries.

Advance of the 1st Division.—Just at the time

¹ "At this time Wodehouse's battery, which had been limbered up and led across the river by Lieutenant-Colonel Dacres, when the Russian guns ceased firing, came up on the right of the 30th Regiment. The slopes in front were still covered by the enemy's skirmishers obstinately contesting the ground with our own, and giving way, if at all, very slowly. Over the height, behind the contested battery, the helmets of a Russian column might be seen, and presently the solid mass, apparently about 2,000 strong, marched over the hill and began to descend towards the British line. A shell from a gun laid by Colonel Dacres himself, before the gun detachments came up, dropped among the Russian skirmishers. The other guns, coming up in succession, opened their fire on the column and struck it every time. Franklin's and Anderson's batteries, B and E, crossing the river, came up and opened on the left, and Paynter followed; and the column, after marching about fifty yards down the hill, halted, turned about, and, disappearing over the crest, was seen no more" ("Campaign of Sebastopol," pp. 30, 31. Compare "War in the Crimea," p. 60; also Kinglake, ii. pp. 438, 439 and n.).

when the Scots Fusilier Guards were retiring, Colonel Yea saw that the Kazan battalions were giving way at last before the fire of his Fusiliers. The regiment had suffered great loss, but his obstinate fight had preserved our footing on the enemy's ground, and support was close at hand. The Grenadier Guards forded the stream in line, and the 7th were re-formed behind them. Farther to the left, the Coldstream Guards crossed in column and were formed into line under the eyes of the enemy, but between these battalions was the gap left by the centre regiment. The broken line was continued to the left by the three Highland battalions. The Kourgané was now about to be assailed for the second time, but not under the same conditions as before. Gun power was no longer on the side of the Russians, for not only had the guns of position been hurriedly removed from the Great Redoubt on the approach of the Light Division, but the field guns in rear were subsequently withdrawn.

The goal of the Guards was the Great Redoubt, and, although infantry¹ alone opposed them, their task was no mean one. Immediately in their front was the Vladimir, supported by the left wing of the Kazan, and the gap in their line left by the Scots

¹ The withdrawal of the Causeway Batteries is thus referred to: "Thus the heavy cannonade which the Light Division had been under was at a most important moment arrested, and this spared the Guards" ("Letters from Head-quarters," i. p. 179). Again, Kinglake says the Highland Brigade received "the badly aimed fire of the field guns in the earthwork on the flank" (i.e., the Lesser Redoubt). These guns then rapidly withdrew from the action ("War in the Crimea," p. 61). There were no other guns in battery (see Kinglake, ii. p. 422).

Fusiliers was not immediately filled up.¹ But, assisted by the fire of our guns in the pass, they gradually attained the mastery of the troops in front of them.² Farther to the left, the 42nd Highlanders found the right wing of the Kazans on their front, and their flank left threatened by the Sousdal left wing. The Highlanders were in échelon of regiments, and while the 42nd defeated the Kazan men, the 93rd fell upon the Sousdals and drove them back. But in doing so their own flank was threatened by the right wing of the same regiment. The last word, however, was with Sir Colin Campbell, for the 79th, coming up the hill, caught the right wing of the Sousdals marching across its front, and routed them.

Movements of Adams' Brigade and G Battery.—Meanwhile Lord Raglan kept his position on the knoll. Adams reached him with his two battalions just as the advance of the Grenadiers commenced, and the presence of British troops on this elevated spot proclaimed the fact that the Russian centre had been pierced. After leaving orders with Turner to keep up a fire on the Russian columns on the Kourgané, and directing Adams to rejoin General Evans, the British Commander rode off to the part of the field where his 1st Division was engaged.

When the Russians retreated before the Guards, Turner advanced his guns to a position farther up the pass, where he was joined by one of the French batteries, and a combined long-range fire was opened

¹ The Fusilier Guards were soon rallied and resumed their place in the line ("Letters from Head-quarters," i. p. 179).

² See Kinglake, ii. p. 439 and notes; also see note on p. 142, *ante*.

on the enemy on the Kourgané; but as the Highlanders were ascending the hill he received an order from Lord Raglan to advance to a more commanding point on his left front. The French battery did not move, but Turner carried out his change of position.

It was after crossing the river that Lieutenant A. Walsham of G Battery was killed: in a subsequent movement the detachments were outpaced, and he and Lieutenant A. Brendon fell in as muzzle numbers of the first gun that came into action; before it could be fired, Walsham was shot by a rifle bullet which entered his breast.


Capture of the Kourgané.—A mighty cheer rent the air as the victorious 1st Division lined the crest of the Kourgané. After refilling its limbers, C Troop R.H.A. crossed the river near where Buller's Brigade had taken up its stand, and with some difficulty ascended the slopes of the Kourgané. The Cavalry Brigade also crossed in the same neighbourhood. A gun carriage of I Troop R.H.A. was overturned, which caused some delay, but the cavalry reached the heights almost as soon as they were crowned. Three guns of I Troop and three guns of C now came into action in line with the Highlanders. The Ouglitz Regiment, as yet untouched, made a forward demonstration, but it was futile; the Russian guns had disappeared, their cavalry made no sign, the infantry that had borne the burden of the fight were melting away, and the Ouglitz followed the other troops in retreat. W Battery of the 3rd Division forded the river as the Grenadier Guards were crossing, but the hill was carried before they came into

action. They pushed on up the slopes, however, followed by a portion of F Battery ; formed up on the right of C Troop on the crest of the Kourgané ; and joined in the general cannonade that was opened on the retreating Russians, who, with praiseworthy steadiness, still maintained a military formation.

Capture of the Telegraph.—On the French side the tide of battle had turned in favour of the Allies. Awed by the imposing appearance of the Column of the Eight Battalions, the French sought shelter on the slopes of the plateau. The Column had not fired a shot and was drawn up in triumph on the ground it had won, when suddenly round shot tore through its ranks and shell burst over it. Kiriakoff, imagining he had come under fire of the fleet, began to retreat by the way he had come, his steady soldiery keeping their formations in spite of heavy loss. It was not, however, the guns of the ships which caused the havoc. The French artillery had at last ascended to the high ground, and, being handled with rare skill and activity, were destroying the Column, although unseen themselves. The French infantry at once advanced, and their task was now comparatively easy. The Militia battalions had become disorganised, the Taroutine alone were left, and just as our Grenadiers were entering into their combat with the Vladimir, the Zouaves and the 39th Regiment crowned the heights and planted the tricolour on the Telegraph. Kiriakoff, gathering his available troops, retired towards the south.

End of Battle.—It was now half-past four o'clock, and the Battle of the Alma was won. The British

cavalry and horse artillery moved towards the post-road, ready for the orders to pursue; but none were forthcoming. General England's Division had hardly been engaged, and was well up in the front; French troops who had not fired a shot were in such a position that a rapid advance would have been disastrous to the Russians; but, in spite of Lord Raglan's representations, Marshal St. Arnaud absolutely refused to co-operate, and the British General was unwilling to risk his small force of cavalry, the only repre-



RUSSIAN GUN CAPTURED AT THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1854, BY CAPTAIN E. W. S. BELL, ROYAL WELCH FUSILIERS.

sentatives of the arm at present with the Allies, in what might turn out a hazardous operation if unsupported. He sent forward the cavalry, but merely as an escort, with the guns which advanced to fire upon the retreating Russians. Kiriakoff, with great skill, occupied for a time a position on the hill south of the Telegraph, and, as the Allies did not pursue, there was no reason why the Russian troops, who had exhibited such courage and endurance, should not have carried out their retreat in an orderly manner. But as darkness closed in, panic arose, and it was a dis-

heartened host that retired behind the Katcha. The Allies bivouacked on the field.

Casualties, etc.—The British lost 26 officers and 327 men killed, and there were 73 officers and 1,539 men wounded. Total casualties, including 18 men missing, 1,983.¹

The French lost 6 officers and 132 men killed, and had 59 officers and 1,140 men wounded. Total casualties, 1,337.²

The Russians lost 46 officers and 1,775 men killed, and there were 145 officers and 3,028 men wounded. Total casualties, including prisoners, etc., 5,709.³

The details of the losses incurred by the Artillery are given in the following table,⁴ as also the number of rounds fired by each battery ; and the expenditure of small-arm ammunition.

TABLE XXIV
CASUALTIES AND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

Troop or Company.	Killed.		Wounded.		Rounds. Expended.
	Officers.	N.C.O.'s and Men.	Officers.	N.C.O.'s and Men.	
C Troop	1	138*
I "	128*
A Battery	3	24
B "	1	3	..	6	49
E "	1	2	..	4	285*
F "	27
G "	1	1	..	3	130
H "	1	56
P "	nil
W "	1	..	2	50
Total	3	9	0	18	887

* Includes rounds fired at the Boulganak.

Note.—Twenty-six horses were killed, in B Battery for the most part.

¹ Sayer, p. 59.

³ Todleben, i. p. 202.

² Niel, p. 27.

⁴ Adye's Order Book.

The expenditure of small-arm ammunition was as follows :

					Rounds.
1st Division	36,360 (Minié)
2nd	„	.	.	.	14,829 (Minié)
3rd	„	.	.	.	47 (Minié)
4th	„	.	.	.	nil
Light	„	.	.	.	38,939 (Minié)
Total				.	<u>90,175</u>

APPENDICES TO CHAPTER III

APPENDIX No. I

COMPOSITION OF ALLIED FIELD FORCE,
SEPTEMBER, 1854

BRITISH ARMY

GENERAL LORD RAGLAN, Commander-in-Chief.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. B. B. ESTCOURT, Adjutant-General.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. AIREY, Quartermaster-General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THE EARL OF LUCAN, Commanding the Cavalry.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL T. FOX-STRANGWAYS, Commanding the Artillery.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN BURGOWNE, Commanding the Engineers.

DR. HALL, Principal Medical Officer.

MR. COMMISSARY FILDER.

CAVALRY BRIGADE

MAJOR-GENERAL THE EARL OF CARDIGAN

I Troop, R.H.A.	4th Light Dragoons.	8th Hussars.
11th Hussars.	13th Light Dragoons.	17th Lancers.

FIRST DIVISION

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

First Brigade

Major-General H. J. W. Bentinck

3rd Battalion, Grenadier Guards.	1st Battalion, Coldstream Guards.
1st Battalion, Scots Fusilier Guards.	

Second Brigade

Major-General Sir Colin Campbell

42nd Foot (<i>The Black Watch</i>).	79th Foot.	93rd Foot.
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Divisional Artillery

Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. Dacres

A Field Battery, R.A.

H Field Battery, R.A.

SECOND DIVISION

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR DE LACY EVANS

First Brigade

Brigadier-General H. W. Adams

41st Foot. 47th Foot. 49th Foot.

Second Brigade

Major-General J. L. Pennefather

30th Foot. 55th Foot. 95th Foot.

Divisional Artillery

Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Fitzmayer

B Field Battery, R.A. (*The Grey Battery*). G Field Battery, R.A.

THIRD DIVISION

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR R. ENGLAND

First Brigade

Brigadier-General Sir John Campbell

1st Foot. 38th Foot. 50th Foot.

Second Brigade

Brigadier-General W. Eyre

4th Foot. 28th Foot. 44th Foot.

Divisional Artillery

Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Dupuis

F Field Battery, R.A. W Field Battery, R.A.

FOURTH DIVISION (*incomplete*)

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THE HON. SIR G. CATHCART

20th Foot. 21st Foot. 68th Foot.
1st Battery, Rifle Brigade. P Field Battery, R.A.

LIGHT DIVISION

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR GEORGE BROWN

First Brigade

Major-General W. Codrington

7th Foot (*Fusiliers*). 33rd Foot.
23rd Foot (*Royal Welch Fusiliers*). 2nd Battalion, Rifle Brigade.

Second Brigade

Brigadier-General G. Buller

19th Foot. 77th Foot. 88th Foot (*Connaught Rangers*).*Divisional Artillery*

Lieutenant-Colonel N. T. Lake

C Troop, R.H.A. E Field Battery, R.A. (*The Black Battery*).

Note.—A proportion of Royal Sappers and Miners was attached to each division of the Army.

In addition to the Siege Train the British Army consisted of 26,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, 60 field guns, and 300 sapper and miners.

FRENCH ARMY

MARSHAL LEROY DE ST. ARNAUD, Commander-in-Chief

FIRST DIVISION

GENERAL CANROBERT

Brigadiers: Generals Espinasse and Vinoy.

SECOND DIVISION

GENERAL BOSQUET

Brigadiers: Generals d'Autemarre and Bouat.

THIRD DIVISION

GENERAL PRINCE NAPOLEON

Brigadiers: Generals de Monet and Thomas.

FOURTH DIVISION

GENERAL FOREY

Brigadiers: Generals de Lourmel and d'Aurelle.

The Divisions varied in strength from 7,000 to 5,000 bayonets, and, with the exception of the Fourth, were each accompanied by two batteries of artillery, and a company of engineers. There was practically no cavalry.

TURKISH ARMY

ACHMET PASHA, Commanding

Infantry Division of 7,000 bayonets

The Turks were under the command of Marshal St. Arnaud.

APPENDIX No. 2

R.A. OFFICERS PRESENT AT THE BATTLE OF
THE ALMA

HEAD-QUARTER STAFF

Brigadier-General T. Fox-Strangways, Commanding R.A. ; 2nd Captain S. E. Gordon, A.D.C. ; Captain J. M. Adye and 2nd Captain the Hon. E. T. Gage, Brigade-Majors ; Captain and Acting-Adjutant J. C. W. Fortescue ; Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel Collingwood Dickson, Turkish Interpreter to Lord Raglan, Doctor R. C. Elliot, Senior Surgeon ; Veterinary Surgeon J. S. Stockley, Principal Veterinary Surgeon ; Commissary W. L. M. Young, Commissary of Ordnance.

CAVALRY BRIGADE

Captain G. A. Maude, Commanding I Troop, R.H.A. (*now O Battery, R.H.A.*) ; 2nd Captain J. D. Shakespeare, Lieutenants A. Vandeleur and H. W. J. Dashwood, Officers of I Troop.

FIRST DIVISION

Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. Dacres, Commanding R.A., First Division ; Captain E. B. Hamley, Adjutant ; Captain D. W. Paynter, Commanding A Battery (*now 38th Battery, R.F.A.*) ; 2nd Captain P. G. Papon, Lieutenants E. Taddy, W. G. Le Mesurier, and G. J. Young,¹ Officers of A Battery ; Captain E. Wodehouse, Commanding H Battery (*now 64th Battery, R.F.A.*) ; 2nd Captain G. Barstow, Lieutenants W. P. Richards, A. H. King, and S. J. M. Maxwell, Officers of H Battery.

SECOND DIVISION

Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Fitzmayer, Commanding R.A., Second Division, Adjutant—; ² Captain C. T. Franklin, Commanding B Battery (*now 14th Battery, R.F.A.*) ; 2nd Captain Armine Dew, Lieutenants E. Markham, H. T. Arbuthnot, and L. D. Broughton, Officers of B Battery ; Captain J. Turner, Commanding G Battery (*now 19th Battery, R.F.A.*) ; 2nd Captain J. G. Boothby, Lieutenants A. Brendon, H. P. P. Phelips, and A. Walsham, Officers of G Battery.

¹ His elder brother was killed at the Alma, and he succeeded to the baronetcy.

² Captain H. W. Patton, Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzmayer's Adjutant, was sick on board ship. Captain J. C. W. Fortescue, who was designed to take his place, was transferred to the Head-quarter Staff. Possibly 2nd Captain H. P. Yates acted as Adjutant at the Alma, but for this suggestion the author can find no authority (see note 3, p. 154).

THIRD DIVISION

Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Dupuis, Commanding R.A., Third Division; 2nd Captain M. A. S. Biddulph, Adjutant; Captain W. Swinton, Commanding F Battery (*now 7th Battery, R.F.A.*); 2nd Captain W. W. Barry and Lieutenant A. W. A. Ogilvie, Officers of F Battery; Captain G. R. Barker, Commanding W Battery (*now 62nd Battery, R.F.A.*); 2nd Captain J. E. Michell, Lieutenants P. Dickson, J. de Havilland, and R. Biddulph, Officers of W. Battery.

FOURTH DIVISION (*in Reserve*)

Brevet-Major S. P. Townsend, Commanding P Battery (*now 63rd Battery, R.F.A.*); 2nd Captain D. E. Hoste, Lieutenants W. W. A. Lukin, F. Miller, and H. J. Alderson,¹ Officers of P Battery.

LIGHT DIVISION

Lieutenant-Colonel N. T. Lake, Commanding R.A., Light Division; 2nd Captain J. F. L. Baddeley, Adjutant; Captain J. J. Brandling,¹ Commanding C Troop (*now C Battery, R.H.A.*); Captain H. F. Strange,¹ Lieutenants A. Y. Earle, S. M. Grylls, and W. A. Fox-Strangways, Officers of C Troop; Captain J. R. Anderson, Commanding E Battery (*now 12th Battery, R.F.A.*); 2nd Captain J. Singleton, Lieutenants R. C. Longley, W. Stirling, and R. H. Cockerell, Officers of E Battery

R.A. OFFICERS NOT INCLUDED IN ABOVE DETAIL

2nd Captain C. H. Ingilby;² 2nd Captain H. P. Yates;³ Lieutenant W. D. Guille.¹

SURGEONS

E. Gilborne (attached to B Battery); S. H. Fasson (attached to C Troop); R. Thornton (attached to I Troop); W. Combe, W. P. Ward, W. Perry, A. S. Fogo (attached to W Battery); J. C. H. Wright.

VETERINARY SURGEONS

H. Withers (attached to E Battery); M. J. Harpley (attached to A Battery).

ASSISTANT AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSARIES OF ORDNANCE

H. Blakeney, J. Lilley, W. Gair, J. O'Connor.

¹ These officers were borrowed from the Siege Train companies, whither they returned after the battle, with the exception of Captain Brandling, who remained in command of C Troop. The author cannot discover what Lieutenant Guille's duties were.

² 2nd Captain Ingilby was a subaltern in E Battery until his promotion in June, 1854. He appears to have continued serving with the battery.

³ 2nd Captain H. P. Yates was a subaltern in B Battery until his promotion in June, 1854. He continued to serve with the battery, which he commanded on October 26.

CHAPTER IV

THE BEGINNING OF THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL

1. THE FLANK MARCH

The Advance to the Belbek.—The main body of the Allies did not quit the ground that had been won until September 23, when the march was resumed to the hills beyond the Katcha. Here his first reinforcements, consisting of the Scots Greys and the 57th Regiment, joined Lord Raglan, having landed at the mouth of the river. On the 24th the British army halted beyond the Belbek. Since the battle of the Alma the Light Cavalry and I Troop R.H.A. had covered the advance of the army, and now they received a foretaste of the trials to come, for the horses "had neither forage nor water for forty-eight hours, all which time they remained accoutred and harnessed; and the men and officers did not for these or two other days taste meat."¹ At this time the momentous decision to attack Sebastopol from the south was arrived at and the famous flank march was begun. On September 25 the British led the advance.²

¹ "War in the Crimea," p. 67.


² The account of the affair at McKenzie's Farm is based on Kinglake, iii. pp. 84 etc.; "War in the Crimea," pp. 75 etc., by Hamley (eye-witness); "Campaign of Sebastopol," pp. 46 etc., by Hamley (eye-

McKenzie's Farm.—It was Lord Raglan's intention to make his way through the steep and densely wooded country to his front and strike the post-road where it crosses the high ground near McKenzie's Farm. A narrow woodland road, which was shown on the map, appeared to lead to this place, and Lord Lucan was ordered to move along it, taking with him some of the cavalry, including the Greys, I Troop R.H.A. (Captain Maude), and a detachment of the Rifles. He was to be followed by the 1st, 2nd, and Light Divisions, who were ordered to break through the trees and brush-wood as best they could, and steer by compass if necessary. B, G, A, and H Batteries¹ received orders to march at once, without waiting for the infantry divisions, and the long column of guns and wagons advanced along the narrow way taken by Lord Lucan, until their further progress was barred by finding I Troop halted in front of them. The cavalry general, after following the direct road for some time, had diverged to his right and taken a by-path which eventually "degenerated into a mere track and at last disappeared altogether." It thus happened that the Rifles and cavalry were no longer

witness); "Letters from Captain G. A. Maude" (eye-witness); "Letters of Lieutenant H. T. Arbuthnot" (eye-witness); and "Corunna to Sebastopol," pp. 112 etc.

¹ Hamley in both his accounts distinctly states that this column consisted of four field batteries, and General H. T. Arbuthnot is sure that B Battery was in front. The four batteries, then, were doubtless those of the 2nd and 1st Divisions. From "Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 112, it is evident that C Troop did not march on a road, but actually cut its way through the wood, which it entered at the same time as the Light Division, and did not arrive at McKenzie's Farm till after the advance of the Greys. Presumably E Battery followed C Troop.

leading the advance on McKenzie's Farm. But Maude had kept to the proper road, and he consequently found himself "leading the advance of an army in ground where the troop could do nothing effectual for its own defence and was devoid of all proper protection and support."¹ He very naturally halted.



At this juncture Lord Raglan, followed by his Staff and a light cavalry escort, appeared upon the scene. He had returned from a reconnaissance² on

¹ "War in the Crimea," p. 75.

² A curious incident is mentioned in "Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 113. As C Troop was fighting its way through the wood it came on a cross-road, where "Lord Raglan with some of his Staff were examining hoof marks in the white dust." The question was, were they British or were they Russian? The troop farrier was called, and gave it "Russian." This, of course, was conclusive.

the hills to the westward, whence he had obtained his first view of Sebastopol, and with some sharpness asked why the column had halted. Presumably without waiting for a reply, he ordered it to proceed and placed himself at its head. The Staff and I Troop hurried forward through the unexplored wood, and the long column of guns followed.

Menchikoff's Movements after the Alma.—Prince Menchikoff, after his defeat at the Alma, had hastened to Sebastopol, reaching the fortress the same night. During the following day, September 21, his army moved across the Roadstead, and went into bivouac to the south of the city. The same day, five ships of war and two frigates were, in accordance with his orders, moored across the mouth of the Roadstead, and, deeply to the chagrin of Admiral Korniloff, who was in command of the Russian fleet, they were scuttled during the night, so that the entrance to Sebastopol was effectually sealed. Then, leaving the city and the troops therein under the command of Lieutenant-General de Moller, and confiding the north front to Admiral Korniloff, the Prince determined to move out with his field army, and, ascending the high ground to the east, to keep open his communications with Russia by taking up his position across the main road, with his back to Baktchiserai. In pursuance of this plan his army marched at dawn on the 25th, and, crossing the Tchernaya by the Tractir bridge, took the main road to the north. Thus at McKenzie's Farm the line of retreat of the Russians and the line of advance of the British crossed each other at right angles.

The Rencontre.—The extraordinary method of advancing through an enemy's country adopted by Lord Raglan was persevered in for some time. Ignorant that his cavalry were on his right and not his front, the British Commander, followed by his Staff in single file, was riding abreast of the leading sub-division of I Troop, when, from the light shining through the trees, an opening in the wood appeared to be at hand. General Airey asked leave to advance and reconnoitre, but he had only gone a few yards when he stopped and held up a warning hand. He saw before him McKenzie's Farm, and hard by on the main road the Russian army on the march. Perhaps the most remarkable *rencontre* in modern war! Luckily for the British, the Russians had almost all passed, and it was merely a careless baggage guard that met the eyes of our astonished Quartermaster-General. Surprise equally possessed the Russian force, which consisted of a battalion of Black Sea Cossacks escorting an ammunition train and some baggage; but there was not an officer among them with sufficient presence of mind to recognise and seize the golden opportunity. Our Head-quarter Staff and the guns behind them, moving along the narrow tree-girt path, would have fallen an easy prey to a few enterprising skirmishers; but, far from making any offensive movement, the Russians hurried along the road to Baktchiserai, their retreat being hastened by a few rounds from I Troop, which upset some of the wagons.

The Pursuit.—About a quarter of an hour after General Airey's discovery Lord Lucan came up with

the cavalry. The Scots Greys at once dismounted and went skirmishing through the woods on either side; while I Troop, pressing forward along the road, came upon the enemy in a wide part of it, drawn up to receive cavalry. At sight of the guns, which got within 30 yards before they were perceived, the Russians at once broke up. Some ran into the woods and opened an ineffectual fire on the troop; some were pursued and cut down by the cavalry; some fell under the fire of the guns, which at once opened with case; and some were shot by the Scots Greys.¹ The field batteries had now come up, and B, the leading battery, fired a few rounds after the retreating Russians; but all the guns (five field batteries and C Troop) were eventually brought into the clear space about the farm, so as to open on the force that had passed, should it return, or on any other that might be following it. The cavalry pursued the Russians to where the road topped the rise, whence a view to the north could be obtained. Large bodies of the enemy were then seen winding northwards along the road, and distant clouds of dust proclaimed the presence of more troops in front of them; but our advance continued, the Head-quarter Staff having wholly failed to realise the extent and meaning of Menchikoff's manœuvres.

¹ "Some of the Scots Greys dismounting went skirmishing through the wood, and about a dozen Russians throwing themselves down and pretending to be dead, rose after they were past and fired on them, for which discreditable ruse they were, as they deserved to be, all put to death" ("Campaign of Sebastopol," p. 48).

It is to be remembered that these were "Cossacks" and not regular Russian troops.

The Prince himself was equally in the dark. He was at Otarköi when the Black Sea Cossacks were put to flight, and, it is said, was for several days under the impression "that the irruption in his rear had been made by a patrol."¹

Capture of Balaclava.—On the evening of September 25 our leading divisions, following the road so lately trodden by the enemy, crossed the Tractir bridge and bivouacked on the Tchernaya, while the French reached McKenzie's Farm. Next day the march was resumed in the direction of Balaclava, and Lord Raglan had passed the little village of Kadikoï when it was reported that Balaclava was undefended. But suddenly an old Genoese fort which crowned one of the hills that closed in the prospect to the south opened fire, and a shot, followed by a shell,² fell close to the Head-quarter Staff. The Light Division was leading, and C Troop at once came into action; but it was found impossible to elevate the guns sufficiently to return the fire of the fort, and

¹ "War in the Crimea," p. 76.

This view is further borne out by the lax state of discipline of this baggage guard, for it can in no sense be considered a rearguard. One officer, a captain of artillery, was taken prisoner, and as Kinglake quaintly puts it: "He had brought himself to that stage and that kind of drunkenness which causes the patient to reel in curves from side to side, declaring his goodwill to his fellow creatures and instantly proffering his friendship" (Kinglake, iii. p. 93).

Captain J. C. W. Fortescue, R.A., who took up Captain G. T. Field's duties in the absence of that officer on sick leave, superintended the blowing up of the captured ammunition, while the plunder of a baggage wagon afforded occupation of a lighter nature to some of the troops ("Campaign of Sebastopol," p. 49).

² The shell "burst amongst the staff, and a splinter tore the back of one of the officers' coats from the waist right up to the collar" ("Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 116).

a half-troop under Lieutenant S. M. Grylls was directed to ascend the steep ground to the left of it. By hooking detachment horses with web breast harness in front of the teams the ascent was successfully made, and the gunners, and the 77th Regiment who accompanied them, were enabled to look into the interior of the fort, which at once surrendered when the guns opened fire. It made no defence, for practically there were no defenders.¹ From Lord Raglan's position a flash of water was visible close to the small street that constituted the village of Balaclava, and even as the white flag was hoisted in the old fort a vessel carrying British colours came gliding into this little pool or basin from between the enfolding hills. Connection with the navy was once more established, for the little pool was the head of Balaclava Harbour.

Next day, September 27, our vessels were crowding in from the sea when the French divisions marched down into the plain, and General Canrobert, who had succeeded Marshal St. Arnaud in the command, hesitated somewhat before consenting to the exclusive use of Balaclava by the British; but there was not sufficient accommodation there for both armies. The ample advantages for a base offered at Kamiesch were not at first recognised, and, seeing that the French had hitherto operated on the right, Canrobert showed considerable forbearance when he gave Lord Raglan his choice of either flank. The latter, urged, it is said, by the strong opinion expressed by

¹ The officer in charge of the Castle, Colonel Monto, had no force under his orders, "except a few Greeks of Balaclava who had been formed into a kind of local Militia" (Kinglake, iii. p. 99).

Admiral Lyons, chose the right with all its burdens and perils, and Balaclava was henceforth his own.¹

2. THE DEFENCES OF SEBASTOPOL ²

The Seaward Defences.—Under the existing conditions of coast warfare, the seaward defences of Sebastopol were of a formidable nature. South of the entrance of the magnificent Roadstead lies the ground upon which the City proper is built. It is bounded on the west by the Quarantine Bay, on the north by the waters of the Roadstead and the inlet of the Artillery Bay, and on the east by the Man-of-War Harbour, a splendid anchorage, which measures 2,500 yards from north to south, and is a quarter of a mile wide. In its central portion rises the commanding City Hill, lying between the rockbound Zagorodnoy Ravine and the Town Ravine, which traverses the city north and south and runs into the Artillery Bay. The eastern side of the Man-of-War Harbour is deeply indented close to its mouth by the creek which leads to the extensive docks, east of which lies the Karabelnaya suburb. The Roadstead itself is deep, and ships of war could ride at anchor close to the mouth of the Tchernaya. Where it washes the Karabelnaya it is fringed by high ground, which presently bends to the south-west, to form the Ouchakoff Ravine, and then continues to the Point, which marks the entrance of the Careenage Creek.

¹ See Kinglake, iii. p. 102.


² When English names exist for any locality, these names are used in the text, even though they were only given or came into use at a later date than that treated of—e.g. Cathcart Hill. In the absence of these names, Russian ones are employed.

The northern banks of the Roadstead are not so precipitous, and are unbroken by any inlet, but the ground rises sufficiently to give adequate command over all the sea approaches.

When the war broke out with Turkey in 1853, the entrance of the Roadstead was protected on the south by two forts, the Quarantine and Alexander—the former a closed earthen redoubt, with guns on barbette mountings; the latter of masonry, with three tiers of guns, one on the roof and two in casemates. A similar work, Fort Constantine, guarded the north side of the entrance, and was supported and flanked by Forts Michael and Catharine, whose guns swept the inner waters. Fort Alexander was supported on its inner flank by the Artillery Fort, while on either side of the mouth of the Man-of-War Harbour stood Forts Nicholas and Paul. Early in 1854, when hostilities with France and Great Britain appeared imminent, the inner defences were strengthened by three new batteries, namely the Twelve Apostles and the Paris, on the north side of the Roadstead, and, opposite to them, the Sviatoslaw, near the entry to the Careenage Creek. The outer waters, also, were further protected by two new works on the high ground north of Fort Constantine; they were named after their designers, Colonel Kartashevsky and Lieutenant Volovkoff, and were destined to demonstrate beyond dispute the value of a high site for coast artillery, so that their English names, the Telegraph and the Wasp, are famous in history.¹

¹ For the marked success obtained by these batteries in the naval engagement of October 17, 1854, see Kinglake, iii. pp. 426 etc.

Naval
Library.



ENTRANCE TO THE ROADSTEAD OF SEVASTOPOL.

(After Rossoli.)

At the time of the landing of the Allies, 610 guns were mounted in these coast defences, and 37 of them, mostly of small calibre, bore upon the land. When the seven war-ships were sunk, they formed an outer boom between Forts Constantine and Alexander, and a second boom of iron cables was made 1,000 yards in rear. The remaining vessels of the Russian fleet were anchored out of range from the sea, and could either sweep the entire Roadstead with their fire or aid in resisting land attacks.

The Landward Defences.—The land side of Sebastopol had been neglected. Invasion was long regarded as outside the sphere of practical politics,¹ and, though in 1853 some measures were taken to resist a possible raid, the land fortifications were entirely inadequate when the presence of 62,000 enemies on Russian soil became an accomplished fact. It was on the north side² of the fortress that an attack seemed imminent, yet, though not devoid of all protection, its defences were most unsatisfactory. The principal safeguard was the large fort, Star, built in 1818, and feverish efforts were still being made to improve its powers of resistance when, on September 25, the march of the Allies along the McKenzie Hills was discerned from the Naval Library. In all haste attention was then turned to the south.

The South Side of Sebastopol.—On the south side the fortress is surrounded by a series of mounds and hillocks admirably adapted for defence. The ground beyond, over which an attacker would have to operate,

¹ Todleben, i. pp. 92, 122.

² The north side of Sebastopol was called the Savernaya.

is divided into an eastern and a western area by the Great Ravine, running north and south.

The Eastern Area.—The eastern area is channelled by four other ravines which, beginning near the Sapouné Ridge as small depressions, gradually deepen and widen as they run parallel to each other in a north-westerly direction; while their sides change from gentle slopes to broken walls of terraced rock. The most easterly is the Careenage Ravine, which terminates in the creek of that name. On its right is the Inkerman Ridge; on its left, the undulating Victoria Ridge whose southern end culminates in a knoll,¹ the site of the Victoria Redoubt, built by the Allies in 1855, whence the ground sinks towards the fortress for 2,000 yards, when it rises up to form the Mamelon, then sinks again, and again rises to form the Malakoff Hill. The next ravine leads to the Karabelnaya, and was called by us the Middle Ravine; it is separated from the Woronzoff Ravine by a somewhat similar ridge. Its southern end is also marked by a knoll on which stood a picket-house whence the ground slopes towards, and well in sight of, the fortress, till it rises up to Frenchman's Hill, whence it undulates gently downwards and presently rises to Redan Hill about a mile distant. In the Woronzoff Ravine lies the road of that name. It is separated from the fourth, or Picket House, Ravine,² which runs into the Great

¹ Before the Victoria Redoubt was built, this knoll was called by us Thistle Hill.

² This ravine got its English name from a picket-house or posting-house standing within it. There was thus a picket-house in the vicinity of each Attack. The two places are liable to be confused.

Ravine about a mile from the head of the Man-of-War Harbour, by a narrow ridge, at the southern end of which is Cathcart Hill. From this hill the ground slopes downwards towards Sebastopol till it rises up to the Green Hill, a mile and a half distant. At the head of the Man-of-War Harbour there is an embankment called the Péressib, south of which lies a wide expanse of fairly level ground. Here the Great and Woronzoff Ravines both terminate, but the rocky cliff that is the eastern boundary of the latter sweeps round to the northward and, gradually subsiding, fringes the right bank of the Man-of-War Harbour for some distance; while, on the west, the steep side of the Great Ravine twisting backwards to form an elbow or return—the Boulevard Ravine—continues its northerly course and becomes the precipitous left bank of the Man-of-War Harbour. Near the mouth of the Great Ravine the level ground is broken by the small Cemetery Hill.¹

The Western Area.—The western area is of much greater extent than the eastern, and is less broken up by accidents of ground. Here lies the Quarantine Ravine, which, running parallel to and about a mile distant from the Great Ravine, opens into the Quarantine Bay. Between these two ravines there is an elevated plateau whence three others emerge—namely, the Town, Zarogdonoy, and Cemetery Ravines, of which the two last-named run into the Quarantine

¹ Both this cemetery and that on the west in the area of the French operations were the scene of combats, and in various accounts both are referred to as "The Cemetery." It is necessary to distinguish between the two places.

Bay. A long, isolated hill, called Mount Rodolph after a farm situated upon it, is found between the Quarantine Ravine and the head of the Town Ravine; it has gentle slopes, and its crest is about 300 feet above the sea. West of these features the ground, more or less broken, stretches away towards the bays of Kamiesch and Kazatch and Cape Chersonese.

Works on South Front.—Since 1837 a project for the fortification of the south side of the fortress had been under discussion. A line of defence was agreed upon which began at the Point, near the Careenage Creek. Here No. 1 Bastion¹ was to be placed. The line then ran to the head of the Ouchakoff Ravine where—on the site of the future Little Redan—No. 2 Bastion was to be built. The next point was the Malakoff Hill where another bastion was projected; but for some unexplained reason it was given no number, so that the fourth bastion which was to be built on Redan Hill was called by the Russians, Bastion No. 3. From here the line ran to the Péressib along the brink of the Woronzoff Ravine. These four bastions were intended for the defence of the Karabelnaya; for the City proper there were to be four also.

On the commanding ground above the Boulevard Ravine and east of the Town Ravine, No. 4 Bastion was to be placed, on the site eventually occupied by the Bastion du Mât, or Flagstaff Bastion. Trending to the westward the line of defence then passed across the Town Ravine to the high ground between the

¹ The works, of whatever kind, eventually built on these eight points of the line of defence were called by the Russians "Bastions."

latter and the Zagorodnoy Ravine, where Bastion No. 5 (the Central Bastion) was to be built ; it then for a time followed the course of the Zagorodnoy Ravine, and, running to the northward, terminated in the Artillery Fort. For some 1,200 yards the ravine formed a natural ditch to the line of defence, but it then turned in a westerly direction. No. 6 Bastion was to be placed at this point of departure, while No. 7 was to be formed by the prolongation of the left face of the Artillery Fort. The defences were to be completed by the land front of the Quarantine Fort. But in 1853, of these projected fortifications, Bastion No. 7 alone existed, and although work then went on with more or less activity and defences began to grow on the eight selected pivots of the line, the south side of the fortress was in a perilous condition when, on September 25, the flank march of the Allies disclosed their intentions.

Korniloff and Todleben.—But at this critical period Russia was well served by two distinguished men. Admiral Korniloff was a born leader of men and possessed in a rare degree the gift of imparting to others his own warlike enthusiasm. His pre-eminence in this respect was generously recognised, and when his services were no longer required on the north side, he, though not the senior officer, became the actual organiser of the southern defences under the title of Chief of the Staff. By his side was an even more distinguished man, Todleben. This gifted officer, now thirty-six years old, was a comparatively unknown lieutenant-colonel of engineers, but he lived to see Europe filled with his fame ; while

Korniloff found a soldier's death on the day of the first bombardment. As the event proved, three weeks were to elapse before the opening of the attack by the Allies, and in this precious interval stupendous efforts were made to strengthen the fortifications. As the work progressed, Korniloff was the heart, and Todleben the brain, of the Russian defence.

When Prince Menchikoff left Sebastopol, the garrison, in addition to some marines and the artillery of the coast defences, consisted of 17 battalions of sailors and 8 battalions of reserve troops. In a day or two a battalion of the Taroutine Regiment was added, so that the number of combatants amounted to some 17,000 or 18,000 men; but, in addition, there were the artificers of the dockyard and the skilled mechanics of the town.¹ There were also mighty stores of cut stone, wood, and cordage, but a shortage of brushwood for revetments and earth for parapets. Above all, there were the great guns of the fleet, which were now available, as were the crews, since the sailors had to forgo their normal functions. Work went on simultaneously along the whole line of defence, and ceased not day or night. Numerous women—for the most part the wives of the sailors—and their children did what they could, and even prisoners released from gaol purged their crimes by patriotic labour.²

Gradually the amorphous defences began to take shape, and, though far from being at that moment a formidable fortress, a striking change had been effected in the southern side by October 16.

¹ Todleben, i. pp. 221, 237.

² *Ibid.*, i. pp. 264 etc.

Todleben found unfinished bastions, sometimes connected by walls made of loose stones, and parapets where guns were needed, only prepared for musketry. He found also a light and scanty armament. In three weeks he was able to give shape to the works already begun; to supplement them by many new batteries; to mount heavy pieces, borrowed from the fleet, at all important points; and to bind the defences together by well-designed musketry parapets and gun emplacements for flank and interior defence.

Defences of South Front, October 17.—On the morning of the first bombardment the extreme right of the fortress was protected by the guns in the land front of the Quarantine Fort and the 7th Bastion; and a new battery, No. 26,¹ the first of the Chemiakine group, was thrown forward in front of No. 6 Bastion to enfilade the right faces of the French batteries on Mount Rodolph.² The Artillery Fort was already connected with No. 6 Bastion by an indented wall, as was also No. 6 with No. 5 Bastion. On the right of the latter was the new Belkine Lunette, Battery No. 7, and on the left, between the flank of No. 5 Bastion and the existing Schwartz Redoubt, Battery

¹ Between the bastions of the line of defence, from time to time, batteries of all shapes and kinds were constructed. These were called either by the name of the officer who made them, *e.g. Schwartz, Belkine, etc.*, or by the name of the battleship or regiment which supplied the working parties, *e.g. Jason, Selinghinsk*. They were, however, numbered consecutively in order of construction, irrespective of whether they were designed to oppose the siege batteries, or for flank and interior defence. As many of the latter never came into action, they are not mentioned in the text.

² See p. 183 *post*.

No. 1, two new batteries, Nos. 24 and 25, were constructed. From the Artillery Fort to the Schwartz Redoubt inclusive was the first section of the defence.

In the second section were the Flagstaff Bastion and its supporting works, consisting of a new battery, No. 22, on its right flank, and two new batteries, Nos. 20 and 23, in rear. Nos. 20 and 23 were the first of the Garden Batteries. Farther to the left, overlooking the Boulevard Ravine, a small battery, No. 2, was already in existence. This, the first of the Boulevard Batteries, was enlarged and strengthened.

The third section included the ground between the Péressib and the Middle Ravine, and the defences consisted of Bastion No. 3 and the neighbouring works. The bastion was a Redan, and, on the right and left, was flanked by two new batteries, Nos. 27 and 21. No. 5, the first of the Barrack Batteries, had already been built on the brink of the Woronzoff Ravine, and another small battery, No. 3, was on the left of the Redan and commanded the Middle Ravine. These were enlarged.

The fourth section, comprising the ground between the Middle and Careenage Ravines, contained the Malakoff Tower, a useless and dangerous erection made of stone at the expense of the merchants of Sebastopol the previous year; but it was supported on either flank by two new batteries of earth—No. 17 on the right, and No. 18 on the left. A third battery, No. 28, was made in rear of the former. Bastion No. 2 completed the defences; it was a work with two faces and two flanks, and was called by us the Little Redan.

In addition to these defences, which carried 118 guns bearing on the siege batteries of the Allies, a man-of-war was moored close to the Péressib, and two others were in the Careenage Creek. In the batteries for flank and interior defence not enumerated above were 223 pieces, many of small calibre.¹ To each section of the defence a special infantry garrison was assigned.

On September 30 Prince Menchikoff's army returned to the heights above the Belbek, and on October 2nd the non-combatants of Sebastopol were passed out of the city by the Inkerman Bridge; the garrison was also reinforced, and on October 17 it consisted of 43 battalions of infantry and sailors and a battalion of engineers, numbering 32,000 combatants with 28 field guns.²

3. PROJECTS FOR THE SIEGE

Position of the Allies.—When the Allies assembled in the Balaclava plain, there were not wanting those who advocated the immediate assault of the fortress, but more cautious counsels prevailed and on September 28 the disembarkation of the Siege Trains began. Next day a general project of attack was agreed upon, which assigned the ground east of the Great Ravine as the British area of operations, while the French occupied that on the west and established their base at Kamiesch. The armies then moved into position on the Plateau. The French siege corps, consisting of three divisions

¹ Todleben, i. pp. 301 etc.

² *Ibid.*, i. pp. 295 etc.

commanded by General Forey, occupied the line of the Quarantine Ravine from the neighbourhood of Strelitzka Bay to the French head-quarters, which were established on the plateau north-west of the Col of Balaclava.

The general position of the British may be indicated by an imaginary line through Cathcart Hill, parallel to, and some two miles distant from, the crest of the Sapouné Ridge. On the left, giving a hand to the French outposts across the Great Ravine, was the 3rd Division, less W Battery, and the line was prolonged to the eastward by the 4th, Light and 2nd Divisions, the last-named being on the exposed flank at Inkerman. In second line, behind the 4th and Light Divisions, lay the 1st Division, less the 93rd Highlanders; its camp was established close to the Windmill, which stood a mile and a quarter to the north-east of Cathcart Hill. The British head-quarters were at the Traktir Farm, about a mile to the south-east of the French.

South of the Windmill two French divisions under General Bosquet formed a *corps d'observation*, and occupied somewhat useless lines of contravallation made along the Sapouné Ridge. By this time also the French cavalry were landed; a division, under General Morris, was encamped on the Plateau near General Canrobert's head-quarters. The Turks were close to the Col.

The defence of Balaclava was confided to Major-General Sir Colin Campbell, who had under his command the 93rd Highlanders, W Battery, 1,200 Royal Marines landed from the fleet, some

Turkish battalions lent by General Canrobert, and such details as might be found at Balacclava. On the east of Balacclava Harbour is a mass of lofty hills quite inaccessible from the sea. These throw out, northwards, numerous projecting spurs which hide the town and cover the entrance to the harbour. Upon them were placed some naval guns, protected by parapets of slight profile, and having a command over the plain. They were manned by the Marines, and the hills were known as the Marine Heights. An outer line of defence was also laid out along the Causeway Ridge; it consisted of six redoubts of even lighter profile. The eastmost, Redoubt No. 1, was on an isolated hill, 450 feet high, called Canrobert Hill; the most westerly, No. 6, was near the Woronzoff Road, two miles north of Kadikoï. The other four were in the interval along the ridge, and they were all garrisoned by Turks. The Highlanders and W Battery were encamped at Kadikoï, while our newly formed cavalry division lay in the plain near No. 6 Redoubt. This division consisted of the Heavy Brigade under Major-General J. Y. Scarlett, formed by the Scots Greys and the newly arrived 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards and Inniskilling Dragoons; and the Light Brigade, which, with I Troop R.H.A., remained under the command of Lord Cardigan. The division thus formed was under the command of Lord Lucan, who was independent of Sir Colin Campbell.

The Flagstaff Bastion.—When the siege of Sebastopol began, and for months afterwards, the French engineers adhered to the opinion that the capture of

the Flagstaff Bastion was of the first importance ; but this work, while it dominated the city, was itself commanded by the Malakoff Hill, and Sir John Burgoyne always maintained that the latter was the true point of attack. Before, however, an advance could be made against the Malakoff, it would be necessary to hold the Inkerman Ridge, which commanded the ground of approach, and without French co-operation this was beyond the powers of the British. Against his better judgment, Burgoyne was forced to yield, and the Middle Ravine became the eastern boundary of our siege works, which were divided into a Right and Left Attack by the Woronzoff Ravine. The French proposed to establish their battèries on Mount Rodolph and join hands with our Left Attack at the Great Ravine, and on the night of October 9 they dug 1,100 yards of trench at an average distance of 1,000 yards from the salient of the Flagstaff Bastion. It was thus left for the British to engage the enemy along the Karabelnaya or Faubourg front, and at the same time to support the French attack.

The British Siege Works.—On October 7, orders had been issued to invest Sebastopol more completely ; but the strength of the British did not permit of the advanced pickets being pushed forward to reconnoitre the enemy's works properly, while the Russian sharpshooters on the Inkerman Ridge continually annoyed us from the neighbourhood of Shell Hill. It was therefore determined to place some of the new Lancaster guns at once in battery, without waiting for the disembarkation of the Siege

Train. These guns had a reputed effective range of 4,000 yards, and could therefore be mounted at such a distance from the fortress as to be quite outside the zone of its fire. Two half-sunken batteries, known as the Right and Left Lancaster Batteries, were completed by the night of October 10. That on the left was near the Woronzoff Road, 2,800 yards from the Redan; that on the right, at our end of the Malakoff Ridge, 1,600 yards from the Mamelon. They were both designed to take two Lancaster guns of 95 cwts., but on the 11th the right battery was extended to include four naval 68-pounders, and thenceforward was known as the Five Gun Battery.¹ Only one Lancaster gun, however, was placed in either battery. Though the first to be constructed, these batteries did not open fire before the others.

On October 10 ground was broken for the Left Attack on Green Hill and for the Right Attack on Frenchman's Hill, at an average distance of 1,600 to 1,700 yards from the Russian works.² The notion of a regular siege not having yet been forced upon the Allies, the one object in view was to establish batteries which it was hoped would soon damage and silence the enemy's works sufficiently to render them open to an assault, and consequently the first trenches made did not present the appearance of an orthodox first parallel.³ They were traced chiefly with the view

¹ This was known to the Russians as the Five-Eyed Battery.

² The Royal Engineers have been criticised for opening the trenches at so great a distance; the results of October 17, however, showed it was not beyond the range of our guns ("Engineer Operations," i. p. 59; also "Modern Artillery," p. 488).

³ "R.E. Journal," i. pp. 27 etc.

of affording to the guns an extensive field of fire, and they were unprovided with covered approaches. The Russians usually opened a heavy fire at the time when working parties were relieved, but on the whole the work was carried on without essential interruption.¹ By the night of October 16 the engineers had finished their work, and the batteries of both attacks were cleared and ready for action. Those of the Left Attack were traced more or less in line, and were numbered No. 1 to No. 5 from right to left. On the Right Attack the guns were placed in a redan-shaped entrenchment, consisting of Batteries Nos. 2 to 5. From the number of guns originally mounted there, this emplacement was called the Twenty-one Gun Battery. On either flank were mortar batteries numbered 1 and 6. The British batteries in general had a command of from 50 to 150 feet over the enemy's defences.²

The Task of the British.—The consequences of our choosing the eastern position were not long in making themselves felt, and they can best be understood by taking a glance at the circumstances of the two armies.

A line drawn north and south through the Great Ravine would divide the ground south of Sebastopol into two nearly equal parts, the eastern of which was

¹ "On the 16th October, the day before we opened fire, the Russians gave us a furious cannonade for about half an hour. A captain of the Guards and two men of the Line were killed, and two gunners who were with me arranging stores on Frenchman's Hill were wounded. This was the first blood of the siege" (Extract from Lieutenant (now General) C. H. Owen's "Diary").

² Todleben, i. p. 344.

held by the British, and the western by the French. In mere length the trenches of the two armies were practically equal; but, while the ground along which the French trenches were traced was comparatively easy to work, the English trenches ran through difficult ground, rock being near the surface. The flanks and rear of the French were well covered, and their base, Kamiesch, was comparatively close. Reinforcements reached the French army rapidly and regularly, and its strength was so well maintained that the siege operations proper were handed over to Forey's three divisions exclusively; and Bosquet's tranquil divisions on the inaccessible Sapouné Heights found their flanks sheltered by the British position.

Very different was the state of things in the British camp. An independent force had to be detached to guard the distant Balaclava. It is not too much to say that a special covering force to protect our exposed right flank was essential to the safety of the Allies—a force that would have held Shell Hill and pushed its pickets down the northern and eastern slopes of the Inkerman Ridge; but our numbers did not permit of the formation of such a force. From the nature of our position we were responsible for an extent of front nearly double Forey's, and the utmost we could do was to occupy a somewhat retired line with weak pickets, instead of taking up a stronger and more advanced position; for all our men had to take their turn in the trenches. Shell Hill remained debatable ground and a standing menace to the right of the allied line.

The road over the Col was only a farm track, and when first made use of was in fairly good condition ; but as the Siege Train had no transport, the horses of the field artillery were unsparingly used for this purpose, and suffered much in consequence. The battery ammunition wagons, the boxes having been removed, and every kind of vehicle that could be got, including the two-wheeled country carts called *arabas*, were used to bring up stores, and the small-arm ammunition ponies carried shot slung in canvas bags across their backs.

A force of 767 officers and men of the Royal Navy, under Captain Lushington, R.N., was landed at first to assist in the operations of the siege, and was continually reinforced. Fifty naval guns were put on shore, of which 12 only were got up to the front, whither they were dragged by the sailors who were supplied with spare travelling carriages by the Royal Artillery.

The Opposing Ordnance.—The British siege batteries were so far completed by October 12 that platforms and ammunition were conveyed to them after dusk, and on the 14th began the operation of arming, which was completed on the 16th, when 73 pieces had been placed in battery. The French had also completed their preparations. Five batteries containing 43 pieces were on Mount Rodolph, and a sixth battery, mounting 6 more, was on the west of the Quarantine Bay.

It will thus be seen that at the beginning of the first bombardment the Allies possessed 122, and the Russians 118, pieces. The distribution of the

latter and the French and British guns directly opposed to them is shown in the following table.¹

TABLE XXVI
OPPOSING ORDNANCE

Position of Russian Pieces.	Number of Russian Pieces.	Number of Opposing Siege Pieces.	Distribution of Siege Pieces.		
			French Batteries.	British Left Attack.	British Right Attack.
Quarantine Fort (Land front), No. 7 and No. 6 Bastions, and Belkine Lunette	13	6	6
Chemiakine Battery (No. 26), No. 6 Bastion, Belkine Lunette, Central Bastion and its Annexes, Schwartz Redoubt, Flagstaff Bastion and Annexes, Garden Battery (No. 23) .	51	43	43
Flagstaff Bastion, Garden Battery (No. 20), Boulevard Battery (No. 2), Redan and Annexes, Barrack Battery (No. 5) . . .	25	41	..	41	..
Barrack Battery (No. 5), Redan and Annexes, Battery (No. 3), Malakoff Batteries (Nos. 17 and 28)	24	26	26
Malakoff Battery (No. 18) Little Redan	5	4	4
Total . . .	118	120	49	41	30

Note.—The two Lancaster guns in the Right and Left Lancaster Batteries were directed against three Russian battleships, one in the Man-of-War Harbour and two in the Careenage Creek. They complete the total of British guns to 73.

The Russian ordnance consisted for the most part of guns, 61-pounders and under; carronades, 36-pounders and under; licornes or howitzers, 36-pounders and under; but only 5 mortars. With the exception of one 50-pounder, the French guns were 30-pounders and under, and on the whole the advantage

¹ Todleben, i. pp. 337 etc., and Auger, p. 105.

of the heavier metal, especially in the case of mortars, lay with the British.

It will be noticed that the Russians opposed 54 pieces to 71 British, and 64 pieces to the French 49; but it was not only in this respect that the French were now at a disadvantage as compared with the British. In selecting sites for their batteries they failed to secure the power of directing a cross fire on the works they were about to attack, and their own works were so traced that they were liable both to enfilade and reverse fire.

“It was otherwise,” says Todleben, “with the English batteries, whose guns were heavier and whose sites were selected with greater skill. The English seized the advantage offered by the ground, so that while firing directly on one face of a work they could at the same time enfilade or take in reverse an adjacent face.”¹

The detail of the British batteries was as follows :

TABLE XXVII
DETAIL OF BRITISH BATTERIES
RIGHT ATTACK

Battery.		Ordnance.	Manned by
The 5-Gun Battery.	Right Lancaster . . .	1 10-in. Lancaster	R.A.
	Left Lancaster . . .	4 68-prs. . .	} R.N.
		1 10-in. Lancaster	
The 21-Gun Battery.	No. I.	2 10-in. mortars . .	R.A.
	No. II.	2 24-prs.	R.A.
		2 8-in. guns	R.A.
	No. III.	1 8-in. Lancaster . .	R.A.
		5 8-in. guns	R.A.
	No. IV.	7 32-prs. (naval) . .	R.N.
	No. V.	4 24-prs.	R.A.
	No. VI.	3 10-in. mortars . .	R.A.

Total, 32 pieces.

¹ Todleben, i. pp. 339, 340; also “Modern Artillery,” p. 488.

LEFT ATTACK

Battery.	Ordnance.	Manned by
No. I.	{ 1 8-in. Lancaster . 3 8-in. guns . 8 24-pr. guns .	{ R.A.
No. II.	{ 2 10-in. Lancaster 3 8-in. guns . 5 24-pr. guns .	{ R.N.
No. III.	{ 6 24-pr. guns 2 8-in. guns .	{ 7 by R.A. 1 by R.N.
No. IV.	{ 5 24-pr. guns 1 8-in. gun .	{ R.A.
No. V.	5 10-in. mortars .	R.A.

Total, 41 pieces.

The Royal Artillery and the Royal Navy.—In following the fortunes of the Royal Artillery through this memorable siege it is necessary to understand clearly the nature of the work performed by the siege companies, and there seems no better way of arriving at this understanding than by comparing the methods they employed with those of the Royal Navy. (See Table XXVIII.)

The Naval Brigade were accustomed to duties which lasted all round the clock, and they employed on shore their excellent system of watches, by which rest and work are distributed to the greatest advantage. But for their satisfactory numerical strength this would have been impossible. Their strength also enabled them to detail their gun crews on a liberal scale, while the artillery detachments were, perforce, confined strictly to the detail of the drill book;¹ so that not only were the hours of rest of the individual sailor more liberal and better distributed

¹ See "Artillery Operations," pp. 77 etc., and app. xix. p. 271, which show the gun crews and detachments as given in Table XXVIII.

than those of the gunner, but during the actual hours of duty the sailors' labour was not so hard.¹

Thus, during each bombardment, the Royal Navy divided their gun crews into four reliefs, two of which were present during the day, and only one during the night. On the first day, Nos. 1 and 2 reliefs went into the batteries at daylight; No. 1 returned to camp at sunset, leaving No. 2 for night

TABLE XXVIII
GUN CREWS, R.N., AND DETACHMENTS, R.A.

Nature of Piece.	Gun Crew R.N.	Detachment* R.A.
68-pr. or Lancaster of 95 cwts.	{ 1 petty officer 36 men . . . }	8 to 9 men.
10-in. gun	{ 2 petty officers 32 men . . . }	"
8-in. gun	28 men . . .	"
32-pr. gun	" . . .	6 men.
24-pr. gun	" . . .	"
Mortars	Not worked by R.N.	4 to 7 men.

* Exclusive of magazine numbers.

¹ During the bombardment the Naval Brigade were reinforced from time to time, and there was no dearth of men.

"It was most amusing to see the sailors who manned the guns in this battery [the author is speaking of the Five-Gun Battery]; there were two reliefs of them, and, as soon as one of them had done its turn of duty, you heard the officer in command say, 'Now then, second relief, fall in; you others can go and skylark.' A nice place in which to skylark with shot and shell dropping in amongst you every minute! However, the blue-jackets did not mind, and took the permission given them quite literally; and in a minute ever so many of them had jumped on the parapet. . . . The Royal Artillery worked admirably, going through the regulation motions in serving the guns as if they were being inspected at Woolwich. They suffered less than the sailors, as they were not so foolhardy in exposing themselves unnecessarily: among the sailors many a fine fellow has lost his life, from his anxiety to see what effect the shot just fired would take, and in so doing exposed himself to be hit by the enemy" ("Letters from Head-quarters," i. pp. 280, 281).

duty. On the second day Nos. 3 and 4 reliefs arrived at daylight; No. 3 returned at sunset, leaving No. 4 for night duty. On the third day Nos. 1 and 2 arrived at daylight; No. 2 returned at sunset, and No. 1 remained for night duty. Thus out of 4 days (96 hours) each relief had 36 hours of duty. The time absorbed by marching from and back to camp varied naturally with the parallel in which the men were employed. The Royal Artillery always manned the more advanced batteries, but for purposes of comparison one hour may be allotted in all cases to each journey; and it may be said that the Naval Brigade had 40 hours' work and 56 hours' rest out of every 96 hours.

The Royal Artillery, during bombardments, had only two reliefs. In the Left Attack the first relief mounted at noon and the second at midnight. The men therefore had 14 hours' work and 10 hours' rest out of every 24 hours. In the Right Attack the first relief mounted at 6 a.m. and was relieved at 2 p.m. by the second relief. At 10 p.m. the first relief again came on duty till 6 a.m. next day. The men therefore had 10 hours' work and 6 hours' rest out of every 16 hours.

The Beginning of the First Bombardment.—The Allies had determined to make a combined attack on the morning of October 17 both by sea and land, with an assault of the place as a possible sequel; and fleets and siege batteries were both to open fire at 6.30 a.m. But late on the 18th the French Admiral declared that his supply of ammunition did not admit of his beginning at so early an hour, and it was then

arranged that the naval attack should take place somewhat later and nearer the critical hour of the possible assault. However, on the morning of the 17th, there was yet another change made in the naval plans and all concert between the two attacks was lost.

The siege batteries were ready at the appointed hour, and the first relief was standing to the guns in the British batteries, waiting for three mortar shells to be fired from Mount Rodolph—the preconcerted signal for the bombardment to begin. At daylight a heavy fire had been opened by the Russians, but it did little harm, as our batteries were enveloped in thick fog. At 6 a.m. the fog cleared, and shortly before 6.30 the embrasures were unmasked. No reply had as yet been made to the Russian fire of the last few days, but, when punctually at 6.30 a.m. the signal was given, the Allies opened a simultaneous bombardment along the whole line.

It soon became apparent that the Russian defences, constructed as they had been with such unavoidable haste, were but a poor protection against artillery fire. The parapets were not thick enough to resist the round shot of the Allies; the dry earth mixed with gravel, of which they were made, had not had time to settle down, and the makeshift revetments of clay, planks, or sandbags, not only crumbled away before hostile fire, but suffered from the blast of the Russian guns.¹ The sailors who composed the detachments, accustomed to broadside tactics, fired salvos with precipitous haste, and, as the day was very

¹ Todleben, i. pp. 320 etc.

calm, thick clouds of smoke soon enveloped the defences, where the fear of an assault was never absent and an imaginary enemy was often saluted with desperate volleys of grape and canister which were wasted on the empty air.¹

The French Batteries Silenced.—In spite of their numerical inferiority the French guns gallantly held their own and at first worked havoc in the masonry defences of the 6th and Central Bastions; but at 9.30 a.m. a Russian shell caused a serious magazine explosion in No. 4 Battery on Mount Rodolph, by which 16 men were killed on the spot and 37 wounded. Shortly afterwards a case of cartridges exploded in Battery No. 1 and caused some damage; whereupon General Canrobert determined to cease fire from the French batteries until they were reinforced by others under construction.²

Having obtained a complete success in such a short time over our allies, the Russians kept up a moderate fire on the silenced batteries, but utilised the respite they had won in repairing the defences on the western side.³

Success of the British Siege Batteries.—The Allies began their attack on the sea side about noon, but met with such signal failure that nothing of the kind

¹ Todleben, i. pp. 320, 345.

² "Un nouvel accident eut lieu dans la batterie No. 1. Une caisse à gargousses y fit explosion et occasionna quelques dégâts: alors le général commandant l'artillerie, consulté pour la deuxième fois par le général en chef sur la nécessité de cesser le feu, fut d'avis qu'il y avait lieu d'attendre pour le continuer que les batteries, Nos. 8 et 9, en construction fussent prêtes (Auger, i. p. 107).

³ Todleben, i. p. 323.

was ever after attempted ;¹ it was reserved therefore for the Naval Brigade and the Royal Artillery to carry off the honours of October 17. "Il n'y eut," says Todleben, "que les batteries anglaises qui obtinrent ce jour-là un succès complet."² Their heavier armament at once displayed a marked superiority over that of the Russians, and spread devastation from the Flagstaff to the Little Redan. The left face of the former was counter-battered by No. 4 Battery, Left Attack, which also took Batteries Nos. 24 and 25 in reverse, and swept the plain in rear of the Central Bastion with ricochet fire. Red-hot shot caused fires in the town, and the Malakoff Tower crumbled away under the guns of the Five Gun Battery, the stone splinters causing much annoyance in the adjacent earthworks whose guns from time to time were reduced to silence by the Twenty-one Gun Battery. But it was the Redan that had to suffer most, exposed as it was to a dangerous cross fire from both Attacks, whereby its two faces were at once enfiladed and counter-battered.

"Towards three o'clock," says Todleben, "a third of its armament had been dismounted, and the embrasures for the pieces still serviceable were entirely destroyed, while the loss in men was so great that in many cases gun detachments had already been changed twice. Despite the evident superiority of the English, the defenders of the 3rd Bastion, cheered by the ex-

¹ For details of the naval engagement, see Todleben, i. pp. 331 etc., and Kinglake, iii. pp. 386 etc.

² Todleben, i. p. 346.

ample of their brave leaders, were unwilling to yield and persevered in their dogged resistance. But all their efforts were powerless to prevent the complete mastery of the Russian by the English artillery. To crown our disasters a shell exploded in the powder magazine in the salient of the Redan. When the smoke cleared away, those who survived beheld the terrible results of the catastrophe. The front of the work was hurled into the ditch, guns and mountings were overturned, bodies disfigured and half burnt, lay about on all sides, while amid the roar of the artillery the triumphant cheers of the enemy could be heard in the distance. A hundred men perished in the explosion. Thereafter, all power of replying to the English fire disappeared; the defence of the Karabelnaya was paralysed and an assault instantly expected.”¹

During the day the British dismounted thirty Russian guns,² while they preserved their own intact, with the exception of one 8-inch Lancaster, which burst.

The Assault Abandoned.—Meanwhile, the trench guards had been kept under cover near the batteries, and the troops not so employed were ready to fall in at a moment’s notice; the field guns had their teams hooked in, and with each infantry division was a party of 20 sappers with tools and scaling-ladders, and a similar party of gunners with rockets and spikes. But the day wore on, and no orders for the assault were given. The misfortune to the French made all co-operation impossible. Firing, however,

¹ Todleben, i. pp. 325, 329.

² *Ibid.*, i. p. 344.

was continued until dusk, when the repair of the batteries and the replenishment of the magazines were taken in hand, and for the first time since ground was broken, the Russian batteries that night were silent.

The Russians Hopeful in Spite of Losses.—But it was not the silence of defeat. In view of their triumph over the French, the repulse of the allied fleets and their immunity from assault on the side of the Karabelnaya, despite their misfortunes there, the Russians might well congratulate themselves on the happy issue of the day.¹ Their losses, however, were heavy; the fear of impending attacks caused them to keep large bodies of infantry close to the front; adequate traverses and blindages did not, as yet, exist, and the casualties exceeded a thousand on October 17. Above all, they had to mourn the loss of Korniloff, the beloved chief and trusted leader, who, early in the day, was killed at the Malakoff by a round shot whilst riding round the defences during the progress of the fight.² Still in no way disconcerted, but rather with feelings of triumph, the Russians worked throughout the night; the batteries were silent because the spades were busy, and damaged ordnance was being replaced by guns of greater power and longer range.

The Small Magazines in the British Batteries.—In spite of the fierceness of the fight, the British casualties were not excessive, and we had only 9 killed in

¹ Todleben, i. p. 348.

² It has been already stated that the Russian bastion on the Malakoff had for some reason been left undistinguished by a number; it was henceforth to bear the name of Korniloff by order of the Czar.

the batteries,¹ the construction of which reflected great credit on the Royal Engineers. Our small and compact magazines were not the same source of danger as were the larger ones made by the French. But they had the disadvantage of limited capacity, and fresh supplies of powder had to be brought up by daylight—a service of no small danger, as the wagons and carts conveying it had to be taken over open ground in sight of the fortress. Early in the day Colonel Collingwood Dickson sent Lieutenant A. K. Rideout back to the Right Attack Siege Park for more powder, and this officer, in company with Lieutenant W. P. Richards and horses, men, and wagons from H Battery, successfully brought a number of cases of powder to a position behind Frenchman's Hill, about 250 yards in rear of the Twenty-one Gun Battery. A wagon was unloaded at once by Colonel Collingwood Dickson² and the cases carried into the battery. At 2 p.m. the second relief came up under Lieutenant C. H. Owen, and a party under that officer set about unloading the second wagon. They had hardly begun work when a round shot, coming over the hill in front, killed two of the horses. The powder cases were brought up on hand-barrows, and during this operation the head of one of the gunners was taken

¹ In the Right Attack the Royal Artillery lost 3 men killed and 18 wounded; in the Left Attack, 6 men wounded. The Naval Brigade had 1 officer and 5 men killed, and 3 officers and 11 men wounded. Total, 47 casualties ("Artillery Operations," p. 12).

² Colonel Collingwood Dickson received the Victoria Cross. In the *London Gazette* the specific act of bravery quoted was the unloading of the powder barrels on October 17. He had, however, specially distinguished himself on many occasions, and his coolness and gallantry were proverbial.

off by a round shot; and after a good number of cases had been got into the battery, a shell struck the wagon and blew up the remainder.

On another occasion a supply of powder was brought up by Lieutenant S. J. M. Maxwell, also of H Battery, who galloped his Flanders wagons right into the trenches; and on October 17 Sergeant J. McGarrity, of F Battery, performed the same office for the Left Attack.¹

Continuation of the Bombardment.—At daylight next morning the British continued the bombardment and had to bear the entire brunt of the day's cannonade, for the French were still silent; and now it became apparent that the superiority of fire gained on the 17th could not be maintained. It was at once seen that the Redan, ruined as it appeared to have been, was stronger than ever. With ceaseless toil the Russians had removed the unserviceable guns and mountings, though buried under tons of débris; had provided new embrasures; relaid platforms; cleared the ditches, and constructed a new magazine, while on the right face 19 pieces appeared in battery where 10 had been placed before. Other repairs, though not so striking, had been carried out during the night, and in all 38 new guns were mounted.* The day passed with no particular incident.

¹ The account given in "Artillery Operations," p. 11, of Lieutenant Maxwell is accurate in detail, but apparently wrong in date; for both Generals C. H. Owen and A. K. Rideout (who witnessed the exploit) have assured the author that the incident did *not* occur on October 17. The exact date is of course of small importance. Sergeant McGarrity received the French Military Medal. He belonged to F Battery and, doubtless, carried powder to the Left Attack, in the neighbourhood of which the 3rd Division, to which F Battery belonged, was stationed.

² Todleben, i. pp. 350 etc.


On the 19th the French, who had laboured hard to reconstruct and re-arm their batteries, reopened fire with 61 guns¹ and reduced many of those opposed to them to silence; but next morning the Russians in their front were as active as ever. As each day dawned, the marvellous recuperative power of the fortress was again shown; and Todleben not only renewed and added to his guns—he also began to make additional batteries.

On the 20th, the sailors brought up an additional 68-pounder gun to our Left Attack, but it was destroyed on the 21st. The 68-pounders were then removed from the Right Lancaster battery (which was left with one gun only) and were placed close to the other batteries on Frenchman's Hill, and a new work called the Picket House Battery (No. 6 Battery), for three guns and two mortars, was begun on the left of the Left Attack. This battery was placed somewhat in advance, on the edge of the Picket House Ravine, and was designed to bear on the Man-of-War Harbour. By the 23rd the supply of ammunition had become an anxiety and the rate of fire, which had sensibly diminished after the first two days, was restricted by order. Brigadier-General Strangways made a request to Lord Raglan to obtain further supplies from the Royal Navy.

While the garrison of Sebastopol were thus showing a gallant front to both French and British, the field armies of the Czar were growing in strength. Indeed, with the dawn of October 25 a time of trial for the Allies began, during which the Chersonese

¹ Auger, p. 569.

was almost torn from their grasp : the preponderance of force would soon be against them, and the time had come for Prince Menchikoff to strike.



A SIEGE GUN ON A MADRAS PLATFORM.

CHAPTER V

ATTACKS ON THE ALLIES

1. THE BATTLE OF BALACLAVA

Russian Forces and Plans.—Menchikoff's first movement was made against Balaclava. The Russian forces, under the command of General Liprandi, had gradually been assembling in the neighbourhood of Tchorgoun and the Kamara Hills, and by the evening of October 24 nearly 25,000 troops of all arms were ready for offensive operations.

The defences of the Causeway Ridge were to be the first object of attack, and several columns were directed against them.¹ General Sémiakine was to march from Tchorgoun with 8 battalions and 20 guns, while, on his left, General Gribbé, with 3 battalions, 1 squadron, and 10 guns, advanced from the Baidar Valley. Colonel Scudéry, with 4 battalions, 3 squadrons, and 6 guns, was to cross the Tchernaya by the Traktir Bridge, and a supporting force of cavalry, consisting of 20 squadrons with 22 guns, under General Ryjoff, was to assemble at the Russian end of the North Valley; while 6 squadrons of Jeropkine's Lancers followed the general advance. There was

¹ "On avait résolu d'attaquer le camp anglais le 13/25 Octobre" (Todleben, i. p. 388).

also a central reserve of a battalion and a battery. As a support to Liprandi's right wing, General Jabokritsky, with 8 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 14 guns, was to occupy the southern slopes of the Fedioukine Hills.¹

The Allies at Balaclava.—On the night of the 24th, Sir Colin Campbell was encamped near the gorge at Kadikoï with 6 companies of the 93rd Highlanders, a battalion of Turks, and W Battery Royal Artillery. The line of redoubts² on the Marine Heights in his rear was held by the remaining companies of the 93rd and 1,200 men of the Royal Marines and Royal Marine Artillery. The outer line of redoubts was garrisoned by 2½ battalions of Turks. By order of Lord Raglan, nine 12-pounder position guns had been handed over to the latter, three of which were placed in Redoubt No. 1 and two in each of Redoubts Nos. 2, 3, and 4. They were to be worked by Turkish detachments, but two gunners of W Battery were placed in No. 1 Redoubt, and one gunner in each of the other redoubts. Nos. 5 and 6 Redoubts were not armed. The Cavalry Division, under Lord Lucan, was encamped on the slope of the ridge south of No. 6 Redoubt, with an outlying picket on the Kamara Hills.

The Russian Advance.—As morning broke it became apparent to Lord Lucan, whose men had fallen in an hour previously, that a hostile advance was

¹ Amongst the guns detailed, twelve were guns of position (Todleben, i. pp. 388 etc.).

² The armament of these redoubts consisted of 18-pounder guns, and 24-pounder, 32-pounder, and 8-inch howitzers (Adye's Order Book).

impending. The preconcerted signal of two ensigns was flying on Canrobert Hill, and the vedettes on the ridge, by circling round each other, gave warning that the enemy was advancing in force. As a matter of fact the Russian plans had been successfully carried out at an early hour without opposition,¹ and the first faint streaks of light revealed their guns in position on the hills commanding Nos. 1 and 2 Redoubts, while Scudéry's force was threatening No. 3.

British Movements.—Lord Lucan at once advanced with the Cavalry Division to support the redoubts, and I Troop R.H.A. came into action on a small plateau to the right of No. 3. The Russians opened fire, and the guns of the redoubts and of I Troop replied.

Sir Colin Campbell's force was standing under arms at Kadikoï when the sound of the firing reached him. He immediately ordered W Battery to proceed to No. 3 Redoubt; but when Captain G. R. Barker reached the position where I Troop was in action, he perceived that there was no suitable place for his guns on the right of the redoubt, and he was obliged to come into action on its left, where he could not bring fire to bear on the Russians attacking Nos. 1 and 2 Redoubts. Scudéry's troops, however, were visible towards the Fedioukine Hills, and Barker at once opened fire upon them.²

¹ The picket in the Kamara Hills was anything but vigilant (see Kinglake, iv, pp. 96 etc.). Cavalry had yet much to learn in scouting duties; twelve years after this date, on the night before the battle of Königgrätz, the Prussians and Austrians were unaware of each other's presence (Home's "Précis of Modern Tactics," p. 125, quoting German Official Account, 1866).

² The movements of W Battery are described from the "Records of Service of the 62nd Battery, R.F.A.," which, as regards the Crimea, are

The wagons of I Troop, under Second-Captain J. D. Shakespear, had been sent as usual before daylight, to assist in the transport of shot and shell to the trenches. Captain Maude therefore had only the limber ammunition with the guns, and this was nearly expended when he himself was severely wounded. The troop lost many horses, and the gun carriages were abundantly marked by bullets, but there had been no casualties among the men when a shell, striking Maude's horse on the shoulder, burst on impact and brought the rider to the ground, grievously hurt. Lieutenant H. W. J. Dashwood was now the senior officer with the troop, and he rode up to Captain Barker and reported that his ammunition was nearly expended. Barker, by Sir Colin Campbell's direction, sent Lieutenant P. Dickson with the right division of W Battery to the excellent position occupied by I Troop which was now withdrawn out of action.¹

Capture of the Redoubts by the Russians.—Against the advancing enemy little could be effected. The Heavy Cavalry Brigade's action was restricted to demonstrations, for the Russian infantry were supported by an overwhelming artillery. Although the garrison of No. 1 Redoubt, numbering between 500

based on notes supplied by General Sir Robert Biddulph, G.C.B. The author is also in possession of manuscript notes from the same officer. Sir Robert served as a subaltern in W Battery at the Alma and at Balaclava.

¹ See "Balaclava: a Recollection," by Colonel F. T. Whinyates, p. 2. The further movements of I Troop are taken from the same source. Surgeon-Major Thornton states in "Crimean Services of I Troop," "R.A.I.P.," xix. pp. 335 etc., that only seven rounds were left when the troop retired.

and 600 men, fought with the most determined gallantry, five battalions, launched against them by Sémiakine, drove them from the work after 170 of them had been killed. The Turks in the other redoubts, seeing the retreat of their comrades, the great superiority of numbers arrayed against them, the preponderance of Russian guns, and the helplessness of our cavalry, broke without waiting for an assault and streamed away in a long fugitive column towards Balaclava. Before quitting their posts the gunners of W Battery spiked the guns in the redoubts.¹

Dashwood had had two horses shot under him, and one gunner and more than a third of the gun teams had been killed, before I Troop, with the Greys as escort, descended from the position they had occupied in action. The main body of our cavalry, who had protected the retreat of the Turks, were themselves retiring; and the Greys, falling back by alternate squadrons, and the guns by half-troops, covered the movement. Near Kadikoï, I Troop was met by Captain Shakespear with the wagons. This officer took over the command, and, after making good the casualties and replenishing the limbers, he followed the Cavalry Division.

Meanwhile, Dickson remained in action with the two guns; and seeing there was no infantry support, and that the Russians were approaching, Sir Colin Campbell ordered the withdrawal of W Battery from

¹ Gunner David Jenkins got the French Military Medal; Gunners Jacob McGarry and John Barrett the Sardinian Medal. A sapper named Lankaster, who is mentioned in "England's Artillerymen," p. 227, was also in No. 4 Redoubt.

its advanced position. Dickson limbered up and tried to continue the fire with rockets, but a round shot killed one of the wheel horses of the rocket carriage which narrowly escaped capture. The battery was then ordered to rejoin the 93rd Highlanders, while the Russians took possession of the captured redoubts.

Lord Raglan's Orders.—It was now about half-past 7 o'clock. When the alarm reached head-quarters, orders were sent by Lord Raglan (who arrived on the high ground overlooking the plain in time to witness the Russian success) for the 1st and 4th Divisions, and the guns of the Light and 3rd Divisions to move down from the Plateau ; and General Canrobert, a little later, sent similar orders to the Brigades of Vinoy and Espinasse and to d'Allonville's Brigade of Cavalry. Some hours, however, must elapse before the reinforcements could arrive, and Lord Raglan, not wishing his cavalry to be entangled in an action without suitable infantry support, directed Lord Lucan to retire to the western end of the South Valley. Thus, excepting Campbell's small force, the gorge at Kadiköi lay open, though behind it was the strong bulwark of the Marine Heights. General Liprandi now occupied the line of the Causeway Ridge from No. 3 Redoubt to the Kamara Hills. General Jabokritsky had reached the slopes of the Fedioukine Hills, and all movements of troops from the Plateau were well in sight. An opportunity for further operations was thus offered to the Russian General, yet for nearly three hours he remained quiescent. It was 10 o'clock before General Ryjoff,

with his cavalry and guns, began to move westwards up the North Valley.¹

Sir Colin Campbell at Kadikoï.—Sir Colin Campbell's 550 Highlanders were at this moment drawn up on a small hill in front of Kadikoï. There they were joined by about 100 invalids who had been sent down to Balaclava, and two battalions of Turks, collected from the débris of the Ottoman force, were formed up behind the 93rd. Barker was ordered to bring his guns into action on the left of the line. The hill obstructed his view to the right front, but though Barker drew attention to the fact, no change was made in the dispositions.

Lord Raglan, however, did not trust the Turkish troops, and shortly before Ryjoff's advance his lordship gave orders for the Heavy Cavalry, under Scarlett, to be sent in support of Sir Colin Campbell. The brigade accordingly moved off in several columns towards Kadikoï. Captain E. D'A. Hunt, with a squadron of the Inniskillings, was in advance on the right, and Scarlett followed with the main body, consisting of one squadron of the Inniskillings and two of the Greys, in all 300 sabres. The 5th Dragoon Guards, the Royals, and the 1st Dragoon Guards marched in rear, while the Light Brigade with I Troop R.H.A. remained halted.

¹ The further objects the Russians had in view are somewhat obscure. Todleben says, i. p. 393 :

“Après la prise des redoutes, le général Liprandi fit avancer la brigade de hussards, neuf sotnias de cosaques et deux batteries à cheval sur le versant des hauteurs qui regardait le camp ennemi et ordonna au lieutenant-général Rijow de tenter de détruire le parc d'artillerie disposé près de Kadikoï.”

The only park that existed was the dépôt established just outside Balaclava (p. 180).

Russian Cavalry Advance.—Meanwhile, General Ryjoff continued his movement up the North Valley until he was fired upon by some French and Turkish guns posted on the crest of the Sapouné Ridge, when he changed direction to his left. His presence then became known to Lord Cardigan, who at once pushed I Troop forward a short distance. Although the troop was not permitted to advance sufficiently to the front to obtain an uninterrupted view of the enemy, it succeeded in putting a few shots into the column as it pressed forward.

During the advance a small body of Russians detached itself from the main force and became visible on the ridge between Redoubts Nos. 3 and 4. It proved to be a weak detachment, masking guns, which suddenly opened upon Campbell's position. The first shot fell amongst the Light Company of the 93rd, which had been extended in skirmishing order, and then, bounding onwards, passed through the main body and disabled two Turks. The latter immediately broke and followed their brethren to Balaclava, with the exception of an officer and a few men who attached themselves to W Battery and remained with it during the day.¹ Campbell ordered the Highlanders to lie down behind the crest of the hill, and Barker opened fire on the enemy's artillery. A little later the guns on the Marine Heights also made themselves heard. The Russians did not continue the contest, and a new target came into view when a large body of cavalry was seen to cross the


¹ As W Battery was somewhat shorthanded, thirty Turks had been attached to it.

Woronzoff Road in the neighbourhood of No. 4 Redoubt. This was at once assailed by fire from W Battery, and also from the Marine Heights. It was Ryjoff's main body.¹

The Charge of the Heavy Brigade.—Scarlett, at this time moving on Kadikoi, was quite unaware of the presence of the hostile horsemen on the other side of the Ridge, when his aide-de-camp drew his attention to the flutter of pennons over the crest to their left. He suddenly realised that he was riding across the front of a numerous body of Russian cavalry, and his mind was at once made up. Immediately wheeling his 300 horsemen into line to the left and charging uphill, he attacked the huge column that was impending over him. This column had been hitherto a mark for Barker's guns, but he had now to hold his hand. In a moment the 300 were swallowed up in the troops they encountered, and nothing was visible but a grey mass, flecked here and there by the British red. Quick to support their chief, the 5th Dragoon Guards followed up the leading line, and Hunt, with his squadron, attacked the Russian left, while the Royals, followed by the 4th Dragoon Guards, crashed in upon their right. Within eight minutes from the time Scarlett's trumpeter sounded the charge, the Russian columns, broken up into scattered bodies of

¹ "Before the Heavy Cavalry charge, Captain Barker's field battery had just come into action close to the 93rd Regiment, and fired about twenty rounds at the Russian column when the squadron of Inniskilling Dragoons crossed the line of fire. The accounts of this fire as given by artillery officers differ, but it must have influenced the result to some extent" ("The Crimea in 1854 and 1894," p. 110).

Captain Hunt always maintained that one of his horses had been killed by W Battery (Biddulph's Notes).



In Middle Distance Hill occupied
by 93rd Regt. and W Battery.

VIEW OF THE SOUTH VALLEY OF BALACLAVA FROM THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF NO. 6 REDOUBT ON THE CAUSEWAY RIDGE.

horsemen, were galloping up the hillside and retreating by the way they had come.

The Highlanders at Kadikoï.—Meanwhile, Campbell had been engaged at Kadikoï. On the retreat of the Turks and the disappearance of the Highlanders, the Russians may have imagined that W Battery was unsupported, for four squadrons detached from Ryjoff's main body advanced against its right flank. The reasons already given prevented their approach being seen from the battery, and they were already within some 600 or 700 yards from the recumbent infantry when Sir Colin ordered the Highlanders to stand up and open fire. The Russian horsemen immediately wheeled about and retired, pursued by the fire of the 93rd and some shells from the Marine Heights.¹ The Russians evidently thought they were riding into a trap.²

Quiescence of the Light Cavalry Brigade.—The Light Brigade had missed a great opportunity. It was drawn up at a distance of not more than a quarter of a mile from the right flank of the mass of cavalry attacked by Scarlett; but it neither took part in

¹ The following passage from Todleben has no basis of fact: "Nos hussards pénétrèrent néanmoins jusqu' au parc de l'ennemi, placé au milieu du camp et retranché par des fossés. En face de cet obstacle inattendu et déjà sensiblement éprouvés par le feu croisé de l'ennemi, nos hussards ainsi que les cosaques durent se retirer" (i. p. 394).

On the other hand, an eye-witness writes: "There appeared to be no saddle emptied, or any confusion whatever in the cavalry, who, however, did not approach much nearer, but wheeled by fours or troops, and went straight away for a long distance in direction of their own left. Then the heavy guns on the Marine Heights fired shell at them, and caused them some losses" ("Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 133).

² Scarlett was just commencing his charge as the Highlanders rose to their feet ("Records of Service of the 62nd Battery R.F.A.").

the combat going on under its eyes, nor followed up the enemy to reap the reward of victory.¹ The defeated Russian cavalry, unmolested by ours, retreated down the North Valley; but they were pursued by artillery fire from the Marine Heights, from the guns of Barker's battery, and from C Troop, Royal Horse Artillery.²

Movements of C Troop.—When the orders for reinforcements reached the Plateau, C Troop had just returned from the daybreak parade at Inkerman, and Captain J. J. Brandling made all speed for the Col. When he reached it, d'Allonville's Chasseurs were about to descend; but they gave way to the guns, and the troop, albeit with jaded horses, reached the right rear of Scarlett as he was advancing to the charge. When the Russians began to retreat, C Troop opened on them at a range of 700 or 800 yards, and all attempts at rallying were thus frustrated.³ After firing a few rounds at some cavalry visible in the North Valley, the troop drew up beside the Heavy Cavalry Brigade.

Effect of the Heavy Brigade's Charge.—Scarlett's brilliant achievement might have led to important

¹ Kinglake, iv. pp. 207 etc.

² Compare Kinglake, iv. p. 202.

³ See "Guns and Cavalry," p. 93; also at p. 94 the following is quoted from a letter written by Colonel Frank Foster, late a captain in the 4th Dragoon Guards, who had been present in the charge of the Heavy Brigade: "If there are any officers alive who were in John Brandling's Troop of Horse Artillery at Balaclava, they would tell you how his opportune arrival with his guns, after the Heavy Brigade charge, saved them from a fresh attack from a very strong force of Russian Cavalry." See also "The Crimea in 1854 and 1894," p. 111. ;

results. The chance of striking a crushing blow against the main body of the enemy's cavalry had indeed been allowed to pass by, but Lord Raglan still hoped apparently that an opportunity might occur for retrieving the misfortunes of the morning.

Lord Raglan's Orders to Lord Lucan.—When General Cathcart received his orders to move on Balaclava, he delayed in carrying them into effect; and when Scarlett's charge was ended, he had only just descended from the Col and was moving in the direction of No. 4 Redoubt. The 1st Division was marching down the slopes a little to the south of the Woronzoff Road, A and H Batteries being sent round by the Col.¹ The Russians still occupied the high ground from No. 3 Redoubt to Canrobert Hill when Lord Lucan received the following order :

“Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the redoubts. They will be supported by infantry, which have been ordered to advance on two fronts.”

On receipt of this order, the cavalry General, seeing that the infantry were still at a distance, considered it his duty to wait for them, although the progress of the latter was slow. Cathcart at length reached No. 4 Redoubt² and, throwing out skirmishers to his front, directed his artillery³ to engage the Russians

¹ These batteries never came into action.

² The Russians never occupied No. 4 Redoubt, but they had dismounted the guns and broken the carriages. By Cathcart's advance
³ two of the captured guns were now recovered; they were subsequently removed by teams sent from W Battery.

³ It is not known to the author what batteries were in action here.

in No. 3 Redoubt; but the range was long, and a desultory and ineffective fire was the only result. Beyond this point Cathcart made no efforts to advance. More than three-quarters of an hour had passed when it seemed to the impatient staff on the Sapouné Ridge that the enemy were preparing to remove the captured cannon from the redoubts they were occupying. Captain L. E. Nolan, an aide-de-camp of General Airey, was forthwith despatched with another order to Lord Lucan, as follows:

“Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. A troop of horse artillery may accompany. French cavalry are on your left. Immediate.”

At this time the Light Cavalry Brigade was drawn up across the North Valley, in a line with No. 4 Redoubt. The Heavy Brigade was on its right rear, and farther to its rear and to its left was d’Allonville’s Brigade with which General Morris was himself present. On the Russian side, Jabokritsky had occupied the foremost slopes of the Fedioukine Hills with his guns, and was on the left front of the allied cavalry; to their right front were other Russian guns, on the Causeway Ridge; while at the far end of the valley were drawn up Ryjoff’s routed squadrons, under the protection of twelve guns. Troops venturing down the fateful valley would thus be exposed to a triple fire of artillery, from the front and both flanks.

The “Blunder.”—Riding at speed down the steep

slopes of the Sapouné, Nolan carried the order to Lord Lucan, and then arose that disastrous misunderstanding which led to the sacrifice of the Light Brigade. Lord Raglan's message referred to "the guns"; Lord Lucan took this to mean, not the guns in the lost redoubts, but the guns attached to Ryjoff's cavalry, and owing to this simple misapprehension Lord Cardigan was despatched on his luckless career down the North Valley.¹ The brigade advanced with the 17th Lancers and 13th Light Dragoons in the first line, the 11th Hussars followed in the second line, and the 8th Hussars and 4th Light Dragoons formed the third line. It was Lord Lucan's intention to support them with the Heavy Brigade, and the Greys and Royals were actually put in motion. The Divisional General himself rode in advance, and with his Staff formed a link between the two brigades.

On the first movement of the cavalry, the Russians, appearing to divine what had been Lord Raglan's real intention, began to draw in their troops on the Causeway Ridge. No. 3 Redoubt was abandoned, a withdrawal in rear of No. 2 was begun, and some of the battalions were thrown into square. But it was soon clear that the advancing squadrons had another object in view, and, to the amazement of friend and foe, Lord Cardigan was seen to head straight down the North Valley, under a cross fire of guns and rifles.

The Light Cavalry Charge.—Though suffering

¹ Controversy has raged round the responsibility for this gigantic blunder. For obvious reasons the author confines himself strictly to the relation of what occurred. The general account of the charge is based on Kinglake's narrative.

Kamars,

Balaclava Harbour,

VIEW OF THE NORTH VALLEY OF BALACLAVA FROM THE FEDIUKINE HILLS. IN THE MIDDLE DISTANCE THE CAUSEWAY
RIDGE WITH THE REDOUBTS CAPTURED BY THE RUSSIANS.

grievous loss, the first line of the Light Brigade steadily followed the Brigadier until it came within effective fire of the 12-gun battery drawn up at the end of the valley. Under this terrible fire the ordered squadrons became a crowd of horsemen racing for a goal, but ever the erect figure of their leader was seen in front, until at the head of 50 men, the remnant of the two squadrons, he rode into the Russian battery. Thereafter he lost all control over his command, for the men, fighting furiously, broke into groups of which some attacked the gunners and others hurled themselves on the cavalry in rear. Following the first line, the supporting squadrons escaped the frontal fire of the 12-gun battery; but the enemy on their flanks, now fully alert, wrought havoc in their ranks. In échelon of regiments they reached the now silent battery, and at once their formation resolved itself into groups which joined in the *mêlée*. The Russian cavalry, unable to withstand the furious assaults to which they were subjected, broke up and fled.¹

The French Cavalry Charge.—Meanwhile General Morris, perceiving that “some one had blundered,” resolved to strike a blow which should at least free one flank from the fire that would be directed on our troops in their inevitable retreat. With this intent he directed d’Allonville to lead the 4th Chasseurs d’Afrique and charge the guns on the Fedioukine

¹ “Cardigan s’élança sur la batterie des cosaques du Don qui avait pris une position avancée, sabra les canonniers, chargea ensuite notre cavalerie, la culbuta et se porta encore assez loin au delà de la ligne des redoutes, en poursuivant notre cavalerie qui se retirait vers Tchorgoun” (Totleben, i. p. 396).

Hills. This duty was gallantly performed with most successful results. Jabokritsky's artillery was forced to retire, and, being skilfully withdrawn before a large body of infantry could be brought against them, the Chasseurs accomplished their purpose with but little loss.¹

Lord Lucan's Movements.—Lord Lucan followed Lord Cardigan's advance, but the ever-increasing pace of the latter tended to widen the interval between the two brigades, while the hopelessness of the adventure became more and more apparent. When level with No. 3 Redoubt, and riding far in advance of his Heavy Brigade, the General perceived that the Greys and Royals were under a cross fire that soon became destructive. Turning to his Assistant-Adjutant-General, he said, "They have sacrificed the Light Brigade; they shall not sacrifice the Heavy, if I can prevent it." He then led his men under cover, just as the Light Cavalry disappeared from view in clouds of smoke at the end of the valley.²

Movements of I Troop.—In spite of the wording of the order, no specific orders reached I Troop. When the Light Brigade advanced, Shakespear followed until it became

"momentarily more and more apparent as the troop trotted steadily forward that, before it could render

¹ "The good comradeship implied in this prompt, resolute, and effectual charge of the French was highly appreciated by their allies, and has received just and warm praise from the historian Kinglake" ("War in the Crimea," p. 120).

² Lord Lucan and his horse were struck three times; his A.D.C. was killed, and there were other casualties in his Staff (Kinglake, iv. pp. 322, 323).

any efficient service, the Russian fire would entirely cripple it: accordingly the word was given to go about, and it retired to a position not far from the Heavy Brigade."¹

Sequel of the Charge.—For a time the victorious horsemen of the Light Brigade pursued the Russian cavalry far beyond the limits of the deserted battery, but they soon realised how few they were. No supports came up, and the Russians, drawing bridle, turned on their pursuers. It was necessary to retire. And now, some on the one side and some on the other, squadrons of Jeropkine's lancers emerged from the hills and prepared to bar the line of retreat; but Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Shewell with the 8th Hussars, the 17th Lancers, and 13th Light Dragoons, broke through and scattered those in front of them; while Lieutenant-Colonel Lord George Paget and the 4th Light Dragoons, followed by the 11th Hussars under Lieutenant-Colonel J. Douglas, were successful in getting past a similar barrier. Slowly and painfully, many of them on foot, the remnant of the Light Brigade made their way up the valley under the fire of the guns on the Causeway Ridge. The onset, the combat, and the retreat had occupied twenty minutes.²

Movements of C Troop.—When the charge began, C Troop was dismounted on the southern side of the Causeway Ridge. It was on ground from which movements in the North Valley were hidden, and was without orders from any one. While

¹ "Balaclava: a Recollection," "R.A.I.P.," xxii. p. 565.

² Kinglake, iv. p. 367.

examining his position, however, Captain Brandling reached a spot whence there was a wide view; and, on seeing what was going forward, he galloped back and led the troop along the crest of the ridge. But the charge had already been made, and only groups of wounded men and stragglers were to be seen making their way up the valley. Nothing, of course, could be done; and, beyond firing a few shells at Russian guns in the neighbourhood of the captured redoubts, the troop took no part in the combat. When the Light Brigade was at last formed up, of the 673 who went into action a mounted strength of 195 alone remained.¹

End of Battle.—As it was soon evident, from the direction taken by our cavalry, that no attack was then impending in the direction they feared, the retreat of the Russians was stayed, and General Liprandi not only reoccupied the ground round about No. 3 Redoubt, but moved up a reinforcement of eight battalions supported by artillery. It was not yet one o'clock, and, had they deemed it advisable, the Allies were in a position to attack, a considerable force being now at their disposal. But the events of the day, especially the loss of the Light Brigade, convinced the commanders that the position at Balaclava, as originally occupied, was too extensive

¹ "Half forgotten already," wrote Kinglake in 1863, "the origin of the Light Cavalry Charge is fading out of sight. Its splendour remains. And splendour like this is something more than the mere outward adornment that graces the life of a nation. It is strength—strength other than that of mere riches, and other than that of gross numbers—strength carried from one generation to another—strength awaiting the trials that are to come" (Kinglake, iv. p. 369).

to be held. Contenting themselves with a distant cannonade and some infantry demonstrations, they held their positions until nightfall, and then withdrew the bulk of the troops to the Plateau, the capture of Redoubts Nos. 1, 2, and 3 being acquiesced in. As a consequence, the Woronzoff Road was lost as a line of supply—a loss which had far-reaching effects for the British.

Russian Exultation.—The display of seven captured guns in the Theatre Square of Sebastopol contributed in no small degree to raise the spirits of the garrison.

“La nouvelle du succès obtenu par nos armes,” says Todleben, “la prise des redoutes turques devant Balaklava, l’anéantissement d’une grande partie de la cavalerie anglaise et l’occupation par nous d’une forte position avancée sur les hauteurs du village de Komara, firent une impression des plus favorables sur les défenseurs de Sebastopol. . . . La catastrophe de l’Alma fut oubliée.”¹

In spite of the brilliant deeds of which it was the scene, Balaclava must be regarded as a doubtful battle. The Allies lost about 600 and the Russians about 627, killed and wounded.²

Artillery Casualties and Expenditure of Ammunition.—Except in I Troop, where one man was killed and one officer severely wounded, and in W Battery, where two men were wounded, the Royal Artillery had no casualties in this battle. The expenditure of ammunition was as follows :

¹ Todleben, i. p. 401.

² Kinglake, iv. p. 380.

TABLE XXIX
CASUALTIES AND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

Troop or Battery.	Gun Ammunition.		Howitzer Ammunition.		Rockets.	Total Shot and Shell.
	Round Shot.	Shrapnel.	Common Shell.	Shrapnel.		
C Troop, R.H.A. .	28	1	..	5	..	34 ¹
I " " .	151	40	13	51	..	255
E Battery R.A. .	103	34	21	41	..	199
F " " .	14	9	..	23
W " " .	121	26	9	30	7	186
P " " .	76	34	22	34	1	166

After the Battle.—When the bulk of the British forces returned to the Plateau, the 42nd and 79th Highlanders were left at Balaclava, and Sir Colin Campbell once more commanded a complete brigade. General Scarlett, with the Heavy Cavalry Brigade, also remained at Balaclava, but at the pressing request of General Canrobert the remnant of the Light Cavalry Brigade was encamped near the Windmill.

Of the French troops, Vinoy's Brigade remained close to Kadikoï, but that of Espinasse rejoined General Bosquet on the Plateau. The Turks occupied their original position close to the Col.

Immediately after the battle Barker entrenched W Battery near Kadikoï. This was the beginning of the "Lines of Balaclava" executed during November by Sir Colin Campbell, whose force was kept continually on the alert by threats of attack from the eastward.

2. THE RUSSIAN RECONNAISSANCE OF OCTOBER 26

Russian Movements.—On the morning of the 26th, while the defenders of Sebastopol were feasting their

¹ The expenditure of ammunition, which is extracted from Adye's Order Book, does not agree with the figures given in "Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 137 and elsewhere.

eyes upon the captured ordnance, the church bells summoned the faithful to a triumphant *Te Deum*, and soon after the end of the service Colonel Féderoff, with 5,000 infantry and four light guns, issued from the east side of the fortress.

Lieutenant-General Sir De Lacy Evans' Position.—

An attack was about to be delivered on our exposed flank at Inkerman. Our 2nd Division was encamped behind Home Ridge, with an outlying picket of the 49th Regiment watching the ground at Shell Hill. A certain number of men were as usual in the trenches, and General Evans had some 2,600 infantry and two batteries¹ under his immediate command. The main picket of the Light Division was at the Right Lancaster Battery,² where Mr. Hewett, R.N., was in charge of the single Lancaster gun. Captain G. L. Goodlake, of the Coldstream Guards, was in the Careenage Ravine with a picket some sixty strong, a gallant band who had a kind of roving commission and were the heroes of many romantic adventures. To-day, following their usual custom of hanging close upon the enemy, they were lurking in the recesses of the ravine, about half a mile in advance of the Lancaster Battery.

Russian Attack.—Soon after mid-day the main body of Féderoff's infantry was seen ascending the northern slopes of Shell Hill by the Light Division

¹ These were the two batteries belonging to the Division, namely B and G. The former was commanded this day by Second-Captain H. P. Yates.

² The Light Division had also an outlying picket, but this was swept back early. For the exploits of Captain Goodlake and his gallant band, see Kinglake, v. p. 10.

picket, and notice of the impending attack was transmitted to Evans, who at once occupied Home Ridge with his division, while his outlying picket commenced to skirmish with the enemy. The 49th men, although reinforced by three companies, were unable to hold back the Russians, who presently established themselves on Shell Hill, and, bringing up their guns, opened fire on Home Ridge. But during the encounter in his front Evans had been reinforced by H Battery, and his artillery, which now numbered twelve 9-pounder guns and six 24-pounder howitzers, replied to the four Russian light pieces, with the natural result that the latter were at once swept off the field. During the fight of the pickets Evans declined to send forward reinforcements; for his plan was to keep his main strength collected on Home Ridge till the time came when he could utilise his triumphant artillery to crush the enemy's advancing battalions.¹


While Féderoff's main body was advancing on Shell Hill, another force of 700 men, detached to cover his right flank, entered the Careenage Ravine; but there they were confronted by Goodlake's picket and held in check at a point just under the Lancaster Battery. When the alarm reached the Light Division, Sir George Brown at once ordered three guns of E Battery to the Victoria Ridge, and Second-Captain J. Singleton, who commanded them, led them to a position very nearly level with the Mamelon; but they were not seriously engaged.²

¹ Kinglake, v. p. 9.

² It will be noticed that in the return of ammunition expended,

Defeat of Russians.—And now the moment awaited by Evans arrived. His pickets in front began to come in rapidly as a reinforcing Russian column descended Shell Hill. This body was at once assailed by our guns, and, after suffering loss, sought temporary refuge in the Quarry Ravine, where it was harassed both by howitzer and rifle fire. This column was followed by a second and then by a third, both of which attempted to advance down the southern slopes of Shell Hill; but each in turn, smitten by artillery fire, was driven back the way it came. Galled by our infantry fire and the howitzer shells, the column that had disappeared into the Quarry Ravine now ascended its right bank, with the intention of making good its retreat by bending off to the west; but again it entered the cannon-swept zone and suffered heavily. At the same time the combat in the Careenage Ravine came to an end, for Goodlake was joined by Lieutenant W. T. Markham and men of the 2nd Battalion Rifles, and the Russians were driven back with the loss of some prisoners.

which is extracted from Adye's Order Book, no rounds are credited to E Battery. This does not altogether agree with the following account by an eye-witness: "At 1 p.m. I was loitering outside our camp when rapid firing commenced near the 2nd Division. . . . Soon after a battery of artillery (E) passed near our camp—the teams stretched down and every driver riding his horse. What impressed me, so as I have never forgotten it, was the set, determined look upon the faces of the men; not an eye was turned to the right or left as the guns swept past, and no one seemed to notice the little bank and surface drain on either side of a road (existing then as it does now) which sent the guns jumping in the air. In silence we watched the battery speed on, until, from where we were standing, they seemed to unlimber within hand-shaking distance of the Russians, who a few minutes later began to fall back before our rapidly increasing numbers" ("The Crimea in 1854 and 1894," pp. 124 etc.).



QUARRY RAVINE.

Major C. H. Owen, R.A., del.

As the Russians retired in good order, in spite of their losses, and occasionally turned to fire, Evans pressed their retreat; but he would not suffer his troops to advance beyond the near slopes of Shell Hill, though their recall was a matter of difficulty. As the enemy retired on Sebastopol, they came within range of Hewett's gun, but the arc of its fire was restricted by the construction of the work. Hewett, in consequence, blew away the right cheek of the embrasure, and, gaining the requisite lateral sweep, he fired some dozen rounds into the enemy with very good effect.¹

The Russians were also observed from the batteries of the Right Attack, and vain efforts were made to turn the right-hand gun, a 24-pounder, upon them, for difficulties arose with the Madras platform which could not be surmounted. Some 24-pounder rockets, however, were successfully fired by No. 1 Company 12th Battalion under Lieutenant C. H. Owen.

Casualties, etc.—The objects of the Russians were probably to reconnoitre the British position and to effect a lodgment on Shell Hill, for Colonel Féderoff's force brought out entrenching tools with them. This hill had up to the present been debatable ground, though guarded by the Russians with great jealousy; but if a sheltering earthwork could have been con-

¹ The account in the text follows Kinglake, v. p. 16. Mr. Hewett was awarded the Victoria Cross for his conduct on this day. Apparently, at one time the Lancaster Battery was in danger of capture; but Hewett stuck to his post, although orders to retire were sent to him by some one or other (*Ibid.*, pp. 125, 126).

Mr. Hewett afterwards became Admiral Sir William Hewett, K.C.B.

structed thereon and held by them, the stern drama that was in preparation, to which the events of October 25 and 26 were a mere prelude, might have had a different issue. The contest lasted about half an hour. The British lost 10 killed and 77 wounded; the Russian casualties, including 80 prisoners, amounted to 330.¹ The Artillery had no casualties. They expended the following ammunition :

TABLE XXX
EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION

Battery.	Gun Ammunition.		Howitzer Ammunition.		Rockets.	Total Shot and Shell.
	Round Shot.	Shrapnel.	Common Shell.	Shrapnel.		
B Battery	160	30	..	34	8	224
G "	120	46	..	74	..	240
H "	33	7	..	20	..	60
No. 1 Company 12th Battalion	24 ²	..

The expenditure of small-arm ammunition from the battle of the Alma up to October 28 was as follows :

TABLE XXXI
EXPENDITURE OF SMALL-ARM AMMUNITION

	Minié Rifles.	Smooth Bore.	Total Rounds.
1st Division	16,094	..	16,094
2nd "	33,293	..	33,293
3rd "	21,201	..	21,201
4th "	8,202	11,149	19,351
Light "	30,915	..	30,915
Total	109,705	11,149	120,854

Continuation of Bombardment.—Meanwhile, in strange ignorance of the growing Russian strength,

¹ Kinglake, v. p. 17.

² Some of these were directed at the town.

the operations of the siege were continued, and to the fight in which our field troops were engaged the heavy guns kept up a thunderous accompaniment. But the marked success obtained by the British on October 17 did not recur ; and the Redan, strengthened and well equipped, was now able to hold its own. The Flagstaff Bastion, however, was a source of anxiety to the Russians ; it occupied a position of great saliency, and was hemmed in on either side by the Town and Boulevard Ravines. The available space for guns, therefore, was much restricted, and those placed in support on the far sides of these ravines were of necessity at a greater distance from the besieger's batteries than were the latter from the bastion itself. From Mount Rodolph and the Green Hill the Allies commanded the Russian work, and the slopes in their front afforded ample space for their batteries, which, while they counter-battered the salient at close range, enfiladed both faces of the bastion. Moreover, the fire these faces could direct against an enemy's final approaches along the capital was of necessity very oblique. The design of the work, and the general direction of the embrasures, had been already fixed when Todleben assumed office ; its ditch was quarried from the solid rock, and the existing trace had therefore to be accepted.¹

The advantages thus afforded for an attack on the Flagstaff Bastion were especially welcome to the French, on account of the nearness of their base at Kamiesch, and from the first they had pushed on their approaches with remarkable energy. On

¹ Todleben, i. pp. 356 etc.

November 1 they opened their third parallel, about 140 yards distant from the Russian counterscarp, and they had 91¹ siege guns mounted in their batteries, which, heedless of the more westerly defences, daily engaged the guns of the Flagstaff Bastion and of the supporting works added by Todleben. Our Left Attack supported the French.

On the British side the want of men was already keenly felt, and our engineers were principally engaged keeping our existing batteries in repair. They opened a trench, however, some 600 yards in front of the Twenty-one Gun Battery, and between this trench and the battery they made an emplacement for bronze mortars²; while in the Left Attack many embrasures were altered so as to support the French attack on the Flagstaff Bastion, by engaging the new Russian batteries opened above the Woronzoff Ravine.³

Our immunity from loss of guns did not continue, and though we replaced some damaged 24-pounders by 32-pounders landed from the fleet, and put a few more bronze mortars into a second emplacement in the Right Attack, on October 29 our ordnance was reduced to 69 pieces.⁴ The horse artillery and field batteries gave occasional help, and a welcome reinforcement reached the Siege Train on October 30⁵; but the excessive work which the men had undergone since the opening of the bombardment began to tell

¹ Auger, i. p. 116.

² These mortars are described as Coëhorn mortars in "Artillery Operations." They really were Royal mortars of 5½-in. calibre (see Table VI. p. 26).

³ "R.E. Journal," i. p. 45.

⁴ "Artillery Operations," pp. 24 etc.


⁵ A draft of men under Capt. C. W. Younghusband.

severely on their health, and diarrhœa and fever became prevalent in camp, so that the number of effectives was barely sufficient for the necessary duties.¹

The French, however, were confident that the time was fast approaching when the City could be carried by an assault, in which the British would co-operate by advancing on the Péressib and attacking the Russians in flank and rear. Sir John Burgoyne submitted a memorandum² on the subject, in which he concurred with our allies; all energies were directed to prepare for what it was fondly hoped would prove the last act of the drama; and the details, it was believed, could be settled by a Council of War, to be held on November 5. But events took a very different course.

¹ "Artillery Operations," p. 36.

² "R.E. Journal," i. p. 123; app. xxv.



A BRONZE MORTAR ON MOVABLE BED.

APPENDICES TO CHAPTER V

APPENDIX No. I

R.A. OFFICERS PRESENT AT BALACLAVA

HEAD-QUARTER STAFF

Brigadier-General T. Fox-Strangways; Major J. M. Adye; Captains S. E. Gordon, J. C. W. Fortescue, and E. T. Gage; Surgeon R. C. Elliot; Chief Veterinary Surgeon J. S. Stockley.

CAVALRY DIVISION

I Troop R.H.A.

Captains G. A. Maude and J. D. Shakespear; Lieutenants H. W. J. Dashwood and F. T. Whinyates.

FIRST DIVISION

Staff

Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. Dacres; Captain E. B. Hamley (Adjutant).

A Battery R.A.

Captains D. W. Paynter and P. G. Pipon; Lieutenants E. Taddy and W. G. Le Mesurier.

H Battery R.A.

Captains E. Wodehouse and G. Barstow; Lieutenants W. P. Richards, A. H. King, and S. J. M. Maxwell.

THIRD DIVISION

Staff

Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Dupuis; Captain M. A. S. Biddulph (Adjutant).

F Battery

Major W. Swinton ; Captain W. W. Barry ; Lieutenants W. Morris, A. W. A. Ogilvie, and P. E. Hill.

W Battery

Captains G. R. Barker and J. E. Michell ; Lieutenants P. Dickson, J. de Havilland, and R. Biddulph.

FOURTH DIVISION

Staff

Lieutenant-Colonel D. E. Wood ; Captain G. Le M. Tupper (Adjutant).

P Battery

Major S. P. Townsend ; Captain D. E. Hoste ; Lieutenants W. W. A. Lukin and F. Miller.

LIGHT DIVISION

Staff

Lieutenant-Colonel N. T. Lake ; Captain J. F. L. Baddeley (Adjutant).

C Troop

Captain J. J. Brandling ; Lieutenants A. Y. Earle, S. M. Grylls, and W. A. Fox-Strangways.

E Battery

Captains C. H. Morris, J. Singleton, and C. H. Ingilby ; Lieutenants R. C. Longley and W. Stirling.

MEDICAL OFFICERS AND VETERINARY SURGEONS

Surgeons S. H. Fasson, R. Thornton, W. Combe, W. P. Ward, R. A. Chapple, A. S. Fogo, and J. C. H. Wright ; Veterinary Surgeons H. Withers and M. J. Harpley.

FIELD TRAIN OFFICERS

W. L. M. Young, G. A. Ayngé, R. Garrard, H. Blakeney, C. W. E. Holloway, H. A. Russell, H. Hewitt, G. Greensill, J. Lilley, W. Gair.

APPENDIX No. 2

R.A. OFFICERS PRESENT AT REPULSE OF RUSSIAN
RECONNAISSANCE, OCTOBER 26, 1854

STAFF OF DIVISIONS

Lieutenant-Colonels R. J. Dacres, J. W. Fitzmayer, and D. E. Wood ;
Adjutants Captains E. B. Hamley, the Hon. W. C. Yelverton,
M. A. S. Biddulph, G. L. Tupper, and J. F. L. Baddeley.

BATTERIES ENGAGED ON INKERMANN RIDGE

B Battery

2nd Captain H. P. Yates ; Lieutenants E. Markham, H. T. Arbuthnot,
and L. D. Broughton.

G Battery

Captain J. Turner ; 2nd Captain J. G. Boothby ; Lieutenant A. Brendon.

H Battery

Captain E. Wodehouse ; 2nd Captain G. Barstow ; Lieutenants W. P.
Richards, A. H. King, and S. J. M. Maxwell.

BATTERY ON VICTORIA RIDGE (3 guns only)

E Battery

2nd Captain J. Singleton ; Lieutenants R. C. Longley and W. Stirling ;
also present, Captain C. H. Morris and 2nd Captain C. H. Ingilby.

BATTERIES IN RESERVE

A Battery

Captain D. W. Paynter ; Lieutenants E. Taddy and W. G. Le
Mesurier.

P Battery

Major S. P. Townsend ; 2nd Captain D. C. Hoste ; Lieutenant F. Miller.

IN TRENCHES. RIGHT ATTACK

8th Company, 11th Battalion

Captain H. F. Strange ; Lieutenant E. G. Bredin.

1st Company, 12th Battalion

Lieutenants C. H. Owen and H. P. Tillard.

MEDICAL OFFICERS, VETERINARY SURGEONS, AND OFFICERS OF FIELD
TRAIN

Assistant-Surgeons W. Perry, E. Gilborne, T. Park, J. C. H. Wright,
E. Bowen, A. H. Taylor, W. P. Ward, and S. H. Fasson ; Veterinary
Surgeons H. Withers and M. J. Harpley ; Assistant and Deputy
Assistant Commissaries W. L. M. Young, H. Blakeney, G. Yellon,
W. Hayter, J. M. Hill, J. Lilley, W. Gair, M. Keir, and J.
O'Connor.

APPENDIX No. 3

COMPOSITION OF ALLIED FIELD FORCE,
OCTOBER, 1854

BRITISH ARMY

The composition of the Head-quarter Staff, the First, Second, Third, and Light Divisions, remained as already detailed. The Cavalry Division and the Fourth Division were completed as shown below :

CAVALRY DIVISION

Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan

Horse Artillery. I Troop, R.H.A.

Heavy Brigade

Brigadier-General the Hon. J. Yorke Scarlett

4th Dragoon Guards. 1st Dragoons (*Royals*).

5th Dragoon Guards. 2nd Dragoons (*Greys*).

6th Dragoons (*Inniskillings*).

FOURTH DIVISION

Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir George Cathcart

Division Artillery

Lieutenant-Colonel D. E. Wood

P. Battery, R.A.

First Brigade

Brigadier-General T. L. Goldie

20th Foot.

21st Foot.

57th Foot.

Second Brigade

Brigadier-General A. W. Torrens

46th Foot.

68th Foot.

63rd Foot.

1st Battalion, Rifle Brigade.

FRENCH ARMY

This army had also been reinforced, and a Cavalry Division had been formed. It was commanded by General Morris, whose Brigadiers were Generals d'Allonville and Feray.

TURKISH ARMY

The composition was unaltered, but the Army was reinforced on October 14 by nearly 4,000 men.

CHAPTER VI

INKERMAN

1. OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN

Russian Forces.—Since the beginning of October the Russians had been receiving reinforcements, and by November 4 their effective strength exceeded 100,000 men, while the land and sea forces of the Allies numbered only 60,500. A gigantic effort to raise the siege was about to be made; the Grand Dukes Michael and Nicholas had hurried to the front to be present at the attempt; and long before the dawn of the memorable Inkerman Sunday

“the besiegers heard drowsily in their tents the bells of Sebastopol celebrating the arrival of the young Grand Dukes, and invoking the blessings of the Church on the impending attack towards which the Russian troops were even then on the march.”¹

The Battlefield.—The scene² of the coming con-

¹ “War in the Crimea,” p. 130.

² In order to describe the battle it is absolutely necessary to adopt names for certain localities that had no names. The author has adopted those invented by Kinglake. He has also followed Kinglake’s division of the battle into periods. Hamley, writing in 1891, says, “Here it must be remarked that the indefatigable inquiries of Kinglake, and the care with which he arranged the information thus obtained, first disentangled the incidents of this battle from the confusion which long hid them, and rendered them intelligible as they had never been before, even to those who fought in the action” (“War in the Crimea,” p. 124).

flict was the north-eastern corner of the Plateau which lies between the Careenage Ravine and the Sapouné Ridge and has been called Mount Inkerman.

Except in the neighbourhood of the Windmill, where a narrow neck of land connects it with the downs farther south, Mount Inkerman is bounded by cliffs, ravines, or steep slopes which generally were clothed with a thick jungle-like growth, sometimes reaching a height of 8 or 9 ft. The interior was open, with occasional patches of dense oak scrub, and brushwood, and offered no difficulty to the movements of field batteries; but from the Russian side guns could only reach the higher ground by the post or military roads. The latter was made to connect Sebastopol with the Inkerman Bridge, and, though continuous, was called the West Sapper Road as far as St. George's Brow, and beyond that point the East Sapper Road.

The only work in the nature of a redoubt that existed on Mount Inkerman was the one constructed by the desire of General Canrobert, whose name it bore. It looked eastwards over the ground towards Balaclava, and held two guns, but took no part in the conflict on Mount Inkerman. A low breastwork, however, was constructed by the 2nd Division on Home Ridge, extending east and west of the post-road, and a wall of loose stones known as the Barrier was made for the picket, overlooking the Quarry Ravine.

On the Kitspur there was a disused emplacement for two guns which was constructed a few days before the battle of Balaclava. The Russians had put a

gun in position near the Ruins of Inkerman, to fire on our parties who went to the valley of the Tchernaya for hay, and two 18-pounder guns were taken to the emplacement by B Battery. They were obtained from the siege park of the Right Attack, whither they were returned after the Russian gun was silenced, which was speedily accomplished. Subsequently they were placed in Canrobert Redoubt.¹ The disused and empty emplacement soon became famous in history as the Two Gun or Sand Bag Battery.

At first no more than a shelter for a sergeant's party, the Sand Bag Battery soon exercised an almost magic influence on both French and British; and it assumed such extravagant proportions in the imagination of the Russians, both during and after the battle, that Todleben himself has been lured into the realms of romance.²

¹ These statements are based on letters written by Sir James Fitzmayer (then Lieutenant-Colonel J. Fitzmayer), General (then Lieutenant-Colonel) G. Gambier, Sir Collingwood Dickson, V.C. (then Colonel Dickson), and by Major-General H. T. Arbuthnot (then Lieutenant Arbuthnot, R.A.), published in the *Times*, and reprinted in *Jackson's Woolwich Journal*, May, 1857, p. 74. Lieutenant H. T. Arbuthnot, who commanded the two 18-pounder guns when they silenced the Russian gun, noticed that the detachment of the latter took refuge in a building close by. Not knowing that it was a sacred edifice, he fired two round shot at it, and, much to his surprise, saw a priest in his robes amongst those who were hastily quitting it. The General, on a recent visit to the Crimea (April, 1910), was much interested to find his two round shot placed on pillars on either side of the altar in the little chapel. No one had been hurt by them because, so the Russians said, the sanctity of the building protected the occupants (see "R.A.I.P.," xxxvii. p. 530).

² The Sand Bag Battery was lost and retaken again and again. Describing one of the combats which gave the Russians its temporary possession, Todleben writes :

"Enfin après des efforts inouïs pour triompher d'une si énergique

Shell
Hill.

Saddle Top
Ridge.

Home
Ridge.



BATTLEFIELD OF INKERMAN, FROM MOUNT HEAD.

Except the breastwork on Home Ridge and the Barrier at the neck of the Quarry Ravine, the British had no defensive works whatever.¹

Russian Plan of Attack.—On November 4 General Soimonoff reached Sebastopol with 19,000 infantry and 38 guns; General Pauloff, on the heights beyond the Tchernaya, had 16,000 infantry and 96 guns; and Prince Michael Gortchakoff, stationed between Kadikoï and Kamara, commanded 22,000 infantry and 88 guns. The two men-of-war, *Vladimir* and *Chersonese*, were moored in the Roadstead west of the mouth of the Tchernaya, so that their fire might be brought to bear on the Plateau as occasion offered. General de Moller, commandant of the garrison, had the remainder of the Russian forces under his orders, Prince Menchikoff being in supreme command of the whole.²

In the early hours of November 5 Soimonoff was résistance, les soldats d'Okhotsk réussirent à expulser les Coldstreams de la batterie et à s'en emparer. Neuf bouches à feu furent le prix de ce brillant fait d'armes; on en descendit immédiatement trois dans le ravin, et les autres furent enclouées" (Todleben, i. p. 470).

This is, of course, quite untrue, and is a remarkable passage, considering the high character of the writer. He must have been misinformed by others, who either drew on their imagination or misinterpreted the fact that a French horse-artillery gun was taken (see p. 264) and thrown down the hillside. It was found there after the battle by our troops and returned to its owners (Kingleake, v. p. 392). Several times British field guns were temporarily in the hands of the Russians, but no gun was definitely lost by either side during the battle of Inkerman.

¹ "No trace of the Barrier is in existence now; it having been made of loose stones, these stones have evidently been utilised for mending the post-road. But the breastwork, being of earth, is still in existence for its whole length and has evidently never been touched since we evacuated the Crimea" (General H. T. Arbutnot to author, November, 1910, on his return from revisiting the Crimea).

² The following regiments, each of four battalions, were under General Soimonoff: Catherinburg, Tomsk, Kolivansk, Vladimir, Sousdal, Ouglitz, Boutirsk. These, with a half-battalion of rifles, a half-

to start from Sebastopol by the West Sapper Road, and effect a junction with Pauloff, who was to cross the Tchernaya and march along the East Sapper Road to meet him at St. George's Brow. The combined forces were then to pass under the command of General Dannenberg, who, as a first step towards sweeping the Allies off the Plateau, was to seize Shell Hill. Gortchakoff was to support the attack by drawing the Allies towards himself, and be ready at the same time to mount the heights and take part in the combat on Mount Inkerman as soon as the Allies were driven back to the Windmill. On his right rear Dannenberg would have the support of the garrison of Sebastopol, which were also to occupy the attention of the enemy by sorties against their left.

The Attack on the British Pickets.—Although throughout the night the noise of the bells and the distant rumbling of vehicles were heard by our advanced parties,¹ yet no idea of an impending attack seems to have entered into the minds of the Allies; and great was the dismay when, in the darkness and mist of a wet wintry morning, our pickets were suddenly driven from Shell Hill, and

battalion of Sappers, and a sotnia of Cossacks, brought the total up to 18,929 men. He had 38 guns, of which 22 were guns of position.

The following regiments, each of four battalions, were under General Pauloff: Selenghinsk, Iakoutsck, Okhotsk, Borodeno, Taroutino, which, with a half-battalion of rifles, brought the total up to 15,806. He had 96 guns, of which 32 were guns of position.

The forces commanded by Prince Gortchakoff consisted of 16 battalions of infantry, about 57 squadrons, and 88 guns. Total effective force, 22,444 men (Todleben, i. pp. 446 etc.).

¹ A sentry in front of the Victoria Ridge reported that he had heard "market carts" on the Sebastopol Road (Codrington's "Letters").

Soimonoff established a battery of 22 guns¹ thereon, supported by large bodies of infantry.

An hour before sunrise the 2nd Division, under General Pennefather,² stood to arms, and, nothing unusual having been observed, the parade was dismissed. Lieutenant H. T. Arbuthnot, told off for day picket duty, with two guns of B Battery,³ had marched only a quarter of a mile down the post-road when he realised, from the sound of musketry in front,⁴ that our pickets were being driven in. He at once trotted back to the breastwork, and, bringing his guns into action on the right of the post-road, opened fire⁵ on the positions which he knew our pickets had occupied on Shell Hill. Here he was joined by the other guns of the battery, under Captain J. F. Pennycuick,⁶ while Captain Turner, with G Battery, took up a similar position on the left of the road.⁷

¹ These 22 guns were his guns of position, and were equivalent to our 12-pounder guns and 32-pounder howitzers (Totleben, i. p. 456, and "Modern Artillery," p. 440). Later on they were reinforced by numerous field batteries.

² General Sir De Lacy Evans was on the sick-list, and General Pennefather, as senior brigadier, was in command of the 2nd Division on November 5. During the course of the battle Evans came on the ground, but did not interfere with the command.

³ These guns were always withdrawn at night.

⁴ The first musketry firing came from Goodlake's "roving picket" of the Guards, which was out in front, repeating the excellent service it had performed on October 26.

⁵ These two guns, under Lieutenant Arbuthnot, were the first British guns fired at Inkerman.

⁶ Pennycuick was the Second Captain appointed to succeed Captain Dew, killed at the Alma. Pennycuick had hurried from England, and arrived just in time for Inkerman. As Captain C. T. Franklin was on the sick-list, Pennycuick commanded B Battery. As at the Alma, Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzmayer was in command of the two batteries, B and G, of the 2nd Division.

⁷ Soon afterwards Colonel Fitzmayer ordered the left half battery under Second Capt. Boothby further to the left.

The 2nd Division, which had only just been dismissed from parade, at once turned out, and took up a position on Home Ridge.

Confusion in Russian Orders.—There had been some confusion in the Russian orders. Pauloff was late in arriving on the scene of action, and Soimonoff did not wait for him, but directed the mass of his infantry to advance at once along the eastern side of the Careenage Ravine. This was not in accordance with Dannenberg's plans, who had wished the attack to be made on both sides of that ravine; and when Pauloff eventually ascended the heights at St. George's Brow, the available front was undoubtedly too narrow for the forces assembled thereon.¹ Soimonoff, however, at once opened fire with his powerful battery against Home Ridge, his apparent object being to harass British reserves which (he imagined) were surely coming up. Such is the in-

¹ On this point Hamley remarks, "The present writer does not doubt that Dannenberg's plan of attacking by both sides of the Careenage Ravine was the right one. It is true that to have attacking troops divided by an obstacle is a great disadvantage. It is also true, as Kinglake says, that 'the camps of the Allies were so placed on the Chersonese that to meet perils threatening from the western side of the Careenage Ravine they could effect a rapid concentration.' But they could only effect it by robbing the eastern side of what was indispensable for its defence. If, instead of one part of the enemy's army attacking while the other was coming up in its rear, and therefore exercising no effect upon the battle, both had attacked simultaneously, it is hardly credible that one (and, if one, both) would not have broken through. And if it is a disadvantage that the front of attack should be divided by an obstacle, it is a still greater evil to restrict the attack, especially against very inferior numbers, to too confined a space. By crowding on to the eastern slope only, in numbers amply sufficient to have attacked both, the Russians were choosing the ground which best suited our numbers and our circumstances, and which least suited their own" ("War in the Crimea," pp. 158-159).

ference suggested by the fact that his projectiles, flying high, spared at first the defenders of the ridge, and spent their energy on the slopes in rear and the camp of the 2nd Division. No such reserves were at hand.

The Russian Advance.—Before long our batteries began to suffer severely from the much heavier metal arrayed against them. Nevertheless, they maintained a brisk fire on Shell Hill, though only the flashes of the enemy's guns could be seen through the fog; for it was before all things necessary to show a bold front and prevent the enemy from at once pressing forward and pushing home the advantage he had gained. For a little time it appeared that this end was approaching, for Soimonoff, as if awaiting Pauloff's arrival, was patiently resting in his strong position. But when a reconnoitring column, sent out towards the Mikriakoff Glen, was roughly handled by a picket of the 49th Regiment, under Major Grant,¹ the Russian General decided to take a vigorous offensive at once.

With this object he put twelve battalions in motion, before whom the 49th began to fall back. Owing to the persistent fire of Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzmayer's two batteries, the Russian infantry continually swerved to their right, away from the shell-zone, and diverged towards the neighbourhood of the Mikriakoff Glen. In this way their line of advance assumed a deep échelon formation with the right thrown forward.

¹ Major Thornton Grant. He succeeded to the command of the 49th Regiment when Colonel Dalton, who commanded it, was wounded.

2. FIRST STAGE OF THE BATTLE

The Second Division Attacked on both Flanks.—While the bulk of Soimonoff's troops were still advancing to St. George's Brow, a force of some 3,000 men were detached and directed to enter the Careenage Ravine near its northern extremity. This column (called by Kinglake the "Under Road Column") was now gradually working its way up towards the Wellway, which debouched at the rear of the 2nd Division camp, and it made such good progress that it formed the leading échelon of Soimonoff's advance.

Meanwhile Pauloff, marching along the East Sapper Road, had detached the Taroutine and Borodino Light Infantry, with orders to ascend the heights by the Volovia Gorge. Reaching the high ground, they followed in the wake of one of Soimonoff's battalions which had broken away from his main line of advance, and was moving towards the east. When these troops had passed the upper end of the Quarry Ravine, the Sand Bag Battery came in view, and at once attracted their attention. The Russians, believing that they had an important work in front of them, rushed forward with exultant cries and drove out a sergeant and twelve men who happened to be inside. Then, enfolding the captured work in their left flank, the Russian infantry, 6,000 strong, formed a line facing south, with their right resting on the post-road, close to the Quarry Ravine. They thus directly threatened the Fore Ridge, for in their immediate front there were only some 250

men of the 30th Regiment at the Barrier (under Lieutenant-Colonel J. T. Mauleverer¹) and some isolated pickets. Thus both flanks of Pennefather's small force of 3,000 bayonets and 12 guns were dangerously exposed.

Codrington on the Victoria Ridge.—It soon became apparent that neither Gortchakoff nor de Moller would seriously embarrass the British movements,² and at an early hour our reinforcements were moving to various points of danger. General Codrington, who was with his brigade on the Victoria Ridge, was joined by some companies of the 19th Regiment from Buller's Brigade, by men of the 1st Royals and 50th Regiment from the 3rd Division, by 3 guns from H Battery, and

¹ Colonel Mauleverer commanded the 30th Regiment, until he was wounded. He was Field Officer of the day, and was stationed at the Barrier.

² The movements of the French, on the other hand, were greatly influenced by the pressure of Gortchakoff's force, which for a time absorbed the attention of Bosquet's Corps. The garrison of Sebastopol also played its allotted rôle with a fair measure of success. At an early hour General Canrobert ordered Prince Napoleon to send General de Monet with three battalions to Mount Inkerman without delay, and to hold himself in readiness to follow with his two remaining battalions; but some unexplained delays took place, and de Monet was so late in starting that he did not reach the battlefield till about 11 o'clock.

At 9.30 General Timonieff, with 3,000 bayonets and 4 guns, made a sortie upon the flank of the French siege works on Mount Rodolph, and succeeded in spiking some guns. This drew upon him the French forces lying to the left of Prince Napoleon's Division, and even caused the Prince himself to move to his left, instead of remaining in readiness to move on Inkerman. Timonieff withdrew before the French attacks, and, being supported by fresh troops from Sebastopol, effected his retreat. He was followed up by the French with such ardour that, coming under the fire of the fortress, they suffered heavy loss, and were with difficulty extricated from their perilous position. Operations were concluded by 11.30, at which hour Prince Napoleon commenced his march to Inkerman, too late to take part in the fight.

later by a division from F Battery.¹ He was never seriously attacked; and with his small force he was able all through the battle to maintain his important position, which afforded strong moral support to the hard-pressed defenders of Home Ridge.² But though reinforcements were pushed on with all speed to join Pennefather, only 300 infantry and 6 guns had reached him when the storm broke over his left flank.

The First Reinforcements.—At the first alarm

¹ There has been some confusion regarding the part played by the artillery on the Victoria Ridge. Thus Todleben remarks:

“La brigade Codrington avec 6 bouches à feu occupa la berge occidentale du ravin de Carénage. . . . L'Artillerie de la brigade Codrington établie sur la berge gauche du ravin du Carénage battait nos réserves et prenait en flanc celles de nos troupes qui attaquaient l'aile gauche de l'armée anglaise” (Todleben, i. pp. 458, 474).

These remarks of Todleben must have been based on hearsay and inaccurate evidence, as will be seen from the following extract from General Codrington's report:

“The numerous and powerful artillery of the enemy was firing heavily upon the skirmishers and the battery (the Right Lancaster Battery), and enfiladed it completely. Three guns under Captain Wodehouse having arrived, they were brought into action for a short time against the skirmishers and supports, but the fire of so many of the enemy's guns was immediately turned upon him, that he very properly brought his guns from under it; and there was no opportunity even up to the last of effectually using our artillery, which had been reinforced by two guns of the 3rd Division.” The General further states that he kept all his field guns under cover during the progress of the battle, at the conclusion of which, Mr. Hewett, in the Right Lancaster Battery, brought his gun into action against the retreating Russians, and some rockets also were fired (Codrington's “Letters”).

Kinglake's account in vol. v., p. 35, is in accordance with this extract.

Captain, afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel, E. G. Bredin, who this day was in the trenches of the Right Attack, published a sketch of the guns of H and F Batteries in action, showing Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Dupuis, Major W. Swinton, Captain C. Wodehouse, and Lieutenants S. J. M. Maxwell and W. Morris present on the Victoria Ridge.

² Codrington's force had 180 casualties.

General Buller pushed forward four companies of the Connaught Rangers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jeffries,¹ who were just in time to take part in the unequal fight which Grant and his picket maintained against two Russian battalions. Close upon their heels came P Battery, under Major S. P. Townsend, which had been hurried on in advance of the 4th Division by Lieutenant-Colonel D. E. Wood. When near the 2nd Division camp, the battery turned to the left off the post-road and made for the Mikriakoff Spur, but soon lost its way in the brushwood. As the smoke and fog made it difficult to see twenty yards ahead, Lieutenant F. Miller (in command of the left half-battery, which was leading) asked leave to ride on and reconnoitre. He immediately came upon some of the Rangers who were being pressed back, and the head of the battery became entangled in a running infantry fight. The grey coats and flat caps of the Russians were plainly visible in the brushwood, as with shrill cries of exultation they advanced firing. The left half-battery came into action, while the right was wheeled about and retired ; but the limbers of the left hurried after the right half-battery almost before any ammunition could be got out. As it was, only one round of case shot was fired.

Loss of 3 Guns by P Battery.—Our infantry were in full retreat, but Major G. V. Maxwell, of the Rangers,² supported by Lieutenants H. J. Le M.

¹ Major and Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel E. R. Jeffries.

² See "With the Connaught Rangers," by Lieutenant-Colonel N. Steevens, p. 122. Private Dunmody received the Sardinian Medal.

Baynes and J. E. Riley, Private Dunmody and others of that regiment, stood for a while by the guns where Sergeant Ramsay, R.A., was conspicuous for his gallantry.¹ The Russians, however, were not to be denied, and two of the guns had to be left to their fate. Miller was with the remaining gun, and, as a forlorn hope, he called upon his men to draw their swords and charge the enemy, who were now about ten yards off. He himself, to set the example, rode straight at a group of ten or twelve Russians who were nearest. Three bullets whistled by him, but neither horse nor man was touched, as he closed with his antagonists and cut with his sword at the nearest, who parried the blow with his musket. Miller's horse swerved, and, finding that he was alone amongst the enemy, he withdrew from the *mêlée* as best he could and made his retreat unhurt. The limberless guns remained in the hands of the Catherinberg battalions which made the attack.

Defeat of the Under Road Column.—It was at this juncture that General Buller and a wing of the 77th Regiment under Colonel T. G. Egerton, appeared upon the scene, groping their way through the mist in the direction from which the sounds of

¹ Sergeant George Ramsay, in recognition of his gallantry on November 5, was given a commission on January 12, 1856, in the Transport Corps, and became, with the rank of Major, an Assistant-Commissary-General on the Commissariat and Transport Staff. In 1868 he gave Lieutenant (now Colonel) H. W. L. Hime a written statement of the occurrences in P Battery, which the latter sent to Mr. Kinglake. This statement was burnt, with all his other papers, on Mr. Kinglake's death by his own order. Ramsay died in April, 1901, and was buried at Plumstead. The coffin was taken to the grave by a team of artillery horses.

conflict were heard. They were moving past the western slopes of Home Ridge when Lieutenant Hugh Clifford,¹ General Buller's aide-de-camp, who had been sent to the rear with an order, became aware of the advance of the Russian Under Road Column, whose head now reached the neck of the Wellway. Followed by some twenty men, Clifford at once charged down upon the Russians, who were at the same time assailed by musketry fire on their right flank, their presence in the Wellway having been detected by an outlying picket of the Guards at Quarter Guard Point.² Thus assailed, the Russian column suffered instant defeat—a defeat that was final, for no further action was undertaken by the enemy in this portion of the field.

Recovery of the Guns of P Battery.—Meanwhile, on the left front of Egerton's advance, Major C. J. Fordyce, with a picket of the 47th, widely extended in skirmishing order, encountered the third battalion of the Catherinberg Regiment, "and harassed it by so destructive a fire that it broke up and retreated."³ At this moment there appeared in Egerton's immediate front two fresh battalions of the attacking échelon, but the 77th so dealt with them by fire and bayonet that they were driven back to the forward slopes of Shell Hill. All pressure on our left was at once relieved; the force which had pressed back Grant and Jeffries and overwhelmed the guns, melted away, and these officers were able

¹ Clifford received the Victoria Cross for this exploit.

² Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar's picket.

³ "War in the Crimea," p. 143.

to form up their men alongside Townsend's right half-battery.

Emerging from the mist, Miller now rode up, and in some excitement asked his commanding officer if nothing could be done to recover the guns. Major Townsend spoke to the infantry officers, and soon a mixed party of gunners, Rangers, and 49th men followed Miller, with a cheer, to the spot where the guns had been left. The enemy had all disappeared, and two of the guns were soon recovered. The third was given up for lost, but Miller, following up the wheel tracks, found it, with his own cap on the ground beside it, and one of our men lying dead across the trail. The Russians had spiked two guns with pieces of twig, which were easily removed; the third gun had not been interfered with. The limbers were soon brought up, and later on P Battery came into action on Home Ridge.¹

¹ The account of Miller's exploit is chiefly based on a "Letter of an Artillery Officer," published in the *Times* of November 27, 1854. This letter, which probably was not intended for publication by the writer, was from Miller to his father. Hamley, in the "Campaign of Sebastopol," Calthorpe, in "Letters from Head-quarters," and the Assistant-Surgeon of P Battery (in a letter dated November 7, 1854, and published in *Jackson's Woolwich Journal* of December, 1854), all refer to this episode. They all differ slightly from Kinglake's account (v. pp. 140-141) but the latter's story, which no doubt was pieced together with the greatest care and research, and with the advantage of evidence from actual eye-witnesses, is in no essential contradicted by the text. It is quite possible that Miller did not know what was going on behind him. Thus Kinglake, after relating Miller's call upon his men, says:

"As though bewildered by the novelty of the challenge and the sudden necessity of having to encounter a horseman, these men (the Russians) for a moment stopped short in their onset, and then there followed a conflict of a singular kind between, on the one hand, a great weight of advancing infantry, and on the other a few score (*sic*) of artillerymen, finding vent for some part of their rage in curses and shouts of defiance, but wildly trying besides to beat back the throng

Defeat of Russians on both Flanks.—The effect of the mist had been to isolate combats; and while Egerton was pushing his victorious advance up to the slopes of Shell Hill, close on his right (although unknown to him) some pickets, who had expended their ammunition, were retiring before the remaining six battalions of Soimonoff's attacking force.¹ Five of these battalions were advancing over Saddle Top Ridge in deep échelon, screened from the fire of our guns by a mass of British fugitives who were drawing in gradually towards Home Ridge. They made their retreat towards the spot where Captain J. Turner was in action, and at last came so close to the muzzles of the guns that the pursuing Russians were well within case-shot range. On seeing this, Corporal P. Conway² of G Battery, who

from their beloved guns with swords, with rammers, with sponge staves, nay, even, one may say, with clenched fists—for the story of the mighty Clitheroe bruiser felling man after man with his blows, and then standing a while unmolested and seemingly admired by the enemy, is not altogether a fable" (Kinglake, v. pp. 140–141).

When the first Victoria Crosses were conferred, Miller was not a recipient. Eventually he received it, and the *Gazette* states, "The Russians had surrounded a battery, driving part of one of our infantry regiments through it. Major (then Lieutenant) Miller personally attacked three Russians, and led his men in charging the occupants of the battery, successfully preventing them doing any damage to the guns" (*London Gazette*, May 17, 1859). This is a somewhat unsatisfactory account of the episode.

¹ The Russians advanced in the following formation: The "Under Road Column" was on their extreme right; in échelon, on its left rear, were the two battalions that captured Townsend's guns; then came the battalion dispersed by Fordyce; and then the two battalions driven back by Egerton. On their left were the six battalions now described as driving in our pickets. Eleven of Soimonoff's twelve battalions are thus accounted for; the twelfth had moved towards the east and joined Pauloff's detached force (p. 238).

² The field batteries had not their full complement of officers

was standing beside Turner, rushed forward from the guns shouting, "Lie down, men! lie down!" The men at once threw themselves on the ground, and immediately the case-shot flew over them in the face of the enemy. The latter turned and fled, pursued to Shell Hill by the very men they had just been pursuing.

The sixth battalion, bearing off to its left and being remote from the combat just described, drove back our pickets towards Hill Bend, where Captain Bellairs¹ had three companies of the 49th Regiment, with B Battery on his left. Lieutenant Arbuthnot was in command of the guns at this moment. Judging, from the sound of the infantry fire coming closer and closer, that our troops were being driven back, he loaded all six pieces with case-shot and waited. Bellairs' men kept doubling back by twos and threes till they were all in rear of the guns. The leading Russians then appeared in the open space which had been cleared in front of the breastwork, and Arbuthnot instantly fired a salvo of case. This momentarily checked them, but the Russians, advancing with great bravery, had almost reached the muzzles of the guns when another salvo was fired in their faces.² While the attackers were reeling

present on November 5; in some cases, as in the present instance, non-commissioned officers replaced them. Corporal Conway received the French Military Medal. See Kinglake v. 160.

¹ Captain William Bellairs, 49th Regiment, D.A.A.G., 2nd Division.

² General H. T. Arbuthnot has informed the author that he has no doubt that he fired two rounds of case from each piece on this occasion. It will, however, be noticed later on that no mention of them is made in the return of ammunition expended (p. 273). From this and other evidence we can only regard these returns as approximately correct.

under the effect of this discharge, Arbuthnot, who was in the centre of the battery, with Bellairs close beside him, cried, "Now is your chance!" Bellairs instantly gave the order to charge, and his men—he had only 183—sprang to the front with a cheer, and drove back the vastly superior forces opposed to them at the point of the bayonet.

Victory now smiled on the British, both on their left and centre, and the danger threatening their right never came to a head. Whether from want of initiation, the lack of orders, or the absence of a general officer, the 6,000 men drawn up over against the Fore Ridge made no forward movement; nay, they even succumbed before the sudden attack of Mauleverer and his handful of men at the Barrier and the simultaneous advance of the 41st, led by General Adams across the Kitspur. Mauleverer pursued his advantage up to the slopes of Shell Hill, his place at the Barrier being occupied by other troops, while the 41st remained on the Kitspur.

Thus all along the line the few had won and the many had lost. It was half-past seven o'clock, and the first phase of the battle was over.

3. SECOND STAGE OF THE BATTLE

Strength of Opposing Forces.—General Dannenberg now arrived and assumed command of the Russian forces. Soimonoff's twelve battalions had suffered so severely, and lost so many officers, including their gallant chief who was the soul of the attack, that they were of no more account in the battle; nor

was the state of the Taroutine and Borodino Regiments better. As a matter of fact, some 15,000 men had not only been defeated, but had been driven from the field.¹

Pauloff, however, had brought up 10,000 fresh men to Mount Inkerman. The 9,000 left in reserve by Soimonoff were still untouched, and the battery on Shell Hill, which now consisted of 90 to 100 guns, occupied more than a mile of ground from the East Jut to the West. Keeping in hand the original reserves, Dannenberg immediately determined to launch Pauloff's 10,000 against the British centre and right.

Pennefather's left was not at the moment threatened, but none the less it had to be watched with care and some 1,000 men (a full one-third of his available infantry) were occupied in this duty. A great portion of the remainder had been out on picket duty, and their worth was somewhat impaired as a fighting force. When the Russian attack began, Pennefather's available force, in addition to P, B, and G Batteries, did not exceed 1,400 bayonets, half of whom were in advanced position on the Kitspur and at the Sand Bag Battery. The nearest reinforcements were 700 men of the Guards, and 15 guns (A, E, and half H Battery) which were close at hand. Behind them were the remainder of the Guards, numbering 500 bayonets, and Cathcart's Division, some 2,000 strong, under his brigadiers, Goldie and Torrens. Two French regiments from Bourbaki's

¹ "Ainsi, dans la première phase du combat, de tous les bataillons qui devaient attaquer la position des Anglais, vingt avaient déjà quitté le champ de bataille" (Totleben, i. p. 465).

Brigade, the 6th of the Line and the 7th Léger, numbering together 1,600 bayonets, were approaching; so that, during the fight about to be described, Pennefather was gradually reinforced by 4,800 men and 15 guns. (See Table XXXV. p. 279.)

Combats round the Sand Bag Battery.—It was from the Quarry Ravine, which proved both a well-covered line of advance and a convenient lurking-place for the Russian soldiery, that the first attacks were delivered, and at once the British were sorely pressed. For some time the Barrier was lost, but it was eventually recaptured and occupied by detachments from the 4th Division. General Adams had been reinforced by Captain Bellairs with a wing of the 49th, but after many vicissitudes, during which the Sand Bag Battery exercised its magical influence on both parties, he was obliged to draw back from the contested spot.

At this juncture the reinforcing guns ¹ were coming up, and on arrival were placed alongside those already in position. Captain E. B. Hamley, with three guns of A Battery, was the first to arrive, and coming into action on Mount Head, where he was sheltered from the fire from Shell Hill,² opened at once with round

¹ "The guns were driven through the camp of the 2nd Division and did some damage on the way. The whole of the band instruments of the 55th Regiment were destroyed during the battle. They had always been placed by themselves in a tent for safety. The tents were all struck by General Pennefather's orders when the battle began. The English artillery galloped over the tents, and all our instruments were smashed. They cost the officers £500, but Government would give no compensation" (General Hume's "Reminiscences, 55th Regiment").

² Writing of this episode, Hamley says, "Grape-shot, too, occa-

shot on the enemy who appeared on the left bank of the Quarry Ravine. The Russians moved quickly out of sight, but immediately reappeared on the right bank, from which they swarmed up in such strength that the 41st and 49th were driven farther back. But now the Guards, marching by companies, came on in succession, and, passing on each side of our guns, checked the enemy's advance, while Hamley, as opportunity offered, fired a round or two of case. Soon after the advance of the Guards the guns, which had only their limbers with them, expended their ammunition and retired to Home Ridge.¹

The encounter now in progress on the Kitspur was one of the sternest that took place all day, and

sionally showered past, from which it would appear that the Russians had brought some iron guns into position, as grape fired from brass pieces would destroy the bore, from the softness of the metal. The ships in the harbour and the battery at the Round Tower (the Malakoff) also threw shot and shell on to the slope" ("The Campaign of Sebastopol," p. 99). The question arises, what guns can Hamley refer to?

Second-Captain P. G. Pipon of A. Battery was this day on the sick-list, and was replaced by the divisional adjutant, Second-Captain E. B. Hamley.

¹ Shortly after Hamley brought the three guns back to Home Ridge he was sent to order another battery to the Kitspur. He says, "While I was delivering the order a round shot passed through my horse, close to the saddle, and rolled us over. . . . While on the ground another cannon-shot passed through him. A sergeant of artillery—a very fine young fellow, named McKeown, of E Battery—ran to extricate me. He had just lifted me from under the horse, and I was in the act of steadying myself on his shoulder, when a shot carried off his thigh, and he fell back on me uttering cries, as if of amazement at the suddenness of his misfortune. . . . Calling two men to carry him to the rear, I hastened to the right after the battery. Advancing in the thick bushes, beyond the spot where the battery had come into action, I turned about and saw it retiring" ("The Campaign of Sebastopol," pp. 99–100). This was at the moment the Guards were fighting their way back from St. Clement's Gorge (p. 251).

resulted in terrible loss to both sides. The Guards fought desperately for the possession of the useless Sand Bag Battery, which was taken and re-taken, and Pennefather and Cathcart, feeding the fight in that direction with men of the 2nd and 4th Divisions, dangerously denuded the main line of defence at Home Ridge. Matters came to a crisis when Torrens' Brigade arrived, for Cathcart himself accompanied it in a furious onslaught delivered downhill against the left of the Russian advance. The Guards at once followed, and the enemy were driven headlong down St. Clement's Gorge and the eastern slopes of the Kitspur. But by this movement a gap was left in our line between the now reoccupied Barrier and the Sand Bag Battery. This gap was at once filled up by the enemy, who issued from the Quarry Ravine, and the troops that had accompanied Cathcart were for a time cut off. They were only saved by desperate fighting, and the timely advance of the 6th French Regiment of the Line, before whom the Russians retired to their lair in the ravine. The 6th and some of the Rifles then occupied the Kitspur, and our troops who had suffered serious loss recovered their formations.¹ Cathcart had been killed, and Torrens mortally wounded.

Russians again Driven Back.—Meanwhile the Russians had been busy in our immediate front, but wave after wave of attack was successfully

¹ The casualties in the Guards Brigade were extraordinary, and the greater part was incurred in this series of combats on the Kitspur. Twelve officers and 182 non-commissioned officers and men were killed, and 19 officers and 382 men were wounded—a total loss amounting to nearly 50 per cent. of all those engaged.

driven back by brisk counter-attacks carried out by much inferior numbers. Some time previously Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzmayer had ordered Captain Turner to send his left half-battery, under Second-Captain Boothby, to a position more to the left on the western slopes of Home Ridge, and now, with no friendly infantry at hand, Boothby saw the Russians surging up to the muzzles of his guns. The enemy, however, afforded an excellent target, and they quickly fell back before the salvo of case-shot with which they were greeted.¹

Another hour passed. It was half-past eight o'clock, and Pennefather still held his ground, unconquered, on Home Ridge. But Dannenberg was in no way discouraged; he still had his reserve of 9,000 men untouched, and the troops who now retired from the conflict, despite the serious loss they had incurred, were of sterner stuff than those encountered by us in the morning, and were quite ready to renew the fight.²

4. THIRD STAGE OF THE BATTLE

The British Position.—It may now be convenient to pass in review the British position from left to right. General Codrington was standing firmly on the Victoria Ridge, and the Careenage Ravine and the Wellway were guarded by the 47th, under Majors Grant and Fordyce, and the picket of the Guards at Quarter Guard Point. Colonel Egerton, with his four companies of the 77th, had followed the

¹ Kinglake v. p. 299.

² See "War in the Crimea," p. 151.

enemy towards Shell Hill and had placed his men in shelter along the Mikriakoff Spur. He was now relieved by a wing of the 21st, under Colonel Lord West,¹ and was himself marching towards Home Ridge, whither he had been summoned. Between Home Ridge and the Wellway some companies of the 21st and 63rd² were extended, but the ridge itself was very lightly held by infantry on either flank, and our long line of guns had little or no protection. Egerton, however, was close at hand, as well as the 7th Léger, the second French battalion of the two previously mentioned.³ Detachments of the 49th and 68th Regiments held the Barrier, while the line to the right was prolonged by the 6th French Regiment and some men of the Rifles.

¹ Major and Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Sackville, Lord West.

² The 21st Detachment belonged to Goldie's Brigade, and the 63rd Detachment to Torrens' Brigade, of the 4th Division.

³ The reasons for the delay in the appearance of General Bosquet are thus explained by Hamley :

"The menace of an attack by Gortschakoff on the heights held by Bosquet had not been without its effect. For an hour, while the real fight was taking place at Inkerman, the French troops were kept in their lines. At the end of that time Bosquet sent two battalions from Bourbaki's Brigade, and two troops of horse artillery, to the Windmill, on the road near the Guards' Camp, and accompanied them himself. He was there met by Generals Brown and Cathcart, to whom he offered the aid of these troops, and expressed his readiness in case of need to bring up others. The Generals took the strange, almost unaccountable, course of telling him that his support was not needed, and asked him to send his battalions to watch the ground on the right of the Guards' Camp, left vacant by the withdrawal of the Guards to take part in the battle. Bosquet had therefore returned to his own command ; but, receiving fresh and pressing communication from Lord Raglan, he had directed the troops already despatched again to march to Inkerman. Thus it was not until the battle had been going on for between two and three hours that Bourbaki's two battalions arrived near the crest of Home Ridge " (" War in the Crimea," pp. 153-154).

Counting all available troops, the Allies had about 3,000 bayonets to meet the threatened attack on Home Ridge, while the advent of two French horse-artillery batteries, under Commandant La Boussinière, brought up the number of their guns to 45. Dannenberg, in spite of his losses, was about to attack with 6,000 men, backed up as before by the huge battery on Shell Hill.

The Quarry Ravine.—The Russian guns directed a storm of fire on Home Ridge, and a close column of some four battalions was formed in the neck of the Quarry Ravine ready to advance when opportunity offered. At the same time, from the latter issued in quick succession battalions and company columns, forming a vanguard which, spread out on a wide arc, threatened Home Ridge along its whole extent. Covering parties were also sent out on the right and left, and these kept up a running fight with our outlying pickets who hung, like terriers worrying a bull, upon the flanks of the Russian advance.

Henry's Exploit.—Captain Boothby's half-battery, with which no other officers were present, was on the western slopes of Home Ridge; No. 6 gun was on lower ground than the other two, and had come into action in such a tangle of trees and brushwood that bill-hooks had to be resorted to to clear the front. The Russian attack appeared to be coming from the right front, when suddenly, from the dense undergrowth on the left, a Russian column, which had approached unobserved, rushed in upon the guns. Nos. 4 and 5 guns were en-

abled to get off a round of case before they fell into the enemy's hands, and though No. 6 was too closely pressed to allow of this last effort, its capture was accompanied by deeds that must be recorded. Andrew Henry, senior-sergeant¹ of the Battery, was close to No. 6 gun, and in a moment he found himself encircled by the bayonets of the enemy. He called upon the detachment to defend the gun; but the Russians were many, the gunners few, and Henry and Gunner James Taylor were soon the only defenders left at No. 6. The latter falling dead, Henry continued the fight alone, and, making play with his sword arm, he used his left to fell an antagonist or wrest a bayonet from his grasp. At last "he received in his chest the up-thrust of a bayonet, delivered with such power as to almost lift him from the ground, and at the same time he was stabbed in the back and stabbed in the arms." While lying on the ground, unconscious from the loss of blood, the Russians, in the frenzy of battle, inflicted new wounds upon him. Nevertheless, this gallant non-commissioned officer survived to receive the Victoria Cross and to rise to a captain's commission.²

Repulse of Russian Vanguard.—Meantime, more to our right, the main Russian attack was de-

¹ In 1854 known as Company Colour Sergeant.

² Kinglake's account (v. p. 324), which is followed in the text, is corroborated by a letter from Henry himself to the author of "England's Artillerymen." In connection with this episode mention must be made of Gunner and Driver James McGrath, who received the French Military Medal for "assisting Sergeant Henry in limbering up a gun surrounded by Russians at Inkerman." Presumably this gun must have been No. 4 or No. 5, which, after firing a round of case, was limbered up preparatory to retiring, but was overtaken and captured by the enemy.

feated by the men of the 63rd and 21st Regiments, and Boothby's guns had only been in the hands of their captors for some three minutes when a small body of Zouaves,¹ appearing suddenly from the rear, charged with the bayonet, cleared the Russians away from the guns, and, following them up, forced them to join the retreat of the rest of the column. The swelling tide of attack next swept back a detachment of the 55th Regiment who were holding the ridge still more to the right, but, coming under the fire of their own artillery, the Russians did not follow up their success. A succeeding wave seemed likely to have more effect, for Turner's half-battery on the right of the 55th, having fired some rounds of case, had to retire temporarily to avoid capture.²

The 7th Léger also, who had opportunely arrived, at first fell back before the Russian attack. They had been brought up in line and were unaccustomed to fight in that formation. The 55th, however, soon rallied. The 77th came up, and the 7th Léger, changing from line to column, again advanced. After some sharp fighting, the Russian vanguard was

¹ These "brave lawless men," as Kinglake calls them, had broken away from duty elsewhere, and had no right to be on this part of the field where their aid proved so effectual; but rumour had it that they were led on by a British General of Division! (Kinglake, v. p. 325).

² The number of field guns in action varied from time to time. Thus a letter from an officer in G Battery (*Civil and Military Gazette*, December 2, 1854), says, "After about 9.30 a.m. we were obliged to refit and complete three guns out of six." About the same hour, when the 55th were swept back from the breastwork, Kinglake speaks (v. p. 328) of a gun and howitzer that "had become clogged, and could not be made to work by any of the contrivances tried."

cleared off Home Ridge, but the main column was now approaching.

Death of Fox-Strangways.—It was an anxious moment for Lord Raglan who, with his Staff, was assembled on the reverse slope of the ridge. The air was now clearer and the view to the Windmill, a mile away, was unobstructed; but not a single fresh battalion could be seen approaching. As the Staff were grouped round their chief, a shell, supposed to have come from one of the men-of-war, passed between Lord Raglan and General Strangways, with whom he was conversing, and striking Colonel Somerset's¹ charger, burst in the body of the animal. Captain Gordon's² horse was killed and several of the Staff were overturned, but no one was hurt except Strangways. His long silver hair, and the full-dress jacket that he always wore, made the veteran of Leipzig and Waterloo a conspicuous figure in the Army, while his brave and gentle nature endeared him to his own regiment. "Will somebody help me off my horse?" said he quietly, and Major Adye and General Estcourt hastily dismounted and received him in their arms as he fell. The shell, in passing between him and Lord Raglan, had shattered his leg. In accordance with his request he was carried to the Siege Park of the Right Attack, that he might die amongst the Gunners.

Defeat of Russian Main Column.—As the Russian main column emerged from the Quarry Ravine

¹ Lieutenant-Colonel P. C. H. Somerset, Coldstream Guards, an officer of the Head-quarter Staff.

² Captain S. E. Gordon, R.A., aide-de-camp to Brigadier-General Fox-Strangways.

our troops retreated from the Barrier and formed up behind the 7th *Léger*, drawn up upon the ridge; while the Zouaves, who had saved the guns and now came up with enthusiastic offers of service, ranged themselves between their compatriots and a small knot of 57th men that were advanced on the left flank. Farther to the left rear was Colonel Daubeney¹ of the 55th. But the 7th *Léger* was a young regiment, and their demeanour in front of the impending attack was again far from satisfactory. The exhortations of their officers, backed up indeed by those of the English Staff, seemed to have little effect, when a voice in rear cried, "Avancez, les Tambours!" At its bidding not only the drummers, but with them also the buglers,² ran boldly out to the front and in another moment were inciting the men to advance with their inspiring "Pas de charge," and not altogether in vain. Colonel Daubeney, at the head of thirty men of the 55th, now rushed out from our left rear, and, circling outside the flanks of the fighting line, charged into the Russian columns on their right flank and tore his way into the centre of the mass; while Pennefather himself, leading a triumphant "Hurrah!" threw his line forward, and Frenchmen and Britons advancing together saw the great column of attack roll back slowly before them.

Defeat of Russian Flanking Parties.—The Russian flanking parties on either side of the main column were not involved in this combat, which was hidden from their view by the dense cover that

¹ Major and Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. B. Daubeney.

² Kinglake, v. p. 350.

existed and the thick clouds of smoke that hung about ; but they were both destined to speedy overthrow. The men of the 21st and 63rd Regiments, who had repulsed the earlier attack on our left, were lying down extended when the right flanking party of the Russians approached. Rising up they immediately attacked it, and swept it back to the post-road. Then, throwing forward their right shoulders, they entered into the main conflict, which ended (as has been related) in the sullen retreat of the Russians to their lair in the Quarry Ravine.

The Russian left flanking party, finding no infantry in their front, marched unmolested up the Home Ridge towards the position held by B Battery, which at once opened fire upon them ; but at first without effect, for the guns were laid too high. Captain Yelverton, the Adjutant of the 2nd Division Artillery, from the vantage of his saddle noticed this waste of ammunition, and, hastily dismounting, he himself depressed one of the guns which thereafter spread their case-shot with such effect that the assailants retreated down the hillside with heavy loss.¹

Commandant La Boussinière now pressed forward some guns to harass the Russian retreat ; but coming under fire from Shell Hill, their loss, especially in horses, was severe and they had to retire to Fore Ridge.

5. FOURTH STAGE OF THE BATTLE

British again Hard Pressed.—It was now a little past nine o'clock, and Dannenberg's second attempt

¹ Kinglake, v. p. 358.

had been beaten back. Far, however, from being oppressed with the sense of defeat, "the retreating masses were in a more collected, more orderly, state than the troops which pursued them."¹ Lord Raglan had not a single fresh battalion with which to follow up his advantage, and the large French reinforcements, led on by General Bosquet in person, were yet at a distance, while the formidable Russian battery on Shell Hill still dominated the field. The Russian attack was once more renewed, and the first assault was directed against the 6th French Regiment which, after covering the retreat of Cathcart's forces and the Guards, had remained drawn up on the right bank of the Quarry Ravine and had not since been engaged. It had now to fall back with considerable loss, and even after the 7th *Léger* had been sent to its assistance and a French battery brought up to the top of Mount Head in support, the two French battalions found themselves in a precarious position. Colonel Haines² and a wing of the 21st Regiment had reoccupied the Barrier, and they were soon fiercely attacked by superior numbers. To make matters worse, ammunition was running short and but small assistance could be given them from Home Ridge. General Goldie, who succeeded to the command of the 4th Division on the death of Cathcart, was mortally wounded close to the Barrier as he was hurrying up some slender aid to his hard-pressed subordinate. In spite of his late discomfiture,

¹ Kinglake, v. p. 360.

² Major and Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel F. P. Haines, afterwards Field-Marshal Sir F. P. Haines, G.C.B., etc.

the enemy had once more gained the ascendant when a new agency made itself felt.

The 18-Pounder Guns.—Ever since the battle of Balaclava, Colonel Gambier, commanding the Siege Train, had held two 18-pounder guns of position always prepared for any emergency. They were in the Siege Park of the Right Attack, and on the morning of the 5th they were drawn up ready to be moved in any direction, with their ammunition and stores packed and man harness at hand for transport. When the alarm sounded, the men not on duty at once fell in and were told off into two parties to drag and work the guns. These men belonged to Nos. 6 and 7 Companies of the 11th Battalion. One gun was placed under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Collingwood Dickson, who commanded the Right Attack; the other under Captain D'Aguilar, commanding No. 6 Company. Gambier was ready and only awaited his orders, but time wore on and none arrived. There had been some unfortunate misunderstanding, and although Lord Raglan had sent for the guns soon after eight o'clock, it was nine before the order to advance reached the Siege Park. The guns moved off forthwith: one was pulled entirely by the gunners; to the other were attached two field-artillery teams that were returning with disabled ordnance.¹ While nearing the Windmill, Gambier was wounded and Dickson, who succeeded to the command, went forward with Captain H. L. Chermiside, Gambier's adjutant, to select a position on Home Ridge for the two guns. This done, they

¹ This account is based on the letters quoted in note 1, p. 232.

were brought with all possible despatch into action at Hill Bend, behind the small breastwork in the centre of the position occupied by B Battery, the guns of which were moved to the right and left to make way for them. At half-past nine they opened fire.

It was no mean task that lay before them. The infantry and field batteries had indeed averted defeat,¹ but it was reserved to the 18-pounders to win victory. From early morning Dannenberg stood like a strong man armed in his fastness on Shell Hill; his columns of attack might suffer defeat after defeat, but while his hundred guns dominated the field no enemy might approach to set foot within his stronghold. But now a stronger than he had come upon him.

It was not without a struggle that the Russian guns gave up the mastery. Battery after battery concentrated their fire on the 18-pounders, and the position they occupied was swept by a storm of projectiles that in a few minutes caused great loss.² But their heavy carriages were themselves a protection, the little breastwork did excellent service, and the lie of the ground was slightly in their favour. Again, the projectiles they threw possessed, at ranges of from 1,200 to 1,500 yards, a stored-up energy that was terrific in its effect. Limbers were blown up,³

¹ Todleben again and again (i. pp. 480, 489, 490) bears witness to the splendid fighting qualities of the British infantry. He also admits the loyal and effective support given to them by the field artillery (i. p. 491).

² Not only did the 18-pounder detachments incur serious loss, but B Battery suffered from its proximity to them. Many of its horses were killed at this time.

³ Kinglake, v. pp. 377 etc.

carriages smashed, guns dismounted, and before long the Russian batteries were seen shifting their positions or retiring altogether. Further, as the heavy guns gained the ascendant, their *personnel* ceased to suffer, so that after the first quarter of an hour Dickson was enabled almost with impunity to continue his task of breaking up the Russian stronghold on Shell Hill.

The rude shock of these blows at the vitals of their position began to deaden the Russian power of attack, and the possibility of the Allies taking the offensive arose for the first time; but for this purpose reinforcements were required.

6. FIFTH STAGE OF THE BATTLE

Arrival of Bosquet.—General Bosquet himself had already pushed forward with 450 of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, who reached the Windmill at about ten o'clock, and 1,500 more of his infantry were close behind him. A French field battery arrived and was placed by Colonel Forgeot, the senior French artillery officer present, beside La Boussinière's guns on Fore Ridge, whence they were able to annoy some of the Russian batteries that had hitherto been spared by the 18-pounders. Mainly owing to the stress put upon him by the 18-pounders, the enemy had not pressed the two French battalions on the Kitspur, and as Haines was holding his own at the Barrier, the opportunity for a united advance across the front was now offered to the Allies. But at this moment the Sand Bag Battery, which had already fascinated

both British and Russians, began to exercise its influence on the French. Bosquet was the master of 3,000 bayonets ; but, instead of giving a hand on his left to Haines at the Barrier, he deflected the march of his reinforcements to the right of the post-road¹ and eventually formed them up in line of battle on the Inkerman Tusk, with a steep precipice on their right and their left uncovered, on the very edge of the lair from which the enemy had been accustomed to spring—the Quarry Ravine.²

Temporary Check suffered by Bosquet.—When too late the French General perceived his danger, and he hastily summoned one of his horse batteries to his assistance. But his line was immediately attacked by a Russian column which, issuing from the Quarry Ravine, flung itself against his exposed flank ; and his right was at the same time threatened by a Russian detachment which, earlier in the day, had been driven downhill out of the Sand Bag Battery and remained waiting its opportunity, hidden in the brushwood. The French line at once retired, having lost a gun,³ and sought

¹ Apparently General Bosquet was disturbed by the account which was sent to him at the Windmill by his subordinate, Bourbaki, who represented that the 6th of the Line and 7th Léger were in a perilous position (Kinglake, v. p. 363), and therefore, instead of making for Home Ridge, he diverged to the Kitspur. "There were not," says Kinglake, "at this time any circumstances to warrant precipitate haste ; for not long after the moment when Bourbaki's flurried Staff officer galloped off to ask for support, a great change . . . had been wrought in the state of the battle by the ascendancy of Lord Raglan's two guns (the 18-pounders)" (*Ibid.*, p. 381).

² Kinglake, v. p. 390.

³ The Russians abandoned the gun in the Quarry Ravine, where it was found next day by the British and returned to the French.

shelter behind Home Ridge. Meanwhile, Forgeot's guns on Fore Ridge, though suffering severely from Russian batteries,¹ protected Bosquet's retreat and checked pursuit. Depression, however, seized upon the French and one of their officers, approaching Dickson, counselled him to save his guns, for all was lost.² Indeed, though Haines still held steadfastly on at the Barrier, a great change in the state of the battle had been almost suddenly wrought by the retreat of the French. But the Russians fortunately did not press their advantage, and on the arrival of further French reinforcements the spirits of our allies arose as rapidly as they had fallen. Bosquet again advanced, and, in company with some isolated bodies of British troops, drove the Russians off the Kitspur.

7. SIXTH STAGE OF THE BATTLE

The End in Sight.—The French then took up a right angular formation which extended along Home Ridge and Fore Ridge, with their right overlooking St. Clement's Gorge. It was now eleven o'clock, and for two hours more the struggle continued. The French covered the British right, and supported it in rear; but they took no further active

¹ At this period the French artillery suffered severely from the fire of Russian guns, which were so placed as to be screened from the fire of the 18-pounders. After "holding on with a courage much praised by our people," Commandant La Boussinière had to retire from Fore Ridge. "Keeping one of his batteries for opportunities of service on the right, he sent off the other one to operate beside the English field artillery on the left of the Home Ridge" (Kinglake, v. pp. 395-396).

² Kinglake, v. p. 397.

measures, except with their artillery, three batteries of which eventually joined our hard-worked field guns. Haines at the Barrier maintained his dogged fight, and even sent forward some riflemen on his left to annoy the Russian gunners. By this time the 18-pounders had become silent, as ammunition was running short, and, pending the arrival of further supplies, Dickson gave his men a rest. But as Haines was gradually able to extend to his left, it was at last possible for him to help those of our troops who, since the first period of the battle, had been watching our left along the Mikriakoff Glen. An advance from this flank was now about to be made, which at once heralded the retirement of the Russians from Shell Hill and the end of the battle.

Ever since he came upon the field, Dannenberg had kept the same devoted battalions in his fighting line, and the reserve left by Soimonoff had never been employed. Whether their retention as a last reserve was enforced upon Dannenberg by superior authority, or whether he acted on his own initiative, it is impossible to say ; but the fact remains that 9,000 men and several batteries of artillery were all day passive spectators of the combat. Dannenberg, entrenching his position upon Shell Hill, had calmly seen his columns again and again thrown back, and he looked in vain for that retirement of the Allies which would render a junction with Prince Gortchakoff possible and give him the mastery of the Plateau.

Lord West's Advance.—A little after twelve o'clock Lord West, who was stationed in the

Mikriakoff Glen, began an attack on a Russian battery which, when the 18-pounders became silent, came into action on the forward slopes of Shell Hill. To support him he called up Lieutenant W. M. C. Acton and some men of the 77th, and the latter were gallantly advancing to their task, backed up by other bodies of our troops drawn in the same direction, when again the fire of the 18-pounders rang out, and the round shot, flying over the heads of our men, crashed into the Russian battery which was immediately seen to limber up and retire. One of the guns was dismounted, but the devoted Russian gunners carried it off, and when Acton gained the site of the battery his only prizes were a gun carriage and a couple of limbers.

8. FINAL STAGE OF THE BATTLE

Effect of the 18-Pounders.—By this time Dannenberg had suffered enough; the fastness of Shell Hill had been broken into, and as one o'clock approached he made up his mind to retreat, constrained thereto by the murderous fire of the guns.¹ The Vladimir Regiment was ordered to cover the retreat, and, somewhat transcending their orders, they

¹ "Bientôt le feu meurtrier d'artillerie ennemie nous contraignit à faire retraite sur la ville" (Dannenberg's despatch). On this Kinglake remarks, "That the statement referred to the 18-pounders is apparently certain, for, apart from the power of those two guns, the Allies were grievously inferior to the enemy in the artillery arm. Indeed Menchikoff in his despatch gave the required point to Dannenberg's general expression, and distinctly ascribed the irresistibly coercive power of the Allies to the 'siege artillery' brought up by the English, i.e. the two 18-pounders" (Kinglake, v. app. xiii. p. 505).

made a forward movement down Shell Hill. The 18-pounders immediately opened fire upon the unfortunate Regiment which, 2,000 strong, was concentrated in one mass, and three of the shot tore through their ranks. They at once retired; yet, though suffering severe loss during their retreat, they still preserved their military formation. And now the enemy, under the protection of the batteries which still occupied the farther slopes of Shell Hill, began to draw off along the roads they had come by towards Sebastopol and the Inkerman Bridge over the Tchernaya. Thereupon an attempt was made to bring forward at least one of the 18-pounders to bear upon them, but the physical difficulties proved too great. The retiring enemy, however, came within range of the Right Lancaster Battery, and some rockets were also fired from the Victoria Ridge by sailors and by gunners from the Twenty-one Gun Battery.¹

Russian Retreat.—About half-past three, after the Russians had cleared away from the high ground, a French battery was pushed on to the East Jut. It was able to harass the column's retreat over the Tchernaya Marshes, but was itself driven back by the fire of the Russian ships of war. The long train of ordnance making its way into Sebastopol was also for a time in danger from the enterprise of Colonel R. Waddy and a company of the 50th, who, descending Victoria Ridge, crossed the Careenage Ravine

¹ Seven 24-pounder rockets were fired on this occasion by No. 1 Company 12th Battalion under Lieutenant C. H. Owen, from the right flank of the Twenty-one Gun Battery. Their effect was very good, and an ammunition wagon was blown up by them.

and threatened the West Sapper Road from the north-west corner of Mount Inkerman. But Colonel Todleben, who happened to be present, took vigorous steps to protect the helpless column, which eventually got back to the fortress without losing a gun. Lord Raglan's troops were too weary, and General Canrobert was unwilling, to follow up the retreat, and the great battle came to an end.¹

Lord Raglan and General Canrobert.—It was yet early when Lord Raglan reached Home Ridge, and he did not interfere with Pennefather's command; and, when General Canrobert came up, he courteously offered to place his forces at the disposal of the commander of the 2nd Division. The two Commanders-in-Chief, in fact, came to offer Pennefather succour, but not to supersede him; and when reinforcements began to arrive from the other British divisions, and the 6th of the French Line and the 7th *Léger* came up, no change was made in this respect, though at times both Cathcart and the Duke of Cambridge acted on their own initiative. Bosquet, also, when he brought up his main body, was only obeying his own impulse in making for the Sand Bag Battery. But with the arrival, about eleven o'clock, of

¹ No account of the battle would be complete without reference to Todleben's generous tribute to the British batteries. Thus he says:

"Il faut remarquer que l'artillerie anglaise en général soutenait parfaitement bien son infanterie; elle la suivait partout et ouvrait le feu à des distances assez rapprochées contre les colonnes assaillantes des Russes" (i. p. 474).

And again: "Il faut encore répéter ici ce que nous avons dit plus haut; c'est que l'infanterie anglaise fut toujours secourue à temps par son artillerie, qui foudroyait par ses décharges de mitraille les colonnes et les tirailleurs russes" (i. p. 491).

General de Monet with the last French reinforcements, Canrobert had under his orders 8,000 French troops, and it was natural, now that the final attack on the British position had been beaten back, that he should enter into a discussion with Lord Raglan as to the next step.

As has been already said, Lord Raglan wished to advance and follow up the Russians; but General Canrobert was unwilling to do so. This matter appears very fairly dealt with by Hamley in the following words :

“Canrobert has been blamed for not attacking him (the enemy) with the 8,000 troops he had assembled on the field, the greater part still unused; and doubtless, had the French General taken a bold offensive, the enemy’s defeat would have become a signal disaster. But if Dannenberg was looking towards Gortschakoff, so, no doubt, was Canrobert. He could not but remember that the 20,000 troops whom he had watched so anxiously in the morning were still at hand in order of battle; the policy he had declared at Balaclava, of restricting himself to covering the siege, no matter what success a bold aggression might promise, governed him now; and this seems, in the case of a gallant, quick-spirited man like Canrobert—one in whom we had often found so loyal an ally—a more plausible explanation of his almost passive attitude at the close of the battle, than either a defect of resolution, or a disinclination to aid his colleague.”¹

Prince Menchikoff, apparently, never assumed personal command during the day, but remained on

¹ “War in the Crimea,” pp. 156 etc.

St. George's Brow with the two young Grand Dukes during the crisis of the battle, where a stray round shot from one of the 18-pounders flew past them and gave the Princes their baptism of fire.

Casualties, etc.—The battle cost the Russians dearly, their loss amounting to 11,959 killed, wounded, and prisoners.¹

The French loss on Mount Inkerman was 782, all ranks, killed and wounded. Including the repulse of Timoniéff's sortie, when our allies suffered severely, the French loss on November 5 was 26 officers and 203 men killed, and 98 officers and 1,339 men wounded; 1 officer and 69 men were missing. Total casualties, 1,736.²

The British loss was 43 officers and 589 men killed, 100 officers and 1,778 men wounded, and 63 men missing. Total, all ranks, 2,573.³

The Royal Artillery lost their commanding officer, General Fox-Strangways, and Major Townsend of P Battery. Although the exact time of Townsend's death is unknown, it is certain that at the moment he was commanding his guns on Home Ridge. Immediately before he was killed, Lieutenant W. Stirling, of E Battery, came up to ask him what o'clock it was; but before Townsend could answer, his head was taken off by a cannon-ball.⁴

¹ "La totalité de nos pertes dans la journée du 24 Octobre fut 5 Novembre donc de 6 généraux, 289 officiers, et 11,664 soldats" (Totleben, i. p. 487).

² Niel's "Siege of Sebastopol," pp. 95, 97.

³ Sayer, p. 59.

⁴ Major Townsend was killed during the course of the battle, but the author has been unable to determine the exact time at which this event occurred, or to ascertain with certainty the further movements

Colonel Gambier and Captains J. F. L. Baddeley, G. Tupper, and C. H. Ingilby were wounded.

General Strangways was succeeded in the command of the Royal Artillery by Colonel R. J. Dacres.¹

of P Battery. From the letter of the assistant-surgeon referred to in note 1, p. 244, one would infer that Townsend was killed about the time Miller charged the Russians. Thus he says, in describing the episode, "A shell burst in among us, and one unfortunate fragment struck him (Townsend) on the head . . . and killed him immediately. Miller drew his sword and," etc. This is probably hearsay evidence. On the other hand, Miller's letter, on which the account in the text is based, after describing the recovery of the guns, proceeds, "We were soon moved to the front and came into action again, but only the left half was there, for the other half had moved considerably to the rear, and afterwards came up a long way to our right. . . . In our new position we had a very heavy fire of artillery upon us. . . . We had been there about an hour when, on going to the rear about some ammunition, I met a driver, who gave me poor Major Townsend's watch and chain and eyeglass, with the intelligence that he had just been killed by a splinter striking him on the head. His body was at once taken back to camp."

The author has seen a sketch of the field by the late Sir William Stirling, who was a lieutenant in E Battery on November 5. He there indicates the position of P Battery as being on Home Ridge, on the left of E. Battery. Furthermore, Sir William told Colonel H. W. L. Hime "that he was standing beside Townsend when he was killed. He walked up to the spot where Townsend was sitting on his horse and asked what hour it was, and before Townsend had time to answer, his head was taken off by a round shot or shell" (Colonel Hime's communication to the author).

From the above it seems safe to infer that P Battery eventually reached Home Ridge, that Townsend was killed there by being struck on the head, and that this occurred probably before 9 a.m. (see Table XXXV., p. 279).

¹ "Dacres' horse was shot under him, when he immediately took that of Trumpeter M'Laren, of Wodehouse's Battery, telling the boy to go back to camp out of danger. The brave little fellow, seeing the loss his battery had sustained, requested permission to remain. He fell in as No. 6 at No. 2 gun, and served as a gunner during the remainder of the action" ("England's Artillerymen," p. 230).

M'Laren received the French Military Medal, and was transferred to the band. He died March, 1859 (*Ibid.*).

The casualties of the Royal Artillery are shown in the following table :

TABLE XXXII
CASUALTIES

	Officers.		N.C. Officers.		Rank & File.		Horses.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	
Staff	1	3
A Battery	1	4	..
B "	4	17	..
E "	1	1	..	1	7	..
F "
G "	7	2	8	..
H "	1	3	..
P "	1	3	2	16	..
11th Battn., 6th Co.	2	..	1	8	..
" " 7th "	1	6	..
Total	2	4	4	10	12	69	80

Total: Killed, 18; Wounded, 83.

CASUALTIES TO MATÉRIEL.

A Battery.—Three wagon wheels disabled and three limber boxes damaged by shot.

B Battery.—Two limber wheels disabled and two limber boxes and one shaft damaged.

P Battery.—Six wheels disabled.

The expenditure of ammunition is shown in the following table :

TABLE XXXIII
AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE
GUNS

Battery.	Guns.				Howitzers.		Total.
	Round Shot.	Shrapnel.	Case Shot.	Common Shell.	Shrapnel.	Case Shot.	
A	155	19	8	28	21	..	231
B	293	58	18	58	75	..	502
E	40	32	3	5	3	2	85
G	239	100	27	24	97	8	495
H	255	47	..	30	22	..	354
P	131	26	8	28	35	3	231
2 18-pounders	168	168
Total	1,281	282	64	173	253	13	2,066

C Troop was in Reserve at the Windmill. Only part of F Battery was near Mount Inkerman; it did not come into action.

SMALL ARMS

	Minié Rifles.	Smooth Bores.	Total.
1st Division	53,370	..	53,370
2nd " 	66,000	..	66,000
3rd " 	1,300	..	1,300
4th " 	6,000	23,150	29,150
Light " 	50,000	..	50,000
Total	176,670	23,150	199,820

9. CLOSE OF THE FIRST BOMBARDMENT

Totleben's Activity.—The proceedings of the Allies after the reopening of fire by the French on October 19, showed the Russians that the object of attack was without doubt the Flagstaff Bastion; and Todleben not only added to the armament of that work, but supported it by new batteries. For these works sites were found in rear of the Central Bastion, along the Boulevard Ravine, and beside No. 5 Battery, on the crest of the Woronzoff Ravine. Energetic measures were also taken to retrench the City Hill and the Karabelnaya. After the battle of Inkerman an assault on the Flagstaff Bastion was daily expected; ¹ works of emergency were continued; and on November 14 the number of new batteries reached 50, mounting 494 guns, of which some 240 could bear upon the siege batteries.²

The Sequel of Inkerman.—Inkerman, in truth, proved a Pyrrhic victory for the Allies: the French had lost heavily; the British were at the lowest

¹ Todleben, i. p. 492.

² *Ibid.*, i. pp. 509 etc.

limit of their strength. A Council of War met on November 6, and decided to postpone an assault until after the arrival of reinforcements. Meanwhile, to protect the right of the Allies, it was determined to erect field works on the Inkerman Ridge, and to move a French division to the right to help in their construction.¹ Thenceforward the fire of the siege guns, which had sensibly diminished after October 29, began to subside and by the end of November the batteries were almost silent.

State of Siege Works at End of November.—The French completed their third parallel, and busied themselves in safeguarding by new batteries and trenches the flanks of their attack. They did not at the moment propose to advance farther by sap, but to proceed against the Flagstaff Bastion by mining.

The activity displayed by the enemy's riflemen at this period was the first cause of an advance being made on the British side. The Russians formed a lodgment in the Quarries in front of the Redan which was a source of considerable annoyance to our Right Attack. Bronze mortars were provided to oppose them, as already mentioned, and a trench was dug in front of the Twenty-one Gun Battery.² The mortars were most effective, and were constantly used so long as ammunition lasted. The trench, which was of small lateral extent at the end of November, eventually became the third parallel of the Right Attack, another

¹ Four works were finished in the neighbourhood of Home Ridge, but were never used.

² See p. 224.

trench having been dug in rear of it at a later period.

On our other flank the Cemetery Hill, at the mouth of the Great Ravine, was the favourite resort of the enemy's riflemen, who from this position persistently fired, not only on our Left Attack, but also on our allies across the Ravine. A trench (eventually the second parallel of the Left Attack) was made 400 yards in front of our batteries; but the Russians, pushing up the slopes of the Great Ravine, established themselves in pits only 250 yards distant. On the night of November 20 these pits were captured, and the third parallel was begun 350 yards in front of the second.¹ Approaches also were made, but the parallels themselves were of small extent at the end of November.

By this time all our siege guns in position were considerably worn, and upwards of twenty had been disabled by the enemy's fire, while carriages and platforms were destroyed in great numbers. Over 40,000 rounds had been fired, and requisition for ordnance stores was made on the Mediterranean fortresses.²

Casualties.—The casualties that occurred in the

¹ The pits were captured by Lieutenant H. Tryon and 200 men of the Rifle Brigade. He was accompanied by Lieutenants W. O. Lennox and G. Philips of the Royal Engineers. Tryon was killed. The exploit was warmly acknowledged by General Canrobert in his General Order.

² The heavier Lancaster guns were very inaccurate; the 8-inch Lancasters were useless and dangerous. Three burst, as did also two 24-pounders. No casualties resulted from these accidents, except in the case of one of the 24-pounders, which burst in No. 1 Battery Left Attack on October 22, after being loaded with hot shot. Two men were killed and four wounded.

British batteries between October 17 and November 30 are shown in the following table :¹

TABLE XXXIV¹
CASUALTIES

	Officers.		N.C. (or Petty) Officers and Men.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Royal Artillery, Right Attack .	..	3	12	60
" " Left Attack .	1	2	3	34
Total . . .	1	5	15	94
Naval Brigade	2	16	19	97
Grand Total .	3	21	34	191

Total casualties, 249.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. Gambier, who, in consequence of his wound at the battle of Inkerman, was invalided, was succeeded in command of the Siege Train by Lieutenant-Colonel N. T. Lake.


Second-Captain S. P. Childers, 7th Company, 12th Battalion, was observing the fire in the Left Attack on October 23, when he was struck on the head by a round shot and killed instantly. Major C. E. Young (Left Attack) was wounded on October 20, Second-Captain E. Moubray and Lieutenant J. E. Hope (Right Attack) were wounded on October 23, Lieutenant C. Andrews (Left Attack) on November 2, and Lieutenant J. Sinclair (Right Attack) on November 4.

Lieutenant the Hon. C. Ruthven, R.N., was killed on October 17, and Lieutenant G. Greathead, R.N., on October 20.

Up to this period the British Army had had the

¹ All detail of casualties that occurred in the British batteries are taken from "Artillery Operations" under the dates in question.

lion's share of the work, the loss, and the glory ; and now, but for our allies, Lord Raglan, far from being able to take his share in the siege, could not have maintained his position on the Plateau. Bitter days were at hand—days of trial and humiliation ; of trial for an army decimated by sickness, half clothed, and half starved, and of humiliation for a country which had listened too long to the evil counsel of fatuous doctrinaires.



The Tusk. (Inkerman.)

from sketch by C.H.O.

APPENDICES TO CHAPTER VI

APPENDIX No. 1

TABLE SHOWING THE ARRIVAL OF THE VARIOUS REGIMENTS, BATTERIES, DETACHMENTS, ETC., ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE, NOVEMBER 5, 1854, WITH DETAIL OF TROOPS IN RESERVE, ETC.

TABLE XXXV
TROOPS ENGAGED AT MOUNT INKERMEN

	Infantry.	Guns.	Cavalry.	Approximate Time of Arrival.
30th Foot, 1st Bgde., 2nd Division	408	Present on Mount Inkerman at daybreak Nov. 5.
55th " " " " "	432	
95th " " " " "	443	
41st Foot, 2nd Bgde. " "	599	
47th " " " " "	570	
49th " " " " "	488	
Coldstream Guards Picket (Goodlake)	30	
Grenadier Guards Picket (Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar)	87	6 a.m.
B Battery, R.A., 2nd Division	..	6	..	
G Battery, R.A., " "	..	6	..	
Force present at daybreak	3,057	12	..	
88th Foot, 2nd Bgde., Light Division	390	6.15 a.m.
P Battery, R.A., 4th Division	..	6	..	
77th Foot, 2nd Bgde., Light Division	259	7.40 a.m.
<i>Reinforcements arrived by 6.15 a.m.</i>	<i>649</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>..</i>	
Grenadier Guards, 1st Division	414	7.40 a.m.
Scots Fusilier Guards " "	392	
A Battery, R.A., 1st Division	..	6	..	
H Battery, R.A. " "	..	3	..	
E Battery, R.A., Light Division	..	6	..	
<i>Reinforcements arriving between 6.15 a.m. and 7.40 a.m.</i>	<i>806</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>..</i>	
Total force arrived on field by 7.40 a.m.	4,512	33	..	

TROOPS ENGAGED AT MOUNT INKERMANN (*Continued*)

	Infantry.	Guns.	Cavalry.	Approximate Time of Arrival.
	4,512	33	..	
Coldstream Guards, 1st Division	438	8 a.m.
57th Foot, 1st Bgde., 3rd Division	196	
20th Foot (part of) 1st Bde., 4th Div.	340	
21st Foot, 1st Bde., 4th Division.	402	
1st Battn., Rifle Brigade, 2nd Bgde., 4th Division	278	
1st Battn., 46th Foot, 2nd Bgde., 4th Division	384	8.15 a.m.
1st Battn., 68th Foot, 2nd Bgde., 4th Division	466	
63rd Foot, 2nd Bgde., 4th Division	466	
6 ^e de Ligne, Bourbaki's Bgde., Bosquet's Division	758	8.25 a.m.
7 ^e Léger, Bourbaki's Bgde., Bosquet's Division	908	
Two batteries of artillery, Bosquet's Division	..	12	..	
<i>Reinforcements arriving between 7.40 a.m. and 8.30 a.m.</i>	4,170	12	..	
Total force arrived on field by 8.30 a.m.	8,682	45	..	
Two 18-pr. position guns, R.A.	..	2	..	9.15 a.m.
50th Foot, 1st Bgde., 3rd Division	255	
57th Foot (part of), 1st Bgde., 4th Division	151	10 a.m.
3 ^e Battn., Chasseurs, Bourbaki's Bgde., Bosquet's Division	470	
1 ^{re} Battn., 3rd Zouaves, d'Autemarre's Bgde., Bosquet's Division	700	10.15 a.m.
2 ^e Battn., Tirailleurs algériens, d'Autemarre's Bgde., Bosquet's Division	757	
4th Chasseurs d'Afrique, d'Allonville's Bgde., Morris' Division	700	
Light Cavalry Brigade (Earl of Cardigan)	200	
Two batteries French horse artillery	..	12	..	
<i>Reinforcements arriving between 8.30 a.m. and 10.30 a.m.</i>	2,333	14	900	
Total force arrived on field by 10.30 a.m.	11,015]	59	900	

TROOPS ENGAGED AT MOUNT INKERMAN (*Continued*)

	Infantry.	Guns.	Cavalry.	Approximate Time of Arrival.
2 ^d Battn., 3 ^d Zouaves, d'Aute- marre's Bgde., Bosquet's Di- vision	11,015	59	900	10.45 a.m.
50 th de Ligne, d'Aute-marre's Bgde., Bosquet's Division	706	
50 th de Ligne, d'Aute-marre's Bgde., Bosquet's Division	1,507	
Total force arrived on field by 10.45 a.m.	13,228	59	900	
2 ^d Battn., 20 ^e Léger, Sol's Bgde., Prince Napoleon's Division	613	11 a.m.
1 st Battn. 20 ^e Léger, Sol's Bgde., Prince Napoleon's Division	1,032	
2 ^d Battn. 2 ^d Zouaves, de Monet's Bgde. Prince Napoleon's Di- vision	789	
50 th Foot (1 company), 1st Bgde., 3rd Division	56	3.30 p.m.
Total force arrived on field by 3.30 p.m.	15,718	59	900	

TROOPS ENGAGED ON VICTORIA RIDGE, EASTERN
SLOPES (UNDER GENERAL CODRINGTON)

	Infantry.	Guns.	Cavalry.	Approximate Time of Arrival.
7th Foot, 1st Bgde., Light Division	384	Present at daybreak
25th " " " " "	322	
33rd " " " " "	251	
Rifle Bgde., 2nd Battn., Light Division	142	
Royal Marines, Light Division	120	
19th Foot, 2nd Bgde., Light Di- vision	180	
H Battery, R.A., 1st Division	3	..	
F Battery, R.A., 3rd Division	2	..	
	1,399	5	..	

TROOPS ON VICTORIA RIDGE, WESTERN SLOPES (UNDER
GENERAL SIR R. ENGLAND) (NOT ENGAGED)

	Infantry.	Guns.	Cavalry.
1st Foot, 1st Bgde., 3rd Division . . .	450
50th " " " " " " . . .	169*
F Battery, R.A., 3rd Division	4	..
	619	4	..

*Note.—The 56 men under Colonel Waddy who made an attack on the retreating Russians at 3.30 p.m. were detached from the 169 men of the 50th Foot under General Sir R. England.

TROOPS IN VICINITY OF WINDMILL (NOT ENGAGED)

C Troop, R.H.A., Detachment 6th Company, 11th Battalion, with two 18-pounder guns of position in Canrobert's Redoubt.

APPENDIX No. 2

OFFICERS OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY PRESENT
AT INKERMEN

HEAD-QUARTER STAFF

Brigadier-General T. Fox-Strangways ; Captain S. E. Gordon, A.D.C. ;
Major J. M. Adye, Assistant-Adjutant-General ; Captain J. C. W.
Fortescue, Staff Adjutant ; Captain the Hon. E. T. Gage, Brigade-
Major ; Senior Surgeon R. C. Elliot ; Chief Veterinary Surgeon
J. Stockley ; Commissary W. L. M. Young.

FIRST DIVISION

Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. Dacres, Commanding Artillery, 1st Division ;
2nd Captain E. B. Hamley, Adjutant.

A Battery (now 38th Battery, R.F.A.)

Captain D. W. Paynter ; Lieutenant E. Taddy.

H Battery (now 64th Battery, R.F.A.)

Captain E. Wodehouse ; 2nd Captain G. Barstow ; Lieutenants W. P.
Richards, A. H. King, and S. J. M. Maxwell.

SECOND DIVISION

Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Fitzmayer, Commanding Royal Artillery, 2nd
Division ; 2nd Captain the Hon. W. C. Yelverton, Adjutant ;
2nd Captain H. P. Yates (attached to 2nd Division).

B Battery (now 14th Battery, R.F.A.)

2nd Captain J. F. Pennycuik; Lieutenants E. Markham, H. T. Arbuthnot, and L. D. Broughton.

G Battery (now 19th Battery, R.F.A.)

Captain J. Turner; 2nd Captain J. G. Boothby; Lieutenant A. Brendon.

THIRD DIVISION

Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Dupuis, Commanding Royal Artillery, 3rd Division; 2nd Captain M. A. S. Biddulph, Adjutant.

F Battery (now 7th Battery, R.F.A.)

Captain W. Swinton; 2nd Captain W. W. Barry; Lieutenants W. Morris, A. W. A. Ogilvie, and P. E. Hill.

FOURTH DIVISION

Lieutenant-Colonel D. E. Wood, Commanding Royal Artillery, 4th Division; 2nd Captain G. Le M. Tupper, Adjutant.

P Battery (now 63rd Battery, R.F.A.)

Major S. P. Townsend; 2nd Captain D. E. Hoste; Lieutenants W. W. A. Lukin and F. Miller.

LIGHT DIVISION

Lieutenant-Colonel N. T. Lake, Commanding Royal Artillery, Light Division; 2nd Captain J. F. W. Baddeley.

E Battery (now 12th Battery, R.F.A.)

Captain C. H. Morris; 2nd Captain J. Singleton; Lieutenants R. C. Longley and W. Stirling; 2nd Captain C. H. Ingilby (attached).

POSITION ARTILLERY, TWO 18-POUNDER GUNS

Lieutenant-Colonel G. Gambier, Commanding Position Artillery; Captain H. L. Chermiside, Adjutant.

6th Company, 11th Battalion (now 65th Battery, R.F.A.)

Captain C. L. D'Aguilar; 2nd Captain E. Moubray; Lieutenant G. S. Harward.

7th Company, 11th Battalion (now 74th Company, R.G.A.)

Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel C. Dickson; Lieutenants J. Sinclair and J. Lyons.

PRESENT ON FIELD, BUT NOT ENGAGED

C Troop (now C Battery, R.H.A.)

(In Reserve at Windmill)

Captain J. J. Brandling; 2nd Captain the Hon. D. N. Fraser; Lieutenants A. Y. Earle, S. M. Grylls, and W. A. Fox-Strangways.

Detachment 6th Company, 11th Battalion (now 65th Battery, R.F.A.)

In Canrobert's Redoubt, two 18-pounder Guns of Position; Lieutenant J. E. Hope.

WITH AMMUNITION FROM BALACLAVA

Detachment I Troop (now O Battery, R.H.A.)

2nd Captain J. D. Shakespear; Lieutenants H. W. J. Dashwood and F. T. Whinyates.

IN TRENCHES

RIGHT ATTACK

7th Company, 11th Battalion (now 74th Company, R.G.A.)

2nd Captain E. Taswell; Lieutenant A. K. Rideout.

8th Company, 11th Battalion (now 78th Company, R.G.A.)

Captain H. F. Strange; 2nd Captain J. Spurway; Lieutenants E. Bredin and W. H. Watson.

1st Company, 12th Battalion (now 67th Company, R.G.A.)

Lieutenants C. H. Owen and H. P. Tillard.

Note.—Some of these officers were employed in the supply of ammunition to the two 18-pounder guns (see "Artillery Operations," p. 28).

LEFT ATTACK

2nd Company, 12th Battalion (now 80th Company, R.G.A.)

Brevet-Major C. C. Young; 2nd Captain G. C. Henry; Lieutenants W. H. R. Simpson and R. Mackenzie.

3rd Company, 12th Battalion (Reduced)

Brevet-Major A. Irving (commanding Left Attack); Lieutenants L. Penn, W. G. Andrewes, and D. G. C. MacLachlan.

6th Company, 12th Battalion (now 17th Company, R.G.A.)

Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel H. S. Rowan; Lieutenants C. E. Torriano and H. J. Alderson.

7th Company, 12th Battalion (Reduced)

Brevet-Major J. N. A. Freese; Lieutenant J. E. Ruck-Keene.

Detachment 2nd Company, 11th Battalion (now 42nd Company, R.G.A.)

Lieutenant W. J. Bolton.

MEDICAL OFFICERS -

Surgeons E. S. Protheroe, W. Perry, and W. Coombe; Assistant-Surgeons, F. Park, J. Wright, E. Bowen, R. A. Chapple, W. Houghton, A. H. Taylor, R. Thornton, W. P. Ward, S. H. Fasson, and R. W. Cockerill.

VETERINARY SURGEONS

H. Withers and M. J. Harpley.

FIELD TRAIN OFFICERS

Assistant-Commissary H. Blakeney; Deputy-Assistant-Commissaries G. Yellon, W. Hayter, J. Hill, J. Lilley, W. Gair, M. Keir, J. O'Connor, and J. McGillivray.

APPENDIX No. 3

COMPOSITION OF THE ALLIED FIELD FORCE,
NOVEMBER 5, 1854

BRITISH ARMY

THE composition of the British Army was the same as that already detailed for October. The French Army is shown in more detail in the following table.

FRENCH ARMY¹ IN CRIMEA, NOVEMBER 5

HEAD-QUARTER STAFF AND SERVICES

General Canrobert, Commander-in-Chief ; 142 officers, and 976 under-officers and men.

CAVALRY DIVISION

General Morris ; 1st Brigade, General d'Allonville ; 2nd Brigade, General Feray ; 127 officers and 1,879 under-officers and men.

FIRST DIVISION

General Bouat ; Brigadiers Espinasse and Vinoy ; 253 officers and 6,162 under-officers and men.

SECOND DIVISION

General Bosquet ; Brigadiers d'Autemarre and Bourbaki ; 280 officers and 9,477 under-officers and men.

THIRD DIVISION

General Prince Napoleon ; Brigadiers de Monet and Sol ; 217 officers and 6,765 under-officers and men.

FOURTH DIVISION

General Forey ; Brigadiers de Lourmel and d'Aurelle ; 224 officers and 6,184 under-officers and men.

FIFTH DIVISION

General Le Vaillant ; Brigadiers de la Motterouge and Couston ; 255 officers and 6,063 under-officers and men.

To each of these five divisions one company of engineers was attached, and with all except the 5th were two batteries of artillery.

Reserves of artillery, Siege Train, etc., 71 officers and 1,944 under-officers and men.

Total strength : 1,569 officers and 39,450 under-officers and men.

TURKISH ARMY

The composition of the Turkish Army remained unaltered.

¹ Niel, pp. 465 etc.

CHAPTER VII


WINTER

1. THE WINTER TROUBLES

The Winter of 1854-1855.—The miseries which the British troops endured during the three never-to-be-forgotten months from November 14, 1854, to the middle of the following February, were due to the fact that the Departments of the Army had not been properly maintained and supported during our forty years of peace. The Army, indeed, had shown magnificent fighting qualities, but after a victorious career of a few weeks it found itself confined to a bleak and inhospitable plateau,¹ where, though engaged in a siege, it might be said to be itself besieged. Thither every shot that it fired, every store that it needed, and every morsel that it ate, had to be brought over a tempestuous sea, landed in a port small and inconvenient, and carried to a distance of some 6 miles by whatever means might be

¹ See Kinglake, vi. pp. 3 etc., where he describes what he calls "the straitened position of the Allies" and "their consequent want of power to appropriate the resources of the country."

When Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch began their investigations in March, 1855, the Commissariat had not made use of the rich country south of the Black Sea for supplies ("Memorials of the Right Hon. Sir John McNeill," p. 328). See note 1, p. 297.



Major C. H. Owen, R.A., del.

available. When an accumulation of stores in camp had been destroyed by a sudden tempest, the rapid advance of winter rendered the only road of supply from the port almost impassable, and the victorious army began to melt like snow under the visitation of sickness. It was under these circumstances that our rotten system speedily collapsed. Before our troops reached the Plateau, the clothing¹ had already shown ominous signs of wear, and the transport of the siege *matériel* was not accomplished without serious detriment to the horses of the field artillery; but forage and food were brought regularly to camp by a small train of bullock-drawn arabas and mules with Maltese carts, the weather was genial, there was plenty of firewood, and nothing that can be called privation occurred before November 14. Then came a change.

The Storm of November 14.—For some time the outlook over the Black Sea had been getting darker and gloomier, and on the morning of November 14 there arose a strong south wind, which drove before it a deluge of rain. Soon it became a tempest² that

¹ Even in Bulgaria this want was felt. An officer of Artillery wrote to his father from Camp Aladyn, June 24, 1854, "The clothing of the men is in rags. This year's clothing, due April 1st, is not come out. Many [of the men] are barefooted" (Letters in possession of Major J. H. Leslie).

The view of the situation set before Mr. Roebuck's Committee by the responsible chiefs of the Ordnance appears to have been rather a pious ideal than a real picture (see evidence of Sir Hew Ross in "Parliamentary Report of Mr. Roebuck's Committee").

The French had excellent greatcoats with hoods; they were supplied to the troops on trench duty.

² "When I was in Sebastopol in April, 1910, I was informed that the great storm of 14th November, 1854, is recorded in the Russian Meteorological Office as the greatest storm that ever raged in the Black

swept the Plateau, and spread desolation far and wide. All work came to a standstill, stores of food and forage in the camps were at once destroyed, tents were blown down, and clothes and bedding sent whirling along the soaked ground, or tossed high into the air. Cavalry picket lines were uprooted,¹ panic-stricken horses galloped to and fro, and the sick and wounded, whose larger hospital tents were the first to succumb to the fury of the blast, lay unprotected in the open. Then snow began to fall.

Wrecks at Sea.—But the miseries on land were small in their after-effects compared with the disasters at sea. During that terrible day numerous vessels were disabled, and twenty-one were dashed to pieces on the rocks of the Crimean coast. The French lost their finest man-of-war, the *Henri IV.*, and amongst the British vessels that went down were our principal ammunition ship and the fine steamer *Prince*, which was loaded with all that the army most needed. Following close upon the heels of the gale came the winter—not, happily, such a winter as sometimes grips Crim Tartary, but a winter that brought many degrees of frost, biting winds, and cold floods of rain.

The Bad Road.—The ground, especially at the Col, at once became a quagmire of clinging clay into which man and horse sank knee-deep;² and, as the

Sea, and is referred to as a comparison with other storms” (General H. T. Arbuthnot to the author).

¹ This happened in the case of the Greys and other regiments. The artillery picket lines, being attached to the wheels of the wagons, held firm.

² The obvious duty of making a good road for supply could not be carried out by the Army; no men could be spared for the work: no steps, however, were taken to procure native labour.

Woronzoff Road had been lost on October 26, the slimy ascent by the Col had to be surmounted by any horse or cart coming from Balaclava to the Plateau.

The Want of Forage.—The first sharp pinch was the want of forage. Chopped straw,¹ the staple forage of the Turkish provinces, possessed little nutriment in proportion to its bulk, and was especially difficult to transport by sea. Mr. Filder, the Commissary-General, consequently accumulated hay and corn in camp, and had some twenty days' supply for the army on ships in Balaclava Harbour. Furthermore, not trusting entirely to what could be obtained on the spot, on September 14 he submitted to his superiors² in London a request for 2,000 tons of English hay, to be sent out to the Crimea during the autumn. But the gale swept away the greater part of his supplies, and my Lords of the Treasury did not comply with his requisition. The horses of the field artillery had already been overtaxed, even when the road was good, the weather fine, and forage plentiful; but now they were worked till they dropped in their traces, or limped back to shiver in their lines and find there half or quarter rations, or soaked and mouldy hay from which their empty stomachs turned. Many a fine cavalry charger, made by dire necessity into a beast of burden, found death awaiting him on that miserable road over the Col. The transport oxen were soon eaten, the broken-down arabas being used as firewood;³ the mules and the

¹ Kinglake, vi. p. 121.

² Mr. Filder was under control of the Treasury.

³ "The only commissariat transport we ever had were arabas and Maltese mule carts. The araba bullocks have been eaten, and the

wretched little baggage and ammunition ponies died like flies; and starved and overworked animals might be seen in camp chewing pieces of the carriages, gnawing the spokes of the wheels, or eating their companions' manes and tails.¹

Want of Clothing and Necessaries.—When the cold weather came the army was in rags, and boots were a serious anxiety. Trousers might be patched with araba carts themselves have been used for firewood and for roofing for huts. Of the Maltese mule carts, most of the mules are dead from overwork and starvation, and most of the carts are now stuck on the road to Balaclava in the mud" (Letter from Lieutenant W. Stirling, December 12, 1854).

All accounts mention the rapid disappearance of the ponies.

¹ The following table shows the number of horses of the Royal Artillery that died during the winter, from October 1 to May 1:

TABLE XXXVI
LOSS OF HORSES

Batteries.	Average Number of Deaths.	Remarks.
7 Batteries stationed at the Front (A, B, E, F, G, H, and P)	$\frac{2}{3}$ of each battery	Exposed all the winter, and had to fetch their own forage daily from Balaclava.
W Battery . . .	$\frac{1}{3}$ of the battery .	Stationed at Balaclava all the winter.
C Troop } I Troop }	$\frac{1}{2}$ each troop .	Part of winter at Balaclava.

Of these, 71 died in October, 293 in November, 361 in December, 359 in January, 133 in February, and 69 in March. Those killed in action were 96 (Adye's Order Book).

In face of these numbers, the following extracts are of interest:

Sir Evelyn Wood says, "The Artillerymen were, I think, the best horse-masters in the Crimea" ("Crimea in 1854 and 1894," p. 183).

Lord Hardinge, Commander-in-Chief, told Mr. Roebuck's Committee that, in the Artillery, "The horses have lived in greater numbers than in any portion of the force. I think more care has been bestowed upon the horses by the officers and soldiers" (Question and Answer No. 20795).

See also "Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 217.

At one time fatigue parties could not be found to bury the dead horses and other animals, and the putrefaction that ensued was a serious contributory to the sickness of the troops.

a bit of canvas, filched possibly from a convenient sandbag, and a tattered blanket might add to the protection of a threadbare coat; but when the only boots the men possessed were wet continually, a day came when they could not be put on again when once they were taken off. Indeed, cases arose where gunners walked to the batteries in socks or with bare feet, even when snow was on the ground.¹ Tons of clothing had gone down in the *Prince*, and, to compensate for this disaster, Lord Raglan at once sent to Constantinople to purchase all the blankets, greatcoats, and other necessary articles that could be obtained. As soon as the state of things became known in England, frantic efforts were made to supply the needs of the troops; but they were marred by the want of organisation and the necessary staff. Ships were injudiciously loaded, and bills of lading got confused; what was most wanted was sometimes at the bottom of the hold, where it lay covered up with cumbrous stores; articles whose possession was a matter of life and death in camp were lying useless in vessels where their existence had been forgotten;² while wharfage was want-

¹ "The Crimea in 1854 and 1894," p. 203.

² *E.g.* . . . "Barley was lost for the want of more bags. From lack of system no one knew until January that such articles were on board ship in Balaclava, . . . where they had been lying ever since July. . . . Similarly, some veterinary stores were not discovered, although urgently required, until they had been on board ship for many months. . . . There was no organised system of stowage" (*Ibid.*, p. 185). "It was only after Lord Panmure came into office that duplicate invoices were sent to the Head-quarter Staff" (Sir G. Ramsay to author).

"As if in derision of the wants of the men, the first things that happened to arrive, about the beginning of January, were some casks

ing and the means of transport from Balaclava almost non-existent.¹

Fuel.—When the siege began, the Engineers laid an embargo on all standing trees, as wood was badly wanted for platforms, etc., but during the pleasant autumn days there was no want of fuel, for the Plateau abounded in brushwood and undergrowth. But this gradually disappeared from the vicinity of the camps, and it became harder to procure wood as the weather became colder. The roots of vines and trees were grubbed up, the helms of the spades and shovels were sometimes sacrificed, and often sacrilegious hands were laid on the very gabions and fascines of the trenches.²

containing dress jackets in material: that is, the breasts were laced, but the lace for the other parts, which were unmade, was loose inside in hanks. These jackets were just what could have best been spared, even if there had been tailors, a tailor's shop, thread, etc. So, having conveyed them to camp, the men had the grim satisfaction of taking them to the ship again, for re-conveyance to Woolwich" ("Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 216).

The Prince Consort sent a present of fur coats to the officers of the Grenadier Guards in October. These arrived in the following summer, "when the heat made it unpleasant to look at such hot things as furs" (Kingleake, vi. p. 101).

An officer of one of the field batteries had (like others) to leave the greater part of his kit on board ship when the Allies landed. This kit was taken back to England, and came into its owner's possession in the summer of 1855 (Major-General H. T. Arbuthnot to author).

¹ In the matter of transport the Siege Trains were exceptionally unfortunate. The Divisions had "mules, carts, and pack ponies at one time, but the Siege Train never." The men had frequently to walk to Balaclava for their rum and biscuit, and always for their winter clothing, necessaries, stores, etc." It was not until the end of March that twelve mules were given to each Attack as means of commissariat transport ("Artillery Operations," pp. 54, 70).

² "... A General Officer, in urging on Lord Raglan the necessity of his men receiving pickaxes to grub up roots, said with some warmth, 'Sir, it is felt pickaxes are essential. I may say they are firewood

Food.—The British soldier did not excel in cooking. At the best of times, by his methods, rations were turned out unappetising even to a hungry man, which in the hands of our allies would have been converted into a palatable meal. Matters now were worse, from the want of cooking-vessels. In many cases the camp-kettles had been lost at the Alma or in the subsequent march, and the men were forced to resort to their mess-tins which were quite inadequate for the purpose of boiling salt meat. Coffee was issued in the berry, and the readiest means of grinding it was to make use of pieces of exploded shell. The preparation of a meal presented so many difficulties that it was not uncommon for a weary man to give the matter up as a bad job, and to eat his salt pork raw. Very little fresh meat ¹ was issued.

The supply of rice ran short, and what remained had to be reserved for the sick and for the Turkish

itself !' Lord Raglan replied, ' So I learn daily from the trenches ' '' ("The Crimea in 1854 and 1894," p. 280).

In the Trench Journals of the Royal Engineers will be found frequent references to the injuries done to revetments by the practice of pilfering the brushwood from the fascines and gabions.

The Commissariat bravely maintained it was not the practice of the service to issue fuel to troops in the field to cook coffee ! ("Memorials of the Right Hon. Sir John McNeill," p. 345).

¹ The French had already discovered the value of horseflesh. "Some of them (the French) declare that, when well cooked, horseflesh is not half bad eating ; and a few go so far as to say that they prefer it to their ordinary ration beef " ("Letters from Head-quarters," ii. p. 3).

There were supplies of cattle within a week's sail of the Crimea, but the Commissariat considered steamers to be necessary for their transport, and, as only sailing-ships were available, they took no steps to procure the cattle, though the Duke of Wellington had fed his troops for months at Torres Vedras on fresh meat brought in sailing-vessels from the north of Spain (see "The Crimea in 1854 and 1894," p. 176).

troops. Vegetables there were none; for the astounding regulation held good that they "should be provided under regimental arrangements." When the men were suffering from scurvy as the result of their diet, a whole cargo of cabbages was thrown into Balaclava Harbour because no one would assume the responsibility of taking it over.¹

Tents, etc.—The miserable tents, overcrowded and unsanitary, were not rainproof, and the horses had no covering at all, for the blankets were quite worn out.² In the course of time materials for huts and stables arrived which were excellent, but they were very cumbrous, and there was delay in landing them. Their transport was a serious difficulty, and before they were erected many horses on the Plateau were frozen to death.

Sickness.—With the advent of winter the cholera, which had never left the army, increased with alarming rapidity, and to its ravages were added those of frost-bite, fever, and scurvy. The work thrown on the medical officers was appalling; for there was little proper food, a dearth of medicine, no hospital appliances, no staff or trained subordinates, no candles even to light the tents and prevent one sufferer being trodden on while another was

¹ "The Crimea in 1854 and 1894," p. 177.

"The ships' stewards reaped a golden harvest. I paid ten shillings for a little bottle of cayenne pepper to try and make the salt pork palatable, and other things were in like proportion" (General H. T. Arbuthnot to the author).

² Our dead were buried in their blankets. This was not the custom of our allies, but there was a strong feeling in our ranks against imitating the French custom of keeping clothes and coverings for the benefit of the living (see Kinglake, vi. p. 207).

being attended. The fate of a man stricken by sickness was terrible, if merciful death did not at once close his sufferings. First came the hospital tent, fetid, cold, and dark; then the long, slow, painful transport to Balaclava;¹ afterwards the voyage, often rough and prolonged, in ships absolutely unprovided with what was most needed; and finally the horrors of the hospital at Scutari.² The deaths were frequent; in the first week in December they amounted to from 80 to 100 men a day, before the worst season had been reached. Reinforcements arrived, it is true, but increasing sickness kept pace with them. Before the end of the year 8,000 men had joined the colours, yet there were more than 10,000 in hospital. The field batteries on the Plateau could turn out a gun, or perhaps two;

¹ The French generously helped us in this as far as they could. Writing in December, Lieutenant (afterwards General Sir William) Stirling says, "The French have a regular organised mule transport. The mules are properly taken care of, and are as *fat and plump as possible* [compare this statement, placed in italics by the present writer, with note 3, p. 289]; they carry immense weights over almost any ground, and are always serviceable." He then describes the caoilet and continues, "Our ambulances are great clumsy things, and *the mules sent out for the purpose are not able to draw them* [again the present writer's italics], consequently we have either to ask the French to carry our sick, or we have to hook our artillery horses into the ambulance carts" (Letter of December 1). But as time went on the French had their own sick to deal with, and for want of horses our ambulance service then was practically non-existent. Thus our sick were "necessarily carried on cavalry horses, which, slipping upon the hill outside Balaclava, often caused further injury or the death of the patient" ("The Crimea in 1854 and 1894," p. 209).

² For the state of the Scutari Hospital before the influence of Miss Florence Nightingale bore fruit, see "The Crimea in 1854 and 1894," p. 214. Suffice it to say here that the deaths in the hospital (both at the front and at the base), which in October were 700, rose in January to 3,168. By April they had fallen to 582.

two-thirds of the cavalry were dismounted;¹ and amongst the infantry one battalion had almost been blotted out.² On February 1 the sick men were as numerous as the sound men on parade, and had reached the enormous total of 18,028.³ (See *Morning State*, February 1, 1855, p. 338).

The Responsibility.—Since most of the evils of these miserable days arose from want of transport,⁴ the question inevitably presents itself, Why were animals not bought in the Turkish provinces where there were plenty? The Board of General Officers that assembled at Chelsea in 1855 heard the reply—namely, that Mr. Filder did not get them because he could not feed them. He looked and looked in vain for that 2,000 tons of English

¹ Speaking of the remnant of the Light Cavalry Brigade which, owing to the pressing request of General Canrobert, had been encamped on the Plateau since November 2, and which, on December 2, led back to Kadikoi horses unfit to carry any weight, Sir Evelyn Wood says, "In that short distance of six miles seventeen fell and died of exhaustion" ("The Crimea in 1854 and 1894," p. 184).

² Different commands suffered unequally. For example, soldiers at Balaclava were very much better off than those on the Plateau, and those who had energetic and resourceful commanding officers reaped the advantage. Thus Colonel Collingwood Dickson, commanding the Right Attack, saved his men untold trouble when he established a common cook-house; and the sailors, men and officers, showed the well-known adaptability of the Royal Navy to any circumstances. See chaps. xiii. and xiv. of "The Crimea in 1854 and 1894," where the life of the soldier in the trenches is contrasted with that of the Naval Brigade.

³ In the seven months from October to April inclusive, with a mean strength of 29,648 of all ranks, there were 50,970 admissions to hospital for sickness alone, after deducting those admitted for wounds and injuries, and 9,232 deaths ("Memorials of the Right Hon. Sir John McNeill," p. 318).

⁴ The most disastrous deficiency was that of land transport (*Ibid.*, p. 345).

hay that did not arrive. In a word, Treasury control had starved the Army.¹

But it must be remembered that the Treasury officials of 1854 merely carried out a system which had been in force for a generation. The real culprits were those who for long years had laboured to reduce the national defences below the minimum of safety, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the greatest soldier living, the Duke of Wellington.² Owing to the successful efforts of the Manchester Party, our Army in 1854, although composed of well-disciplined regiments,³ was "without a staff, without artillery, without a commissariat, without medical staff, without means of transport, without stores, destitute in short of all

¹ Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch were sent out to the Crimea as Commissioners by the Government in February, 1855, where they took the evidence of about two hundred officers, and before publication each officer's evidence was sent to him for correction. The conclusions of the Commission, founded upon statements made and signed by the officers themselves, implied censure on certain officials, but on February 16, 1856, a Board composed of seven General Officers assembled at Chelsea and exonerated Lord Raglan's principal officers from all blame ("Memorials of the Right Hon. Sir John McNeill," p. 360). As Kinglake puts it: "After long dubious searchings in the labyrinth of our military institutions the finger of blame rested pointing—and pointing judicially—to a great Department of State, that is, to Her Majesty's Treasury. In this judgment the State acquiesced" (Kinglake, vi. p. 378).

See also "War in the Crimea," pp. 187-189.

² Hime's "History of the Royal Artillery," p. 78.

³ The regiments that landed in the Crimea were filled with excellent and well-disciplined soldiers, but owing to the incapacity of the long-service system to furnish a continuous supply of satisfactory recruits, the ranks were soon full of men physically inferior to those they replaced. This is painfully evident when comparing the Light Division as it existed at the Alma, with the Light Division that assaulted the Redan on September 8, 1855. For Army Reduction, see Clode i. pp. 275, 398, etc.

the known wants and requirements of an army.”¹ On the outbreak of war necessary administrative departments had to be created,² and, being new to

¹ Gardiner's Report, 1856, pp. 27, 28.

These statements can be supported as follows :

“*No Staff.*”—Except at the Chobham Camp of 1853, where the training as a preparation for war was at best a puerile effort in the right direction, the three arms had never been brigaded together in Great Britain since Sir John Moore's camp at Shorncliffe in 1805 (see Hime's “History of the Royal Artillery,” p. 86).

“*No Artillery.*”—Fortunately, Lord Hardinge took steps to raise the strength of the Artillery before the war (see p. 23). But there was a scarcity of men trained to ride and drive (see p. 65), so-called batteries of service were practically ruined to supply the small force of field guns we put into the field (see p. 64), and the Siege Train, never strong enough for its duties, was only maintained by the somewhat dangerous withdrawals from the Mediterranean garrisons, etc. (see Tables X.—XII., pp. 71 etc). It had no transport (see p. 32).

“*No Commissariat.*”—When the war broke out, the Commissariat was in the hands of Treasury clerks. It had no military organisation and was useless for war. It was transferred to the War Office in December, 1854, but it was not till 1858 that its officers were selected from the commissioned ranks of the Army (Clode i. p. 276).

“*No Medical Staff.*”—The Medical Department consisted of surgeons and assistant-surgeons attached to regiments. There were no Medical Staff Corps. The Purveyor's Department (for hospitals) was re-established in 1853, but only for finance purposes. The sole charge of hospital buildings and grounds was not confided to it till 1860. The Army Hospital Corps was not instituted till 1861 (Clode i. pp. 277–278).

“*No Transport.*”—The wagon train of the Peninsula was disbanded in 1815. The Land Transport Corps—afterwards Military Train—was raised as a Military Corps June, 1855 (Clode i. p. 277).

“*No Stores.*”—The Public Stores were held by the Board of Ordnance. Their administration in the war was far from satisfactory (see Report of Mr. Roebuck's Committee, 1855). On the abolition of the Board of Ordnance they were transferred to a Civil Department under the Secretary of State. The Military Store Department was instituted in 1861 (Clode i. p. 277).

Just when the war was beginning, the important item of clothing of the infantry and cavalry was removed from the charge of the colonels of the regiments and placed under the Crown (Clode i. p. 108).

² “It was not till six months after we landed in the Crimea that any drastic measures were taken to cope with the existing chaos. On 12th February, 1855, a Cabinet Council resolved: To form a Land

their work, they were for a time totally unfit for active service. When the terrible and inevitable results of so insane a policy were realised, a popular reaction took place, and millions were squandered to undo what could not be undone. The millions came too late. An army, a most complicated and delicate machine, cannot be improvised, and its efficiency in war depends upon the care with which it is maintained in peace.

The country was furious, the press was indignant at a state of things which it had helped to bring about, and the question in every one's mouth was, Who is to blame? Apparently no one outside the Army perceived that the horrors of the Crimean winter were the handiwork of the leaders of the Manchester Peace Party.¹

The storm and the cold which our troops had to endure were no new experience in warfare; the difficulties about the road between Balaclava and the Col would never have arisen if men had been at once forthcoming for its repair; the resources of the Turkish provinces would have supplied the army had there been a properly organised commissariat; disease would have been met, combated, and checked, had there been an adequate medical staff. But the country had willed otherwise. Our troubles were not caused by the carelessness of Colonel X., or the want of foresight of Doctor Y., or

Transport Corps; to procure a corps of scavengers; to employ civilian doctors; to send out commissions of inquiry; and to form a Sea Transport Board at the Admiralty" ("Memorials of the Right Hon. Sir John McNeill," p. 319; "Panmure Papers," i. p. 53).

¹ See Hime's "History of the Royal Artillery," chaps. ii. v. and vi.

by the stupidity of Commissary Z.; they were the necessary and inevitable effect of a cause that had been in action, with little remission, from 1816 to 1854—the unreasonable reduction of the Army and all its departments, through the influence of the Peace Party, to a state of inefficiency and paralysis.

At last better weather came, and with it returning health. Stores of warm clothing were eventually distributed with a lavish hand; the Land Transport Corps was organised, and a railway laid from Balaclava to the Camp. Reinforcements, too, of men and horses joined the army, which, well fed, clothed, and sheltered, rose like a phoenix from its ashes; but as the story of the winter months unfolds itself it will be seen how this country, lately the arbiter of Europe, had to lean heavily on the kindly arm of her ancient rival, France.

2. OPERATIONS DURING THE WINTER OF 1854-5

The Russian Field Army.—After their failure to raise the siege on November 5, the Russian forces withdrew across the Tchernaya, leaving outposts only on the left bank. Sir Colin Campbell continued the construction of the strong lines which rendered Balaclava secure against attack, and for a time the Allies and the Russian field army lost sight of each other.

Moves and Counter-Moves.—On December 30 the French made a reconnaissance in force. They advanced across the plain of Balaclava, crossed the Tchernaya, and, after a sharp skirmish, captured

and burned Tchorgoun. Having ascertained that the Russian strength in the neighbourhood was not serious, they returned to camp. As the French advanced, Sir Colin Campbell moved a portion of his force out in support, and took up a position overlooking Kamara and the entry to the Baidar Valley.

When the Allies withdrew the Russians again advanced, and during the end of January and the beginning of February they were once more established in the neighbourhood of Tchorgoun, with outposts on the left bank of the Tchernaya and the Fidioukine Hills. Their total force did not exceed 8,000 men, and it was determined by the allied Generals to make an attempt to cut them off. It was accordingly arranged that General Bosquet, with a strong force of three arms, should descend during the night of February 19 from the Plateau by the Col, march to the Traktir Bridge, and attack the enemy at day-break; while Sir Colin Campbell, with the bulk of his command, was to move against the south-east slopes of the Fidioukine Hills. The French General had hardly commenced his movement at midnight when a great storm, accompanied by blizzards, broke over the Plateau, and he found it impossible to advance. Part of his force was at once halted and sent back to camp, but some of the rest lost their way in the darkness, and staff officers were busy all night collecting the wanderers. Bosquet, as soon as it was practicable, informed his chief that he was obliged to give up the expedition, and General Canrobert at once despatched an officer to inform

Lord Raglan ; but it was 5 a.m. before he reached the British head-quarters.¹

Meanwhile, at 2 a.m. Sir Colin Campbell began his march. The 71st Regiment led, then came W Battery, the Highland Brigade, and the 14th Regiment,² followed by the cavalry and C Troop, R.H.A. They proceeded cautiously towards Canrobert Hill, but great difficulty was found in making the horses face the storm, and halts were frequent. At last the end of the North Valley was reached where the crisis of the Light Brigade charge took place, and Campbell halted his force near the aqueduct and waited for daylight. As morning broke, Russian troops in close column, with bayonets fixed, were seen standing motionless on the Fidioukine Hills, and a brigade of French troops appeared upon the scene.³

During the night it became known in General Vinoy's camp near Balaclava that the British were advancing without French support, and, although he knew the expedition had been countermanded, the General lost no time in turning out his brigade and following in the track of Sir Colin. He had, however, no sooner joined him than Lord Raglan's orders of recall, despatched at 5 a.m., reached the combined

¹ "A minuit, par l'obscurité la plus profonde, le mouvement commença ; soudain fondant du nord sur les têtes des colonnes, le plus violent des chasse-neige les arrêta court. . . . Heureux les corps qui, n'ayant point encore marché, purent recevoir assez tôt les contre-ordres ; les autres eurent toutes les peines du monde à regagner leurs campements," etc. (Rousset, ii. pp. 59 etc.).

² The 14th Regiment was among the reinforcements, and was posted to Sir Colin Campbell's command at Balaclava.

³ "Corunna to Sebastopol," pp. 223 etc.

forces of the Allies, who at once returned to Kadekoi which was reached about 10 a.m.¹ The Russians were now aware of the dangers of their position, and no further attempts were made to surprise them in this portion of the theatre of war.² They did not, however, escape discomfiture in the north.

Attack on Eupatoria.—During the first months of the year Omer Pasha gradually assembled at Eupatoria portions of the Turkish Army which had been engaged on the Danube during 1854, and by the beginning of February the garrison consisted of 23,000 infantry and 34 guns, while a girdle of field works, with flanks resting upon the sea, encircled the town. On February 16 Prince Menchikoff ordered a strong force, drawn from his field army, to attack Eupatoria; for he considered the growing Turkish garrison to be a menace to his lines of communication between Sebastopol and the interior of Russia. His troops, however, were repulsed with heavy loss, and, no further attempt being made, Eupatoria remained a valuable asset in the hands of the Allies, in view of possible operations for the complete investment of Sebastopol. In consequence, it is supposed, of this last failure Prince Menchikoff was replaced in his command by Prince Michael Gortschakoff, and shortly afterwards the Emperor Nicholas, who by many was regarded as the principal obstacle to peace, died and was succeeded by his

¹ "Not a man of Sir Colin Campbell's force fell out during the whole of this trying march, though several had to go to hospital with frost-bites" ("Letters from Headquarters," ii. p. 116).

² "La surprise manquée avait donné l'éveil à Tchorgoun; elle ne fut pas renouvelée" (Rousset, ii. p. 60).

son Alexander. But the new Emperor at once evinced a spirit as uncompromising as his father's had been, and the Powers of Europe, about to meet in a Peace Conference at Vienna saw little chance of a cessation of hostilities.

Progress of Works for the Defence of Sebastopol.—The definite result of the battle of Inkerman is pointed out by Todleben with perfect truth. The Allies were compelled to abandon the offensive, and betook themselves to seek protection from the attacks of the Russians, who, as our siege batteries became inactive, were enabled to undertake extensive works for the better defence of the fortress.¹ For this purpose they employed from 6,000 to 10,000 men, who worked continuously day and night.²

All the bastions and the batteries along the south side were strengthened and improved by raising the height and increasing the thickness of the parapets, by deepening the ditches, and by providing traverses and blinded cover. A number of fresh batteries were added to those already in existence, and the pivots of the line were, with one exception, occupied by works closed at the gorge. Thus the Little Redan, the Malakoff, and the Flagstaff and Central Bastions became independent strongholds; but the Redan remained open at the rear. The Marine Barracks in the Karabelnaya were fortified, and served as a keep for the Faubourg, and three new redoubts were provided for the defence of the City. The Jason was placed behind the Garden Batteries, in rear of the

¹ See Kinglake, vii. p. 351, n. 3; and Todleben, i. pp. 525–526.

² Todleben, i. p. 514.

Flagstaff Bastion, the Tcheshmé supported the left face of the Central Bastion, and the Rostislaw occupied a position behind the indented wall some 600 yards south of Bastion No. 6. The guns of the south front, which had steadily increased since September 25, reached by the middle of February a total of close on 700, not including small mortars and pieces mounted for high-angle fire at close range.¹

On the north side the field fortifications already existing were further developed. An extensive position between the Star Fort and the post-road was prepared for defence, and some works—including a new battery near the Light House—were erected along the north bank of the Roadstead and also on the right bank of the Tchernaya, the line of which was held by the troops of Prince Gortchakoff.

Progress of French Trenches.—Though the French did not at the moment propose to advance beyond their third parallel against the Flagstaff Bastion, they extended their trenches so as to threaten the Schwartz Redoubt and Central Bastion. The magazine of the latter and those of the Flagstaff Bastion were connected by electric wires to a point within the city, so that they could be exploded if the works in question were captured; but Todleben found in the extensive network of lodgments for riflemen which he spread round the city front an effective answer to the French attack, and while small sorties were constantly made from the fortress, it was against our allies that they were principally directed.² Having pushed their trenches within 470

¹ Todleben, i, p. 642.

² *Ibid.*, chaps. xix.—xxiii.

yards of the Schwartz Redoubt and extended them to the Quarantine Bay, they advanced no farther, but made many new siege batteries.¹

Progress in British Left and Right Attacks.—On the British side work was very much slower. The engineers pursued their labours under the greatest difficulties, their principal work being the repair and drainage of the existing trenches and batteries ; but a little progress was nevertheless made. By the end of January the second parallel of the Left Attack was extended from ravine to ravine, and a new mortar battery (M.B. No. 2) was made and armed, its position being between Nos. 2 and 3 Gun Batteries. A new gun battery (No. 9) was begun at the left of the second parallel, but work upon it was postponed for want of labour.

The Inkerman Attack.—The defensive works on the Inkerman Ridge progressed but slowly, for no real work could be got out of the Turks and all night work was soon abandoned. For the protection of our exposed flank Captain D'Aguilar, with No. 6 Company, 11th Battalion, was detached to the right front of the 2nd Division camp with three 18-pounder guns, five 8-in. howitzers, and four 32-pounders. The first parallel of the "Inkerman Attack," as it was called, was traced in a north-easterly direction across the farther slopes of Shell Hill, in such a way that its prolongation cleared the Russian work at the Light House.² This parallel was made conjointly by French and British troops, and soon after it was opened a second parallel was dug, 400 yards in front

¹ The number now reached 41 (Auger, i. p. 162). ² See Map, p. 315.

of it. A mortar battery was made and armed by us at the extreme right of the first parallel, and a little in front the French made St. Laurent's Battery (called by us the Light House Battery), of which the British were to supply the armament; but by the end of January this battery was still incomplete.

Meanwhile every effort was made to prepare for another bombardment.

Work in the Siege Train.—Early in December guns, mortars, etc., began to arrive from the Mediterranean, more pieces were landed from the fleet, and the problem of getting the fresh *matériel* to the trenches presented itself in all its embarrassments. It required twenty-four horses to move a 32-pounder gun, thirty to forty were required for a 68-pounder gun or 13-in. mortar on a sling wagon, and only in comparatively favourable weather could the journey from Balaclava to either of the siege parks be performed in a single day. A *depôt* was therefore established at the Col, about 4 miles from the wharf, but it needed a day of strenuous labour, and the life of many a horse, to surmount this poor distance. The heavily loaded wagons sank up to their axles in the yielding mud; while horses were getting scarcer day by day, and those that remained were debilitated by overwork and semi-starvation. However, by December 22, two 10-in. guns, two 68-pounders, eight 13-in. mortars, etc., fifty-five pieces in all, had been got up to the *depôt* on the Col. But the real crux was the transport of the ammunition and stores; for, with the exception of the trench carts, the few wagons the Siege Train possessed were not adapted

to carry heavy loads of shot. To supply this want the French lent us six ten-horsed wagons, each of which carried twelve 13-in. shell, and from time to time they repaired the road at the Col.

Makeshifts.—Otherwise we had to resort to makeshifts. Flanders and store limber wagons were strengthened with battens, and by removing the ammunition boxes from the field-artillery limbers and constructing a rough sort of box thereon, ten horses were enabled to carry six 13-in. shell. The transport of one hundred such shell from Balaclava to the siege parks was considered a very good day's work. The troop detachment horses were also utilised. Pairs of canvas bags, joined by a canvas band, were made on board ship, and this contrivance, with a 32-pounder shot in each bag, was slung across the back of a horse. The horses travelled three abreast, the centre one being ridden by a gunner, who led the other two. Thus three horses brought up four 32-pounder shot. Men were also employed. A thousand men daily were detailed by Sir Colin Campbell, and each of these carried one 24-pounder, or one 32-pounder projectile (placed in a sandbag slung over his back) from Balaclava to the Col dépôt, whence they were transported to the siege parks by detachments of Turks. At one time it was proposed to utilise the latter on the Col road, and to hook them into trench carts, with man harness; but as most of the Turks on the very first occasion lay down before they had gone a mile and a half and several died where they lay, the experiment was not repeated.¹

¹ See "Artillery Operations," pp. 39 etc.

The Batteries Practically Silent.—No part of the new armament reached the actual batteries during December, the state of the roads to and through the trenches rendering the arming of the batteries an impossibility. At the same time, the men of the Siege Train were so reduced in number by sickness and so worn with fatigue, that they were insufficient for even the trivial amount of work that went on in the trenches. A small quantity of fresh ammunition, about equivalent to two-and-a-half days' expenditure, was brought to the magazines, but there was little firing during the month. In the Right Attack the bronze mortars were used as before. Some shrapnel and case were fired from the 24-pounder guns against the enemy's working parties, and the 10-in. mortars were also occasionally employed, the total rounds being 408. The Left Attack was silent.

Reinforcement of Siege Train, etc.—The following reinforcements joined the Siege Train, and were posted as shown below :

TABLE XXXVII
REINFORCEMENTS

Date of Arrival.	Designation.	Commanding Officer.	Strength.		Posted to
			Officers.	Men.	
Dec. 4	No. 4 Company, 2nd Battalion . . .	Captain S. D. Broughton . .	5	144	Left Attack
„ 15	No. 1 Company, 5th Battalion . . .	Capt. H. A. B. Campbell . .	4	116	Right Attack.
„ 16	No. 4 Company, 6th Battalion . . .	Captain A. R. Wragge . .	4	118	Left Attack.
„ 24	No. 1 Company, 1st Battalion . . .	Capt. G. Graydon	4	135	Right Attack.
„ 24	No. 8 Company, 4th Battalion . . .	Capt. A. Oldfield	4	134	Right Attack.

Lieutenant-Colonel N. T. Lake was invalided home,

and was succeeded in temporary command of the Siege Train by Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Dupuis; Major Irving was appointed to command the Artillery at Scutari, and was succeeded in command of the Left Attack by Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel Rowan; and Captain Strange, with No. 8 Company, 11th Battalion, relieved Captain D'Aguilar on the Inkerman Ridge. On December 29 Captain Taswell was sent to Scutari, and was succeeded as Commissary of Ordnance by Captain J. R. Anderson.

The Naval Brigade was also considerably reinforced.

Progress in Renewing the Armament of the Batteries.—The new year commenced with wet, cheerless weather, and the siege *matériel* continued to struggle up through the mud with small result and great sacrifice of horses. With the coming of the frost, however, the transport was facilitated. The French increased their loan of wagons from six to twelve, and also detailed from 800 to 1,500 men daily to carry shot, etc., from Balaclava to the dépôt at the Col. Towards the end of January the weather became finer, and some progress was made in arming the batteries in accordance with a new project entailing a heavier armament, designed to cope with the ever-increasing strength of the Russian defences. The guns were drawn (during daylight) by gunners using man harness to a covered spot near the trenches, and at night they were taken into the batteries. About 1,400 rounds of various calibre were brought into the magazines. During January the Left Attack was still silent, and our fire

from the Right was confined to occasional shots at large working-parties, each single round being answered by the Russians with at least ten, and sometimes twenty, in reply ; but with this exception there was little firing on either side, nor were there any casualties in the Siege Train.¹ The Right Attack only fired 103 rounds, more than half of which were from the bronze 5½-in. mortars.

3. THE OCCUPATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE ALLIES BY THE FRENCH

British Weakness.—General Canrobert found various excuses for not moving a division of his army to the right, in accordance with the decision of the Council of War held on November 6, and the efforts of the French continued to be directed against the Flagstaff Bastion. Our allies, however, aided us in various ways, mending our road, transporting our ammunition, helping us with our sick, reinforcing our working parties, and from prudential reasons Lord Raglan felt himself debarred from pressing for the transfer of the division ; but the consequence was that an ever-increasing strain was thrown upon the British troops, whose weakness now was a common danger. During December the trench guards of the Right Attack, with more than a mile of front to defend, had an average strength of 350 men ; on the night of January 21 only 290 could be found for this duty, and the guards for the other Attacks were

¹ [2012] Second-Captain C. M. Raynes died on passage in the Dardanelles, December, 1854.

equally small.¹ Luckily for the Allies, the existing state of affairs was not realised by the Russians.

Sir John Burgoyne's Proposals.—On November 24 Sir John Burgoyne made a new proposal—namely, that, while the British continued to man and maintain the batteries of their Left Attack, its protection should be undertaken by the French, thus setting free the British 3rd Division for the prosecution of the attack on the Malakoff.²

This, however, was not agreed to, and for a time the French were inclined to listen to no counsel which tended to draw them from their cherished attack on the town front; but as the year drew to a close they realised that the fire from the Malakoff must be subdued,³ and as they declined to accept Burgoyne's proposition, it followed that they themselves must undertake the operation. On January 12, 1855, their Chief Engineer, General Bizot, wrote to the French War Minister, Marshal Vaillant, informing him that they had agreed to attack the Malakoff.⁴ But not until the French mining operations at the Flagstaff Bastion had been frustrated

¹ "R.E. Journal," i. p. 82.

² *Ibid.*, p. 63 and app. xxxv.

In February, General Sir Harry Jones succeeded Sir John Burgoyne as Chief Engineer; but Lord Raglan retained Burgoyne on his staff until the end of March, when he returned to England and resumed his post of Inspector-General of Fortifications.

³ The Malakoff, as it existed in October, had been effectually dealt with by the British guns; but it now had assumed a very different character, owing to the skill and energy of Todleben. If the British were to give effective support to a French assault on the Flagstaff Bastion, a necessary preliminary was the subjection of the fire from the Malakoff.

⁴ Rousset, ii. p. 31.

by Todleben¹ were definite steps taken to attack the Malakoff, and February came before French troops relieved our over-worked men on the heights of Inkerman.

The French had not passed the winter without suffering; comparatively they were better off than the British, that was all;² but their Government took energetic measures to send out strong reinforcements, and a new organisation was given to the Army and officially announced on February 8. (See App. No. 3, p. 339.)

The French occupy Our Right.—The French force was now to consist of two Corps d'Armée and a Reserve. Each Corps included four divisions of infantry, and the Reserve was made up of an infantry and cavalry division, reserves of fortress engineers, and artillery, and a brigade of the Imperial Guard. General Forey, who had commanded on the French left, was relieved by General Péliissier, who was specially selected by the Emperor Napoleon for the post of Commander of the 1st Corps. General Bosquet commanded the 2nd Corps, and his cantonments, when the French relieved us on the right flank, extended from the Woronzoff Road to the Inkerman Ridge. The Imperial Order which brought this new organisation into being was conveyed to

¹ The Russian countermines had been successful. On February 3, when the French mines were ready, the Russians fired a camouflet, which ruined the French subterranean advances, and new projects of attack had to be taken in hand (Rousset, ii. p. 128).

² "S'il n'y avait pas eu, comme terme de comparaison, cette action meurtrière de la misère et du froid sur l'armée anglaise, les Français auraient pu croire, qu'ils avaient atteint eux-mêmes les dernières limites de la souffrance" (Rousset, ii. p. 15).

the Crimea by a distinguished officer of French Engineers, and personal aide-de-camp to the Emperor. This was General Niel, who was destined to play an important part in the further conduct of the war.

The Agreement of February 2.—At the end of January the British and French Engineers met in consultation, and as a result of their proposals the Allies made an agreement on February 2 by which the French were to undertake the attack of the town front and the Malakoff, while the British were to press on against the Redan, and support and flank the two French attacks. But it was always understood that the attacks on the Redan and the Flagstaff Bastion should be concurrent.¹


The Preparation of the Attack on the Malakoff.—The movement of the French troops to the right rendered the attack on the Malakoff feasible, and, as a preliminary, the British began the construction of two new batteries, namely, No. 9 in the second parallel of the Right Attack, and the “Artilleur,” or “Careenage” Battery,² at the left end of the second parallel of the Inkerman Attack.

The “Ouvrages Blancs.”—Totleben was not slow to perceive that these new works were a standing menace to the Malakoff, and on the night of February 21 seven battalions issued from Sebastopol and, mounting St. George’s Brow, began the construction of the Selinghinsk Redoubt, the first of the “Ouvrages Blancs”—so called from

¹ “R.E. Journal,” i. pp. 85 etc.

² The latter name was used by our people, but the battery was soon handed over to the French, by whom it was called “l’Artilleur.”

the colour of the upturned soil. The Russians continued the work on the following night, and in the early hours of the 24th the French delivered an



assault, which was repulsed with serious loss. By the 28th the Selinghinsk Redoubt was armed, and the Volhynie Redoubt begun on its left front. No further interference was offered by the French, and

by March 10 the two works held twenty-two 24-pounder guns.

The Mamelon.—General Bizot vainly urged that the Mamelon should at once be occupied; but on March 11 it was apparent that such occupation, if attempted, would be disputed, for the Russians had made a lodgment thereon during the night. Canrobert would not listen to the idea of an assault, and the French broke ground for a regular siege of the Mamelon when the Kamchatka Lunette¹ began to take form on its summit. The parallel they opened was practically a continuation of the third parallel of our Right Attack, but separated from it by the Middle Ravine. By the 21st the lunette was completed and armed with ten 24-pounder guns, covered in rear by twelve others. But the French trenches and approaches were pushed on at the same time that our Right and Left Attacks were advancing, and on the night of March 22 the Russians determined to make a more serious sortie than they had yet attempted.

4. PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE FROM THE END OF JANUARY TO THE REPULSE OF THE SORTIE OF MARCH 21

Progress of Left Attack.—Ever since the end of January our weak working parties in the Left

¹ This was the Russian name for the lunette constructed by them on the Mamelon. Later on, the French converted this lunette to their own uses, and their work was called the Brancion Redoubt. But in common parlance both were spoken of as "The Mamelon." (see Map p. 366).

Attack had been seriously molested by the active Russian sharpshooters, who continually assailed them from nooks and recesses in the rocks bordering the ravines, or from rifle-pits and lodgments skilfully constructed. In spite of this, however, two new batteries, Nos. 7 and 8, were in course of completion in the third parallel, and a new mortar battery (M.B. No. 1) on the right of No. 1 Gun Battery in the first parallel. Work on No. 9 Battery was also resumed.

Progress of Right Attack.—In the Right Attack the new battery, No. 9, designed to oppose the Malakoff, was finished with the help of the French—a help gratefully acknowledged by our Chief Engineer;¹ and as the Russian work on the Mamelon progressed, the embrasures of this new battery were constructed so as to bear on it. The bronze mortar emplacements were converted into Batteries Nos. 7 and 8 for 10-in. mortars, and, in order to check the Russian sharpshooters two lodgments (or rifle-screens, to use the term then in vogue) were made in front of the third parallel, as well as an emplacement for two 9-pounder guns near No. 8 Mortar Battery. Other mortar batteries were also begun.

French Works.—The French completed the Victoria Redoubt on Thistle Hill which we had begun, and finished the St. Laurent's and Artilleur Batteries, the embrasures of the latter being directed on the Mamelon.

Changes in Siege Train.—During this period some changes took place in the Siege Train. In February Lieutenant-Colonel E. Warde relieved Colonel Dupuis

¹ "R.E. Journal," ii. p. 49.

in the command. Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel H. S. Rowan, on promotion, was succeeded for a short time in the command of the Left Attack by Major J. N. A. Freese. Freese, on promotion, was followed by Captain S. D. Broughton, and when Broughton was invalided he was succeeded on March 17 by Captain G. Shaw. In the Right Attack, Colonel C. Dickson was wounded on February 4, and was succeeded by Captain A. Oldfield, who was presently transferred to the Inkerman Attack, and was followed by Captain C. L. D'Aguilar. On March 21 Dickson resumed command.

Reinforcements.—The following reinforcements joined the Siege Train and were posted as shown below :

TABLE XXXVIII
REINFORCEMENTS

Date of Arrival.	Designation.	Commanding Officer.	Strength.		Posted to.
			Officers	Men.	
Feb. .	Remainder of No. 2 } Company 11th Battalion (from Varna)	2nd Capt. J. L. Bolton	1	7	L.Att'k.
Mar. .	No. 7 Company, 5th Battalion .	Capt. H. Rogers .	3	129	R.Att'k.
Mar. .	No. 5 Company, 9th Battalion .	Capt. M. C. Dixon .	4	131	R.Att'k.

On March 2 Captain Oldfield's company was sent to reinforce Captain Strange at Inkerman, and No. 4 Company, 6th Battalion (Captain A. R. Wragge) was transferred from the Left to the Right Attack on March 17.

During this period there were many additions of officers and men to the Naval Brigade.

Progress of the Work.—At the beginning of February the sickness reached its height, but as the

month went on the weather became finer and the health of the men began to improve. Colonel Warde took advantage of the improvement to have daily drills and gunnery instruction in the batteries, special attention being made to fuses. He also made very strong representations regarding the weakness of the Siege Train, and the necessity for more companies.¹ Although the siege carriages were much dilapidated, over 5,000 rounds of ammunition were got into battery during the month, a large increase over former months. The arming of the batteries on the Inkerman Ridge also made considerable progress. Three 32-pounders, with 300 rounds apiece, were placed in St. Laurent's Battery, and four 13-in. mortars, with 100 rounds of shell, in the mortar battery behind it. In conjunction with the French,² ten British 32-pounders were mounted in the Artilleur Battery; some days later two 68-pounders were added, and on March 14 we sent three more 32-pounders to complete its armament.

On March 3 the arming of No. 9 Battery, Right Attack, was begun—an operation of much difficulty, as the guns had to be brought from the right of the

¹ There was always a very strong feeling amongst the officers of the Siege Train that throughout the siege their numbers were much too small for their work, and that this did not receive sufficient consideration at Artillery Head-quarters. At a later period of the siege Miss Florence Nightingale drew the attention of Lord Panmure to the disproportionate number of cases of pulmonary disease that occurred in the Siege Train and urged the necessity of giving them more assistance in their severe labours ("Panmure Papers" i., p. 356).

² The guns, carriages, wheel-drivers, and horses were British; the centre and lead were supplied by the French. English gunners were with the guns, and French infantry carried the ammunition (see "Artillery Operations," p. 54).

first parallel over open and stony ground. The night was bright, and the enemy's rifle-pits close at hand. A route was carefully fixed upon, gunners being placed at intervals to mark the track, and two 8-in. guns were got into their places by Captain D'Aguilar. Three more were added during the next two nights without any casualty. Other guns and mortars were brought into both Left and Right Attacks, and early in March there were 132 British guns in position. It soon became possible to employ Flanders wagons and trench carts, drawn by horses, to bring ammunition to the trenches, and, after the arrival of the French division on our right, fatigue parties were nightly detailed from the infantry to aid in this work. When the artillery night reliefs came down, they usually brought with them to the batteries trench carts filled with ammunition. On their way to the Attacks the trench guards were ordered to march to the parks, where a 32-pounder shot was given to one man, and an 8-in. shell in a box to two men. The Highland Brigade and the French continued to work between Balaclava and the Col. Thus the armament of the siege batteries assumed a formidable character, and the organisation and storage of the ammunition became a matter of the first importance. The D.A. Commissaries of Ordnance of the two Attacks, H. W. Hayter and G. Yellon, were indefatigable in their exertions, and usually spent six or seven hours every night in the trenches.

Fire Infrequent.—During February our fire practically ceased. The 5½-in. mortar ammunition was running low, and only ten rounds could be

spared for these useful little pieces. On the 12th, Captain H. A. B. Campbell, noticing a large working party at the Malakoff, dispersed it with a couple of 24-pounder shrapnel shells, which drew from the Russians fifty-three rounds in reply. No casualties occurred, and our batteries were little injured; but, as it was useless to open fire unless we were prepared to sustain it, for a time all the embrasures were closed up and the Right Attack became silent. On March 6, Major Strange,¹ with his company, manned St. Laurent's Battery and drove off a couple of the enemy's ships that were harassing the French operations on the Mamelon. He fired some sixty rounds, but with this exception all our guns continued silent until March 11.

On this day, in order to assist the French operations on the Mamelon, the Right Attack opened fire with mortars about 5 p.m., and Captains Strange and Oldfield, with their companies, were directed to man the Artilleur Battery. Its embrasures were unmasked under a sharp rifle fire, but owing to the magazines not being supplied with powder, considerable delay occurred in opening fire, which was sustained during the night. It was then agreed that the French artillery should take over duty in this battery, St. Laurent's Battery and the Mortar Battery behind it being still worked by our men.

From March 11 to the night of the 22nd a daily average of one hundred rounds was fired from the Right Attack against the Russian works on the Mamelon, and every effort made to keep down

¹ See App. No. 1, p. 334.

the enemy's rifle fire from the "Quarries" in front of the Redan and the large lodgments made at the base of the Mamelon Hill. Heavy mortar shells were directed against the former, and on the night of the 21st two 9-pounder guns, placed in the advanced right approach of the Right Attack, were successful in driving out the Russian riflemen from the Mamelon trench.

Sortie of March 22. Attack on French.—Such was the state of affairs when the Russians sought to interrupt the works of the Allies by a determined sortie, supported by a heavy fire from the fortress. About ten o'clock on the night of March 22, 5,500 Russians advanced from the flank of the Kamtchatka Lunette along the Victoria Ridge, and, after incurring considerable resistance, swept back the French from their advanced saps to the shelter of their first parallel. Here our allies were able to maintain themselves, and, though they lost heavily, they drove back the Russians to the shelter of the lunette.

Attack on British.—A little later the British lines were attacked, but, instead of operating in one unwieldy mass, the Russians now advanced in four distinct bodies. Colonel R. D. Kelly, 34th Regiment, was field officer of the night in the Right Attack and had 1,200 infantry under his command. Warned by the sound of the conflict on his right, he was quite prepared for the assault delivered on his front by some 800 Russians, who issued from the Middle Ravine. This attack was at once driven back, as also a second made by another body on Kelly's right flank; but an hour or so later the Colonel was not so fortunate.

Another band, led by a fine-looking Albanian wearing the national dress, advanced from the Redan and took Kelly prisoner, who in the darkness mistook them for his own men.¹ They succeeded in getting into the Right Attack as far as the second parallel; but here they were met by the working party and some of the trench guards who, gallantly led on by Major J. W. Gordon and Lieut.-Col. R. Tylden, of the Royal Engineers, charged with the bayonet and drove them out. The Russian leader was killed, but not before he had fired his pistol into the magazine of No. 8 Mortar Battery, happily without effect. Lieutenant J. A. Price and the detachment of Royal Artillery in charge of the two 9-pounder guns had a narrow escape, as at one time they were entirely surrounded.

At the same time a party of Russians, issuing from the Barrack Batteries and passing themselves off as French, penetrated the Left Attack as far as Nos. 7 and 8 Batteries, and drove out the working parties who were engaged upon them. The latter were soon rallied by Captain S. R. Chapman, 20th Regiment, and Captain H. W. Montague, R.E., and the enemy were driven out at the point of the bayonet. They had been able to do little damage to the battery, but they carried off Montague as a prisoner and removed the entrenching tools which the working parties threw down when they took up their arms. The British loss was about 80, including 3 officers

¹ Colonel Kelly was knocked down and badly wounded, and would have been killed but for the chivalrous conduct of a Russian officer, who stood over the prostrate Colonel and defended him from the Albanians.

During the time he was a prisoner, Colonel Kelly was treated by the Russians with the greatest kindness (see Kinglake, vii. p. 96 and n.).

and 16 men killed; that of the French about 640, and that of the Russians about 1,300.¹ On the 24th a burial truce was agreed upon, and while the white flags were flying the combatants on either side fraternised in friendly fashion. Indeed, a sporting match was arranged between two opposing pieces of ordnance, to which the official accounts both of the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers make only the most discreet reference.²

¹ See "R.E. Journal," ii. p. 94, and Kinglake, vii. p. 102.

The Artillery had no casualties, but one man was killed in the Naval Brigade.

² Major Reilly merely says, "The Mamelon opened one of its embrasures, and, after firing several shots at the Right Attack, closed it again. . . ." ("Artillery Operations," p. 68). Major-General Sir Harry Jones, in his weekly report, gives a little more information. He says, "The enemy having opened fire from the 68-pounder in the Mamelon, it was answered by seventeen rounds from the 68-pounder manned by the Naval Brigade, which dismounted it, and the mantlet dropped" ("R.E. Journal," ii. p. 107).

General Sir D. Lysons, who was serving before Sebastopol as a young Staff Officer, gives the following account:

"While the flag of truce was flying, a Russian Artillery officer inquired if General Dacres was on the ground but he did not happen to be there. General Airey, however, who was present, asked what he could do for him. 'Your 68-pounder gun,' said the Russian, 'that your people call "Jenny," is a beautiful gun; but we think we have as good a one in that embrasure (pointing up at the Mamelon), and we should like to have a fair duel with her.' Airey took up the challenge at once, and everything was arranged for noon next day. All the batteries on both sides ceased firing, and a large number of officers, French and English, assembled at the look-out station behind the Twenty-one Gun Battery to look on. Our 68-pounder was manned by a crew of sailors, who mounted the parapets and took off their hats in salute to the Russians, who returned the compliment. The English gun, as 'senior gun,' was given the first shot, which struck the side of the Russian embrasure, and a good shot was returned; the third shot from 'Jenny' went clean through the Russian embrasure, and up went two gabions; the bluejackets mounted their parapets and cheered; but out came the Russian gun again, and in a little 'Jenny' got a nasty thump; but it did her no harm, for at the seventeenth round she

In this sortie, which was chiefly aimed at the French, the Russians failed to drive them from their lines ; but they succeeded in converting the chain of rifle-pits which were in front of the Mamelon into a trench extending to the Middle Ravine. On the morning of the 23rd they occupied this lodgment which was only 80 yards distant from the French works, and which was supported by, while it covered, the Kamchatka Lunette. Their spade work was actively continued up to the beginning of the second bombardment.

5. THE COUNSELS OF THE ALLIES

Intervention of Napoleon III.—The time had now come to give effect to the February agreement and carry on the joint attack ; but unexpected obstacles began to intervene. The ostensible object of General Niel's presence with the army was to report to Paris on the general aspects of the siege, and soon the Emperor Napoleon began to turn over in his mind certain plans upon which he worked in secret. When he came to the Crimea, Niel was at once strongly impressed with the belief that a more complete investment must precede the capture of Sebastopol, and he may possibly have impregnated the French Emperor with the same conviction.

knocked the Russian gun clean over. The Russians mounted their parapets, took off their caps in acknowledgment of defeat, and dropped the mantlet. Then all the batteries resumed their fire " ("The Crimea from First to Last," pp. 168 etc.).

Sir Evelyn Wood, who was at this time in the Naval Brigade, also alludes to "the great duel" in "The Crimea in 1854 and 1894," p. 241.

"However this may be," says Hamley, "it had fixed itself in Napoleon's mind, which was much given to patient and persistent brooding, and cogitating over ideas, and, when under this process they had so far taken shape as to inspire in him a paternal interest, he also acquired in them a profound belief."¹

But whether the idea was his own or Niel's, there is little doubt that dreams of personal glory began to flatter his imagination. In these dreams an immediate assault on Sebastopol had no place: rather the preservation of the existing state of affairs seemed to be desirable, until the Army of Reserve, which he proposed to assemble at Constantinople, should be ready to undertake field operations of an extensive character—operations in which a French force, landing at Aloushta under his personal command, should press through the mountains and cut the communications between Sebastopol and Russia. It is outside the present purpose to inquire whether the Emperor was really convinced that his plan would be to the advantage of the Alliance, or whether he was guided rather by motives of policy—policy which might lead to military achievement and personal prestige; but, from whatever cause proceeding, his influence in the Crimea resulted in a miserable game of cross purposes. General Canrobert had, though somewhat tardily, acted up to the agreement made with Lord Raglan at the beginning of the year; the presence of the French on the Inkerman Ridge at once gave an impetus to the progress of the siege; and now all was

¹ "War in the Crimea," [p. 217.

ready for a second bombardment. The British Commander fully intended that this bombardment should be followed by its natural sequel—an assault; but Niel, without actually revealing his purpose, was able so far to influence Canrobert that he always held back at the critical moment. The General knew that Niel was in the confidence of the Emperor—a confidence in which he himself was not allowed altogether to share—and this knowledge tended to hold him back, whilst his plain duty to his ally and the honour of the French Army were both urging him forward.¹

Niel's Methods.—It was General Niel's object to temporise; to amuse the more ardent spirits amongst the Allies with partial cannonades that should not be followed up by costly attacks; to damage if possible the Russian defences; and to defer an actual assault till the field army should have completed the investment. However, in spite of Niel's advice, it

¹ The following extract illustrates this paragraph:

“L'empereur avait en principe adopté les idées de son aide de camp. Dès le 3 février, le maréchal Vaillant avait envoyé au général Larchey des instructions pour se préparer à recevoir, loger et nourrir, dans un avenir prochain, quarante, cinquante et peut-être soixante mille hommes. Le secret sur ce grand envoi de troupes devait être absolument gardé; le général Canrobert lui-même n'en devait rien apprendre. Cependant, quelque temps après, le ministre de la guerre lui en fit la confiance, mais sous la forme la plus mesurée, en l'avisant avec mystère que l'empereur avait ordonné la formation d'un camp de 40,000 hommes, près de Constantinople, mais que ces forces ne pourraient être appelées par lui que dans un cas désespéré, s'il y allait du salut de l'armée même: ‘L'empereur veut avoir son armée de réserve sous la main; je ne puis mieux m'expliquer,’ ajoutait le ministre plus mystérieusement encore” (Rousset, ii. p. 35).

It is also to be noted that so late as April 3 Lord Raglan wrote, “What a body of French troops is collecting at Constantinople for, I cannot divine” (to Lord Panmure, private letter; Kinglake, vii. p. 121, n.).

was determined to have recourse to a general bombardment: but Canrobert entered on the undertaking with a mind perplexed and a half-hope that the opening of fire would arouse the Russian field army to action, and possibly lead to an attempt to raise the siege, in which a blow similar to that of Inkerman might be dealt them.¹ With his new reinforcements, Canrobert had some 70,000 men; whilst the British, though men were rapidly coming off the sick-list, did not number more than 20,500 men—excluding those landed from the fleet. Since the Turkish success at Eupatoria, Omer Pasha consented to a transfer of some of his forces, and he came to the Chersonese in April with some 15,000 to 18,000 men.

The Second Bombardment Agreed On.—The determination to open a general bombardment was agreed upon by a Council of War on April 7. Fire was to begin on the morning of April 9, and was to be maintained for twenty-four hours, after which the Council would again meet and discuss and decide upon a mode of attack.²

¹ Deux résultats pouvaient être obtenus par ce bombardement . . . il serait possible de donner l'assaut, ou bien, le prince Gortchakoff venant par le dehors au secours de la place aux abois, il serait possible de lui livrer bataille et d'en finir, une bonne fois, avec l'armée de secours " (Rousset, ii. p. 131).

In his resignation addressed to the Emperor at a later date, Canrobert includes among the reasons for that step his disappointment at "la non-attaque de nos lignes extérieures par l'ennemi, à la réouverture du feu, attaque qui paraissait très probable et sur laquelle j'avais fondé des espérances d'un succès plus décisif que celui d'Inkerman " (Rousset, ii. p. 180).

² " R.E. Journal," ii. p. 124.

6. THE EVE OF THE SECOND BOMBARDMENT

By April 8 the following work had been done in the British trenches :

Work in Left Attack.—In the Left Attack the advanced batteries, Nos. 7 and 8, were completed by the Royal Engineers. They also finished three mortar batteries called No. 1 Mortar Battery, on the right of No. 1 Gun Battery ; No. 3 Mortar Battery, between Nos. 3 and 4 Gun Batteries ; and a third, unnumbered, on the right of No. 1 Mortar Battery. No. 9 Battery was unfinished, but an emplacement for two 9-pounders was made on the right of the third parallel.

Work in Right Attack.—In the Right Attack Batteries Nos. 7 and 8 were ready to receive their 10-in. mortars, in addition to the bronze mortars which were still occasionally employed, and four new batteries were completed—namely, No. 10 Mortar Battery, on the right front of the Twenty-one Gun Battery, and about 100 yds. in front of the first parallel ; No. 11 Mortar Battery, to the right of, and in line with, No. 1 Battery ; No. 12 Mortar Battery, to the left of No. 9 Battery ; and No. 13 Mortar Battery on the right of No. 12. A trench ran along the rear of Nos. 9, 12, and 13 Batteries and formed the second parallel. An emplacement for field guns was made in it on the left of No. 9 Battery, which at a later period was transformed into No. 14 Battery. A mortar battery to hold two 13-in. S.S. mortars was made by the Royal Artillery some 600 yds. north of the Woronzoff Road Picket House.

Reinforcements, etc.—The following reinforcements joined the Siege Train and were posted as shown below :

TABLE XXXIX
REINFORCEMENTS

Date of Arrival.	Designation.	Commanding Officer.	Strength.		Posted to.
			Officers	Men.	
Mar. 25	No. 8 Company, 7th Battalion	Captain A. C. Hawkins	3	182	{ Right Att'k.

This company and the 8th Company, 4th Battalion, Captain Oldfield, were transferred on April 5 to the Left Attack, of which, as senior officer, Captain Oldfield took command.

As a rule, the Right Attack continued to fire some hundred rounds a day against the Mamelon and the rifle-pits, and the Left remained silent; but this rule was broken on April 5, when a combined fire of 13-in. mortars was opened from both Attacks against the Redan, the Malakoff, and the Mamelon, which were actively thwarting the French advance. Some three hundred rounds were fired this day and the Russians were for the moment silenced.

By the end of March the railway began to bring ammunition to the Col, and on April 8 all magazines were well supplied, each mortar having 300, and each gun at least 500, rounds. In all 135 pieces were mounted, or ready for mounting, including the 7 guns in St. Laurent's Battery.

The Opposing Ordnance.—While the French still persevered with their mining works, they pressed forward the construction of their batteries with great energy. There were now 39 west of the Great

Ravine, and 8 in their new front of attack against the Malakoff, and in them were mounted 388 guns and mortars, amongst which some 40 pieces—68-pounders, 32-pounders, 13-in. and 10-in. mortars—were borrowed from the British.¹

The garrison of Sebastopol in April consisted of 34,000 infantry and 9,000 artillery and seamen gunners,² and the defence was organised in five sections, the fifth section being necessitated by the developments of the Allied attack on the Russian left. Works of defence had gone on increasing—the number of new batteries now reached 86—and 996 pieces were mounted, of which 466 bore on the siege batteries.

The table on page 332 gives the numbers and distribution of the opposing ordnance.³

Although the Russian guns were more numerous, they were on the whole lighter than those of the Allies, who had more than double the number of mortars and a far greater number of shell guns, thus possessing a preponderating power in vertical fire. The siege batteries, moreover, were as a rule on commanding ground, and encircled the Russian works in a wide-stretching arc, which always admitted of a concentrated and sometimes of a re-

¹ Auger, i. p. 225.

² Todleben, ii. pt. 1, p. 100.

³ This table is based on Todleben, ii. pt. 1, pp. 110 etc. It does not include the armament of St. Laurent's Battery nor the S.S. mortars (p. 329) in the British Right Attack nor all the guns mounted in Nos. 7 and 8 Batteries in the British Left Attack (see Table XLI., p. 345). In the case of the French there is a discrepancy of 67 pieces. Auger no doubt included all French guns mounted; Todleben merely took account of those fired in the bombardment.

TABLE XL
OPPOSING ORDNANCE

Position of Russian Pieces.	Number of Russian Pieces.	Number of Opposing Pieces.	Distribution of Siege Pieces.		
			French Batteries.	British.	
				Left Attack.	Right Attack.
Quarantine Fort (land front), Chemiakine Batteries, ¹ Bastion No. 6, Rostislaw Redoubt, Belkine Lunette, Central Bastion	54	53	53
Chemiakine Batteries, Central Bastion and Annexes, Rostislaw Redoubt, Town Ravine Batteries, ² Flagstaff Bastion	85	102	102
Flagstaff Bastion and Annexes, Jason Redoubt, Garden Batteries, ³ Boulevard Batteries ⁴	149	126	101	25	..
Flagstaff Bastion, Barrack Batteries, ⁵ Redan and flanking Batteries, Malakoff (Right Flank Battery No. 28)	85	80	22	40	18
Redan and flanking Batteries, Gervais Battery, ⁶ Malakoff, Kamchatka, Lunette	60	55	15	2	38
Malakoff (Left Flank Battery No. 18), Little Redan, Selinghinsk and Volhynie Redoubts	33	28	28
Total	466	444	321	67	56

¹ These were the group of batteries placed alongside of No. 26, which enfiladed the French batteries on October 17.

² These batteries were now armed with heavy guns; previously they had only light guns, and took no part in the bombardment.

³ The Jason Redoubt and Garden Batteries were both known to us under the latter name.

⁴ These had increased in numbers and lined the crest of the Boulevard Ravine, and, descending the slope, joined hands with the defences of the Péressib, later known to us as the Creek Batteries. One of the Boulevard Batteries had a cavalier; it was called by us the Crow's Nest.

⁵ This group were built in the vicinity of Battery No. 5, along the crest of the Woronzoff Ravine.


⁶ The Gervais Battery (No. 6), on the right bank of the Middle Ravine, was not armed with heavy guns at the date of the first bombardment.

verse fire upon the enemy.¹ The guns, too, had a deep target in front of them, and projectiles passing over the main defences would reach the works in rear, or create havoc in the City and the Faubourg. On the other hand, the Russians had to keep bodies of infantry always in readiness to resist an assault. These troops had perforce to remain under fire, whilst no one was exposed on the side of the Allies except men working in the batteries and the guards extended along the trenches.²

There was also, at first, a great scarcity of powder in Sebastopol, and the Russians were compelled to husband their ammunition.

¹ This was especially the case at the Flagstaff Bastion and Kamchatka Lunette.

² Todleben, ii. pt. 1, pp. 166 etc. ; also pp. 184 etc.



Mallette Cart, made in Royal Arsenal

APPENDICES TO CHAPTER VII

APPENDIX NO. I

ST. LAURENT'S BATTERY, MARCH 6, 1855¹

At this period the French working-parties on the Inkerman Ridge were much harassed by shells fired from two Russian steamers, which were anchored at the head of the Roadstead 500 yds. apart, the nearer being about a mile distant from St. Laurent's, or, as we called it, the Lighthouse Battery (see Map, p. 315). Three embrasures in the latter looked down into the Roadstead and in these were placed three 32-pounder guns of 56 cwts., which Major H. F. Strange was directed to man with men of No. 8 Company, 11th Battalion. The embrasures, which were kept masked until daylight, were opened on the morning of March 6. Round shot were heated in a furnace supplied with patent fuel, and when the hulls of the steamers became visible Strange opened fire.

Each steamer had two heavy shell guns, and on the north side of the harbour there were six Russian works which could fire on St. Laurent's Battery, three of them so placed as to command it.

The fourth shot from the British struck the paddle-box of one of the steamers, up to which time no one had appeared on board; but now the crews got their guns into action and the steamers prepared to shift their position, while in the distance Russian gunners could be seen running down into the batteries from the camp behind them, and soon the whole six opened a fortunately ill-directed fire on St. Laurent's. Strange fired fifty-nine rounds from his three guns in the first half-hour; twenty-seven of these were hot shot, and the two steamers (one of which was badly damaged, having been hulled seven or eight times) disappeared out of sight round a point of land.

During this time the Russians had fired some 240 rounds at the three guns, but no casualties occurred on our side. A handspike was broken, and a sight knocked out of a gunner's hand. The French were spared further annoyance, for the steamers never again appeared.

Some dissatisfaction was expressed because the steamers were not destroyed—either burned, blown up, or sunk. There were many critics looking on, and the author of "Letters from Headquarters"² writes, "I thought our practice indifferent, but the officers of artillery would

¹ "Artillery Operations," pp. 57 etc.

² See vol. ii. pp. 136 etc.

not allow that such was the case, as, from the fact of our battery being on such high ground, the fire from thence was naturally plunging, and consequently the object was much more difficult to strike than if they had been able to make their shot ricochet on the water. Some of the officers of the Naval Brigade declared that with their gunners they would have struck the vessel oftener."

In consequence of remarks such as these, Colonel Warde, commanding the Siege Train, addressed the officer commanding Artillery as follows :

"CAMP BEFORE SEBASTOPOL,
"SIEGE TRAIN OFFICE,
"6th March 1855.

"SIR,—You will have received in due course this morning my official report of the practice, carried on by Major Strange from the Lighthouse Battery, against the two Russian steamers lying at the head of the Harbour.

"Under ordinary circumstances I should not have considered it necessary to trouble you further upon this subject; but as I have heard to-day in various quarters that the practice is stated to have been very indifferent, and as I have further heard that his Lordship, the Commander-in-Chief, has expressed dissatisfaction at the result, I have the honour to request that you will be pleased to submit this statement for his Lordship's information, in the hope that he will be disposed to place more confidence in it than in any other information he may have received from people less capable of forming a correct judgment upon the subject, and wholly unacquainted with the difficulties under which the practice was conducted.

"In the first place, the range was at the commencement about 1,800 yards, and, from the height of the battery above the small object fired at, was of a very plunging nature.¹

"Secondly, the tangent scales were not adapted for the length of range.

"Thirdly, after the fourth round (which struck the ship) the object fired at was a moving one.

"Notwithstanding the above-mentioned drawbacks, the vessel² was hulled seven or eight times; her larboard paddle was so damaged as to be useless, and she had been so injured that she was seen this afternoon by Major Gordon, Royal Engineers, careened over for the purpose of repairing damages.

"I beg, therefore, to submit that the object for which the practice was ordered has been most fully attained; the steamers have been obliged to withdraw, thereby removing all annoyance from their presence, and one of them, the nearest, has been seriously damaged.

"Under these circumstances, I consider that the practice has been highly satisfactory.

¹ The battery was between 400 and 500 ft. above the sea, and at the range of a mile the 32-pounder shot would strike the water at an angle of 13 to 15 degrees.

² One steamer was apparently not fired at after the first two or three rounds; she was the more distant of the two and lay close to a place of safety, round the Point at Careening Bay.

"I would call attention to the fact that H.M.S. *Agamemnon* was for six hours (during which time she remained stationary) exposed to the fire of one of the heaviest batteries in Sebastopol; notwithstanding which, she was enabled to steam away comparatively uninjured.¹

"I trust that, taking these circumstances into consideration, his Lordship, the Commander-in-Chief, may be induced to form a more favourable opinion on the subject, and that he will be satisfied that every exertion was used on the part of both officers and men through the previous night, and during the practice, to carry out his wishes.

"I have, etc.,

"(Signed) E. C. WARDE,

"Lieutenant-Colonel Royal Artillery

"Commanding Siege Train."

"LIEUTENANT-COLONEL DACRES,

"Commanding Royal Artillery."

The above episode is quoted here *in extenso*, as it throws an interesting light on the gunnery ideas of the day and other matters.

APPENDIX No. 2

STATISTICS CONNECTED WITH THE NUMBERS OF SICK IN THE BRITISH ARMY DURING THE WINTER 1854-1855

I. FROM MORNING STATES ²

Date.	Present under Arms. All ranks.	Sick. Exclusive of Officers.
October 1, 1854 . . .	24,127	6,713
November 3, 1854 . . .	23,310	7,116
November 14, 1854 . . .	21,623	8,316
February 1, 1855 . . .	19,219	18,028

II. NUMBERS OF MEN SICK DURING THE MONTHS APRIL, 1854, TO FEBRUARY, 1855³

Date.	Total Sick and Wounded of all Arms during each Month.
April, 1854	503
May, 1854	1,835
June, 1854	3,498
July, 1854	6,937
August, 1854	11,236
September, 1854	11,693
October, 1854	11,988
November, 1854	16,846
December, 1854	19,479
January, 1855	23,076
To February, 20, 1855	16,964

¹ This refers to the naval attack made by the allied fleets on October 17.

² "Letters from Headquarters" under dates concerned, and "R E Journal," ii. p. 27.

³ Sayer, pp. 424, 430.

III. NUMBERS OF ALL RANKS IN VARIOUS HOSPITALS AT SPECIFIED DATES IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1855¹

Hospital.	Date.	Officers.	Men.
Crimea	Feb. 10	69	4,945
Scutari	" 18	76	4,984
Varna	Jan. 20	1	32
Abydos	Feb. 18	..	264
Gallipoli	"	..	54
Smyrna	"	..	500
		146	10,779
Total		10,925	

IV. AVERAGE STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH ARMY, WINTER 1854-1855²

	Nov. 1854.	Dec. 1854.	Jan. 1855.	Feb. 1855.	March 1855.
Cavalry Division . . .	1,952	1,758	2,087	2,065	2,135
1st Division	5,511	5,692	5,909	5,197	4,550
2nd "	4,389	4,794	4,545	4,468	4,985
3rd "	1,830	4,650	5,056	5,923	6,650
4th "	5,100	5,200	4,412	3,900	4,010
Light Division	4,385	5,174	5,196	5,090	5,688
Siege Train	1,022	977	1,428	1,088	1,700

APPENDIX No. 3

THE FIELD ARMIES OF THE ALLIES

THE organisation of the British Army remained unaltered after Inkerman, but the Highland Brigade was gradually reinforced. In addition to drafts, etc., the following reinforcements arrived

During November.—The 9th Foot, 46th Foot, 62nd Foot, and 97th Foot.

" December.—The 17th Foot, 18th Foot, 34th Foot, part of 71st Foot, 69th Foot, 90th Foot, and 92nd Foot.

" January.—The 39th Foot.

" February.—The 14th Foot and remainder of 71st Foot.

The strength of the Army, etc., is shown in the Morning State³ following of February 1, 1855 (see p. 338).

¹ Sayer, pp. 424, 430.

² *Ibid.*

³ "R.E. Journal," ii. p. 27.

Corps.	Under Arms.				Battalions and Otherwise Employed.			On Command.			Sick.			General Total Exclusive of Officers.						
	Field Officers.			Staff.	Sergeants		Trumpeters and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Sergeants.		Trumpeters and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Absent.							
	Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.		Sergeants.	Trumpeters and Drummers.			Rank and File.	Sergeants.			Trumpeters and Drummers.		Rank and File.					
Cavalry Artillery and Sappers and Miners Infantry .	15	28	38	43	110	26	838	47	..	267	20	2	227	10	2	180	23	6	548	2,306
	11	19	75	23	153	45	2,551	1	1	129	15	5	206	3	4	452	28	4	672	4,269
	94	265	376	211	1,034	459	12,805	280	15	4,688	144	15	2,052	196	48	4,876	455	108	10,413	37,588
	120	312	489	277	1,297	530	16,194	328	16	5,084	179	22	2,485	209	54	5,508	506	118	11,633	44,163
	1,198				18,021			5,428			2,686			5,771			12,257			18,028

MORNING STATE, February 1, 1855.

FRENCH ARMY,¹ FEBRUARY, 1855

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: GENERAL CANROBERT

Head-quarter Staff and Services.—186 officers and 2,118 under-officers and men.

FIRST CORPS: GENERAL PÉLISSIER

First Division.—General Forey ; Brigadiers Niol and d'Aurelle.

Second Division.—General Le Vaillant ; Brigadiers de la Motterouge and Couston.

Third Division.—General Paté ; Brigadiers Beuret and Bazaine.

Fourth Division.—General de Salles ; Brigadiers Fauchaux and Duval. With each division two batteries of artillery and a company of engineers.

SECOND CORPS: GENERAL BOSQUET

First Division.—General Bouat ; Brigadiers Espinasse and Vinoy.

Second Division.—General Camou ; Brigadiers d'Autemarre and Vergé.

Third Division.—General Mayran ; Brigadiers de Monet and de Faily.

Fourth Division.—General Dulac ; Brigadiers de Bonsingeu and Bisson.

With each division one company and two batteries of artillery, except Dulac's, which had no artillery.

Cavalry Division.—General Morris.

Two brigades and two batteries of artillery.

Reserves of Artillery, Siege Parks, etc.

Total effective, February 10 (including Army of Reserve in process of formation): 2,497 officers and 63,891 under-officers and men.

TURKISH ARMY

The Turkish Army was now under Omer Pasha, who transported a strong force from Varna to Eupatoria. The Turkish forces landed in the Crimea by the end of January amounted to some 50,000 men.

¹ Niel, pp. 468 etc.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SECOND, THIRD, AND FOURTH
BOMBARDMENTS1. THE SECOND BOMBARDMENT, AND ITS GENERAL
RESULTS

Easter in Sebastopol.—April 8 fell upon Easter Sunday,¹ a day held especially holy by the Greek Church, and, all unconscious of the impending storm, the inhabitants of the beleaguered city, from Governor to simple soldier, observed the sacred festival with the usual solemn services of the Church and the usual popular merrymakings and rejoicings. Nor were these confined to the city, for during the day might be seen, in the bastions and redoubts of the fortified enceinte, women and children who came to give the Easter kiss to their husbands and fathers, and carry them the Paschal food that had been blessed by the priests. The batteries had assumed their Sunday appearance, the paths were swept and sanded, the gun carriages and platforms washed and scrubbed, the soldiers were in new uniforms, and the day was passed in dancing and singing and listening to military bands. The straggling shots (fired during the

¹ In 1855 Easter Sunday fell on the same day both in the Greek Calendar and in that generally adopted by other nations.

day from our Right Attack against the Mamelon Lunette) in no way affected the equanimity of the light-hearted crowds in Sebastopol, who retired to rest in hopes of passing the second day of the festival as safely and joyously as the first. But they were rudely aroused by the thunder of four hundred guns.¹

Opening of Fire.—The morning of April 9, following a night of drenching rain, broke in thick fog and drizzling mist, and heavy clouds hanging over the Russian works obscured them for a time from the view of the Allies; but shortly after half-past five o'clock the outlines of the Redan and Malakoff were perceived, and the first British gun opened fire, speedily followed by a hundred others in our Left and Right Attacks. In a little while the French also came into action with over three hundred guns, and the fire of the Allies blazed round Sebastopol from the sea to the Inkerman Ridge.

Completely taken by surprise, it was six o'clock before the Russians returned a continuous fire, and then not from all their guns. Heavy rain began to fall, and a southerly wind carried dense clouds over the town; but towards evening the prospect became clearer, and it then appeared to observers in our lines that considerable damage had been inflicted on the defences. The comparative slowness of the Russian fire—about one shot to our three—led to the belief that their guns were mastered. As a matter of fact, a breach had been made in the indented wall, north of the Central Bastion. This work and its adjacent defences were silenced; the

¹ Todleben, ii. pp. 104 etc.

Flagstaff Bastion was smothered with débris, some of its guns being dismounted; and the Mamelon Lunette and the White Works were brought to a state of complete ruin. But in the Russian centre little damage had been done, and the slowness of fire noticed by our people was due more to scarcity of powder than to the effect of our guns. During the night of the 9th the Russians worked hard, in spite of the mortar fire to which they were subjected; parapets and embrasures were repaired, new guns were mounted, and next morning so formidable a front was presented, that an assault did not appear feasible and the Council of War determined to continue the bombardment.

Meagre Results.—On the morning of the 10th the Allies reopened their fire and the Russians replied as before, but when evening came disaster was hanging over them on both flanks. On the Russian left the French guns again reduced the White Works to such a state that they must have fallen before an assault, and their loss would have entailed the evacuation of the Mamelon Lunette;¹ and on the Russian right fortune offered the Allies a far greater prize, for, aided by the guns of our Left Attack, the French artillery had completely overpowered the Flagstaff Bastion where only two guns remained in action. This work, if assaulted on April 10, must, in the opinion of Todleben, have fallen and, its fall might have brought the siege to an end.²

¹ "La ruine des redoutes devait nécessairement entraîner la chute de la lunette Kamchatka" (Todleben, ii. p. 182).

² Todleben, ii. cp. xxix. *passim*: e.g. "Les Français auraient pu,

General Canrobert, however, refused to sanction an assault on either flank. Days went on and the bombardment was continued, but the saps advancing slowly on the French right showed plainly that neither the White Works nor the Lunette were at present in danger of the bayonet; while the Flagstaff Bastion hung like a ripe fruit ready to fall at a touch—its embrasures and merlons destroyed and its salient, only 80 yards from the French trenches, in a state of ruin. Councils of War met and met again with the same result; General Niel was always present, and was always able to ensure delay;¹ and under his influence, and in spite of the open discontent of his gallant soldiery, Canrobert persistently held his hand. Finally, at a Council that met on the 16th, it was determined to bring more guns to the trenches before undertaking a general assault, which was now postponed till April 28. On the 17th firing was restricted and the second bombardment came to an end—a sufficient proof of vacillation and want of purpose.²

avec une entière assurance de succès, monter à l'assaut de ce bastion " (p. 182).

"La chute des bastions Nos. 4 et 5, qui commandaient la ville entière, eût nécessairement rendu impossible toute défense ultérieure de Sebastopol" (*ibid.*, p. 186).

¹ Extracts from General Niel's correspondence will be found in Rousset, *passim*. For example, on April 16 he wrote to the French War Minister as follows: "Je crois qu'on va marquer le pas, et je ne sais quand on repartira. Je vais tâcher de détourner les généraux en chef d'une tentative aussi dangereuse qu'inutile, qui, j'espère, sera abandonnée," etc., etc. (Rousset, ii. pp. 145 etc.).

² "Il y avait eu des conseils de guerre le 8, le 12, le 14, le 16 avril, et chaque fois il en était résulté moins de décision, moins de hâte. L'assaut que tout le monde avait attendu, redouté dans Sebastopol, espéré au dehors, l'assaut reculait toujours. Les Russes étaient surpris

During this bombardment the British lost 265 men killed and wounded, the French 1,585, and the Russians 6,130¹—for the most part from artillery fire.

2. THE PART PLAYED BY THE BRITISH IN THE SECOND BOMBARDMENT

Comparative Impotence of the British.—The relative strength of the two armies had placed the French in the position of the predominant partner, and during those precious days when General Canrobert was letting his chances slip, the British Commander was obliged to possess his soul in patience; he could do nothing more than express his willingness to undertake his portion of the enterprise by attacking the Redan. In a word, Great Britain had no longer a weight equal to that of France in the Councils of the Allies.

Work Done by British Guns.—As the British guns were less numerous than those of our allies, and as those portions of the Russian defences which suffered most during the bombardment were directly opposite to the French siege batteries, it might therefore appear at first sight that the British contribution to the general result was small. But it is to be remembered that the British guns held the central position whence, although exposed to a cross fire from the principal Russian works, they were able to support (and did support) the French on both flanks; and that

et joyeux, les Anglais mécontents, les Français pour le moins étonnés" (Rousset, ii. p. 145).

¹ Rousset ii. p. 144.

their superior weight of metal and shell power were a substantial compensation for their comparative numerical inferiority. The British batteries were disposed as shown in the following table :

TABLE XLI¹
DETAIL OF BRITISH BATTERIES
LEFT ATTACK

Mortar Battery (unnumbered)	4 13-in. Mortars.
No. 1 Mortar Battery . . .	2 13-in. Mortars.
No. 1 Gun Battery . . .	2 8-in. Guns, 10 24-pr. Guns.
No. 2 Gun Battery . . .	2 8-in. Guns, 8 32-pr. Guns.
No. 2 Mortar Battery . . .	4 13-in. Mortars.
No. 3 Gun Battery . . .	6 32-pr. Guns, 2 8-in. Guns, 1 Lancaster Gun of 95 cwt., 2 24-pr. Guns.
No. 3 Mortar Battery . . .	4 10-in. Mortars.
No. 4 Gun Battery . . .	3 24-pr. Guns, 3 32-pr. Guns.
No. 5 Gun Battery . . .	1 Lancaster Gun of 95 cwt., 1 68-pr. Gun.
No. 6 Picket House Battery . . .	1 24-pr. Gun, 2 32-pr. Guns, 3 10-in. Mortars.
No. 7 Gun Battery . . .	5 32-pr. Guns.
No. 8 Gun Battery . . .	6 32-pr. Guns.
Total pieces Left Attack	72

RIGHT ATTACK

No. 1 Battery . . .	1 24-pr. Gun, 1 68-pr. Gun.
No. 2 Battery . . .	1 13-in. Mortar, 1 10-in. Mortar.
No. 3 Battery . . .	1 68-pr. Gun, 2 24-pr. Guns, 2 32-pr. Guns.
No. 4 Battery . . .	5 32-pr. Guns, 1 68-pr. Gun.
No. 5 Battery . . .	1 68-pr. Gun, 6 32-pr. Guns, 1 8-in. Gun, 2 24-pr. Guns.
No. 6 Battery . . .	1 13-in. Mortar, 2 10-in. Mortars.
No. 7 Battery . . .	2 10-in. Mortars.
No. 8 Battery . . .	3 10-in. Mortars.
No. 9 Battery . . .	8 8-in. Guns.
No. 10 Battery . . .	3 13-in. Mortars.
No. 11 Battery . . .	3 13-in. Mortars.

¹ This table exhibits the British ordnance mounted in battery on April 14, and is based on Adye's Order Book. It will be noticed that in the Left Attack, gun and mortar batteries are separately numbered, while in the Right Attack they are on one list.

RIGHT ATTACK (*continued*)

No. 12 Battery . . .	1 13-in. Mortar.
No. 13 Battery . . .	3 10-in. Mortars.
Parallels . . .	3 5½-in. Mortars,* 2 9-pr. Guns.*
St. Laurent's Battery . . .	7 32-pr. Guns.
"Picket House Hill"¹ . . .	2 S.S. Mortars.

Total pieces Right Attack	63
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Total British pieces	<u>135</u>
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* Not included in Right Attack total.

Difficulties Encountered.—The above pieces were not all mounted in battery on the morning of April 9, and General Dacres asked in vain for forty-eight hours' delay in opening fire. The ground was soft and greasy, and great difficulty was found in getting the 13-in. mortars into the new batteries and arming the advanced batteries of the Left Attack (Nos. 7 and 8), which were some 900 yds. in advance of the first parallel. The men worked all night in the heavy rain, but the wet tackles would not run in the blocks and in the mud there was no purchase for the handspikes. By morning only some 100 guns were ready to open fire. At 4 a.m. the first relief was in the trenches, and many of the men who composed it had been on fatigue duty the previous day from 6 p.m. till midnight. When fire opened the weather began to tell severely on the gunners, as it greatly increased their labours. The mortar platforms became so slippery that it was

¹ This is the name used in "Artillery Operations" for the mortar battery made north of the Picket House on the Woronzoff Road (see p. 329). No mention is made, however, of these mortars in Adye's Order Book under the date April 15, and they do not appear to have expended any ammunition on that day. They were occasionally manned by officers and men of the field batteries.

hardly possible to lay the pieces, until sawdust and iron-shod handspikes had been obtained from the engineers. In spite of all difficulties a brisk fire was kept up by guns and mortars till dusk, after which time it was continued by the mortars only.

The effective strength of the Siege Train was some 1,800 (all ranks), and the number present in the batteries when the bombardment began amounted to 1,200.¹ Since the afternoon of the 8th work had been carried on in two reliefs, and both officers and men were becoming exhausted. They were continually wet; their feet were so swollen by constant standing in, and walking to and from, the batteries, that many of the men were afraid to take their boots off lest they should not be able to get them on again.² Many were fitter for the hospital than for duty, yet comparatively few gave way and, shorthanded as they were, they carried on their work with a patient heroism deserving of all praise.³ The remaining pieces were now nearly ready to come into action, but men could not be found to work them. The much-needed reinforcements for the Siege Train had not yet arrived, and

¹ Adye's Order Book.

² See "Artillery Operations," p. 78. The field batteries on the Plateau gave what help they could, but not many men could well be spared from their own duties.

³ "It has always been a matter of regret to me," writes Sir Evelyn Wood, "that no one has adequately recorded the patient heroism of the siege train companies. They saw their comrades of the cavalry and infantry decorated with clasps which betokened only a small part of the dangers they incurred for months, and if clasps had been given equally in the service for dangers braved, a gunner who served throughout in the trenches should have had five" ("The Crimea in 1854 and 1894").

Lord Raglan was obliged to ask for further help from the Royal Navy. This was at once freely given, and from April 11 sailors manned some fifty of our siege guns, the remainder (including all the mortars) being manned by gunners.

The Advanced Batteries of the Left Attack.—Amongst the pieces not yet mounted was the armament of the two advanced batteries, Nos. 7 and 8, of the Left Attack. On the night of the 10th an attempt was made to arm No. 7 Battery, and the guns were brought on travelling-carriages to the rear of the first parallel where they were met by a large fatigue party of the line; but such was the state of the ground that only one gun could be got into position. The others were left behind the second parallel, the drag-ropes having snapped while in use. Next night, however, by most strenuous exertions, four 32-pounder guns were got into position by a fatigue party under the orders of Second Captain C. E. Oldershaw, and at 1 a.m. on the 12th these guns were manned by detachments under Second-Captain W. W. A. Lukin and Lieutenant W. J. Hall. No. 7 Battery and its companion, No. 8, unlike the majority of our batteries, were placed upon comparatively low ground and were commanded by many of the opposing works, which, in their advanced position, rendered the service of their guns unusually dangerous. Captain Oldfield, therefore, who commanded the Left Attack, ordered Captain Lukin not to open fire until mantlets had been put up by the engineers. This work was not finished till 4 p.m., when twenty-seven rounds were fired at

the Garden Batteries. Although this fire drew the enemy's attention, little damage was done to No. 7. On the 13th, No. 7, manned by a detachment under Second-Captain Oldershaw and Lieutenant W. H. R. Simpson, opened fire in company with the other British batteries, and soon became a target for the concentrated fire of many Russian guns. The duel, although an unequal one, was maintained with decided success against the Garden and Boulevard Batteries. About 11 a.m., after a hot contest of five hours, during which 240 round shot were fired at an average range of 1,170 yards, the battery was compelled to cease fire. The embrasures, magazine, and the battery generally, were much cut up, and Oldershaw's company, No. 7, 12th Battalion, lost 1 man killed, and had 6 wounded.¹

During the night No. 7 Battery was fully repaired, an additional 32-pounder gun was mounted in it and six others were got into No. 8 Battery. Both works opened fire on the morning of the 14th—No. 7 under Captain Charles Henry, and No. 8 under Second-Captain C. E. Walcott and Lieutenant C. E. Torriano. The Russians at once concentrated a number of guns upon these batteries, the Redan, at a range of some 750 yds., proving a most formidable antagonist to No. 8, where the muzzles were knocked off two of the guns during the first half-hour of firing. But both batteries were steadily fought until the arrival

¹ The total casualties in the Left Attack on this day were 2 sergeants and 1 gunner killed and 7 men wounded. Sergeant Devine, of Captain Oldershaw's battery, showed conspicuous gallantry and was afterwards decorated with the 5th Class of the Légion d'Honneur. Sergeant J. M. McPherson received the French Military Medal.

of the 3 p.m. reliefs under Second-Captains P. Dickson and Lukin, with Lieutenants W. Briscoe and N. Harris. As the day wore on the Russians did not relax their exertions, and soon after the arrival of the reliefs a third gun was disabled in No. 8, at the moment when Harris was in the act of laying it. Nevertheless both batteries kept up their fire till darkness set in. No. 7 Battery fired 864, and No. 8 Battery 445, round shot during the day, but they did not open fire again during the bombardment. The casualties of the Left Attack on April 14 were 4 men killed and 1 officer, and 19 men wounded.

The gallant fight maintained by these advanced batteries on the 13th and 14th was duly acknowledged as follows :

“ CAMP BEFORE SEBASTOPOL,

“ *28th April, 1855.*

“ The Brigadier Commanding has great pleasure in publishing to the Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and men of the Royal Artillery, the following Remarks made by Field-Marshal Lord Raglan on the conduct of Captains Henry and Walcott, and the Officers and men under their command, whilst manning the guns in No. 7 and No. 8 Batteries, Left Attack, on the mornings of the 13th and 14th April :

“ ‘ Colonel Dacres will be so good as to communicate to Captains Henry and Walcott, and express to them not only my approbation of their conduct, and that of the Officers and men under them, but my warmest thanks for their gallantry and steady perseverance in discharge of their duty.

“ ‘ (Signed) RAGLAN.

“ ‘ *15th April, 1855.*’

"The following are the names of the Officers referred to :

"Captain Oldershaw. Lieutenant Simpson.

„ P. Dickson. „ Torriano.

„ Lukin. „ Harris.

„ Briscoe.

"By Order, (Signed) JOHN ADYE,

"Lieutenant-Colonel, A.A.General."¹

Two days later Lord Raglan embodied the same remarks in a despatch to the Secretary of State.

No. 9 Battery, Right Attack.—On the 14th the Right Attack employed all its pieces, except three mortars, and for the first time during the bombardment No. 9 Battery was manned. It was within 450 yds.' distance from some Russian rifle-pits, and in order to screen the gunners Colonel Collingwood Dickson devised makeshift mantlets of bullock-hides stuffed with hay. They were, however, soon laid

¹ The account of these two days in the Left Attack given in the text follows closely "An Episode of the Siege of Sebastopol," by Colonel F. A. Whinyates, R.A.I. "Proceedings," vol. xxiv. No. 10, which was written by him after much correspondence with brother officers who had served in the Crimea. "Observations on Mr. Kinglake's Account of the Bombardment of Sebastopol," R.A.I. "Proceedings," . . . p. 527, by the same author, has also been consulted. Adye's Order Book gives the casualties, etc.

It seems a pity that Second-Captain Oldershaw's name was not included in Lord Raglan's Memorandum, as he was the only officer commanding in No. 7 on the 13th, and No. 8 on that day was not manned. On the 14th Second-Captain Lukin and Second-Captain P. Dickson relieved Second-Captain Walcott and Captain C. Henry at 3 p.m., and apparently all five officers exercised similar functions and were deserving of similar praise.

For his conduct in No. 8 Battery on this occasion Sergeant R. Perkins received the French Military Medal.

aside, for by using short fuses, so that their 8-in. common shell burst over the Russian pits, our gunners rapidly drove the enemy from their lurking-places. Two days later No. 9 Battery was the scene of a notable episode. Its magazine, made by the French engineers (see page 317), was not of that solid construction employed in our service, and on the day in question a shell fell on it and blew it up, killing one man and wounding five others. A large crater was formed, the parapet was partially knocked down, and all the guns but one were buried in débris. The Russians manned their parapets and cheered, and a concentrated fire was opened on No. 9 Battery; but its remaining gun was at once turned upon the enemy, and was fought with grim determination. The officers in the battery at the time were Captain M. C. Dixon and Lieutenant C. H. Owen. The senior officer received the Victoria Cross.

There is nothing further to chronicle in this bombardment so far as the British are concerned.¹

Casualties.—The casualties that occurred in the British batteries during the second bombardment are shown in the table on page 353.

The artillery officers killed were Lieutenant E. Luce, 7th Company, 5th Battalion, on April 11, and Lieutenant R. A. Mitchell, 6th Company, 11th Battalion, on April 14. Luce was struck by a round

¹ "The second bombardment of Sebastopol was at an end, without any decisive result. After eight days' incessant firing with some of the heaviest guns and mortars ever used at a siege, served with admirable precision, and with an extreme expenditure of ammunition, we had yet failed to silence the enemy's fire or destroy his works" ("Artillery Operations," p. 87).

shot in both legs and died two hours after his removal to camp. Mitchell was killed by a round shot from the Redan, which, after passing through the crest of the epaulement of No. 9 Battery, fractured the base of his skull.

The artillery officers wounded were Lieutenant J. Sinclair, severely (Right Attack, April 10), Lieutenant P. W. L'Estrange (Right Attack, April 13), and Assistant-Surgeon R. W. Cockerill (Left Attack, April 14).

The naval officers killed were Lieutenant Twyford (April 9) and Lieutenant H. W. Douglas (April 12).

TABLE XLII
CASUALTIES

	Officers.		N.C. (or Petty), Officers and Men.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Royal Artillery, Right Attack .	2	2	6	34
„ „ Left Attack .	..	1	12	34
„ „ Total .	2	3	18	68
Naval Brigade . . .	2	4	24	92
Grand Total . . .	4	7	42	160

Total casualties, 213.

Twenty-six pieces of British ordnance were disabled. The guns fired 37,413 rounds, the mortars 10,441 rounds; total, 47,854 rounds.¹

3. THE CHANGE IN THE FRENCH COMMAND

Napoleon III.—Whilst the second bombardment of Sebastopol was in progress, the Emperor Napoleon visited England and caused no small consternation

¹ "Artillery Operations," p. 205.

when he broached the idea of proceeding himself to the seat of war. His Army of Reserve was ready at Constantinople, and the time had come to disclose his plans fully. In view of possible serious complications, it was fortunate that other considerations induced him eventually to abandon his purpose of personally taking the field. He still, however, favoured, and was prepared to carry out, field operations on a large scale. To these proposals the British Government did not show themselves altogether averse, seeing that the Allies were daily increasing in strength and that the King of Sardinia had joined the coalition against Russia.

The Assault again Deferred.—On April 25 the French Admiral was ordered by a telegram ¹ from Paris to assemble all available means for transporting the Army of Reserve to the Crimea; and General Canrobert at once informed Lord Raglan that, in view of the large reinforcements about to arrive, he would defer the assault fixed for the 28th. This did not meet the views of the British Commander, who saw the potential difficulty of his task increased daily by the growing Russian counter approaches in front of the Redan.² On the other hand Lord Raglan was grati-

¹ It was at this period that the Crimea was placed for the first time in electric communication with London and Paris.

² On May 10 General Sir Harry Jones wrote a memorandum for Lord Raglan, in which he says, "The works which have been thrown up in front of the English Right Attack since April 23 have so materially altered the relative strength of the two positions that the ground in front of the English, which was nearly unoccupied on April 23, is now studded with strong rifle-screens, connected with each other by trenches of communication, and also with the place. The Quarries in front of the Redan have now assumed a formidable appearance" ("R.E. Journal," ii. p. 218).

fied by the French at last consenting to a joint expedition against Kertch.

Kertch.—This town was a port in the sea of Azof, and was connected with Simferopol by a good road, along which supplies for Sebastopol were constantly passing. As it lay open to attack from the sea, the British were specially anxious to proceed against it. On May 3 a joint expedition sailed for Kertch; but the same night a telegram from Paris informed General Canrobert that, as soon as the Army of Reserve reached the Crimea, field operations were to begin. He at once despatched a swift steamer to recall the French portion of the Kertch expedition; and Lord Raglan, to his extreme chagrin, had to agree to the temporary postponement of the enterprise.

Resignation of General Canrobert.—In the middle of May an officer arrived from Paris with full instructions concerning the field operations, in which it was proposed Lord Raglan's army should take part; but the plan entailed the guarding of the British trenches by a Franco-Turkish force, and neither Omer Pasha nor Canrobert saw their way to undertake this charge. A crisis thus arose, and the French Commander, feeling himself unable to cope with the difficulties of his position, requested permission to resign his command and revert to his former post as a General of Division. His request was immediately granted, and General Pélissier was appointed to succeed him and assumed the command of the French Army on May 17.¹

¹ The Chief French Engineer, General Bizot, was killed during the second bombardment. Early in May, General Niel was appointed to succeed him.

General Pélissier.—The new Commander-in-Chief was a man of strong and determined character. "Pélissier," said Marshal Vaillant, the French War Minister, "will lose 14,000 men for a great result; whilst Canrobert would lose the same number by dribblets without obtaining an advantage." "If there was an insurrection," said another French General, Changarnier, "I would not hesitate to burn one of the quarters of Paris; Pélissier would not shrink from burning the whole."¹ When still in a subordinate position he had given a display of energy, which at the time was uncommon in the French operations. The Russians made a strong lodgment in front of the Schwartz Redoubt in the middle of April, and from this lodgment Pélissier drove them on May 1 with a (Russian) loss of 900 men. The French immediately converted the lodgment to their own uses; but as its capture cost them 600 men, Canrobert sent an apologetic report on it to his Government.²

His View of the Situation.—There was now an end of vacillation at the Council Board. General Niel's remonstrances were contemptuously brushed aside; nay, even the avowed wishes of the Emperor Napoleon carried little or no weight with the new Commander,³ who was strongly of opinion that if the Allies relinquished their ever-tightening grip upon Sebastopol, in order to undertake field operations,

¹ "War in the Crimea," p. 231.

² Rousset, ii. p. 167.

³ See Kinglake, viii. pp. 27 etc., where he quotes from French authorities and despatches.

they would run the risk of losing the reward of their long labours. The strength of Russia in the Crimea was on the wane; it was known that during the past month the garrison had lost over 10,000 men, and that the total Russian force could not exceed 100,000 men, whilst the troops of the four nations mustered 188,000.¹ Pélissier determined to press the siege.

His Resolute Action.—A fresh challenge on the part of the Russians at once displayed the mettle of the new French Commander. On the night of May 21, 2,400 Russian labourers were employed on two new counter approaches—the one at the head of Quarantine Bay, the other running parallel to the boundary of the Cemetery, to the west of the indented wall. The works were carried on under the protection of the guns of the fortress and 6,000 infantry, and when completed they would rake the trenches of the French Left Attack. On the night of the 22nd, Pélissier ordered a force of 6,000 infantry to attack these counter approaches. That at the head of Quarantine Bay was at once captured and held, but round the Cemetery lodgment there raged one of the fiercest conflicts of the war. The work was taken and retaken five times, but on the night of the 23rd the French were at last victorious, and succeeded in

¹ French (including Army of Reserve)	.	.	100,000
British	.	.	28,000
Sardinians	.	.	15,000
Turks	.	.	45,000
			<hr/>
Total	.	.	<u>188,000</u>

converting the lodgment into a new parallel confronting the fortress. Their loss was 1,724; that of the Russians, 2,569 killed and wounded.¹

The Kertch Expedition.—Pélissier at once repaired the blunder of recalling the Kertch expedition; for Canrobert's action not only jeopardised the mutual understanding that should exist between the allied Generals, but it threw away the chance of striking a serious blow against Russia. With the cordial agreement of Lord Raglan, a joint force again sailed for Kertch on May 22. Indeed, when Pélissier assumed command there was complete accord between him and the British Commander, and by common consent they determined to attack the Russian outworks—namely, the White Works, the Mamelon, and the lodgments and trenches at the Quarries.² Preparations were then made for a fresh bombardment, which was fixed to open on June 6.

4. PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE

The French Trenches.—With the exception of the conflicts already described, there was no serious fighting in the trenches of either the Left or Right French Attack until the third bombardment began. The French constructed many new batteries and gradually advanced their saps against the Mamelon

¹ Todleben, ii. pt. i., p. 246.

² In "Letters from Head-quarters," ii. pp. 287 etc., there is a description of the Council of War held early in June, when the attack on the outworks was agreed upon. General Pélissier would not brook any arguments put forward by his Staff, but clenched the matter by saying simply, "Lord Raglan and I have decided it."

Lunette and the White Works, while on the left their new lodgments were in close proximity to the Russian enceinte. Their siege guns were now increased to 385.

British Right Attack.—The British Attacks were also pushed forward, but not without active opposition on the part of the Russians. The most serious encounter took place on the night of April 19. Some Russian rifle-pits existed on the eastern edge of the Woronzoff Ravine, and barred the advance of our Right Attack. These were assaulted by our trench guards at nine on the night in question, the Russians were driven out, and the pits were converted into a lodgment under the orders of Colonel Tylden, R.E. But at 1 a.m. the Russians made a determined attempt to recapture the pits, which was successfully resisted by some of the 77th Regiment under the command of Colonel Egerton, who was killed, as was also another officer of his regiment. We lost in all 12 killed and 6 officers and 50 men wounded; but the pits were incorporated into the Right Attack, and were thereafter known as Egerton's Rifle Pits.¹ Two new batteries were finished in this Attack by June 6—No. 14, between Nos. 9 and 13, and No. 15, on the left of the second parallel.

British Left Attack.—In the Left Attack No. 9

¹ This was one of the many occasions upon which Lieutenant-Colonel R. Tylden, R.E., distinguished himself, as did also Captain H. C. C. Owen and Lieutenant C. E. S. Baynes of the same corps. Sergeant McDonald, Royal Sappers and Miners, was also noticeable for special zeal and gallantry. Colonel Egerton was the officer who had distinguished himself at Inkerman, and was a great loss to the Army. Captain A. Lemprière, the other officer of the 77th killed on this occasion, was also present at Inkerman.

Battery was completed; a new battery, No. 10, was made in front of the second parallel; No. 14, originally designed for 9-pounders, was converted to take 32-pounders; and other new batteries were No. 12, on the right of No. 9, and No. 13, between Nos. 7 and 8. A trench also was made some 300 yds. in front of the advanced batteries, and converted into a fourth parallel.

The only serious fighting in the Left Attack occurred on the night of May 12, when the Russians made a vigorous sortie and penetrated into No. 8 Battery. During their attack the bronze 5½-in. mortars, on the left of No. 7 Battery, gave considerable assistance by throwing light balls, and Captain P. Dickson, in No 8 Battery, fired several rounds from his flank gun; but it became necessary to withdraw the gunners from No. 8, who spiked four guns before they left. After half an hour's conflict, however, the trench guards succeeded in driving back the enemy. Captain R. L. Edwards, of the 63rd Regiment, and 5 men were killed, and we had about 30 wounded.¹

The Siege Train.—For a few days after the conclusion of the second bombardment our guns were occasionally busy, and the expenditure of ammunition rose and fell in sympathy with the ever-changing counsels of the Allies; but during the whole of May, except for a weak mortar fire, our batteries were practically silent, and all efforts were devoted to replacing damaged, and bringing up new, ordnance, in which work the greatest assistance was obtained

¹ "Artillery Operations," p. 98, and "R.E. Journal," ii. p. 211.

from the railway.¹ All the 24-pounder guns (with the exception of two) were dismantled, and their places taken by 32-pounders, and an increase was made in the number of mortars. The two Attacks now mounted 159 pieces.

Reinforcements.—The following reinforcements joined the Siege Train and were posted as shown below:

TABLE XLIII
REINFORCEMENTS

Date of Arrival.	Designation.	Commanding Officer.	Strength.		Posted to.
			Officers	Men.	
May 14	No. 5 Company, 4th Battalion (part only)	Capt. G. H. L. Milman	3	64	L. Attk.
May 25	No. 8 Company, 6th Battalion	Capt. F. W. Hastings	3	121	L. Attk.

On June 5 the Right Attack was reinforced by 50 Royal Marines, under Captain G. G. Alexander and Lieutenant H. T. Tull, who came as volunteers from the Balaclava defences. They were subsequently attached to the Left Attack.

● Colonel Collingwood Dickson, detached with the Kertch Expedition, was succeeded by Captain H. A. B. Campbell in command of the Right Attack; and Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Franklyn, from England, assumed command of the Left Attack as senior officer, Captain A. Oldfield being specially retained as second in command.

5. THE THIRD BOMBARDMENT

The Russian Forces.—On June 5 the Russians had 1,174 pieces of ordnance mounted on the south side of Sebastopol, of which 571 bore on the siege

¹ "19th April. The railway at this time was of the greatest service, giving us the very great assistance of forty wagons per diem" ("Artillery Operations," p. 93).

batteries, the remainder being used for flanking fire or interior defence. Each gun or licorne¹ had 140 rounds provided, and each mortar 60 rounds. On their left the Russians had constructed a new work, the Zabalkansky Battery, in rear of the existing White Works. They had strengthened the Mamelon Lunette, while their counter approaches, in front of the Redan, completely enclosed the Quarries. In addition to artillerymen and seamen gunners, they had on the south side of Sebastopol 36,000 infantry and some field guns.²

The Opposing Ordnance.—The united guns of the Allies were, as in April, less numerous than the Russian, but they still maintained their superiority in weight of metal and capacity for shell and vertical fire.

The following table shows the distribution of the opposing ordnance :³

TABLE XLIV
OPPOSING ORDNANCE

Position of Russian Pieces.	Number of Russian Pieces.	Number of Opposing Siege Pieces.	Distribution of Siege Pieces		
			French Batteries.	British Left Attack.	British Right Attack.
From the 7th to the 6th Bastion inclusive	62	59	59
From the Rostislav to the Schwartz Redoubt . . .	126	121	121
Flagstaff Bastion and its annexes; Town Ravine, Garden and Boulevard Batteries, and Jason Redoubt to Creek Battery	150	141	91	50	..
Creek Battery, Barrack Battery, Redan and its extensions	104	121	55	52	14
Malakoff, Mamelon, Little Redan, and White Works . .	129	102	59	..	43
Total	571	544	385	102	57

¹ A species of howitzer.

² Todleben, ii. pt. i., pp. 307, 315.

³ Todleben, ii. pt. i., p. 309.

The British Guns.—The British guns were still less numerous than the French, but their numerical inferiority was partly compensated by their shell power and capacity for vertical fire. The positions occupied by them were also very important in the coming conflict, in which some of the French pieces had but a secondary part to play, the principal fighting being confined to the Faubourg or Karabelnaya front.

They were grouped in batteries as follows :¹

TABLE XLV
DETAIL OF BRITISH BATTERIES
LEFT ATTACK

Battery.	Ordnance.	Manned by
Right Mortar Battery	4 13-in. Mortars .	R.A.
No. 1 Mortar Battery	2 13-in. Mortars .	R.A.
No. 1 Gun Battery	{ 4 8-in. Guns . . . }	R.A.
	{ 2 10-in. Guns . . . }	
	{ 5 32-pr. Guns . . . }	
No. 2 Gun Battery	{ 2 8-in. Guns . . . }	R.N.
	{ 8 32-pr. Guns . . . }	
No. 3 Gun Battery	{ 6 32-pr. Guns . . . }	R.N.
	{ 1 10-in. Gun . . . }	
No. 4 Gun Battery	{ 1 8-in. Gun . . . }	R.N.
	{ 6 32-pr. Guns . . . }	
	{ 2 24-pr. Guns . . . }	
No. 5 Gun Battery	Not armed . . .	
No. 6 Gun Battery	{ 3 32-pr. Guns . . . }	R.A.
	{ 3 10-in. Mortars . . }	
No. 7 Gun Battery	6 32-pr. Guns . .	R.A.
No. 8 Gun Battery	{ 3 8-in. Guns . . . }	R.A.
	{ 8 32-pr. Guns . . . }	
No. 9 Gun Battery	{ 1 68-pr. Gun . . . }	R.N.
	{ 1 10-in. Gun . . . }	
	{ 2 8-in. Guns . . . }	
No. 10 Gun Battery	7 8-in. Guns . .	R.N.
No. 11 Gun Battery	8 8-in. Guns . .	R.A.
No. 12 Mortar Battery	4 10-in. Mortars .	R.A.
No. 13 Mortar Battery	{ 4 10-in. Mortars . . }	R.A.
	{ 1 S.S. 13-in. Mortars }	
No. 2 Mortar Battery	4 13-in. Mortars .	R.A.
No. 3 Mortar Battery	4 13-in. Mortars .	R.A.

Total, Left Attack : 102 pieces.

¹ These figures are taken from Adye's Order Book.

RIGHT ATTACK

Battery.					Ordnance.	Manned by
No. 1 Battery	{ 1 10-in. Gun . 1 68-pr. Gun . }	R.N.
No. 2 Battery	{ 1 13-in. Mortar . 1 10-in. Mortar . 1 68-pr. Gun . }	R.A.
No. 3 Battery	{ 1 8-in. Gun . 3 32-pr. Guns . }	R.N.
No. 4 Battery	{ 2 8-in. Guns . 5 32-pr. Guns . 4 68-pr. Guns . }	R.N.
No. 5 Battery	{ 2 10-in. Guns . 2 13-in. S.S. Mortars . }	R.A.
No. 6 Battery	2 10-in. Mortars .	R.A.
No. 7 Battery	3 10-in. Mortars .	R.A.
No. 8 Battery	8 8-in. Guns .	R.A.
No. 9 Battery	3 13-in. Mortars .	R.A.
No. 10 Battery	3 13-in. Mortars .	R.A.
No. 11 Battery	{ 2 13-in. Mortars . 1 13-in. SS. Mortar . }	R.A.
No. 12 Battery	{ 1 10-in. Gun . 3 8-in. Guns . }	R.A.
No. 13 Battery	4 8-in. Guns .	R.A.
No. 14 Battery	3 13-in. Mortars .	R.A.
No. 15 Battery		

Total, Right Attack : 57 pieces.

Grand Total, Right and Left Attack : 159 pieces.

The First Day's Fire.—Under a bright and cloudless sky the third bombardment of Sebastopol began at 2.30 p.m. on June 6, and the opposing artilleries had for three hours contended with equal force when the Russian left flank showed signs of exhaustion. Under the fire of twenty-five French guns the Volhynie and Selinghinsk Redoubts were much damaged; but the Mamelon Lunette was the principal sufferer, for the heavy vertical fire to which it was subjected destroyed its embrasures, filled up its ditches, covered its guns with débris, and caused such loss to its *personnel* that, as evening came on, it was reduced to complete silence. The right face of the work, which fronted the guns of our Right

Attack, was cut down level with the banquette; and Todleben, while ascribing the miserable plight of the lunette partly to the fire of the French guns, avers that its crowning misfortunes were due to the British, which, if they fired slowly, fired with extreme accuracy.¹

In the main line of defence all the Russian works suffered more or less, notably the left faces of the Flagstaff Bastion and the Redan; but they all were able to display an obstinate resistance with the exception of the Malakoff, of which the right half had been so effectually battered by the British projectiles that it was almost reduced to silence.² As darkness came on, the mortars alone continued the contest. The Russians, as usual, laboured during the night repairing embrasures and mounting new ordnance where necessary; but with all their efforts the Mamelon Lunette was only partially restored.³


The Second Day.—Next morning the bombardment was resumed, especially against the portion of the Russian defences that stretched eastwards from the Flagstaff Bastion, the Redan, the Malakoff, Mamelon,

¹ "Quand le soir arriva, presque toutes les embrasures de la lunette Kamschatka . . . se trouvèrent démolies, le parapet de la face droite de cet ouvrage rasé à fleur de banquette, etc. . . . Mais le comble du dommage auquel cet ouvrage était exposé lui venait des batteries anglaises, qui savaient compenser la mesure un peu lente de leur feu par la précision remarquable de leur tir" (Todleben, ii. pt. i., pp. 311, 310).

² "La Malakow seul, dont la partie de droite avait été déplorablement labourée par les projectiles anglais, s'était vu forcé, vers le soir, de cesser presque entièrement le feu de ses batteries" (Todleben, ii. pt. i., p. 311).

³ "La lunette Kamschatka seule n'avait pu entièrement réparer ses dégâts, devant lesquels tous les efforts de ses défenseurs étaient restés insuffisants" (Todleben, ii. pt. i., p. 312).

and White Works being the principal points of attack. The last-named soon again gave way before the French guns; the Mamelon Lunette was silenced by the shell fire to which its defenders were subjected; and the Malakoff, after serving for two hours



THE RUSSIAN OUTWORKS, JUNE 6TH.

as a target for the British guns, was no longer able to afford it any support.¹ By 8 a.m. all Russian guns

¹ "La lunette Kamschatka se trouvant sous le coup d'une grêle de projectiles creux, essuya des avaries si graves qu'il arriva un moment où elle fut complètement réduite au silence.

"Le mamelon Malakow, après avoir été pendant deux heures consécutives en butte à une canonnade furieuse de la part des Anglais, se trouva lui-même affaibli au point de ne pouvoir plus soutenir la lunette Kamschatka dans sa lutte avec l'artillerie alliée" (Todleben, ii. pt. i., p. 312).

to the east of the Middle Ravine appeared to have been mastered ; but the Redan repeated its obstinate resistance of the previous day, and about ten o'clock one of its shells caused the explosion of a second magazine in No. 9 Battery, Right Attack. Though on this occasion no damage was done, the Russians, as before, manned their parapets and cheered.¹

By midday it appeared to the allied Commanders that the time had come for the assault, it being arranged that the French should simultaneously attack the White Works and the Mamelon, and that, when the latter fell, the British should advance against the Quarries. To prepare the way a general cannonade was opened and, with a view of preventing the enemy from concentrating his attention on the three points selected for assault, fire was also directed against the western portion of the Russian defences which had been hitherto spared.

In the British Right Attack orders were given to those mortar batteries which were firing at the Malakoff and Mamelon to concentrate on the latter as heavy a fire as possible until the assault was driven home, and then to turn with all speed on the Malakoff. The guns, on the other hand, were to continue firing on both works as usual until the lunette fell, when all were to be concentrated on the Malakoff. Three 8-in. guns in No. 9 Battery

¹ It so happened that the two officers present on this occasion were again Captain M. C. Dixon and Lieutenant C. H. Owen.

An embrasure took fire during the day in No. 13, or the Sand Bag, Battery, Right Attack, and Gunner John Powell leaped into it and extinguished the flame, for which act he received the French Military Medal ("England's Artillerymen," p. 242).

which commanded the communications between the two works, were specially ordered to prepare for shrapnel fire against the Russian infantry. These orders affected forty-three pieces of the Right Attack; the remaining fourteen were to oppose the Redan and Barrack Batteries, upon which the majority of the guns in the Left Attack were to concentrate.¹

Capture of the White Works.—The storming columns were ready in the trenches at 6 p.m., when the artillery fire had reached its greatest intensity and bore with overwhelming force upon the hapless lunette. The Mamelon, indeed, presented the appearance of an active volcano,² for the explosions of the large mortar shells which rained upon it hurled smoke, dust, and débris of all kinds into the air, as if from an actual crater.

At 6.30 p.m. Péliissier gave the signal for his troops to attack, and two French brigades, advancing along the Inkerman Ridge, soon made themselves masters of the Volhynie and Selinghinsk Redoubts; but as they pressed on towards the Zabalkansky Battery they were met by Russian reinforcements,

¹ On June 6 No. 7 Battery was not manned, and there were only three 8-in. guns in No. 8 which were able to rake the Quarries. But on June 7 both batteries were fully manned ("Artillery Operations," p. 110).

² See "Artillery Operations," p. 110.

"Cependant rien n'égalait la furie avec laquelle les batteries de siège vomissaient leurs projectiles contre la lunette Kamschatka. Dans l'après-midi, à partir de trois heures, aux batteries qui avaient déjà harcelé la veille et au commencement de cette journée la lunette Kamschatka, se joignirent toutes les batteries de mortiers anglais qui, jusque-là, avaient tiré sur le Malakow et le bastion No. 3, et qui réunirent leurs efforts pour écraser définitivement la lunette" (Todleben, ii. pt. i., p. 314).

issuing from the fortress. The latter, however, were at once taken in flank by two French battalions, who had worked their way along the bed of the Careenage Ravine, and the Russians were defeated with a loss of 400 prisoners. The Zabalkansky Battery then fell into the hands of the French, who destroyed the embrasures and spiked the five guns it contained. Owing to its very advanced position, the Zabalkansky Battery was not occupied,¹ but garrisons were placed in the other two captured redoubts. This successful operation cost the French very few men.

Capture of the Mamelon.—Simultaneously with this attack, three French columns advanced against the Mamelon Lunette—an Algerine battalion on the right, one of Zouaves on the left, and the 50th of the Line in the centre. The assault was delivered with great determination, and soon the colour of the 50th was planted on the captured work by Colonel Brancion.² Three 8-in. guns in No. 9 Battery, Right Attack, now opened with shrapnel on the retreating Russians,³ while the Algerines and Zouaves, with an *élan* nothing could restrain, poured out of the lunette after them, until they were brought to

¹ The Zabalkansky Battery was abandoned by the Russians after this day.

² Colonel Brancion commanded the 50th of the Line. He was killed soon after he planted the colour of his regiment on the lunette, which, later on, was converted by the French into the "Brancion Rédoute."

³ Sergeant Christopher Fitzsimons was noted for his good work on this occasion, under Captain H. Rogers, commanding the battery, and also when the Quarries were armed by us. He also commanded No. 10 Mortar Battery on three occasions. He obtained the French Military Medal.

a standstill by the short-range fire of the main defences. They were then compelled to seek what shelter they could find in the *trous de loup* in front of the Malakoff, upon which the Allies had turned their artillery.

If these *enfants perdus* had been supported, it is possible that the Malakoff might have fallen, for Todleben tells us that at the moment it had no infantry garrison;¹ but as an attack on it had not been contemplated, no assistance was forthcoming for the adventurous Frenchmen. Soon Russian infantry came up in force and our allies were driven back, followed by the victorious enemy, who crowned his success by the recapture of the lunette which was once again subjected to a concentrated artillery fire. This fire ceasing as suddenly as it had begun, two fresh French brigades sprang from the trenches and, gallantly advancing, captured and held the work. Thenceforward the tricolour dominated the Mamelon; but the victory was costly, for in the various attacks our allies had 5,443 casualties.²

Capture of the Quarries.—As soon as Brancion's colour was seen on the lunette, the British column advanced against the Quarries. Previously the Redan had been swept by a continuous fire of shot and shell, which caused heavy losses among the Russian infantry garrisoning the work. As an attack was now imminent they were summoned from their blinded

¹ "Cependant le Malakow, presque complètement dégarni de troupes, se trouvait placé dans une position fort critique; il n'est pas à douter que les Français n'eussent pu facilement s'en emparer, s'ils avaient voulu tenter l'entreprise" (Todleben, ii. pt. i., pp. 323, 324).

² Niel, p. 301.

cover, and observers in our lines could see the havoc created as the round shot tore through their ranks and shells exploded in their midst.¹ The advance of our infantry was prepared by a rapid fire of common shell upon the Quarries,² but once they left the trenches all our artillery fire was of necessity stopped. The assaulting troops were composed of detachments from the Light and 2nd Divisions, supported by the 62nd Regiment, and were under the command of Colonel H. Shirley, 88th Regiment, with whom was Colonel R. Tylden, R.E., the Director of the Right Attack. Two columns, each 200 strong, advanced against either flank of the main Russian work at the Quarries, while 300 more attacked the collateral trenches; and then began a strenuous encounter which lasted for ten hours. The Russians resisted valiantly, but they had been previously shaken by heavy shell fire delivered at a range of under 800 yds., and giving way before our stormers they fell back on the Redan; while some of our men, following them up, lay down in sheltered positions and attempted to fire into the embrasures of that work.³

¹ "The effect of our fire on the Redan was frightful to witness. The Russians, evidently expecting an attack on that work, had brought all their men from their caves and hiding-places and massed them together in it. As one looked at the work from the Left Attack, the rays of the setting sun lighting up the mass of troops, the shells could be seen plunging and cutting gaps in the ranks, blowing the bodies of their victims into the air" ("Artillery Operations," p. 111).

² Twenty-seven 8-in. common shell were fired from the three guns in No. 8 Left Attack, which were able to sweep the Russian trenches at the Quarries. Range about 800 yds. (Adye's Order Books).

³ "Gunner Thomas Arthur distinguished himself during the attack on the Quarries by carrying barrels of ammunition across the open to the 7th Fusiliers. This he did of his own accord several times" ("England's Artillerymen," p. 242).

Thus far the attack on the Quarries had been successful, and now it was only necessary to make such lodgments before daylight as would render the position tenable under the guns of the fortress. The intention was to employ a working party of 800 men, under cover of the assaulting troops and the supporting regiment; but so active were the Russians in their efforts to drive back the British and recapture the counter approaches, that only 250 men could be spared to the Royal Engineers, the rest being engaged in the various combats that ensued. The first occurred soon after nightfall, and the British were for a time forced to abandon their position; but, returning to the charge, they once more expelled the Russians. Later on the Volhynie Regiment made a second attempt, but this was successfully frustrated. When the Russians made a third attempt our men were so weary that many could hardly stand up; but, by great good fortune, the attack was not pressed and apparently some panic arose among the enemy.

Not unnaturally, the Russians failed to realise that the British held this important point with men who, after ten hours' working and fighting, were incapable of resisting; and the writer is unable to explain why no reinforcements were sent from our lines. But though a great risk was incurred, no harm ensued and, thanks to the devoted efforts of the Royal Engineers, when morning came the Russian works at the Quarries were incorporated in our front of attack. In this operation the British lost 671 killed and wounded, among whom were 47 officers.¹

¹ Kinglake, viii. p. 125.

The Allies now set to work to mount new ordnance in the captured positions, but the general bombardment was continued till the 11th, when fire was restricted in order to husband ammunition for what it was hoped would be the final effort.

On June 10 a Council of War decided that as soon as the new batteries should be ready, a bombardment of forty-eight hours should precede a general attack on the fortress by a number of columns. The French were to assault the Town Front with three columns, which would operate against the Quarantine, Central, and Flagstaff Bastions; the British were to assault the Redan, and the French the Malakoff.¹

6. THE FOURTH BOMBARDMENT

Pélissier and Napoleon III.—While the news of the victories of June 7 was received with delight by the British Government, the Emperor Napoleon preserved an unbroken silence. It was not until June 14 that he telegraphed to Pélissier, saying that he admired the courage of his troops, but wished him to observe that a general action which would have decided the fate of the Crimea would not have cost more, and he persisted in ordering him to make every effort to take the field. To this Pélissier replied by tendering a conditional resignation of his command.

“C’est me placer, Sire,” said he, “entre l’indiscipline et la déconsidération . . . que Votre Majesté

¹ The detail of this plan of attack is given in “R.E. Journal,” ii. pp. 286 etc.

me dégage des limites étroites qu'elle m'assigne, ou qu'elle me permette de résigner un commandement impossible à exercer de concert avec nos loyaux alliés, à l'extrémité quelquefois paralysante d'un fil électrique."¹

The Emperor's reply was not satisfactory, because it was not definite; but before it was received the fourth bombardment was in progress.

Preparations for the Fourth Bombardment.—On June 16 the Russians had 1,129 pieces mounted on the south side of Sebastopol—549 opposing the siege batteries, 319 for flanking fire and close defence, and 261 for interior defence. For each gun or licorne 140 rounds were provided, and 60 rounds for each mortar. The infantry garrison now amounted to 43,000 bayonets, and in the vicinity was Prince Gortchakoff's field army of 21,000 men. In the fortress itself were 10,697 artillerymen and seamen gunners,² and, in addition to the ordnance above mentioned, field guns were placed *en barbette* in the interior of some of the works.

By the same date the French had extended their trenches so as to include the Mamelon Lunette and the Volhynie and Selinghinsk Redoubts, now converted into batteries bearing on Sebastopol, and in their trenches 422 guns were mounted.³ The British had made two new batteries in the captured Quarries—No. 16 for four 8-in. mortars, and No. 17 for three 32-pounder guns. Some 8-in. mortars were also sent to the Left Attack. With

¹ Rousset, ii. p. 256.

² Todleben, ii. pt. i., pp. 349, 353.

³ Auger, i. p. 590.

these exceptions, the arrangements in our batteries were the same as on June 6. The Left Attack had now 104 pieces, and the Right Attack 62—total 166—of which 53 were manned by the Royal Navy. Colonel Collingwood Dickson, having returned from Kertch, resumed command of the Right Attack.

The Opposing Ordnance.—The opposing ordnance in the fourth bombardment is thus grouped by Todleben: ¹

TABLE XLVI
OPPOSING ORDNANCE

Position of Russian Pieces.	Number and Nature of Russian Pieces.			Number and Nature of Siege Pieces.		
	Guns.	Mortars.	Total.	Guns.	Mortars.	Total.
From Bastion No. 7 to Bastion No. 6 inclusive	57	8	65	44	21	65
Rostislav Redoubt, Central Bastion and its annexes, to Schwartz Redoubt inclusive	104	23	127	96	26	122
Town Ravine, Garden and Boulevard Batteries, Jason Redoubt, Flagstaff Bastion and its annexes	133	17	150	91	42	133
Creek Battery, Barrack Batteries, Redan extensions and annexes	103	9	112	99	29	128
Malakoff, Little Redan to No. 1 Bastion	83	12	95	58	42	100
Total	480	69	549	388	160	548

The Allies had from 400 to 500 rounds for each piece.

Opening Fire.—At daylight on June 17 all the batteries opened fire for the fourth time upon Sebastopol. Although the British efforts were mainly directed against the Redan, the heavy mortars of our Right Attack gave great assistance to the French

¹ Todleben, ii. pt. i., p. 350.

by directing their shells upon the Malakoff which, after suffering from the close attack of the new French battery on the Mamelon, was almost reduced to silence by 9 a.m. and only fired an occasional shot during the day. The Redan also ceased to fire with vigour from its heavy guns, but caused many casualties in the Quarries by small mortar shell and showers of hand grenades.

The falling off in the enemy's rate of fire was partly caused by scarcity of ammunition, and partly by his practice of withdrawing guns before they were overwhelmed by superior fire, so as to reserve them for the critical moment of the assault. But although these facts were not entirely realised by the Allies, there was ocular proof that great damage had been done to the Russian defences along the Faubourg Front, and the outlook seemed to promise a successful assault.

Pélissier's First Change of Plan.—Though the Council of War had agreed that this assault should include the Town Front as well as that of the Faubourg, before the opening of the bombardment Pélissier changed his mind and determined to confine his assault to the Malakoff. He came to this conclusion against the advice of his Chief Engineer, and he resented General Bosquet's¹ remonstrances so strongly that he removed him from command of the 2nd Corps and replaced him by General St. Jean d'Angely, a newcomer who had no knowledge of the

¹ It is also said that Bosquet gave offence to his chief by not at once forwarding to head-quarters some Russian plans that had been captured.

ground. In this change of plan, much against his judgment, Lord Raglan had to acquiesce.

Pélissier's Second Change of Plan.—On the morning of the 17th the two Commanders had a conference and finally agreed that next day, after a two hours' bombardment, the French should attack the Malakoff, and that, when it was carried, the British should assault the Redan. But before evening Pélissier again changed his mind, and determined to attack at daybreak. His actions indeed during this period of the siege have never been fully explained. To remove the experienced Bosquet, on the eve of an assault, from the command of troops who knew and trusted him, was an act of autocratic folly; to forgo the demoralising effect of a general assault—an assault justified by his available strength, the condition of the Flagstaff Bastion, and the proximity to the enceinte of the trenches of his Left Attack—was a serious tactical mistake; but to attack the strongest positions in Sebastopol before they had been shaken by artillery fire was the worst of bad blunders. Time after time the Russians had shown their skill in repairing by night the damage done during the day; and an attack at daybreak neither permitted the siege guns to prepare the way for the assault, nor entailed any sacrifice of the enemy's infantry, who could be safely massed close to the parapets they would be called upon to defend.

As it was the custom of the French to employ in their assaults more troops than we did,¹ and

¹ This difference was very marked: if the French employed too many, we undoubtedly employed too few. See next note.

as Bosquet's successor found it impossible to place his columns of attack in the trenches without being seen by the enemy, it was apparently with the idea of preserving the element of surprise that Pélissier made his sudden change of plan.

Acquiescence of Lord Raglan.—Lord Raglan had issued his orders in accordance with the agreement come to in the morning, and was at his head-quarters when, at 8.30 p.m., General Pélissier's aide-de-camp brought him the new proposal. Against his better judgment the British Commander felt again constrained to concur, and fresh orders were issued.¹ At 2 a.m., accompanied by the Head-quarter Staff, he set out for No. 7 Mortar Battery, in the third parallel of our Right Attack, which he selected for his position during the coming action.

June 18.—As if in mockery of the French precautions, the Russian bugles were sounding in Sebastopol

¹ This action of Lord Raglan is open to much criticism; by consenting he necessarily participated in General Pélissier's blunder. One of Lord Raglan's personal staff thus states the circumstances as they occurred:

"Lord Raglan was excessively annoyed at receiving this despatch, and said that altering all the arrangements at the last moment was quite enough to peril the success of the undertaking. He had all along thought the numbers of the French assaulting columns unnecessarily large; indeed, as the best proof of this I need only state that they were no less than *fifteen* times the strength of the British, our columns consisting of 400 men each, and the French of 6,000 men each. Certainly they had far more to attack than we had, but still the proportion of troops in their favour was ten times as many as ours. However, indecision at such a moment as this would have been fatal to the operations; Lord Raglan therefore agreed to accede to General Pélissier's wishes, but at the same time expressed his opinion that the change was most unwise, and he feared that much confusion would ensue. Lord Raglan had then to issue fresh instructions, etc." ("Letters from Head-quarters," ii. p. 322).

when Lord Raglan rode from his head-quarters ; for in the brightness of the summer night the preliminary movements of the attackers did not escape the vigilance of the besieged. Infantry hurried to man the parapets, field guns were placed in position, and many of the heavier pieces were loaded with grape.

Defeat at the Malakoff.—June 18 commenced with misfortune. Three French columns were detailed to make a concentric attack on the Malakoff. General d'Autemarre was on the left, General Brunet in the centre, and General Mayran on the right ; and a bouquet of rockets from the Right Lancaster Battery, where Pélissier proposed to be, was to give the signal to begin. But Mayran, whose duty it was to attack the Little Redan, which supported the left flank of the Malakoff, mistook a congreve rocket for the bouquet of signal rockets and made a premature attack, which was at once driven back by a combined fire of guns and musketry, supported by several Russian ships in Careenage Bay. Pélissier, when he arrived at his station, was greeted to his intense anger by the sound of the premature fusillade on his right. He at once ordered the rockets to be fired, though it was twenty minutes before the appointed hour ; and thus it happened that Brunet's Brigade, in obedience to the signal, issued from its trenches in some confusion, as it had not had time to get into the proper formation. Although it came at once under the cross fire of the east face of the Malakoff and the Little Redan, the brigade pushed on, and had almost reached the curtain connecting these two works when a heavy musketry fire assailed it and it

was driven back to its trenches. On hearing of Mayran's mishap, Péliissier sent forward a reinforcement of four battalions of the Imperial Guard who were drawn up in reserve behind the Victoria Redoubt, and another assault was made by the right column; but it was driven back into the Careenage Ravine. Both Brunet and Mayran were killed. The left column under d'Autemarre, on the signal being given, moved rapidly round the west of the Mamelon and along the Middle Ravine towards the Gervais Battery, which supported the right flank of the Malakoff. This alone of the French columns had any success, for d'Autemarre penetrated the Gervais Battery, and, taking up a position in the Faubourg, sent back to Péliissier to ask for reinforcements.

Defeat at the Redan.—For the British assault on the Redan it was arranged that detachments from the Light, 2nd, and 4th Divisions, under the orders of Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown, should be formed into three columns, two of which should deliver an attack on the flanks of the work, while, a little later, the third should attack the salient. Engineer officers were ordered to accompany each column; the Royal Navy supplied a ladder party under Captain W. Peel; and Captain W. J. Williams and Lieutenant E. J. Ward were in command of thirty of the Royal Artillery whose duty it was to spike guns, or turn them when captured on the enemy.¹

¹ A party of volunteers, for the same purpose, from the Left Attack, were assembled under Lieutenant M. Le F. Taylor, but were not employed" ("Artillery Operations," p. 121).

When the French were seen penetrating the Gervais Battery, the signal for the British attack was made, and as soon as the troops showed themselves outside their trenches they were assailed by a very heavy fire of grape and musketry. After vainly endeavouring to advance, the columns were directed to retire into the trenches, but not before almost all the superior officers had been killed or wounded. The sailor ladder party was conspicuous for its gallantry, the Royal Engineer officers accompanying the attack lost heavily, and of the spiking party 11 men were killed or wounded.¹

Lord Raglan, from his dangerous position² in No. 7 Battery, witnessed the failure of the assault

¹ Amongst the killed were Major-General Sir John Campbell and Acting-Brigadier-General L. Yea (7th Fusiliers), and Lieutenant-Colonel T. Shadforth (57th Regiment). The gallantry of the Royal Engineers was most conspicuous. Captain W. H. Jesse, and Lieutenants J. M. Graves and J. Murray were killed, and that excellent officer and Director of the Right Attack, Lieutenant-Colonel R. Tylden, was mortally wounded. Nine sappers were killed or mortally wounded. For his service on this occasion Lieutenant Graham, R.E., afterwards General Sir Gerald Graham, K.C.B., etc., received the Victoria Cross.

The sailors, under Captain Peel, gave a splendid example of courage and coolness in the face of danger. They lost 1 officer (Lieutenant Kidd) and 13 men killed; and 6 officers (including Captain Peel) and 42 men wounded ("R.E. Journal," ii. pp. 307 etc.).

Of the spiking party, 11 were killed or wounded, Captain Williams being among the latter. Gunner Glass was wounded when about half-way between the Redan and the advanced trenches. He was completely disabled, being wounded in three places. Gunner McArdle crept out of the trenches on his hands and knees, and brought in Glass on his back. Gunner Thomas Arthur again distinguished himself (see note 3, p 371). Corporal James Browne, Bombardiers John Hagan and Samuel Ewing, who lost a leg, and Gunners Michael O'Donohue, R. Botfield, and E. O'Brien, were specially noted for gallantry, and all obtained the French Military Medal.

² Lord Raglan and the Staff were under a heavy grape fire as soon as the attack began. Many casualties occurred here, including General

on the Redan. At 3.30 a.m. the guns were ordered to open fire, and considerable loss was inflicted on the Russians, whose guns were reduced to silence in about three-quarters of an hour.

The Attacks Relinquished.—Meanwhile, d'Aute-marre's messenger slowly made his way to Pélissier, but an hour passed before a reinforcement of the Zouaves of the Guard began to march towards the Middle Ravine.¹ By this time the French had been obliged to evacuate the Gervais Battery, the British attack on the Redan had failed, and in consequence Pélissier ordered the Zouaves to halt. Both he and Lord Raglan, who met in consultation, were at first desirous of organising a second attack, but eventually the idea was abandoned.²

Capture of the Cemetery by Eyre.—The fatal June 18 did not pass without one bright episode—the successful, though somewhat costly, attack of a column of 2,000 men of various regiments, under Major-General W. Eyre, upon a Russian lodgment on the Cemetery Hill, in the mouth of the Great Ravine. The attack was brilliantly executed, but unfortunately the ardour of the troops urged them to push on and occupy some

Sir Harry Jones, who was wounded in the forehead when talking to Lord Raglan ("Letters from Head-quarters," ii. pp. 334 etc.).

Later on, Lord Raglan shifted his position to the right of the first parallel ("Artillery Operations," p. 122).

¹ d'Aute-marre's messenger had to make his way through the crowded trenches, back to the Right Lancaster Battery, where Pélissier was stationed, and from thence orders had to be sent to the Zouaves, who were behind the Victoria Redoubt.

² This was done apparently after d'Aute-marre had represented that the temper of the troops did not justify any more assaults that day ("Letters from Head-quarters," ii. p. 340).

houses situated at the foot of the enemy's main line of works. It was never intended that the attempt should be made on the enemy's works beyond the Cemetery, unless the attack on the Redan should be successful, or that some great advantage presented itself for attacking the flank of that work. No support, therefore, was forthcoming for Eyre. The British occupied the houses till sunset, when they withdrew and established themselves in the Cemetery, where their position was for a time undisputed. But on the night of June 21, the Russians attacked them with vigour and were successfully repulsed, after which they did not renew the attempt. The post was handed over to the French on June 27, but eventually a joint occupation was agreed on.¹

Eyre's loss on the 18th was serious. The killed and wounded amounted to 562, among whom were 31 officers; thus more than one-quarter of his force was placed *hors de combat*.²

Our gallant adversaries had every reason to be proud of the brilliant success of their arms on June 18. Their drooping spirits were raised by it, and they now believed that Sebastopol would never fall.' But they

¹ "It was never intended that any attempt should be made on the enemy's works beyond the Cemetery, unless the attack upon the Redan should be successful, or that some great advantage presented itself for attacking the flank of that work, with a view to materially assist in the lodgments to be made in it" ("R.E. Journal," ii. p. 308).

² Kinglake, viii. p. 204.

³ "En ce qui concerne la garnison de Sébastopol, la brillante victoire qu'elle venait de remporter, avait eu sur elle la plus salutaire influence; elle la consola de la perte des contre-approches et la pénétra de cette conviction que Sébastopol ne pourrait jamais tomber au pouvoir de l'ennemi" (Todleben, ii. p. 383).

paid a great price for their victory : amongst their wounded was General Todleben, who took no further active part in the war.

The losses on the two days' fighting appear to have been :

British, 1,505 ;
French, 3,551 ; } practically all incurred on 18th.

Russian, 5,446, 4,000 incurred on 17th.¹

Casualties.—The casualties that occurred in the British batteries during the third bombardment are shown in the following table :

TABLE XLVII
CASUALTIES

	Officers.		N.C. (or Petty) Officers and Men.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Royal Artillery, Right Attack .	..	2	13	29
„ „ Left Attack .	..	2	7	51
„ „ Total	4	20	80
Naval Brigade	5	12	68
Grand Total	9	32	148

Total casualties, 189.

Captain M. Adye was very severely wounded by the explosion of a shell in No. 14 Battery, Left Attack, on June 6, and Captain A. Gordon was wounded the same day, in the Right Attack. Lieutenant J. E. Ruck-Keene was wounded in the Right Attack on June 7, and Lieutenant H. H. Conolly in the Left Attack on June 9.²

¹ Kinglake, viii. p. 204, where official returns are quoted.

² Four or five men of the Royal Artillery were severely wounded at the same time as Captain Adye ("Artillery Operations," p. 108).

"Five sergeants were wounded during the bombardment, of whom one, Sergeant Daniel Dowling, belonged to H Field Battery, and was

There were six guns and nine carriages destroyed or disabled, and 32,883 rounds were fired, of which 13,814 were from mortars.

The casualties that occurred in the British batteries during the fourth bombardment are shown in the following table :

TABLE XLVIII

CASUALTIES

	Officers.		N.O. (or Petty) Officers and Men.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Royal Artillery, Right Attack .	..	3	7	18
" " Left Attack	15
" " Total	3	7	33
Naval Brigade . . .	1	7	16	49
Grand Total . . .	1	10	23	82

Total casualties, 116.¹

Captain C. G. Arbuthnot and Lieutenant H. P. Tillard were wounded in the Right Attack on June 17, and Captain W. J. Williams on June 18, while in command of the spiking party. Lieutenant Kidd, R.N., was killed whilst advancing with the ladder party, June 18.

Three pieces of ordnance were disabled or destroyed, and one carriage.

23,946 rounds were fired, of which 4,432 were from mortars.

serving in the trenches as a volunteer. He was noticed for his gallantry on two occasions, and at the conclusion of the war he received the Sardinian Medal and a commission in the Military Train. He subsequently went to Italy, served under Garibaldi, and later on received the commission of Colonel in the Italian Army" ("England's Artillerymen," p. 242, n.).

¹ This includes the losses of the spiking and ladder parties.

7. THE EXPEDITION TO KERTCH


On May 24 an expedition for the second time set sail for Kertch. It was composed of combined French and English fleets, under Admirals Lyons and Bruat, and a land force of 15,000 British, French, and Turkish troops, under Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown. The Royal Artillery, under the command of Major G. R. Barker, consisted of W Battery, and a detachment of No. 1 Company, 1st Battalion, under Captain G. Graydon, armed with two 18-pounder guns of position. A few days later Lieutenant-Colonel Collingwood Dickson followed the expedition, taking with him a quantity of artillery stores and a detachment of No. 5 Company, 4th Battalion, under Second-Captain R. E. F. Craufurd.


No resistance was offered by the Russians who, after destroying some of their forts, retired before the Allies, into whose hands fell a large amount of ordnance and stores, including vast quantities of corn and coal. The Russian Kertch Squadron ceased to exist, the Sea of Azof no longer remained a closed sea to the fleets of the Allies, and very serious loss was inflicted on the enemy both afloat and on shore. By the middle of June Sir George Brown was back in the Crimea, having left 5,000 Turks, 1,000 French, and 1,000 British troops to guard the Straits of Kertch; and with this force Captain Graydon remained with No. 1 Company, 1st Battalion, R.A., in order to assist the Turkish artillery in the defence of Cape St. Paul. The rest of the British artillery accompanied Sir George Brown.

Fort
Catherine.
Star Fort.
Fort
Nicholas.

Cemetery
Hill.

Boulevard Batteries.





APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII

ALLIED FIELD FORCE, APRIL, MAY, AND JUNE, 1855

BRITISH ARMY

DURING April, May, and June the following reinforcements joined the field force :

Cavalry Division.—A Troop, R.H.A., and detachment R.H.A., to form a ball-cartridge brigade, 10th Hussars, 12th Lancers.

Divisional Artillery.—Q, Y, and X Field Batteries, and three ball-cartridge brigades.

Reserve Artillery.—J and V Batteries of Position.

Infantry.—2nd Battalion 1st Foot, 3rd Foot, 48th Foot, 31st Foot, 72nd Foot, 13th Foot.

By the Morning State of June 3 the Army of Lord Raglan, including the Siege Train, had a total strength of over 49,000 all ranks ; there were some 10,000 sick, and, deducting these as well as employed men and men on command, there were present under arms :

Officers	1,566
Sergeants	1,995
Trumpeters and Drummers	702
Rank and File	29,048
Total	<u>33,311</u> all ranks.

FRENCH ARMY¹

The French " Army of Reserve " having been landed and General Canrobert having resigned the chief command in favour of General Pélissier, the composition of the force was as follows on May 20, 1855 :

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF : GENERAL PÉLISSIER

FIRST CORPS : GENERAL DE SALLES

First Division.—General d'Autemarre ; Brigadiers, Niel and Breton.

Second Division.—General Le Vaillant ; Brigadiers, La Motterouge and Coustou.

¹ Niel, pp. 481 etc.

Third Division.—General Paté ; Brigadiers, Beuret and Bazaine.

Fourth Division.—General Bouat ; Brigadiers, Fauchaux and Duval.

Cavalry Division.—General Morris ; Brigadiers, Cassaignolles and Feray.

SECOND CORPS : GENERAL BOSQUET

First Division.—General Canrobert ; Brigadiers, Espinasse and Vinoy.

Second Division.—General Camou ; Brigadiers, de Wimpffen and Vergé.

Third Division.—General Mayran ; Brigadiers, de Lavarande and Faily.

Fourth Division.—General Dulac ; Brigadiers, de St. Pol and Bisson.

Fifth Division.—General Brunet ; Brigadiers, Cœur and Lafont de Villiers.

Cavalry Division.—General d'Allonville ; Brigadiers, — and Champéron.

ARMY OF RESERVE

COMMANDER : GENERAL REGNAULT DE ST. JEAN D'ANGELY

First Division.—General Herbillon ; Brigadiers, Marguenat and Cler.

Second Division.—General d'Aurelle de Paladines ; Brigadiers, Montenard and Perrin-Jonquières.

Imperial Guard.—General Mellinet ; Brigadiers, Uhrich and Pontevés.

Reserve Cavalry.—Two regiments.

With each of the above divisions, and with the Imperial Guard, were two batteries of artillery.

TOTAL AND EFFECTIVE STRENGTH, MAY 20

	Total Strength.		Total Effectives.	
	Officers.	Under-Officers and Men.	Officers.	Under-Officers and Men.
Head-quarter Services, etc.	192	2,506	189	2,433
1st Corps	1,114	31,886	1,046	25,090
2nd Corps	1,594	44,525	1,536	36,055
Army of Reserve	1,007	26,718	981	24,318
Reserves & Parks (Artillery)	190	7,913	183	6,594
Artillery & Eng. (Engineers)	94	2,357	85	1,916
Total	4,191	115,905	4,020	96,406

SARDINIAN ARMY

During May, General La Marmora arrived in the Crimea with a force of 14,000 infantry.

TURKISH ARMY

During April, Omer Pasha arrived in the Crimea and assumed command of the Turkish troops ; he brought 13,000 men with him.

CHAPTER IX

THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL

1. THE BRITISH FIELD ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL

Reinforcements in General.—When the winter of 1854 began, the British field force in the Crimea consisted of 31 battalions, 9 regiments of cavalry, 2 troops of horse artillery, and 8 field batteries; between November, 1854, and September, 1855, 21 battalions, 5 regiments of cavalry, 1 troop of horse artillery, and 5 field batteries joined the army, and 5 companies of artillery and 1 detachment of horse artillery were sent out, to form ball-cartridge or ammunition brigades.

Artillery Remounts.—The first artillery remounts arrived in the Crimea in February, 1855, and by the end of May 1,738 English and 433 Spanish horses made good all deficiencies in the troops and batteries. As summer progressed the number of horses on the strength of the Royal Artillery exceeded the establishment, and General Dacres wrote to Woolwich requesting that the supply might be restricted.¹

Artillery Reinforcements.—The value of heavy metal, as exemplified at Inkerman, did not pass

¹ Letter from General Dacres to the Deputy-Adjutant-General, Woolwich, July 7, 1855, and returns of horses in Adye's Order Book.

unnoticed, and two of the five companies detailed for field service were armed as position artillery.¹ They are included in the following table, which sets forth the artillery reinforcements to the field army :

TABLE XLIX
REINFORCEMENTS TO FIELD ARTILLERY

Troop or Company.	Commanding Officer.	Crimean Designation.	Date of Embarkation, 1855.
A Troop	Capt. A. T. Phillpotts	A Troop	June.
Detachment R.H.A. ²	Second-Capt. W. B. Saunders	Cavalry Ammunition Brigade	"
5 Compy., 3rd Battn.	Capt. F. B. Ward	J Battery of Position	March.
1 " 6th "	Capt. E. Moubray	V " " "	"
5 " 12th "	Capt. J. R. Gibbon	Q Field Battery	April.
8 " 1st "	Capt. A. F. Connell	X " " "	May.
2 " 3rd "	Capt. A. C. Gleig	Y " " "	"
5 " 6th "	Capt. A. Thompson	Ball Cartridge Brigade	"
6 " 2nd "	Capt. A. C. Pigou	" " " "	"
2 " 5th "	Capt. J. Travers	" " " "	June.
7 " 6th "	Second-Capt. L. H. Denne	" " " "	July.
8 " 9th "	Lieut. C. F. Cockburn	" " " "	"

¹ The two companies embarked with an equipment of three 32-pounder howitzers each, but when they arrived in the Crimea this was changed, by orders from England, to four 32-pounders for one battery, and four 18-pounder iron guns for the other. Lord Raglan was pleased with the appearance of the horses of J Battery, and the 18-pounders were assigned to Captain Ward, his lordship, in virtue of being Master-General of the Ordnance, overruling another arrangement. Curiously enough, Ward himself had to go to Sir Colin Campbell to persuade him to let him have four guns from the defences of Balaclava. For a time Sir Colin was loth to part with his guns, and Lord Raglan had to apply some gentle pressure. At the final interview, much to Ward's relief, Sir Colin was in high good humour, and said he had been done out of his guns by "a damned red-headed fellow from Woolwich." The Captain's hair, indeed, tended to that hue, but, as Sir Colin remarked with a chuckle, the Master-General was nearly as red (Ward's "Letters").

Later on, 18-pounder guns of 38 cwts. were sent out from England to equip J Battery, replacing those of 42 cwts. taken from the Balaclava defences.

² This detachment eventually became B Troop, R.H.A., on augmentation.

There were now three troops of horse artillery in the Crimea which, with the cavalry ammunition brigade, were placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Dupuis and attached to the Cavalry Division. Q Battery was attached to the 4th, and Y to the Light, Division, and X and the two position batteries (J and V) were brigaded under Lieutenant-Colonel J. St. George and designated the Reserve Artillery.¹

Changes in Command.—When July came, many changes of command, due to death, illness, and other causes, had occurred in the British army. Lieutenant-General Sir J. Y. Scarlett now commanded the Cavalry Division, and Major-General Lord George Paget the Light Cavalry Brigade. The 1st Division, which had been re-constituted, was under Lieutenant-General Lord Rokeby, while the Highland Brigade was reinforced, and eventually became the Highland Division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Colin Campbell. The 2nd Division was under Lieutenant-General F. Markham, the 3rd Division under Lieutenant-General Sir William Eyre, the 4th Division under Lieutenant-General H. W. Barnard, and the Light Division under Lieutenant-General Sir W. Codrington. But the greatest change of all was occasioned by the sudden death of Lord Raglan at the end of June, when General Sir James Simpson succeeded to the chief command.

Death of Lord Raglan.—Lord Raglan's outward

¹ After the fall of Sebastopol, when the field army was being organised for possible operations, X Battery was attached to the 1st Division, while A and H were transferred to the Highland Division.

demeanour was always cheerful, and he bore the reverses of June 18 with his usual equanimity ; but he was oppressed by private sorrow,¹ and no one can say how deeply he was affected by the venomous attacks of the English press. It was remarked that recently he had aged greatly, and on June 26 he was slightly indisposed : on June 28 he was dead. This sudden event caused a profound sensation, and by none was more genuine grief expressed than by his old comrades in command, Generals Pélissier and Canrobert.² On July 3 his body was removed from the British Head-quarters to Kamiesch Bay, where H.M.S. *Caradoc* waited to convey it to England for burial. The coffin was borne on a gun carriage of C Troop, and was followed by the four Generals in chief command, the escort being selected from the mounted troops of the Allies. Regiments of infantry and batteries of artillery lined the route, the Zouaves appearing in green turbans. The bands of three regiments headed the procession, and here and there batteries of artillery fired salutes as it passed ; but during the whole period of its progress the guns of Sebastopol were silent.³

¹ " Letters from Head-quarters," ii. pp. 342, 358.

² " General Pélissier stood by the bedside for hours, crying like a child. General Canrobert also testified the most profound grief at seeing the remains of him for whom he entertained a sincere affection " (" Letters from Head-quarters," ii. pp. 363-364).

³ " A curious circumstance was remarked, whether by accident or design I cannot say. During the whole time the procession lasted, not a shot was fired from any of the Russian batteries, and consequently none from us. Might it not have been an act of courtesy on the part of Prince Gortschakoff to the remains of his old friend, FitzRoy Somerset ? " (" Letters from Head-quarters," ii. p. 367, n.).

2. THE COUNSELS OF THE ALLIES

Tact of the French War Minister.—In the failure of June 18 the advocates of investment recognised the confirmation of their views, and it was fortunate for the Alliance that the War Minister of France was a man of tact and judgment, friendly to Niel as well as to Péliissier, for whose soldierly qualities he had a frank admiration. He exerted himself to the utmost to calm the General's proud spirit, fretting as it was under defeat, and at the same time to soothe the Chief Engineer who was hurt, not only by the neglect with which his advice was treated, but also by the somewhat contemptuous manner in which it was received at the Council Board. In these endeavours Marshal Vaillant was successful, but he had also to reckon with Napoleon III. After the receipt of the bad news at Paris, the Emperor grew daily more incensed with the obstinate commander who set so little store by his advice and who even contravened his absolute commands. On July 3 he gave an order for his recall ; but the astute War Minister sent it by the post instead of the telegraph, and on the opportune arrival of a letter from Péliissier, which exercised a tranquillising effect upon the angry monarch, the Marshal was empowered to intercept his own despatch at Marseilles and the dangerous crisis passed by.¹

Péliissier's Proposals.—In his letter to the Emperor, Péliissier, while respectfully admitting the

¹ The letters that passed at this period between Marshal Vaillant and Generals Péliissier and Niel will be found in Rousset, ii. pp. 275-299.

attraction of a grand turning movement such as was advised, pointed out the many practical difficulties that would arise in its execution and the serious results that might follow a defeat. At the same time he reiterated his opinion that any relaxation of the actual siege was to be strongly deprecated, since experience showed that it would be at once turned to advantage by the enemy; but in order to give effect to the Emperor's wish for field operations he proposed the following line of action. He would extend his batteries along the Inkerman Ridge, so as to effectually deal with the remaining vessels of the Russian fleet; he would harass the Malakoff Front,¹ not with a great bombardment, followed by an immediate assault, but by a moderate and uninterrupted fire, whereby the defences would be worn down and loss inflicted on the garrison; and while disposing certain troops so as to suggest the idea that a general attack on Sebastopol was impending, he would, with six infantry divisions, all his cavalry, and as many guns as he could muster, suddenly mount the McKenzie Hills and interpose between the fortress and the relieving army.

Sir Harry Jones' Misgivings.—When, however, this letter came to be considered by the War Minister, he asked Péliissier the following question, “*Que devient l'attaque par le Bastion du Mât ? Pourquoi ne joue-t-elle plus de rôle ?*”² This self-same ques-

¹ The “Malakoff Front” was an expression used by the French to describe that portion of the enceinte which included the Malakoff and its annexes, and the Little Redan and the curtain connecting it with the Malakoff.

² Rousset, ii. p. 294.

tion was, in no small degree, exercising the mind of the British Chief Engineer. Ever since June 18 Sir Harry Jones was becoming more and more impressed by the difficulties and dangers of an assault on the Redan, especially if unsupported on the left. On June 21 he drew up a memorandum, in which he expressed the opinion that no success could be hoped for against that work so long as the enemy could command and flank it by guns which could neither be efficiently enfiladed nor counter-battered, and so long as he was enabled to construct new batteries, and arm and man them as fast as they were made. He further submitted that as the February agreement, by which the French were to attack both the Flagstaff Bastion and Malakoff, while the British attacked the Redan, had practically been allowed to lapse, the British should now be employed elsewhere and the attack on the Redan abandoned.¹ This memorandum at once drew a reply from General Niel, in which he agreed that without question the attacks on the Flagstaff Bastion and the Redan constituted a combined operation, thereby incidentally admitting the serious error that the French fell into on June 18; but he urged that to relinquish the attack on the Redan would practically be equivalent to raising the siege.² Sir Harry thereupon remarked that the British had no desire to abandon this attack, if there appeared a fair chance of success and if no

¹ In view of later events, it is important to note the growing anxiety of our engineers in respect to the Redan, and to compare it with the optimistic ideas of the previous April. The memorandum of June 21 is given in "R.E. Journal," ii. pp. 330 etc. See also note 1, p. 421.

² "R.E. Journal," ii. p. 331.

useless sacrifice of life were involved; at the same time he was anxious to be informed what support on the left the French were prepared to offer.¹ No definite record of the French reply is available; but as a result of these discussions our Right Attack was carried slowly forward, and the Russian counter approaches at the Quarries (albeit with much labour and loss of life) were being converted to our use, when on July 30 Sir Harry reported that in view of the Russian fire and the nature of the soil no further advance could be made on the glacis of the Redan. Its flanks, said he, had been strengthened, and the difficulties of the situation were now so great that an assault was too hazardous, and ought not to be attempted.²

Field Operations no longer Contemplated.—General Péliissier's letter to the Emperor was despatched on June 29, and during this exchange of views between the Chief Engineers he does not appear to have displayed any anxiety to carry out his project against the McKenzie Hills. The proposal may have been made merely to amuse Napoleon III.; and as July wore on Marshal Vaillant himself began tactfully to

¹ "R.E. Journal," ii. p. 333.

The lack of support given to our Left Attack by the French was an object of complaint on various occasions. Thus, in "Artillery Operations," p. 108, it is stated, "On the left (June 6) the French fire was feeble and unsustained, thereby throwing a heavier share on the batteries of our Left Attack"; and on June 7, "The batteries of the Left Attack again suffered severely from not receiving the expected support of the French on the left against the Town and Garden Batteries." See also note 1, p. 413.

² The memorandum in question is given in "R.E. Journal," ii. p. 416.

oppose his influence to the idea of field operations, for he realised that the advancing season was unsuitable for the execution of a wide turning movement such as that from Aloushta, and that in any direct attack on the Russian field army a very strong position would be encountered.¹ Indeed, Pélissier himself wrote to the Marshal in the middle of July and expressed the prophetic opinion that whichever force, allied or Russian, quitted its position to attack the other, would inevitably be beaten.² The Emperor still kept harping on his favourite string, and, instancing the success of the expedition to Kertch, could not see why a similar effort should not be made at Aloushta. It appeared to him so simple, so easy, nay, so prudent ; the risk so little, the reward so great.³

Conference of August 1 between the Chief Engineers.—Meanwhile Sir Harry Jones' memorandum brought matters to a crisis. The Allied Generals called upon the two Chief Engineers to meet and confer on the present aspects of the siege and its future prospects. On August 1 a joint report was furnished. The Chief Engineers pointed out that, the French trenches having been pushed as far as it was possible, active operations on the Town Front had for some time ceased, and that the pause had been utilised by the Russians to construct fresh

¹ Rousset, ii. pp. 311-320.

² Marshal Vaillant, when writing to General Niel about this time, said, " Il (Pélissier) dit que le premier de deux qui quittera ses positions fortifiées pour attaquer l'autre sera inévitablement battu " (Rousset, ii. p. 317).

³ Rousset, ii. p. 313.

obstacles for the protection of the Central and Flagstaff Bastions. No further advance could be made on the Faubourg Front until the British had established a marked superiority over the guns protecting the Redan, and the French a like superiority over those protecting the Little Redan and the Malakoff. Siege batteries, to reopen the attack on the Town Front and to prosecute that on the Redan, had been armed and supplied with ammunition ; but the new French batteries in course of construction, to complete the attack on the Malakoff and Little Redan, would not be finished for some days and the delay, though detrimental, must be accepted in view of the desirability of acting everywhere simultaneously. When all was ready they proposed to open a moderate fire on the place, to subdue those guns which most interfered with the advance, to destroy or deform by mortar fire the works they proposed to attack, and to search out by shell fire places where works were in progress or reserves were collected. If the enemy remained silent to preserve his guns, a stratagem already adopted by him, the approaches would be proceeded with ; if he opened fire with any piece or pieces which damaged our works, then all available guns would be concentrated on such pieces until they were silenced, and if this small struggle brought on a more general one it would be sustained. By this means they hoped to push on the trenches to within 70 or 80 yds. of all the works to be attacked, and to make suitable communications and convenient *places d'armes* for the assaulting columns to assemble in ; but, while they considered

that any chance of victory lay in a combined assault against City and Faubourg, they both concurred in the belief that until the relieving army were beaten or driven off, so that the garrison could no longer be constantly renewed, an attack by assault offered little chance of success and was an extreme attempt beyond the rules of war. They added that, if the place did not fall before winter, the siege must be raised.¹

Another Bombardment Agreed On.—These views, the reverse of optimistic, were not altogether accepted by the Generals in chief command; but amid many conflicting ideas there was one on which all were agreed, the necessity of pressing the siege. Whether the relieving army were attacked, or whether another assault were determined upon, in either case the grip on Sebastopol must not be relaxed and the trenches must go forward. Although those on the Town Front had reached their limit of advance, no longer respite must be allowed the enemy in that region; and if those on the Faubourg Front were brought to a standstill by the superiority of the enemy's fire, then this fire must be subdued. For these reasons a fresh bombardment was agreed on, and August 17 fixed for opening fire. But before the day arrived Russian impatience brought about that pitched battle which had so long excited the imagination of Napoleon III.

¹ This report is given in detail in "R.E. Journal," ii. pp. 435 etc.

3. THE TCHERNAYA

Reoccupation of the Left Bank of the Tchernaya by the Allies.—When the April bombardment passed away without any sign from Prince Gortchakoff's army, it was supposed that the bulk of the Russians had withdrawn to the north side of Sebastopol, and, to ascertain whether the line of the Tchernaya had been abandoned, a reconnaissance, under Omer Pasha, was made on April 19. His force consisted of twelve Turkish battalions, supported by French cavalry and artillery (including a rocket troop), by four squadrons of British cavalry, and C Troop, R.H.A. The Pasha advanced to the Tchernaya and occupied the high ground upon its right bank; but nothing was seen of the enemy. A few days later General La Marmora, commanding the Sardinian army, landed at Kamiesch and by the middle of May had assembled 15,000 men at Karani, a mountain village to the west of Balaclava. It was not only feasible but desirable for the Allies to extend their cantonments, and on May 25 three French divisions, under General Canrobert, occupied the Fidioukine Hills and constructed a *tête du pont* at the Traktir Bridge; while two strong divisions of Turks encamped in the North Valley of Balaclava. At the same time the Sardinians, covered by a force of British cavalry, advanced from Karani, occupied Mount Hasfort, and pushed their outposts across the river to the high ground about Tchorgoun. Though in the beginning of May a few Cossack vedettes were still visible on the Causeway Ridge,¹

¹ The mounted troops of the Allies used to drill in the South

no opposition whatever was offered to these movements of the Allies; and early in June, after reconnoitring the Baidar Valley, the French established a cavalry encampment there under General d'Allonville, to whom were attached some British squadrons and a contingent of Turkish infantry. Under the pressure of the increasing allied strength Prince Gortchakoff relinquished the line of the Tchernaya, and retired to the north-west where, hidden by the well-wooded McKenzie Hills and protected by field works constructed on their forward slopes, he was still in touch with the north side of Sebastopol.

Russian Impatience.—But the gallant and prolonged resistance of the great fortress was regarded by the Russians with strong emotion, and the question was asked, not only in court circles, but by the people, “Can the relieving army do nothing, with its 70,000 men?”¹ No one, however, knew better than Prince Gortchakoff how small were his chances of success, should he be forced to attack the Allies. Not only would they possess the advantages of position, but their troops were more numerous than his own and of better quality. The waste of war was keenly felt in the armies of the Czar, and, though reinforcements were constantly reaching the field army, the gaps in it caused by battle and disease were often filled by

Valley of Balaclava, and the Cossack vedettes on the Causeway Ridge were often interested spectators. “They never fired; had they done so, they would have been shelled off the position every morning before the drills began.” After the reconnaissance of May 25 the artillery exercised in the North Valley (“Corunna to Sebastopol,” pp. 227-228, 232).

¹ Rousset, pp. 341 etc.

recruits, badly trained and badly equipped.¹ The Prince, however, was left no choice in the matter. General Vrevsky was despatched by the Czar to urge him to immediate action, and early in August he was directed by orders from St. Petersburg to place the military situation before a Council of War and abide by its decision. As General Todleben was at this time lying in a hospital on the Belbek, and could take no part in the Council, Prince Gortchakoff repaired to his bedside to obtain the opinion of the great engineer. Of this he was left in no doubt, for Todleben expressed a strong opinion against taking the offensive. Vrevsky was present at the interview, and when he heard Todleben's advice he flew into a transport of rage with the sick man, and during the return to camp continued to press his own view of the case upon Prince Gortchakoff. Then, apparently by persistent bluster, he prevailed on the Council to advise an attack on the Tchernaya, and Gortchakoff, although unconvinced and without confidence of success, found himself constrained to act.²

The Position of the Allies on the Tchernaya.—On the night of August 15 the French force on the Fidioukine Hills consisted of 18,000 men and 48 guns; and 10,000 Sardinians with 36 guns were on Mount Hasfort, with outposts at Tchorgoun. A French force of four regiments of cavalry and five troops of horse

¹ Rousset, p. 341.

"Captain F. B. Ward, R.A., who rode over the battlefield of the Tchernaya after the action, noted that the dead and wounded Russians were usually very young, or else men presenting an old and worn appearance" (Ward's "Letters").

² Rousset, ii. p. 343.

artillery were in rear of the Fidioukine Hills ; Scarlett's Cavalry Division was at Kadekoï ; the Reserve Artillery, under Captain F. B. Ward,¹ were at Karani ; and two divisions of Turks were in rear of the Sardinians. The Tchernaya, which ran along the allied front, was fordable almost everywhere at this season of the year. Parallel to it on the left bank was an aqueduct, 4 ft. deep and 8 ft. wide. This was the position Prince Gortchakoff proposed to attack in the early hours of August 16.

With this object he ordered General Read, with the 7th and 12th Divisions, to operate against the Fidioukine Hills, while General Liprandi, with the 5th and 17th Divisions, was to make a simultaneous movement against Mount Hasfort ; but these Generals were ordered to act more as if they were carrying out reconnaissances in force than actual attacks, as the Prince wished to be left free to choose the flank which promised the greater chance of success. Accordingly he held under his own hand the bulk of his guns and cavalry and two infantry divisions, as a central reserve. It was beyond question that if the Allies were defeated, their detached force in the Baidar Valley would be cut off. The Prince further proposed to attack Balaclava with a portion of his force, and to storm the Sapouné Ridge with the remainder, the latter operation to be supported by two vigorous sorties made by the garrison of Sebastopol from either flank of their defences.²

¹ Colonel St. George was removed to the Siege Train, and for a time Captain F. B. Ward was in command of the Reserve Artillery.

² Prince Gortchakoff's orders were found on the body of General

Battle of the Tchernaya.—In pursuance of this plan, Liprandi, at dawn on the 16th, drove in the Sardinian outposts, who retired steadily across the river upon their main body. The Russian artillery, including some batteries of position, then came into action on the high ground west of Tchorgoun and opened fire on Mount Hasfort.

On the other flank General Read, who during the night arrived within cannon range of the Fidioukine Hills, brought his guns into action when the light permitted, and then, contrary to Prince Gortchakoff's directions, began an impetuous assault on the French position. His infantry soon crossed the Tchernaya, and enveloped and captured the *tête du pont* at the Traktir Bridge ; but their further advance was broken by the aqueduct, and the French, making a rapid bayonet charge downhill, drove them in confusion across the river. Seeing this repulse, Gortchakoff at once relinquished the attack on Mount Hasfort and ordered Liprandi to send his 5th Division along the right bank of the Tchernaya to support Read, while a brigade of the 17th crossed that river and attacked the proper right flank of the French position. The brigade forded the river and crossed the aqueduct without mishap, but then the Sardinians, descending from Mount Hasfort, attacked it with great vigour, and, falling on its flank, drove it back across both obstacles. The 7th and 12th Russian Divisions,

Read, who was killed in the battle. Their tenour was conveyed in General Simpson's despatch to Lord Panmure, dated August 18, 1855.

As to the extent of blame attachable to General Read, there is some difference of opinion. See Todleben, ii. pt. ii., cp. xxxix.

supported by the 5th, renewed the attack on the Fidioukine Hills, and an obstinate encounter ensued; but, after some of the hardest fighting of the war, the French were victorious and the enemy defeated with great slaughter. Although driven across the river at all points, the Russians re-formed under the protection of their reserves, and even when General Péliissier himself, accompanied by a brigade of the Imperial Guard and two divisions, arrived upon the scene, the rearguard positions at the disposal of the Russians appeared too strong to justify pursuit, and Prince Gortchakoff retired unmolested, except by artillery fire, to the shelter of the wooded heights he had quitted in the morning. His attack had failed signally and cost him 8,000 men. The French loss was 1,500, and that of the Sardinians 250.¹

Part Taken by the British in the Battle.—In this brilliant victory the British had little or no share. General Scarlett, indeed, moved out to the South Valley, and in accordance with orders placed his force at the disposal of General Péliissier; but except that C Troop fired a few rounds at the close of the action when the Russians were nearly out of range, the Cavalry Division took no part in the fight.² A

¹ Rousset, p. 357.

² In his despatch General Péliissier acknowledged the readiness with which the Cavalry Division appeared on the scene, but he added that there was no opportunity for its employment.

C Troop, R.H.A., appears to have been detached from the rest of the division. It was in the North Valley, and, towards the end of the battle, Colonel Dupuis ordered it forward to the aqueduct where it came into action against the retreating Russians; but "only a few rounds were fired, as the range was great" ("Corunna to Sebastopol," p. 236).

battery of the Reserve Artillery had an opportunity of intervening in the action.

The Reserve Artillery.—The Reserve Artillery were paraded before daylight, and in accordance with orders from head-quarters Captain F. B. Ward, directing J and X Batteries to stand fast,¹ proceeded with Captain E. Moubray's 32-pounder howitzers—V Battery—escorted by two squadrons of Carbineers, to report himself to General La Marmora. Having arrived at Mount Hasfort, the howitzers, in accordance with the wishes of the General, were placed in a small work on the crest of the hill. A Russian light battery was perceived in action to the east of Tchorgoun, and a few rounds from the 32-pounders forced it to retire, but the high ground to the west and north of that village, where Liprandi's heavier artillery was placed, was beyond the reach of the British pieces, which, though larger in calibre, could be outranged by a 9-pounder gun. If the 18-pounder guns had been brought up, they would have had an excellent opportunity of performing good service, but J Battery was standing idle some miles in rear. Fortunately, however, in the same work as V Battery there were two 8-in. iron howitzers which, though manned by the Sar-

¹ J Battery should have been sent to La Marmora. That General, however, had asked for "obusiers." Captain Ward relates how, the day before the battle, he had expressed the opinion that the 18-pounders could have been taken up Canrobert Hill, which was being reconnoitred. He was also of opinion that they could have been taken to Mount Hasfort. But no option was left him in the matter, as the howitzers were expressly selected. They were of little or no value. Seeing that 8-in. iron howitzers were on Mount Hasfort, there is no doubt the 18-pounder guns could have been got there.

dinians, were British guns; and these fired with good effect, blowing up three of the enemy's ammunition wagons. After this catastrophe the Russian guns withdrew, though no doubt this was owing to the fact that the attack on Mount Hasfort was relinquished. Beyond opening fire on a Russian force descending the Chouliou Valley and forcing it to turn off the road, the 32-pounders had no further opportunity for action;¹ but although the service rendered by them was slight, the presence and support of British guns was warmly acknowledged by General La Marmora, who addressed the following letter to the officer commanding the Reserve Artillery²:

“ΚΑΔΙΚΟΪ,
“8 Αούτ.

“MONSIEUR LE COMMANDANT,—

“Il m'est bien agréable de vous remercier, Monsieur, et de vous dire combien j'ai apprécié votre coopération dans la journée du 16 en unissant vos

¹ According to the return in Adye's Order Book, the expenditure of ammunition this day by V Battery was 8 rounds.

² Captain F. B. Ward was in command of the Reserve Artillery and, acting under orders from Head-quarters, he attached himself to General La Marmora. That General's letter was sent to Ward direct; but Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Dupuis, commanding the Royal Artillery in the temporary absence of General Dacres, refused to recognise it, as he considered it had not been sent through the proper channel, nor did he mention Captain Ward's name in his report of the battle. However, when General Dacres reassumed command, he at once sent on La Marmora's letter to Sir Hew Ross, and it was officially noted at Head-quarters that Captain F. B. Ward had “commanded the Royal Artillery attached to the Sardinian Army at the battle of the Tchernaya”; but that officer, by the action taken before General Dacres' return, was deprived of the mention in despatches which he had every right to expect. Captain Moubray's name alone was mentioned. However, both Ward and Moubray received brevet-majorities in the following November (Ward's “Letters,” and certified extracts from official documents).

pièces aux miennes pour la défense de nos positions vivement attaquées par l'ennemi.

"En vous félicitant, Monsieur, sur l'excellent maintien de vos hommes, je me souhaite qu'à la première occasion nous aurons le plaisir de combattre encore ensemble.

"Agréez, Monsieur, etc.,

"(Signed) ALPHONSE LA MARMORA,

"Le Général Commandant l'Armée Sarde."

"TO MONSIEUR LE CAPITAINÉ WARD,

"Commandant la Réserve d'Artillerie, etc."

4. PROGRESS OF SIEGE AND OPENING OF FIFTH BOMBARDMENT

Work in the British Attacks.—Since the conclusion of the fourth bombardment three new batteries were added to our Left Attack—namely, No. 15, in the third parallel; No. 16, in the second parallel; and No. 17, in front of this parallel, at the edge of the Woronzoff Ravine. A fifth parallel was in course of construction, but was not finished till August 21.

In the Right Attack two batteries, Nos. 18 and 19, were made in front of the third parallel, and a new battery, No. 20, was added to the two already existing in the Quarries, where the Russian counter approaches were being converted into our fourth and fifth parallels, a work not completed till August 21.

An observatory, also, was established in rear of the Right Attack, which was in touch with the signallers of H.M.S. *Hannibal*, anchored off the mouth of the Roadstead, and the artillery in the trenches. The movements of the troops in the town, of reliefs, etc., could thus be communicated

to the officers in charge of the various mortar batteries, and by means of this signal station considerable loss was inflicted on the Russians.

Our engineers made a large magazine to contain 3,000 barrels of gunpowder, as well as live shell, rockets, etc., in a secure place at the head of the Woronzoff Ravine, near the Windmill, thus obviating the danger of possible explosions in the siege parks which were situated in the middle of the camps. Subsequent events showed the value of this precaution.¹

The siege batteries continued to fire fitfully till the end of June. In July our daily consumption was on an average some 300 rounds, occasionally increased, as on July 10, when over 1,000 rounds were fired to facilitate the advance of the trenches in the Right Attack. When August came the rate of fire varied greatly; some 90 rounds were fired on the 10th, while on the 16th 800 were expended.

Casualties.—In the interval between the fourth and fifth bombardments the Siege Train had 52

¹ On November 15 a serious explosion in the French park led to some partial explosions in this dépôt. If this occurrence had taken place before the removal of the combustible stores from the centre of our camps, disastrous results would have ensued and many lives must have been sacrificed. Even as it was, Deputy-Assistant-Commissary G. Yellon, whose comrade Hayter was killed on September 8, was now himself killed. Lieutenant C. F. Roberts, R.A., was badly burnt, and Lieutenant J. W. J. Dawson, R.A., was severely wounded and died on December 11 following. The door of the Windmill in which much gunpowder was stored was blown in, and the building began to burn. The danger was imminent, but Captain J. E. G. Grant and a party of gunners were successful in extinguishing the flames. For their gallantry on this occasion, Bombardier Angus Sutherland got the French Military Medal, and Sergeant H. J. Macleod, R.A., was promoted to a commission in the Military Train.

casualties, including 1 officer and 6 men killed. Captain A. Gordon, R.A., had since May been serving as a volunteer in the trenches. He was wounded on June 6, and after three weeks in hospital rejoined the Right Attack, although under orders to return home. On July 6 he was killed by a heavy mortar shell while in No. 14 Battery.

In the Naval Brigade 4 men were killed and 29 wounded.

Reinforcements.—The following reinforcements joined the Siege Train and were posted as shown below :

TABLE L
REINFORCEMENTS

Date of Arrival.	Designation.	Commanding Officer.	Strength.		Posted to
			Officers	Men.	
July 11	No. 2 Company, 1st Battalion . . .	Capt. H. P. Newton .	5	134	R. Attk.
July 11	No. 6 Company, 1st Battalion . . .	Capt. A. F. F. Lennox	4	133	R. Attk.
July 11	No. 4 Company, 3rd Battalion . . .	Capt. T. W. Milward .	3	135	R. Attk.
July 11	No. 3 Company, 1st Battalion . . .	Capt. M. Clifford .	3	134	L. Attk
July 11	No. 7 Company, 4th Battalion . . .	Capt. A. C. L. FitzRoy	3	140	L. Attk.

On August 4, Lieutenant-Colonel Warde being invalided, Lieutenant-Colonel J. St. George, commanding the Reserve Artillery, was appointed to succeed him in command of the Siege Train. On July 20, Colonel Collingwood Dickson being ordered home to take charge of the Waltham Abbey powder mills, Captain H. A. B. Campbell assumed command of the Right Attack, and on August 13 Lieutenant-Colonel Franklyn, being invalided, was succeeded in command of the Left Attack by Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. Barker. On July 21 Captain J. R. Anderson was invalided,

and was succeeded by Captain P. G. Pipon as Commissary of Ordnance.

The Fifth Bombardment.—The fifth bombardment, undertaken for the reasons already mentioned, began with two days' heavy firing. It was then found that the enemy's guns protecting the Redan and Malakoff were sufficiently subdued to admit of the continuation of the saps towards those works, and during the next few days the fire was slackened. The period August 17-21 is assigned as the duration of this bombardment, but, as a fact, fire was kept up with more or less intensity until September 5, when the final bombardment began. These two bombardments merge into each other and do not stand out as separate episodes of the siege, as was the case with the preceding ones.

The following table shows the extent and distribution of the opposing ordnance :¹

TABLE LI
OPPOSING ORDNANCE

Position of Russian Pieces.	Russian Works.			Allied Siege Batteries.		
	Guns.	Mortars.	Total.	Guns.	Mortars.	Total.
From No. 7 Bastion to No. 6 inclusive	61	8	69	44	15	59
Rostislaw Redoubt, Central Bastion, and Schwartz Redoubt, inclusive	110	20	130	101	29	130
From left bank of Town Ravine to the Creek, including Flagstaff, Garden, and Boulevard Batteries	124	14	138	80	32	112
From the Creek to the Middle Ravine, including Barrack Batteries, Redan, etc.	114	12	126	112	61	173
The Malakoff, Little Redan, Point Battery, and their annexes	108	15	123	96	68	164
Total	517	69	586	433	205	638

Part Taken by the British in the Fifth Bombardment.—The British batteries were disposed as shown in the following table :

TABLE LII
DETAIL OF BRITISH BATTERIES
LEFT ATTACK

Battery.	Ordnance.	Manned by
Right Mortar Battery	3 13-in. Mortars	R.A.
No. 1 " "	1 13-in. S.S. Mortar	"
No. 1 Gun Battery .	2 10-in. Guns, 2 8-in. Guns, 5 32-pr. Guns	"
" 2 " "	"
" 3 " "	3 32-pr. Guns, 2 8-in. Guns	R.N.
" 4 " "	4 32-pr. Guns, 1 8-in. Gun, 1 10-in. Gun	"
" 5 " "	"
" 6 " "	"
" 7 " "	6 32-pr. Guns	R.A.
" 8 " "	8 32-pr. Guns	"
" 9 " "	1 68-pr. Gun, 1 10-in. Gun, 2 8-in. Guns	R.N.
" 10 " "	7 8-in. Guns	"
" 11 " "	8 8-in. Guns	"
" 12 Mortar Battery	4 10-in. Mortars	R.A.
" 13 " "	4 13-in. Mortars, 3 10-in. Mortars	"
" 14 Gun Battery .	5 8-in. Guns, 5 32-pr. Guns	"
" 15 Mortar Battery	11 10-in. Mortars	"
" 16 Gun Battery .	7 32-pr. Guns	"
" 17 Battery .	2 32-pr. Guns, 4 5½-in. Bronze Mortars .	"
" 2 Mortar Battery	4 13-in. Mortars	"
" 3 " "	3 13-in. Mortars	"

Total: 109 pieces.

RIGHT ATTACK

Battery.	Ordnance.	Manned by
No. 1 Battery	
" 2 " "	1 10-in. Mortar, 1 68-pr. Gun	R.N.
" 3 " "	1 8-in. Gun, 1 32-pr. Gun	"
" 4 " "	"
" 5 " "	4 32-pr. Guns, 1 8-in. Gun, 2 68-pr. Guns	R.N.
" 6 " "	"
" 7 " "	2 10-in. Mortars	R.A.
" 8 " "	3 10-in. Mortars	"
" 9 " "	7 8-in. Guns	R.N.
" 10 " "	3 13-in. Mortars	R.A.
" 11 " "	3 13-in. Mortars	"
" 12 " "	2 13-in. Mortars	"
" 13 " "	4 5-in. Guns	"
" 14 " "	5 8-in. Guns, 2 10-in. Guns	R.N.
" 15 " "	3 13-in. Mortars	R.A.
" 16 " "	4 8-in. Mortars	"
" 17 " "	3 32-pr. Guns	"
" 18 " "	6 13-in. Mortars, 1 13-in. S.S. Mortar .	"
" 19 " "	2 10-in. Mortars	"
" 20 " "	2 32-pr. Guns, 10 5½-in. Bronze Mortars	"

Total: 73 pieces.

Total both Attacks: 182 pieces.

Left Attack Advanced Batteries Silenced.—At 5 a.m. on August 17 a salvo of three shells fired into the Redan from No. 13 Battery, Right Attack, gave the preconcerted signal for opening fire, and all the British guns at once came into action. Early in the day the fire of the Malakoff was got under, and the French working parties were enabled to push on their approaches; but, owing to some deplorable misunderstanding, the advanced batteries of the Left Attack were unsupported and were so dealt with by the Russians that they were not manned again until September 8. The three batteries, Nos. 7, 8, and 14, in the third parallel of the Left Attack opened fire at 5 a.m., but the French on their left did not begin till 7 a.m., and the batteries manned by the Royal Navy remained silent for some hours.¹ Their inaction permitted so many Russian guns to bear upon our advanced batteries that they were soon overwhelmed by superior fire. Thus the six 32-pounders in No. 7 were engaged by from thirty to forty Russian guns, and the other two batteries

¹ On the right, the French did not open fire till 8 a.m. The silence of the naval batteries was due to one of those unfortunate misunderstandings which are so apt to occur when there is a mixed responsibility and divided command. Todleben remarks:

“Le bastion No. 3, grâce au concours que lui prêtait le flanc gauche du bastion No. 4 et les batteries collatérales, lutta avec succès contre l'artillerie anglaise. Celles de leurs batteries qui étaient installées sur la Montagne vorto dans la troisième parallèle et qui par suite de leur position désavantageuse essayaient plus fortement le feu des bastions Nos. 3 et 4, furent vers midi forcées de cesser complètement leur tir” (Todleben, ii. pt. ii., p. 141).

On this occasion Bombardier John Trotter distinguished himself by clearing away the earth from an embrasure, which had been laid in ruins by the enemy's fire. He received the French Military Medal (See “England's Artillerymen,” p. 244).

were in similar case. Captain W. J. Bolton and Lieutenant C. E. S. Scott were in No. 7 Battery. By 9.30. a.m. four guns were out of action, and a fifth gun, which Bolton himself was laying, was struck in the middle of the chase and broken in two. Bolton was wounded in the face, and all the detachment more or less covered by the splinters; and Scott, who had been hit in the arm, was sent to report to Captain A. Oldfield that No. 7 Battery had only one gun in action. Scott found Oldfield in No. 14 Battery, but before he could speak to him a large mortar shell exploded in rear of the battery, and Oldfield was severely wounded in three places. He was placed on a stretcher and carried back to the first parallel, but only lived an hour.¹ Scott returned to his commanding officer, and found that the last 32-pounder was out of action, whereupon Bolton marched his men back to camp, and was just in time to prevent the relief being sent down to the disabled battery.² Captains A. C. L. Fitzroy and A. C. Hawkins and Lieutenant E. C. Vaughan were in Batteries Nos. 8 and 14. No. 8 fired 900 rounds at the Barrack Batteries, and No. 14, 750 at the Redan, but by noon it was evident the batteries were

¹ "I have had frequently to lament the loss of valuable officers, among whom I wish to particularise the late Captain Oldfield, who was most zealous and indefatigable in his services in the Left Attack" (Major-General Dacres' report to General Simpson, September 14).

² The narrative of events in No. 7 Battery is based on letters written by Lieutenant (now Colonel) C. E. S. Scott, R.A. (Letters in the possession of Major J. H. Leslie).

No. 7 Battery on this day fired 500 rounds before it was silenced (Adye's Order Book).

Captain Oldfield was the senior officer in the third parallel.

untenable and the detachments were withdrawn. The Russian triumph over these advanced batteries is duly chronicled by Todleben, and the gallant fight made by the artillerymen concerned was brought specially under the notice of the General Commanding.

Progress of Bombardment.—On the right our guns contributed their share to the success against the Malakoff, and from both Attacks mortar fire was continued during the night. Next day all our batteries, except the three advanced batteries of the Left Attack, opened in concert with the French and the general bombardment was continued, but without special incident.

Progress of Works.—The battle of the Tchernaya had now reconciled all conflicting views and the end was in sight. New batteries were being made, and all the approaches were pressed on very much in accordance with the memorandum of August 1, except that progress against the Redan was very slow. After the completion of the fifth parallel a sap was broken out in the direction of the capital of that work, but further advance was soon forbidden, not only by the close fire of the enemy, but also by the fact that the picks were encountered by solid rock. A terrible explosion of 15,000 lb. of powder, which took place on August 28 in the Brancion Redoubt on the Mamelon, and nearly wrecked that work, delayed for a few more days the crisis that was fast approaching.


5. THE FINAL BOMBARDMENT

Russian Plans.—The attempt on the Tchernaya was doubtless Prince Gortchakoff's last card, and when he reached Sebastopol he was able to realise the critical state of affairs in that city. On August 17 the casualties were 1,500, on the following days the average was about 1,000, and even when the fire had somewhat diminished after the 22nd there was still a daily loss of 500 or 600 men.¹ During August a floating bridge was made across the Roadstead, which permitted the free transport of men and material from the south to the north side of Sebastopol; everything was in readiness for a retreat, and on the 24th the Prince wrote to the War Minister that there was not a man in the army who did not think it folly to continue the defence. But a few days afterwards he appears to have taken a desperate resolution. "I am resolved," wrote he on September 1, "to continue the defence of the south side of Sebastopol *à outrance*."²

At this date the garrison consisted of 50,000 men, including 4,000 seamen-gunners, the sole survivors of that gallant 180,000 who undertook the defence a year previously. Every effort again was made to renew and strengthen the defences, to replace damaged ordnance, and above all to provide ample blinded cover. There were still 1,380 pieces mounted on the


¹ From the *Invalides Russe*, quoted in "Letters from Head-quarters," ii. 404, n.

² Rousset, ii. p. 375.



BARRACK BATTERY (NO. 5) AFTER THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL.

(From a contemporary photograph.)



IN THE TRENCHES, 1855.

(From a contemporary photograph).

south side of Sebastopol, of which 682, including 56 field guns, were in front line.¹

Conference of September 3.—On September 3 the Chief Engineers of the Allies had their last conference and concurred in thinking that the time for a general assault was at hand. They pointed out, however, that though the guns protecting the Malakoff were mastered, no superiority had yet been obtained over those of the Town Front or the Redan. They therefore recommended an energetic bombardment of three days as a prelude to the assault.² For a time General Péliissier seemed to hesitate; he, who had been so impetuous, was now inclined to caution, and he spoke of waiting for a large reinforcement of mortars which was on its way. But on the Chief Engineers urging the dangers of delay, he eventually agreed with their proposals and, with the complete concurrence of Sir James Simpson, the bombardment was fixed for September 5.³

Progress of Works.—By this date three new batteries, Nos. 18, 19, and 20, were completed in the Left Attack, although not armed. In the Right Attack No. 21, for two 8-in. mortars, was constructed in front of No. 18 Battery; No. 22 Battery, for three guns, was made at Egerton's Pits; and two new emplacements were added to No. 14 Battery. The five additional guns (68-pounders and 8-in.) thus provided for were intended to fire against the flanks of

¹ Todleben, ii. pt. ii., p. 183.

² See notes 1, p. 395; 1, p. 421.

³ "L'expérience du 18 Juin avait fortement agi sur le Général Péliissier: de l'extrême audace il était passé à la prudence extrême" (Rousset, ii. p. 365).

the Redan, but most unfortunately it was not found possible to mount them in time for the bombardment.

The French batteries were also increased in number, and the extension of trenches on the Inkerman Ridge referred to in Pélissier's letter to the Emperor was carried out, though at considerable cost of men.¹ The guns of our allies situated above Cape Troitsky were now very favourably placed to oppose the Russian ships, which no longer ventured to anchor when supporting the land defence with their fire.

The Opposing Ordnance.—The allied and Russian ordnance, as they existed at the sixth bombardment, did not differ materially from that employed on August 17. Todleben says that out of the 982 pieces comprised in the five sections of the defence, 600 were directly opposed to the siege batteries, the others being used to watch the ravines and approaches from the sea, for flanking fire, and for interior defence. He adds, however, that some of the 600 pieces were dismounted in the fifth bombardment, and were not replaced.² The French pieces amounted to 620, the British to 183.³

The British batteries were disposed as shown in the following table:

¹ Rousset, ii. pp. 307 etc.

² Todleben, ii. pt. ii., p. 153.

³ Niel (p. 531) gives 620 as the number of the French pieces employed, which includes those borrowed from the British and Turks, as well as captured ordnance. It is not known how many of these pieces were actually in action.

The number of the British pieces includes only those manned and fired during the bombardment, and is taken from Adye's Order Book.

TABLE LIII
DETAIL OF BRITISH BATTERIES
LEFT ATTACK

Battery.	Ordnance.	Manned by
Right Mortar Battery	4 13-in. Mortars	R.A.
No. 1 " "	1 13-in. S.S. Mortar	"
" 1 Gun Battery .	2 10-in. Guns, 2 8-in. Guns, 2 32-pr Guns	"
" 2 " "	"
" 3 " "	5 32-pr. Guns	R.N.
" 4 " "	4 32-pr. Guns, 1 10-in. Gun, 1 8-in. Gun	"
" 5 " "	"
" 6 " "	"
" 7 " "	6 32-pr. Guns	R.A.
" 8 " "	8 32-pr. Guns	"
" 9 " "	2 68-pr. Guns, 2 8-in. Guns	R.N.
" 10 " "	2 32-pr. Guns, 5 8-in. Guns	"
" 11 " "	7 8-in. Guns, 1 68-pr. Gun	"
" 12 Mortar Battery	4 10-in. Mortars	R.A.
" 13 " "	4 13-in. Mortars, 3 10-in. Mortars	"
" 14 Gun Battery .	5 8-in. Guns, 5 32-pr. Guns	"
" 15 Mortar Battery	11 10-in. Mortars	"
" 16 Gun Battery .	7 32-pr. Guns	"
" 17 " "	2 32-pr. Guns	"
" 2 Mortar Battery	4 13-in. Mortars	"
" 3 " "	3 13-in. Mortars	"

Nos. 18, 19, and 20 Batteries were not armed.

Total: 103 pieces.

RIGHT ATTACK

Battery.	Ordnance.	Manned by
No. 1 Battery
" 2 " .	1 10-in. Mortar	R.N.
" 3 " .	{ 4 68-pr. Guns, 6 32-pr. Guns, 2 10-in. Guns }	"
" 4 "	"
" 5 "	"
" 6 "	"
" 7 " .	2 10-in. Mortars	R.A.
" 8 " .	3 10-in. Mortars	"
" 9 " .	7 8-in. Guns	R.N.
" 10 " .	3 13-in. Mortars	R.A.
" 11 " .	3 13-in. Mortars	"
" 12 " .	2 13-in. Mortars	"
" 13 " .	2 32-pr. Guns, 2 8-in. Guns	"
" 14 " .	5 32-pr. Guns, 2 10-in. Guns	R.N.
" 15 " .	3 13-in. Mortars	R.A.
" 16 " .	4 8-in. Mortars	"
" 17 " .	6 32-pr. Guns	"
" 18 " .	6 13-in. Mortars, 1 13-in. S.S. Mortar	"
" 19 " .	2 10-in. Mortars	"
" 20 " .	2 32-pr. Guns	"
" 21 " .	2 8-in. Guns	"
" 22 "	"
In parallel .	10 5½ in. Bronze Mortars	R.A.

Total: 80 pieces.

Total both Attacks: 183 pieces.

Failure to Mount Guns to Oppose Flanks of Redan.

—The failure to mount the guns in Nos. 14 and 22 Batteries was due to one of those small oversights which often exact heavy penalties in war. The engineers finished their work on September 6, and it was intended that the five guns should be mounted by the artillery during the night, but all their efforts were foiled by the constant breaking of worn-out guys and falls. All the rope in the siege parks was of a similar quality—old and worn. What was wanted was new 2½-in. white rope, and none was to be had from any military store. Application was then made to the Royal Navy, and on the evening of the 7th an orderly arrived in the Right Attack with a coil of rope of the requisite size. But this rope was tarred, and was therefore perfectly useless, as it would not run through the sheaves of the pulley-blocks. Nothing was left then but to renew the attempts with the stores at hand. The ropes broke sometimes when the guns were got within a few inches of the trunnion holes. The most intelligent non-commissioned officers were selected for the work, and unremitting labour went on all night and even after dawn, but only one gun was mounted in No. 22. The two guns to be mounted in No. 14 were given over to the Naval Brigade, as this was one of its batteries, but its efforts met with no better success.¹

Reinforcements.—The bombardment was in progress when the last reinforcements² arrived and were posted as shown in the following table :

¹ "Artillery Operations," pp. 184–185, n.

² No. 1 Company, 4th Battalion (Captain A. G. Burrows) joined the

TABLE LIV
REINFORCEMENTS

Date of Arrival.	Designation.	Commanding Officer.	Strength.		Posted to
			Officers	Men.	
Sept. 6	No. 6 Company, 3rd Battalion . . .	Capt. H. A. Vernon .	4	114	R. Attk.
Sept. 6	No. 1 Company, 9th Battalion . . .	Capt. the Hon. W. C. Yelverton . . .	4	114	R. Attk.
Sept. 6	No. 1 Company, 7th Battalion . . .	Capt. E. H. Fisher .	2	116	L. Attk.
Sept. 6	No. 2 Company, 8th Battalion . . .	Capt. N. M ^c I. Mackay	4	118	L. Attk.

Opening of Final Bombardment.—At 5 a.m. on September 5 the Allies opened fire against both Town and Faubourg Fronts, and very soon the Malakoff was rendered incapable of making any reply. The Redan, Redan Wall, Barrack, Garden, and Crowsnest Batteries, however, were quite unsubdued. The guns mounted in No. 14 Battery, Right Attack, were directed exclusively on the right flank of the Redan; but the left flank of that work, containing three carronades, was perforce neglected, and the original scheme of assault which included the attack upon it, had to be altered.¹ Towards Siege Train after the fall of Sebastopol. Captain Vernon's and Captain Yelverton's companies did not reach the trenches before the conclusion of the bombardment.

¹ Sir Harry Jones was certainly not sanguine as to the success of an assault in the Redan (see note 1, p. 395). Writing after the events of September 8, he says: "The attack on the Redan is not to be regarded as a simple and isolated operation, but part of the great combination for the day, made with a view to ensure an entrance into the town on any point attacked, in the then state of the defences. No attack on the Redan by assault was contemplated by the English General, nor would it have been undertaken, except from the circumstances of the French army having but a small quantity of ammunition remaining, and, having advanced their trenches and batteries very close to the enemy's works, it was absolutely necessary for an advance to be made, or to abandon the siege altogether. It was therefore determined, with a view to distract the attention of the enemy as much as possible, that

evening the bombardment subsided, the mortars only remaining in action during the night. A Russian frigate was set on fire, and during the hours of darkness the flames illumined the sky and lighted up the enemy's works, into which the mortar shells could be seen falling with great accuracy. Throughout the day and night all the artillery at Balaclava were employed in drawing up trucks of ammunition along the railway, while large parties of infantry, mules from the Land Transport Corps, and teams from the field batteries on the Plateau, assisted in carrying it to the trenches.

Progress of Bombardment.—During the next two days a similar bombardment was carried on, and again the nights were lighted up by burning shipping and bursting mortar shells. At dawn on the 8th a heavy cannonade was opened, and for the first time since August 17 the advanced batteries of the Left Attack were manned. The field troops continued to bring up ammunition, and the dangerous service of transporting it in carts to the batteries during daylight was performed by artillery teams, supplied by the troops and batteries.¹

one column instead of three, according to the original plan of operations, should attack the Redan. . . . Any person who inspects the plan of attack will see that the part assigned to the English was not the point on which a decisive impression could be made on the garrison. . . . So long as he [the enemy] could retain possession of the Malakoff and Bastion du Mât, it would not have been possible for the English . . . to have established themselves within it [the Redan]. . . . That the attack failed is no doubt a matter for regret" ("R.E. Journal," ii. p. 538).

It is to be noted that by thus attacking the salient the assaulting column was exposed to a flanking fire from the Garden Batteries.

¹ "The chief way in which the horse and field batteries were engaged

At noon the fire of the French on the Malakoff Front suddenly ceased : the hour for the assault had come.

6. THE ASSAULTS OF SEPTEMBER 8

Plan of Attack.—The plan agreed upon by the allied Generals was this : The main attack was to be delivered against the Malakoff Front by the French, while subsidiary attacks were made elsewhere, in order to maintain the segregation of the enemy's forces and to prevent him, should the attack on the Malakoff prove successful, from attempting its recapture. To this end, as soon as success in that quarter appeared certain, the British were at a preconcerted signal to attack the Redan, while the French delivered an assault upon the Town Front.¹

French Force to Attack the Malakoff.—In the attack of the Malakoff Front the French arranged to employ 61 battalions (25,300 men) under the supreme command of General Bosquet. General MacMahon's Division, supported by Wimpffen's Brigade and the Zouaves of the Guard, was to attack the Malakoff ; La Motterouge's Division, with the

[in the siege] was in arming the breaching batteries, and very nasty work it was. We took down all the heavy guns, powder, shot, shells, etc., being peppered by the Russians the whole time whilst we were going across the open" (General H. T. Arbuthnot to author). See App. 9, 482.

¹ "R.E. Journal," ii. pp. 531 etc., where the memorandum of agreement drawn up by the commanding officers of Artillery and Engineers, both French and British, is given *in extenso*. This memorandum was translated into English by Major, afterwards General, S. E. Gordon, who in his paper, "The Assault of the Redan," "R.A.I.P." xii. pp. 227 etc., lays great stress on the auxiliary nature of the British attack.

Grenadiers and Voltigeurs of the Guard, was to attack the curtain between the Malakoff and the Little Redan; and Dulac's Division and Marolle's Brigade and the Chasseurs of the Guard were directed against the latter work. These three operations were to commence at noon, without signal. When the Malakoff fell, the French and British flags were to be displayed on the Brancion Redoubt, and the two subsidiary attacks were at once to be made on the Town Front and the Redan.¹

British Force to Attack the Redan.—As the fire of the flanks of the Redan had not been subdued, it was considered necessary to direct the attack on the salient. Throughout the campaign the 2nd and Light Divisions had hitherto borne the brunt of the infantry fighting, and their ranks were full of recruits and young soldiers; yet, in spite of this, these divisions were now selected to deliver the attack. They were under the command of Lieut.-Generals Sir William Codrington and F. Markham, the former being senior officer. The formation for attack was as follows:

(1) A covering party of 200 rifles to keep down the fire from the enemy's embrasures.

(2) A ladder party of 320 men, with 40 ladders, to assemble in the advanced sap that issued from the fifth parallel, Right Attack.

(3) The main assaulting body, 1,000 strong, drawn from both divisions, to assemble in the fifth parallel.

(4) The support of 1,500 men, drawn from the same divisions, to assemble in the fourth parallel and its approaches.

¹ Rousset, ii. pp. 369 etc.

(5) An armed working party of 200 men.

(6) The additional support, 3,000 strong, being the remainder of the two divisions, to assemble in the third parallel.

The 3rd Division, with the 4th in rear, was to take post in the Left Attack; the Highland Division was to be brought up from Balaclava, and occupy the rear trenches of the Right Attack; the 1st Division was to remain under arms, in front of its camp; and General Simpson, with the Head-quarter Staff, proposed to be in No. 1 Battery, Left Attack.¹

French Force to Attack the Town Front.—For the attack on the Town Front, General de Salles, commanding the 1st French Corps, had 57 battalions (20,580 men). His principal object of attack was the Central Bastion with its annexes, the Schwartz Redoubt, and the Belkine Lunette, and two brigades of Levaillant's Division were detailed for this purpose. When this attack was successfully pushed home, the left face and the gorge of the Flagstaff Bastion were to be assaulted by d'Autemarre's Division, while Cialdini's Sardinian Brigade was to throw itself against the right face.*

Assault of the Malakoff.—The three columns told off for the attack of the Malakoff Front were to advance without signal exactly at noon; and at the appointed hour MacMahon's stormers sprang from their trenches, the Zouaves leading. The ditch of the Malakoff was full of débris and offered no obstacle

¹ "R.E. Journal," ii. p. 534, and "Letters from Head-quarters," ii. pp. 410 etc.

² Rousset, ii. p. 369.

to an advance, and in a few moments the interval separating the salient of the work from the advanced parallel was crossed, and the French troops obtained a footing in the enceinte. It was the dinner hour of the Russians who, harbouring no suspicion of the impending attack, had withdrawn in great numbers to the blindages. Only the artillerymen serving the guns remained on the ramparts, and on the sudden appearance of the French these gallant soldiers threw themselves upon them with no better arms than handspikes and rammers. But the contest was hopeless. Decaen's Brigade became immediately master of the salient, where the tricolour was planted at the moment that Vinoy's Brigade entered the enceinte by the Gervais Battery.¹

With equal celerity, St. Pol's Brigade of Dulac's Division broke into the Little Redan, and in the centre Bourbaki's Brigade of La Motterouge's Division cleared the curtain joining this work to the Malakoff. The gorges of the two works were connected by a strong retrenchment which was now attacked, on the left by Bourbaki, towards the right by St. Pol. Bourbaki was successful and captured four guns, but St. Pol was driven back to the Little Redan. Dulac's second brigade was not on the spot, and St. Pol, without supports, was driven out of the Little Redan ; the consequence being that Bourbaki, whose right flank was left open, had to retreat also. The French left, under MacMahon, alone held its ground, and Bosquet sent forward reserves in support of his centre and right ; but the trenches were choked

¹ Rousset, ii. pp. 377 etc.

up by the killed and wounded, and a general advance was difficult. The curtain and Little Redan, however, were again carried by assault, and though the French were soon driven out of the latter with serious loss, La Motterouge clung to the curtain which he lined with infantry, although under a serious fire of grape from the retrenchment. It was at this moment the French artillery performed a deed of desperate valour, which for its magnificent folly vies with the Light Cavalry charge at Balaclava. Two field batteries were drawn up near the Victoria Redoubt, and a path had been prepared for their advance across the trenches which intervened between them and the enceinte of Sebastopol, the necessary openings being blinded by gabions. These batteries Bosquet now ordered forward to clear the retrenchment of its defenders. The gabions being brushed aside, Commandant Souty led the guns at a brisk trot through the prepared intervals, and, crossing the French advanced parallel, formed line to the front for action. The result might have been foreseen. The twelve field guns were at once overwhelmed by the heavier metal and musketry fire opposed to them; Souty was killed, and of the 150 men he had led into action only 55 issued from the combat; while 19 horses were all that were left for the 12 guns and 12 wagons.¹ It was now about half-past two o'clock, and no further advance was made on the centre and left.² About half-past three a large magazine exploded in

¹ Rousset, ii. p. 381.

² General Bosquet was wounded, and succeeded in the command by General Dulac.

the Postern¹ in rear of the Malakoff, and for a moment threw La Motterouge's troops into disorder ; but the panic soon passed and they held steadfastly on to the curtain, while MacMahon established his position in the Malakoff. The Russians, however, maintained their hold of the retrenchment and Little Redan, against which the French guns reopened a heavy fire.²

Assault of the Redan.—Soon after twelve o'clock the French and British flags were displayed on the Brancion Redoubt, and General Simpson gave the signal for the attack on the Redan. The covering party of the Rifles thereupon issued from the trenches and advanced in extended order against the salient. The ladder party prepared to follow ; but before they got clear of the trench our young soldiers perceived that the French were masters of the Malakoff and, breaking through all restraints of discipline, rushed in tumult from the parallel. Thus at the very outset the elements of disorder were sown. Nevertheless, the 200 yds. that intervened between the trenches and the salient were soon passed over by our leading troops, and the abattis, *trous de loup*, etc., failed to prove serious obstacles. Lieut.-Colonel F. F. Maude of the Buffs, with a portion of the ladder party, was the first to enter the Redan, where soon a small body of British troops were established in the salient. Colonel H. Shirley, who led the stormers of the Light Division, was

¹ This was the name of an abandoned Russian battery, behind the Malakoff ; it was used as a magazine (Rousset, ii. p. 381).

² Rousset, ii. pp. 378-382.

wounded in the advance and Colonel C. A. Windham, who commanded those of the 2nd Division, was the senior officer present. The salient was well provided with traverses and parados, and behind these the small British force took shelter; for the Russians had retired to a retrenchment across the gorge, from which they maintained a heavy fire. Meanwhile more ladders were planted at the salient of the Redan, clear of the heavy fire that flanked the faces. There was a good deal of débris in the ditch, which was only 8 ft. wide and 15 ft. deep, so that the engineers had little difficulty in constructing a ramp which gave easy access to the work. They also pulled down gabions from the counterscarp and, filling them with stones, set about making cover on either hand, to afford some shelter from the fire of the flanks; but before their task was completed our troops were driven from the work.

The adventurous body in the salient did not receive proper support. From the shelter of the traverses they could see the formidable force holding the retrenchment which commanded the open *terre-plein*,¹ and nothing but the advancing tide of a strong body of supports in formation could have carried them forward. No such body arrived; messengers were sent back to point out the urgent necessity for help, but either they failed to reach the commanding officers, or the request was unheeded. Men in driblets, it is true, found their way into the work; but owing to the persistent and unsubdued fire from the flanks of

¹ Persistent reports in the London newspapers maintained that this *terre-plein* had been mined by the Russians.

the Redan, all who approached it naturally made for the salient, and such reinforcements as reached Windham came up on a very narrow front which it was found impossible to extend. Captain W. J. Williams, R.A., acting A.D.C. to Major-General C. T. Straubenzee, was in the work with Windham, and at this trying time he displayed conspicuous courage.¹ But all efforts to produce order in the prevailing confusion were in vain. Officer after officer was killed or wounded while endeavouring to lead on the men for a rush at the retrenchment; regiments, companies, and sections were hopelessly intermingled, and the men found themselves under officers whom they did not recognise. At length, in despair, Windham himself went back to collect reinforcements; but in his temporary absence those within it quitted the Redan, after maintaining their position for about an hour. The Russians immediately hurried a field gun to the salient to open fire on our retreating troops, but it was at once put out of action by the siege batteries, who directed a furious fire upon the work. Beyond all question the failure of the attack was mainly due to the want of organised infantry support, and to the absence of that artillery support which might reasonably have been expected. Doubt-

¹ "I have this moment received two notes from General Officers Windham and Straubenzee, mentioning the gallantry of Captain Williams during the attack on the Redan on the 8th, when he was acting A.D.C. to the latter; it was equally conspicuous on August 18, when he commanded the spiking party" (General Dacres to General Simpson, September 14).

[2136] Captain Williams, afterwards General Sir William John Williams, K.C.B., Colonel-Commandant, was thenceforward known as "Devil Williams."

less our siege batteries kept up a brisk fire on all parts of the Redan that were unassailed, as well as on the supporting batteries; but the want of the five guns in Nos. 14 and 22 Batteries, which would have dealt with the flanking Russian carronades, was fatal. Again, when they captured the Malakoff it was the duty of the French to turn some of its guns on the gorge of the Redan, and this they failed to do. Their spiking party placidly contented themselves with spiking the guns.

The services of our own artillery spiking party were not called for. It remained under the command of Captain Gronow Davis, who had volunteered to lead it, at the head of the advanced sap. But though the twenty gallant men composing it had no opportunity for their own special work, they exerted themselves during and after the assault in rescuing the wounded. Davis himself and Bombardier Daniel Cambridge obtained the Victoria Cross for their gallantry, and others of the party received honourable distinctions of various kinds.¹

In this disastrous attack the British had over 2,000 casualties, and the trenches were choked up

¹ Captain G. Davis was the Second-Captain of Captain J. Travers' Ball Cartridge Brigade. Bombardier Cambridge received the Sardinian Medal as well as the Victoria Cross. He was twice wounded. Sergeant William Armstrong received a commission in the Military Train. Corporal James Hamilton, who carried a wounded officer of the 3rd Buffs from the ditch of the Redan to the advanced trench (200 yds.), received the French Military Medal, as also did Bombardier John Bower, for devoted work among the wounded. Gunners Botfield and McArdle, who had previously distinguished themselves on June 18, were again noticed, and both received the French Military Medal, as also did Gunners Henderson and O'Brien ("England's Artillerymen," pp. 246 etc.).

with the dead and wounded. It was impossible at the time to organise a fresh attack, and General Simpson ordered Lieutenant-General Sir Colin Campbell to make another assault next morning with the Highland Division.¹

Assault of Town Front.—It was between one and two o'clock when the French assaulted the Town Front. Trochu's Brigade advanced against the Belkine Redoubt and the right face of the Central Bastion, while Couston's Brigade attacked its left face and the Schwartz Redoubt. The garrison of the latter were expelled, but, on Trochu's attack failing, Couston was also driven back and during the retreat both generals were wounded. Rallying his men, Levaillant made a second attempt; and, this attack failing also, the idea of attacking the Flagstaff Bastion was abandoned and d'Autemarre's Division was directed against the Schwartz Redoubt. On issuing from the trenches it was immediately assailed on its right flank by a heavy fire of artillery, and the division, reeling under the shock, was compelled to retire after two Brigadiers had been killed. General de Salles was obliged to content himself with opening a furious cannonade against the works that had defied him.²

The Malakoff Alone Captured.—Thus, except at

¹ See "R.E. Journal," ii. pp. 535 etc.; also the Reports (in same Journal) of Captain H. Montague, in engineer charge of the assault, p. 540, and of Lieutenant G. Ranken, in engineer charge of the ladder party, p. 539.

Also "Letters from Head-quarters," ii. pp. 411 etc., and Rousset, ii. pp. 382 etc.

² Rousset, ii. pp. 385 etc.

the Malakoff where the tricolour waved in solitary glory, the Allies had failed in their assaults ; but to hold the Malakoff was to hold Sebastopol. The Russians had suffered terrible losses from the necessity of keeping their infantry close to the parapets, but with unabated gallantry they spared no effort to recover the key of the fortress. The Malakoff,¹ however, had no open *terre-plein* commanded by a retrenchment, and assailants once established therein fought on equal terms with the defenders. Although Prince Gortchakoff called up every man that could be spared, the French, by 2 p.m., had established themselves at the gorge as well as at the salient ; the only Russians left in the work were a desperate band who held the central tower and refused to surrender. Some gabions were heaped up and set on fire to smoke out this small garrison, but they flamed so fiercely that the expense magazines were in danger, and men were set to dig up earth to smother the fire. While this work was in progress some electric wires were discovered and immediately cut. A small mortar was now brought up, the strong door of the tower was blown in, and the garrison laid down their arms ; but at this moment the explosion at the Postern, before referred to, took place. Débris was hurled in

¹ " Au Petit Redan, au Grand Redan, au bastion Central, les traverses peu nombreuses et surtout reculées vers la ligne de gorge laissaient devant elles un terre-plein découvert, un vaste espace où l'assaillant, nécessairement en tumulte, ne trouvait ni appui pour se reformer, ni abri pour se couvrir, etc. A Malakof, rien de pareil ; le terre-plein, réduit au saillant, n'avait qu'une étendue restreinte," etc. (Rousset, ii. p. 388).

all directions, and though La Motterouge's Division was the chief sufferer, casualties occurred in the Malakoff. For a moment the gallant little band of Russians were in imminent danger, for the enraged French soldiers had seen the wires and imagined that their prisoners had fired a mine ; but the French officers at once intervened, and the last defenders of the Malakoff, honoured by their chivalrous enemies, lived to receive the just reward of their valour at the hands of the Czar.¹

In their successful resistance to all attempts to recapture the Malakoff, the French were assisted by the fire of No. 17 Battery, Right Attack, under the command of Second-Captain C. E. Burt, which materially checked the advance of Russian supports moving across the Faubourg to the Malakoff. The efficiency of the left guns being marred by the direction of the embrasures, the gunners tore down the gabions revetting their cheeks, and thus all the 32-pounder guns in the battery were brought into play.² Their deadly effect was visible next day, when heaps of men, horses, and broken limbers were found lying on the ground over which their fire was directed.³


Evacuation of Sebastopol.—Soon after dark incendiary fires broke out in the town, and about 11 p.m. some magazines in the Little Redan were blown up. About 3 a.m. on the 9th, Corporal J. Ross,⁴ of the

¹ Rousset, ii. p. 392.

² Sergeant-Major W. Flockhart, No. 1 of one of these guns, was given the French Military Medal.


³ " Artillery Operations," p. 187.

⁴ Corporal Ross received the Victoria Cross.



Major C. H. Owen, R.A., del.

GUN WITH ROPE MANTLET, AND ROPE MANTLET IN EMBRASURE,
IN THE REDAN.



Major C. H. Owen, R.A., del.

POWDER MAGAZINE IN THE REDAN, SHOWING SUPPORTS OF ROOF AGAINST
MORTAR SHELLS.



Royal Sappers and Miners, at work on the glacis of the Redan, became impressed by the unusual silence in the work, and, creeping cautiously forward, he discovered that the Russians had abandoned it.

The fact was confirmed by a staff officer sent forward by Sir Colin Campbell, who found that the Russians had dressed our wounded before they left the work.² As morning advanced magazine explosions followed each other in quick succession, and the whole city, with the exception of one large building used as a hospital, was in flames.³ During the night the Russians had sunk their remaining warships, and crossed to the north side by means of the floating bridge. So nicely was this operation timed that by daylight the bridge had been broken up and its sections towed across the harbour, while the rear of the Russian column could be seen ascending to the higher ground that rose from the margin of the water. In a word, the great siege was at an end.

Casualties.—The losses of both sides in this last day's fighting, terrible to contemplate, are shown in Table LV. on page 436.⁴

¹ "R.E. Journal," ii. p. 537.

² "I was all over the Redan at daylight on the morning of the 9th. . . . Before leaving the Russians dressed our wounded and did not blow up the magazine of the Redan, which was very humane on their part" ("Letters from the Army in the Crimea, by a Staff Officer who was there," p. 222. This officer was Major A. Stirling, Brigade-Major Highland Brigade).

³ For a description of the terrible sufferings of the wounded found in this hospital, see "Letters from Head-quarters," ii. pp. 419 etc.

⁴ Quoted from the *Invalides Russe, Moniteur*, and *London Gazette* in "Letters from Head-quarters." ii. n. 421.

TABLE LV
CASUALTIES

	Officers.			Men.			Total.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
Russian .	59	279	24	2,625	6,964	1,739	11,690
French .	145	254	10	1,489	4,259	1,400	7,557
English .	29	129	1	361	1,914	176	2,610
Total .	233	662	35	4,475	13,137	3,315	21,857

The casualties that occurred in the British batteries from August 17 to September 8 inclusive are shown in the following table :

TABLE LVI
CASUALTIES

	Officers.		N.O. (or Petty) Officers and Men.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Royal Artillery, Right Attack .	1	5	8	55
„ „ Left Attack .	3	4	10	74
„ „ Total .	4	9	18	129
Naval Brigade .	1	6	12	69
Grand Total .	6	14	30	198

Total casualties, 248.

Captain Oldfield was killed on August 17, as already described. Second-Captain E. G. Snow was killed in the Left Attack on September 5. Deputy-Assistant - Commissary W. Hayter, who was so active during the whole siege in the work of his department and served in the sixth bombardment as a volunteer, was killed in the Right Attack on September 8. Captain A. C. L. Fitzroy, conspicuous for his gallantry on August 17, was on September 8 again in the advanced batteries of the Left Attack, where he distinguished himself in unmasking an

embrasure under heavy fire. While he was on his way to camp after being relieved, he was struck in the spine by a musket-ball, and the wound proved mortal. On the same day Lieutenant Champion was severely wounded in the Left Attack. Major C. S. Henry was in No. 16 Battery, Left Attack, on August 17, and about midday received a wound by which he lost his right arm. Lieutenant C. E. S. Scott was wounded on August 19, and Lieutenant P. Dickson on August 20, both in the Left Attack. The following were all wounded when in the Right Attack : Lieutenant F. W. de Winton on August 24, Captain C. G. Arbuthnot for the second time, on August 26, Lieutenant J. A. Price on September 2, Lieutenant C. F. Roberts on September 3, and Lieutenant C. J. Tyler on September 8.

Commander L. Hammet, R.N., was killed on August 17.

In the fifth bombardment the British siege batteries fired 26,270 rounds, in the sixth 28,476, and in the interval between the two bombardments, about 13,000.

During the period August 17—September 8 six guns were permanently disabled in the Right Attack, and eight in the Left Attack. Six carriages, beds, etc., were destroyed.

7. THE END OF THE WAR

After the fall of Sebastopol, a combined force of the Allies were stationed in the city, the British contingent consisting of the 3rd Buffs, and 500 men

from the Siege Train. The Russians occupied the north side, where they set to work to strengthen their position; while the Allies began the destruction of the seaward forts and the docks of Sebastopol.

Eupatoria.—Towards the middle of September General d'Allonville, with a French force of 2,000 light cavalry and several infantry battalions, embarked at Kamiesch for Eupatoria, to reinforce Achmet Pasha, who with 30,000 Turks was operating in the neighbourhood, and at Lake Sasik the French cavalry had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves. Early in October Marshal Péliissier¹ requested that a reinforcement of British cavalry should join d'Allonville, and accordingly Lord George Paget, with the Light Cavalry Brigade and C Troop, R.H.A. proceeded to Eupatoria. Here they took part in various tedious reconnaissances to ascertain the enemy's strength and position.

During an operation of this kind, on October 27, Captain H. J. Thomas, who now commanded C Troop, found an opportunity of displaying to advantage the capability of horse artillery. On this day, as he knew there was a probability of long and rapid movements, he selected three well-horsed wagons to accompany the troop, and, on finding himself a target for position guns firing at a known range, he was able to gallop through the dangerous zone without mishap and bring his light pieces into action at

¹ The Emperor made General Péliissier a Marshal at the fall of Sebastopol. There was also an exchange of the highest distinctions of the Legion of Honour and the Bath between France and the United Kingdom.

a range suitable to their powers. This episode made a deep impression on the Russian officers who, when they met our officers at the signing of the armistice, bore witness to the great effect of Captain Thomas' fire.

No serious fighting, however, fell to the lot of C Troop while at Eupatoria. Its casualties consisted of 1 man wounded and 2 horses killed, and it fired in all 63 round shot and 12 shrapnel shells.¹

Kinburn.—On October 7 the Allies despatched a combined naval and military force to attack the three forts at Kinburn, which protected the estuary at the mouths of the Dnieper and Bug. The town of Nicholiaeff, some 80 miles inland on the banks for the last-named river, was the great nursery of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, and it was determined to deny the further use of the estuary to Russia. The contingent supplied by the British Army was under Brigadier-General the Hon. A. Spencer, and consisted of a brigade of the 4th Division, P Battery under Captain G. V. Johnson, 22 men of the Siege Train under Second-Captain R. Mackenzie, and some Royal Sappers and Miners—in all 4,000 men. The French land force was somewhat stronger and was commanded by General Bazaine.

On October 15 a flotilla forced an entrance into the Dnieper and the allied troops landed on the spit to the south of the forts, thus cutting off the retreat of the garrison and intercepting the advance of reinforcements. When the forts were bombarded

¹ "Corunna to Sebastopol," pp. 239 etc., and Adye's Order Book.

two days later by the mortar-vessels, gun-vessels, and French floating batteries, they capitulated after losing 45 killed and 130 wounded. The Royal Artillery were not in action, but next day were employed in dealing with the large quantity of ordnance stores that fell into our hands.

On the 20th the Allies made a reconnaissance which lasted three days, and led to nothing of importance. P Battery accompanied it, but did not come into action. On the 27th, after leaving a small garrison in Kinburn and some men-of-war to guard the estuary, the expedition returned to the Crimea. The only casualty in the Royal Artillery was one man missing in P Battery.

Return of the Army.—On the arrival of No. 4 Company, 4th Battalion (Captain A. G. Burrows), after the fall of Sebastopol, the Siege Train consisted of twenty-nine companies, eleven of which were sent to garrison the forts at Balaclava, while a large number of gunner-drivers were transferred to the field batteries to make good casualties or replace weak and sickly men.

During the winter the British army was brought to a high state of discipline; the young soldiers were constantly drilled, and when spring came our army was strong and ready for war; but the French began to show signs of exhaustion.¹

By the middle of February, 1856, the demolitions in Sebastopol were completed by the engineers of the Allies, and seventeen companies of the Siege Train were sent back to England; at the end of the month

¹ Rousset, ii. pp. 455 etc.

an armistice was signed, and on March 30 peace was declared.¹ General Sir William Codrington, who succeeded General Sir James Simpson, now began, in concert with Marshal Pélessier, to make arrangements for the evacuation of the Crimea, and when July came all the field artillery had returned to England.²

When the first contingent of the Siege Train arrived in Woolwich in March, 1856, they had a grand reception. The veteran Commandant, Sir E. C. Whinyates, bared his head in their honour as they passed him, and the Sovereign herself came to Woolwich to review them and inspect the various trophies they brought home. Queen Victoria was again present at Woolwich on July 14 to review the troops and field batteries drawn up on the Common for her inspection : on this occasion her Majesty was mounted on a favourite chestnut horse and wore a scarlet habit, trimmed with gold lace, the sash and plumes of a General Officer, and the riband of the Garter.

Shortly afterwards the following General Order appeared :


“G.O.—Although only a few days have elapsed since their disembarkation, the good working condition of the horses, and the health of the men, afford suffi-

¹ On April 17, 1856, a grand field day took place before the Russian General Luders. In a letter dated April 29, addressed to Lord Panmure, Sir William Codrington referred to the field artillery in very complimentary terms, saying “the artillery horses (were) in high appearance, and the admiration, probably the envy, of all” (“Panmure Papers,” ii. p. 197).

² The last casualty was caused by the death of Lieutenant F. Temple, of the Siege Train. He died on the homeward passage in July.

cient proof of the admirable system established in the Regiment. Despite the disadvantages of a sea voyage, the movements were performed with the precision of that Noble Artillery which under all circumstances has maintained its high character for perseverance, endurance, and courage in siege and in field.

“(Signed) A. G. WETHERALL,
“A.G.”



THE R.A. MEMORIAL AT SCUTARI.

APPENDICES TO CHAPTER IX

APPENDIX No. I

DESCRIPTION OF LORD RAGLAN'S FUNERAL

No. 99. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *July 7, 1855.*

... IN the courtyard of the house was stationed a guard of honour of one hundred men of the Grenadier Guards, with their drums and regimental colours; fifty men, with one field officer, one captain, and one subaltern from the Royal Sappers and Miners, and from each regiment, lined the road from the British to the French Head-quarters, a distance of about a mile; a squadron of cavalry was stationed on the right of the line; two batteries of artillery and a squadron of cavalry on the left of it. The infantry was commanded by Major-General Eyre, C.B.

The road from the French Head-quarters to Kazatch Bay was lined throughout the whole way by the infantry of the French Imperial Guard and of the 1st Corps; bands were stationed at intervals, and played as the procession passed; and field batteries (French) at intervals, on the high ground right and left of the road, fired minute guns.

The procession to escort the body was as follows:

Two squadrons British cavalry (12th Lancers).

Two squadrons Piedmontese light cavalry.

Four squadrons French Chasseurs d'Afrique (1st and 4th Regiments).

Four squadrons French Cuirassiers (2nd and 9th Regiments).

Two troops French horse artillery.

Major Brandling's troop, R.H.A. (I Troop).

The coffin, covered with a black pall, fringed with white silk, and the Union Jack, and surmounted by the late Field-Marshal's¹ cocked hat and sword, and a garland of "immortelles," placed there by General Pélistier, was carried on a platform, fixed upon a 9-pounder gun, drawn by horses of Captain Thomas' troop, R.H.A. (C Troop). At the wheels of the gun-carriage rode General Pélistier, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, His Highness Omer Pasha, Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Army, General Della Marmora, Commander-in-Chief of the Sardinian Army, and Lieutenant-General Simpson, Commander-in-Chief of the English Army.

¹ General Lord Raglan was promoted Field-Marshal after the Alma.

Charger of the late Field-Marshal, led by two mounted orderlies.

Relations and Personal Staff of the late Field-Marshal.

General and other officers of the French, Sardinian, and Turkish Armies.

British Commissioners in Foreign Armies.

British General Officers and their Staffs.

Staff of Head-quarters.

One officer of each regiment of cavalry and infantry, Royal Sappers and Miners, and Land Transport Corps; two from the Naval Brigade, Royal Marines, Medical and Commissariat Staff, and three from the Royal Artillery.

Personal escorts of the Allied Commanders-in-Chief.

Personal escort of the late Field-Marshal (Captain Chetwode, troop of the 8th Hussars).

A field battery of the Royal Artillery.

Two squadrons of British cavalry (4th Dragoon Guards).

Detachment of Mounted Staff Corps.

The escort was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dupuis, R.H.A.

Two field batteries of the Royal Artillery, stationed on the hill opposite the house, fired a salute of nineteen guns as the procession moved off.

The united bands of the 3rd, 9th, and 62nd Regiments, stationed in the vineyard that surrounds the house, played the "Dead March."

The band of the Sardinian Grenadiers was stationed half-way to the French Head-quarters, and the band of the 10th Hussars on the left of the line.

The approach to the wharf at Kazatch Bay was lined by detachments of the Royal Marines and sailors.

The body was received on the wharf by Admiral Bruat and Rear-Admiral Stewart, C.B., and a large number of officers of the combined fleets. The launch of the British flagship, towed by man-of-war boats, conveyed the coffin to the *Caradoc*, the boats of the combined fleets forming an escort; and the troop and battery of the Royal Artillery included in the escort formed upon the rising ground above the bay, and fired a salute of nineteen guns as the coffin left the shore. . .

(Sayer, pp. 231 etc.)

APPENDIX No. 2

TABLE LVII

COMMANDING OFFICERS AND COMPANIES PRESENT
AT THE BOMBARDMENTS OF SEBASTOPOL

	Officer Commanding Siege Train.	Officer Commanding Right Attack.	Officer Commanding Left Attack.
1st Bombardment	Lieut.-Col. G. Gambier	Bt. - Lieut. - Col. * Collingwood Dickson	Bt.-Major A. Irving
2nd Bombardment	Lieut.-Col. E. C. Warde	Bt. - Lieut. - Col. Collingwood Dickson	Captain A. Old- field
3rd Bombardment	Lieut.-Col. E. C. Warde	Captain H. A. B. Campbell	Lieut.-Col. J. H. Franklyn
4th Bombardment	Lieut.-Col. E. C. Warde	Bt. - Lieut. - Col. Collingwood Dickson	Lieut.-Col. J. H. Franklyn
5th Bombardment	Lieut.-Col. J. S. St. George	Captain H. A. B. Campbell	Lieut.-Col. G. Barker
6th Bombardment	Lieut.-Col. J. S. St. George	Captain H. A. B. Campbell	Lieut.-Col. G. Barker

COMPANIES

RIGHT ATTACK

Bombardment.	Company.	Battalion.	Present Designation.
First	{ 6	11	65th Battery, R.F.A.
	{ 7	11	74th Company, R.G.A.
	{ 8	11	78th " "
	{ 1	12	67th " "
In addition for second, third, and fourth	{ 1	1	1st Battery, R.F.A.
	{ 1	5	26th " "
	{ 7	5	29th " "
	{ 4	6	32nd " "
	{ 5	9	92nd Company, R.G.A.
In addition for fifth	{ 2	1	2nd Battery, R.F.A.
	{ 6	1	32nd Company, R.G.A.
	{ 4	3	101st " "
In addition for sixth	{ 6	3*	No. 3 Mountain Battery.
	{ 1	9*	41st Battery, R.F.A.

* Not in trenches.

LEFT ATTACK

Bombardment.	Company.	Battalion.	Present Designation.
First	{ 2	12	80th Company, R.G.A.
	{ 3	12	Reduced 1871.
	{ 6	12	17th Company, R.G.A.
	{ 7	12	Reduced 1871.
	{ 2	11	42nd Company, R.G.A.
In addition for second	{ 4	2	5th Battery, R.F.A.
	{ 8	4	17th " "
In addition for third and fourth	{ 8	7	28th " "
	{ 5	4	16th " "
In addition for fifth	{ 8	6	3rd Company, R.G.A.
	{ 3	1	No. 1 Mountain Battery.
In addition for sixth	{ 7	4	14th Company, R.G.A.
	{ 1	7	3rd Battery, R.F.A.
	{ 6	8	40th " "

APPENDIX No. 3

ALLIED FIELD FORCE, SEPTEMBER, 1855

BRITISH ARMY

FURTHER reinforcements arrived during July, August, and the early part of September, and the British Army was organised as follows :

GENERAL SIR JAMES SIMPSON, Commander-in-Chief.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR R. J. DACRES, Commanding Royal Artillery.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR HARRY JONES, Commanding Royal Engineers.

CAVALRY DIVISION

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR J. YORKE SCARLETT

Horse Artillery

A, C, and I Troops, and Ball Cartridge Brigade.

First Cavalry Brigade (Heavy)

1st, 4th, and 5th Dragoon Guards.

1st, 2nd, and 6th Dragoons.

Second Cavalry Brigade (Light)

6th Dragoon Guards.

12th Lancers.

4th Light Dragoons.

13th Light Dragoons.

Third Cavalry Brigade (Hussars)

8th, 10th, and 11th Hussars.

FIRST DIVISION

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL LORD ROKEBY

Divisional Artillery

X Battery, R.A.

First Brigade

3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards. 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards.

1st Battalion Scots Fusilier Guards.

Second Brigade

9th Foot. 13th Foot. 31st Foot. 56th Foot.

SECOND DIVISION

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL F. MARKHAM

*Divisional Artillery*B and G Batteries and 6th Company,
2nd Battalion, R.A. (Ball Cartridge Brigade).*First Brigade*

41st Foot. 47th Foot. 49th Foot. 62nd Foot. 82nd Foot

Second Brigade

3rd Foot. 30th Foot. 55th Foot. 95th Foot.

THIRD DIVISION

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM EYRE

*Divisional Artillery*F and W Batteries and 7th Company, 6th Battalion, R.A. (Ball
Cartridge Brigade).*First Brigade*

4th Foot. 14th Foot. 39th Foot. 50th Foot. 89th Foot.

Second Brigade

18th Foot. 28th Foot. 38th Foot. 44th Foot.

FOURTH DIVISION

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL H. J. W. BENTINCK

*Divisional Artillery*P and Q Batteries and 8th Company, 9th Battalion, R.A. (Ball
Cartridge Brigade).*First Brigade*

17th Foot. 20th Foot. 21st Foot. 57th Foot. 63rd Foot.

Second Brigade

46th Foot. 48th Foot. 68th Foot. 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade.

LIGHT DIVISION

(LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON)

Divisional Artillery

E and Y Batteries and 2nd Company, 5th Battalion, R.A. (Ball Cartridge Brigade).

*First Brigade*7th Foot. 23rd Foot. 33rd Foot. 84th Foot.
2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade.*Second Brigade*

19th Foot. 77th Foot. 88th Foot. 90th Foot. 97th Foot.

HIGHLAND DIVISION

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR COLIN CAMPBELL

Divisional Artillery

A and H Batteries and No. 5 Company, 6th Battalion, R.A. (Ball Cartridge Brigade).

First Brigade

42nd Foot. 79th Foot. 92nd Foot. 93rd Foot.

Second Brigade

1st and 2nd Battalions, 1st Foot. 71st Foot. 72nd Foot.

RESERVE ARTILLERY

J and V Batteries of Position.

SIEGE TRAIN

29 Companies Royal Artillery.
9 Companies Royal Sappers and Miners.*Note.*—One company—4th Company, 4th Battalion—joined after the fall of Sebastopol.

In addition to British troops, Foreign Legions had been raised, and as the autumn passed more drafts, etc., were sent out, but no further troops, regiments, or batteries were landed.

An official return,¹ dated March, 1856, gives the strength of the British Army as follows :¹ Sayer, p. 432.

						Officers.	N. C. Officers and Men.
Cavalry	264	6,089
Artillery	220	7,123
Engineers	44	1,242
Infantry	1,691	43,887
Total						2,219	58,341
Land Transport	163	6,795
British German and British Swiss Legions						235	5,774
Grand Total						2,617	70,910

FRENCH ARMY

The organisation already detailed remained in force up to the fall of Sebastopol. On September 8 the following changes in command had taken place :

Corps Commands.—General Herbillon, while retaining command of the 1st Division, replaced General St. Jean d'Angely in command of the Army of Reserve.

Divisional Commands.—General MacMahon replaced General Canrobert in command of 1st Division, 2nd Corps ; General Espinasse replaced General Mayran in command of 3rd Division, 2nd Corps ; General La Motterouge replaced General Brunet in command of 5th Division, 2nd Corps.

There were also changes in the Brigade Commands,

There were no changes of importance in the Sardinian or Turkish Armies.

STRENGTH, CASUALTIES, ETC., OF TROOPS, BATTERIES, AND COMPANIES,
ROYAL REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY

ASSISTANT-ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, WOOLWICH,
September 13, 1856.

Designation in Crimea.	N.C. Officers and Men.					
	Strengthening on Joining Army.	Reinforcements to Sept. 9, 1855.	Killed or Died prior to Sept. 9, 1855.	Ineffective from any Cause to same Date.	Number in Crimea Sept. 9, 1855.	Officers killed to same Date.
<i>With Cavalry Division:</i>						
Staff	98	1
C Troop, R.H.A. . .	208	88	51	58	204	..
I " . . .	189	12	48	35	203	..
A " . . .	224	..	40	20	261	..
B " " (Ball Cartridge Brigade) }	74	..	4	3	72	..
<i>With First Division:</i>						
X Battery, R.A. . .	194	10	11	1	193	..
<i>With Second Division:</i>						
B Battery, R.A. . .	183	120	59	28	204	1
G " " . . .	192	121	49	40	191	1
6 Company, 2nd Battn. (Ball Cartridge Brigade)}	119	42	7	19	114	..
<i>With Third Division:</i>						
F Battery, R.A. . .	177	154	77	29	196	..
W " " . . .	117	141	60	34	196	..
7 Company, 6th Battn. (Ball Cartridge Brigade)}	139	8	3	15	106	..
<i>With Fourth Division:</i>						
P Battery, R.A. . .	217	72	34	31	203	1
Q " " . . .	200	18	13	15	192	..
8 Company, 9th Battn. (Ball Cartridge Brigade)}	162	20	5	2	71	..

APPENDIX No. 5—TABLE LIX

MONTHLY RETURNS OF THE FIELD ARTILLERY,
INCLUDING THE TROOPS, BATTERIES, AND
AMMUNITION RESERVES (ALL RANKS)¹

Month.	Effective.	Sick. ²	Total.
1854.			
September	1,853	127	1,980
October	1,634	351	1,985
November	1,706	343	2,049
December	1,576	438	2,014
1855.			
January	1,348	675	2,023
February	1,293	603	1,896
March	1,373	487	1,860
April	1,416	405	1,821
May	1,829	318	2,147
June	2,715	323	3,038
July	2,986	634	3,620
August	2,923	638	3,561
September	3,158	527	3,685

MONTHLY RETURNS OF THE SIEGE COMPANIES³

Month.	Effective.	Sick. ²	Total.
1854.			
September	940	76	1,016
October	953	147	1,100
November	962	219	1,181
December	839	343	1,182
1855.			
January	1,363	430	1,793
February	1,198	482	1,680
March	1,134	470	1,604
April	1,882	437	2,319
May	1,727	496	2,203
June	2,025	380	2,405
July	1,924	295	2,219
August	2,413	405	2,818
September	2,394	496	2,890

The total strength of the Royal Artillery in the Crimea on October 1, 1855, was 7,540. Over 2,000 officers and men of the Royal Navy (exclusive of Marines) took part in the siege, but the monthly strength is not known to the author. 975 seamen were landed during October, 1854, 600 were landed in the December following, and 400 in April, 1855.

¹ See Public Record Office, *W.O.* 17, 2691.

² Non-commissioned officers and men only.

³ This table includes detachments at Varna and Kertch.

APPENDIX No. 6—TABLE LX

LIST OF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY WHO RECEIVED THE VICTORIA CROSS, THE LEGION OF HONOUR, THE FRENCH MILITARY MEDAL ("VALEUR ET DISCIPLINE"), OR THE SARDINIAN MEDAL ("AL VALORE MILITARE")

Note.—The rank of the recipient is that which he held at the publication of the *Gazette*.

VICTORIA CROSS

Rank and Name.	Reference to Particular Service Performed.	Date of <i>Gazette</i> .
<i>Captain</i> Andrew Henry ¹	G Battery, Inkerman	{ Feb. 24, 1857
<i>Sergeant</i> Daniel Cambridge	Spiking Party, September 8, 1855	{ June 23, 1857
<i>Lieutenant</i> George Symons ¹	18-pounders, Inkerman; unmasked embrasures under heavy fire, June 6, 1855	{ Nov. 20, 1857
<i>Gunner and Driver</i> T. Arthur	Carried ammunition into Quarries, June 6, 1855; Spiking Party, June 18	{ Feb. 24, 1857

LEGION OF HONOUR. Knights (5th Class)

London Gazette, August 1, 1856

Rank and Name.	Troop or Company.
<i>Sergeant-Major</i> : W. Norton, R.H.A.	C and I Troop, R.H.A. .
<i>Quartermaster-Sergeant</i> : G. Marvin, R.H.A.	I Troop, R.H.A. .
<i>Colour-Sergeant</i> : J. Mitchell	6 Compy., 11th Battn., Siege Train
<i>Sergeant</i> : Thomas Mitchell	2 Compy., 8th Battn., A Battery
<i>Sergeant-Conductors</i> : J. Devine	7 " 12th " Siege Train
G. Ker	7 " 12th " " "
R. Bruce	7 " 5th " " "
<i>Corporals</i> : J. Hargreaves	4 " 12th " P Battery
J. Stevenson	5 " 11th " H "

¹ The names of these two officers are included in this list as they were not commissioned when they performed the services for which the Victoria Cross was conferred upon them. Lieutenant Symons also received the Sardinian Medal.

LEGION OF HONOUR. Knights (5th Class)—*Continued*

Rank and Name.	Troop or Company.
<i>Bombardier :</i>	
H. Wheatley . . .	6 Compy., 12th Battn., Siege Train
<i>Gunners and Drivers :</i>	
W. Todd . . .	6 " 11th " " "
W. Hendry . . .	1 " 12th " " "
R. Burke . . .	6 " 11th " " "
J. Gibbs . . .	8 " 3rd " B Battery
J. McVeigh . . .	4 " 11th " G "

Note.—The author can find no record of the particular services for which the Legion of Honour was conferred. Mr. J. Browne, the author of "England's Artillerymen," writes: "I have an idea that it was awarded generally to certain officers and men who had served throughout the campaign."

FRENCH MILITARY MEDAL

Rank and Name.	Reference to Particular Service Performed.
<i>Sergeant-Major :</i>	
W. Flockhart . . .	Inkerman (18-pounders), No. 17 Batty., Right Attack, September 8, 1855
<i>Sergeants :</i>	
W. Kempton, R.H.A.	General good service
W. Scott, R.H.A. . .	" " "
F. Iles . . .	" " "
R. Perkins . . .	No. 8 Battery, Left Attack, April 13 and 15, 1855
C. FitzSimons . . .	No. 9 Battery, Right Attack, June 7 ; arming Quarry Battery ; three times in charge of mortars
J. Adams . . .	General good service
J. Ackland . . .	" " "
Joseph Smith . . .	" " "
J. Fairfax . . .	" " "
J. McGarrity . . .	Brought up ammunition, October 17, 1854
J. McPherson . . .	No. 7 Battery, Left Attack, April 14, 1855
H. Bacchus . . .	General good service
T. Walsh* . . .	" " "
S. Ewing* . . .	Spiking Party, June 18, 1855
J. McKown* . . .	General good service
<i>Sergeant-Conductors :</i>	
Job Smith . . .	18-pounders, Inkerman
J. Buchanan . . .	General good service
J. Boggie . . .	" " "

FRENCH MILITARY MEDAL—*Continued*

Rank and Name.	Reference to Particular Service Performed.
<i>Corporals :</i>	
J. Hamilton	Spiking Party, September 8, 1855
J. Milligan	General good service
M. Fenton	
P. Conway	G Battery, Inkerman
J. Browne	{ 18-pounders, Inkerman ; Spiking Party, June 18, 1855
T. Betts*	
	General good service
<i>Bombardiers :</i>	
G. Gibson	" " "
W. T. Burrows	" " "
W. Hewitt	" " "
J. Bower*	Spiking Party, September 8, 1855
C. Henderson	" " " " "
J. Hagan	Spiking Party, June 18, 1855
D. Jenkins	Turkish Redoubts, Balaclava
W. Ramsay*	General good service
A. Sutherland	{ Explosion in French Park, November 11, 1855
J. Trotter*	
	Cleared an embrasure under heavy fire, August 17, 1855
<i>Driver :</i>	
R. Smeaton, R.H.A.	{ General good service ; rescued French soldier from Belbek River, September, 1854
<i>Gunners and Drivers :</i>	
H. Wood	{ Brought in a wounded Croat, September bombardment
R. Botfield	
J. Douglas	Spiking Party, June and September, 1855
J. Cannell	General good service
J. McArdle	{ Spiking Party, June 18, September 8, 1855
J. Hay	
G. Davis	Wheel Driver No. 6 Gun, Inkerman
	Both horses killed at Inkerman, P Battery
J. Powell	Put out a fire in No. 13 or the Sand Bag Battery, Right Attack, June 7, 1855
M. O'Donohue	Spiking Party, June 18, 1855
M. Malowney	{ General good service ; noted by General Dacres at Inkerman
J. McGee	
E. Boner	General good service
J. Vance	" " "
P. Knight	" " "
R. Woodbridge	" " "
T. Margree*	" " "
W. Hovenden*	" " "
T. Revnolds*	" " "

FRENCH MILITARY MEDAL—*Continued*

Rank and Name.	Reference to Particular Service Performed
<i>Gunners and Drivers (continued):</i>	
G. Bines	General good service
J. McGrath	G Battery, Inkerman
John Norton	18-pounders, Inkerman
H. Davis*	" " " (lost both arms)
E. O'Brien*	{ Spiking Party, " June 18, September 8, 1855
<i>Trumpeter:</i>	
J. McLaren	Inkerman

See lists in *Jackson's Woolwich Journal*, August, 1856, p. 123, and May, 1857, p. 78. Names marked * are in the later list.

SARDINIAN MEDAL

Rank and Name.	Reference to Particular Service Performed.
<i>Troop Sergeant-Major:</i>	
J. Beardsley, R.H.A.	General good service
<i>Colour Sergeant-Major:</i>	
J. Hamilton	" " "
<i>Sergeants:</i>	
John Hamilton	" " "
S. Ewing	Spiking Party, June 18, 1855
D. Dowling	General good service
G. Symons	{ 18-pounders, Inkerman; unmasked embrasures under heavy fire, June 6, 1855
Moses Hunter	General good service
<i>Bombardiers:</i>	
D. Cambridge	Spiking Party, September 8
W. Ramsay	General good service
H. Collier	" " "
<i>Gunners and Drivers:</i>	
E. O'Brien	{ Spiking Party, June 18 and September 8, 1855
T. Arthur	{ Spiking Party, June 18 and September 8, 1855; carried ammunition into Quarries, June 7, 1855
J. McGarry	Turkish Redoubts, Balaclava
J. Barrett	" " "
J. Dealh	18-pounders, Inkerman

See G.R.O. July 17, 1857.

Note.—Lists of names, with greater detail of service, will be found in "Medals of the British Army," by T. Carter: vol. i. pp. 112-116, French Military Medal; vol. i. pp. 149, 150, Sardinian Medal.

APPENDIX No. 7.

THE OPPOSING ORDNANCE

THE following tables are based on Adye's Order Books, Auger, i. p. 590, and Todleben, i. ("Pièces Justicatives") p. 55; ii. pt. i, pp. 387, 418, 445, and ("Pièces Justicatives") ii. pt. ii, p. 8. The numbers of French and Russian pieces actually employed in each bombardment are deduced from Todleben's tables referred to in the text.

The French and Russian *canons* were generally similar to the British guns of like nomenclature, except that they were slightly heavier. Thus a 24-pounder round shot weighed $23\frac{1}{2}$ lb., while that of a Russian *canon de 24* weighed $24\frac{1}{2}$ lb., and that of a French *canon de 24* weighed 26 lb. The projectiles of our 8-in. and 10-in. shell guns weighed 49 and 84 lb. (total weight); the shell of the French *obusier de 80* weighed 60 lb., and that of the 1-pood Russian *licorne* or howitzer 36 lb. The British 13-in. mortar shell had a total weight of 207 lb.; that of the French *mortier de 32* weighed 185 lb.; that of the Russian 5-pood mortar, 183 lb. For further details see "Modern Artillery," pp. 487 and 525, and Todleben, ii. pt. i, p. 165.

Note.—1 pood = 36 lb. avoirdupois.

1 Russian pound = .9 lb. avoirdupois.

1 French pound = 1.08 lb. avoirdupois.

1 centimètre = .39-in.

TABLE LXI
BRITISH SIEGE GUNS

Bombardment.	Guns.					Mortars.				Total.	Employed in Bombardments.
	68-pr.	10-in.	8-in.	32-pr.	24-pr.	13-in.	10-in.	8-in.	Cothorn.		
First . . .	8	..	18	7	30	..	10	73	73
Second . . .	7	..	15	50	21	24	18	..	3	138	128
Third . . .	7	8	45	50	2	30	17	159	159
Fourth . . .	8	8	46	49	..	30	17	8	..	166	166
Fifth . . .	4	6	45	50	..	33	26	4	14	182	182
Sixth . . .	7	7	33	62	..	34	26	4	10	183	183

Note.—In May, 1855, experiments were begun, on the initiation of the Premier, Lord Palmerston, with mortars of 36-in. calibre, designed to throw shells weighing 22 cwts., containing bursting charges of 480 lb. of powder, to a distance of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles. The experiments, which led to no practical result, were continued till 1858. (See "The Story of the 36-in. Mortars of 1855-58," by Major-General Lefroy, C.B., F.R.S., R.A., "R.A.I.P.," vol. vii., No. 4, 1871.)

TABLE LXII

GUNS MOUNTED IN FRENCH TRENCHES

Bombardment.	Canons.				Canons—Obusiers.			Mortiers.				British Pieces.						Turkish Pieces.		Russian Pieces.		Total.	Employed in Bombardments.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
	de 50.	de 30.	de 24.	de 16.	de 80.	de 30.	de 12.	Obusier de 22 cm.	de 32 cm.	de 27 cm.	de 22 cm.	de 15 cm.	Guns.				Mortars.		Guns.	Mortars.	Guns.			Mortars.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
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* No authoritative information at disposal of author.

GUNS MOUNTED FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE SOUTH SIDE OF SEBASTOPOL

Bombardment.	Canons.						Canons— Cannonades.			Cannonades.					Licornes.				Mortars.				Total.	Employed in Bombard- ments.	
	de 3 poods.		de 68.	de 36.	de 24.	de 18.	de 24.	de 36.	de 18.	de 24.	de 36.	de 18.	de 24.	de 36.	de 18.	de 24.	de 36.	de 1 pood.	de 1 pood.	de 1 pood.	de 3 poods.	de 2 poods.			de 1 pood.
	5	5	26	32	24	22	2	3	82	18	7	14	15	34	16	2	3	7	24	..
First . . .	5	5	26	32	24	22	2	3	82	18	7	14	15	34	16	2	3	7	24	..
Second . . .	5	26	153	150	11	10	5	64	159	20	41	34	72	15	48	31	17	40	39	41	17	40	39	41	..
Third . . .	5	38	165	163	11	11	24	80	186	18	47	65	74	17	45	35	19	27	48	45	27	48	45	43	..
Fourth . . .	5	38	166	159	8	11	5	75	174	18	34	65	74	12	45	35	12	24	45	35	24	45	35	43	33
Fifth . . .	6	48	223	176	4	8	5	59	167	19	34	83	71	25	32	37	..	30	39	60	30	39	60	57	64
Sixth

No authentic details given, but probably similar to the Fifth Bombardment.

No authentic details given, but probably similar to the Fifth Bombardment.

APPENDIX No. 8

LISTS OF OFFICERS SERVING IN THE CRIMEA
BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 14, 1854, AND SEPTEMBER 8, 1855

TABLE LXIII. Officers of Royal Artillery holding commands and Staff appointments.

- „ LXIV. Officers serving with the Royal Horse Artillery and Cavalry Ball Cartridge Brigade.
- „ LXV. Officers serving with the Field Batteries.
- „ LXVI. Officers serving with Infantry Ball Cartridge Brigades.
- „ LXVII. Officers serving with the Siege Train.

Note.—The same officer occasionally appears more than once in the above lists, owing to promotion, transfer, etc.

- „ LXVIII. Medical Officers serving with the Royal Artillery.
- „ LXIX. Veterinary Officers serving with the Royal Artillery.
- „ LXX. Officers of the Field Train.

In the columns giving the duration of Crimean service, L indicates that an officer landed either with the Field Army or the Siege Train, and P that he was present in the Crimea when Sebastopol fell. In lists 2, 3, 4, and 5 the present designations of troops and companies are given in italics and are enclosed in parentheses.

TABLE LXIII

R.A. OFFICERS HOLDING COMMANDS AND STAFF APPOINTMENTS IN THE CRIMEA BETWEEN THE LANDING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL

Number in Kane's List.	Name and Rank on Arrival in Crimea.	Present in Crimea		Nature of Appointment.
		From	To	
1365 1668	Brig.-Gen. T. Fox-Strangways Lieut.-Col. R. J. Dacres	L L	Nov. 5, '54 P	C.R.A. Killed at Inkerman. Commanded R.A., 1st Division, till Nov. 5, '54; then C.R.A.
1690	Lieut.-Col. N. T. Lake	L	Dec. '54	Commanded R.A., Light Division, till Nov. 6; then commanded Siege Train till Dec. '54. Invalided.
1714	Lieut.-Col. J. E. Dupuis	L	P	Commanded R.A., 3rd Division, till Dec. '54; then in temporary command of Siege Train till Feb. '55. Assumed command of the R.H. Artillery attached to Cavalry Division, May '55.
1732	Lieut.-Col. H. J. Morris	Dec. '54	May '55	Commanded R.A., Light Division, from Dec. '54 to May '55. Absent from Crimea, May '55 to Sept. '55. Rejoined after fall of Sebastopol and commanded Reserve Artillery.
1746	Lieut.-Col. J. St. George	March '55	P	Commanded Reserve Artillery till Aug. 4, '55; then appointed to command of Siege Train.
1747	Lieut.-Col. W. R. Nedham	April '55	May '55	Commanded R.A., 3rd Division. Invalided. Rejoined after fall of Sebastopol.
1751 1757	Lieut.-Col. E. C. Warde Lieut.-Col. A. J. Taylor	Jan. '55 May '55	Aug. '55 P	Commanded Siege Train. Invalided. Commanded R.A. of 1st Division, and subsequently of Highland Division.
1758	Lieut.-Col. G. Maclean	June '55	P	Commanded R.A., Light Division.
1767	Lieut.-Col. D. E. Wood	L	P	Commanded R.A., 4th Division.
1775	Lieut.-Col. J. W. Fitzmayer	L	P	Commanded R.A., 2nd Division.
1781	Lieut.-Col. J. H. Francklyn	May 25, '55	Aug. 13, '55	Commanded Left Attack.
1783	Lieut.-Col. G. Gambier	L	Nov. '54	Commanded Siege Train till wounded at Inkerman, Nov. 5, '54.

1792	Lieut.-Col. N. E. Harrison	July '55	Aug. '55	Commanded R.A., 3rd Division. Died at Scutari, Aug. 12, '55.
1803	Capt. (Brev.-Major) A. Irving	L	March '55	Appointed Left Attack till Dec. '55. Appointed to Scutari Dépôt. Invalided March '55.
1808	Capt. (Brev.-Lieut.-Col.) H. S. Rowan	L	Jan. '55	Commanded Left Attack from Dec. 1, '54, to Jan. '55. Then to England on promotion.
1809	Capt. (Brev.-Major) J. N. A. Freese	L	Feb. '55	Commanded Left Attack from Jan. '55 to Feb. '55. Then to England on promotion.
1846	Capt. G. R. Barker	L	P	Commanded Left Attack as a Lieut.-Col. from Aug. 13, '55, to end of siege.
1874	Capt. (Brev.-Lieut.-Col.) C. Dickson	L	July '55	Turkish interpreter to Lord Raglan till Oct. '54. Commanded Right Attack, Oct. '54 to May '55, except when temporarily disabled in Feb. '55. Proceeded to Kertch. Resumed command of Right Attack, June 16, '55. Proceeded to England to take charge of Waltham Powder Mills, July 20, '55.
1879	Capt. A. Oldfield	Dec. '54	Aug. '55	Commanded Right Attack temporarily during Feb. '55. Commanded Left Attack, April 5 to May 25, '55. Killed Aug. 17, '55.
1889	Capt. S. D. Broughton	Dec. '54	P	Commanded Left Attack, Feb. '55 to March 17, '55. Temporarily invalided to Scutari.
1891	Capt. J. M. Adye	L	P	Brigade-Major and later A.A.G. for Royal Artillery.
1912	Capt. H. A. B. Campbell	Dec. '54	P	Commanded Right Attack, May 25 to June 16, '55; and again from July 20 to end of siege.
1920	Capt. F. B. Ward	April '55	P	Commanded Reserve Artillery in Aug. '55, including battle of the Tchernaya.
1950	Capt. J. R. Anderson	L	July '55	Commissary of Siege Train Stores, Dec. 29, '54, to July 21, '55. Invalided.

R.A. OFFICERS HOLDING COMMANDS AND STAFF APPOINTMENTS IN THE CRIMEA—Continued

Number in Kane's List.	Name and Rank on Arrival in Crimea	Present in Crimea		Nature of Appointment.
		From	To	
1955	Capt. H. F. Strange	L	P	Appointed D.A.Q.M.G. Siege Train at end of siege.
1957	Capt. J. C. W. Fortescue	L	P	Attached to Head-quarter Staff. Subsequently acted as Brigade-Major and D.A.Q.M.G.
1975 1986	Capt. C. H. Morris Capt. G. Shaw	Oct. '54 Jan. '55	P P	Attached to Staff of French Army, '55. Commanded Left Attack, March 17 to April 5, '55.
1992	2nd Capt. P. G. Pipon	L	P	Commissary of Siege Train Stores, July 21, '55, to end of siege.
1996	2nd Capt. E. B. Hamley	L	P	Adjutant R.A., 1st Division, till Nov. 5, '54; then A.D.C. to Officer Commanding Royal Artillery.
1997 2006	Capt. G. T. Field 2nd Capt. the Hon. W. C. Yel- verton	Dec. '54 Sept. '54	P P	D.A.Q.M.G., R.A.
2010	2nd Capt. M. A. S. Biddulph	L	P	Adjutant R.A., 2nd Division, Sept. (after the Alma) to March '55. To England on promotion.
2016	2nd Capt. J. F. L. Baddeley	L	Dec. '54	Adjutant R.A., 3rd Division, during '54. Attached to Electric Telegraph Department in '55.
2043	2nd Capt. H. L. Chermiside	L	Aug. '55	Adjutant R.A., Light Division, till Nov. 5, '54 (severely wounded). Invalided Dec. '54.
2052	2nd Capt. S. E. Gordon	L	P	Adjutant Siege Train. In Nov. '54 invalided to Scutari. Returned to England, Aug. '55.
2057 2072	2nd Capt. the Hon. E. T. Gage 2nd Capt. G. Le M. Tupper	L L	P P	A.D.C. to Gen. Strangways, and afterwards to Gen. Dacres. Brigade-Major and D.A.Q.M.G., R.A. Adjutant R.A., 4th Division, till Jan. '55; then appointed to I Troop.

2073	2nd Capt. H. Heyman	March '55	P	Adjutant R.A., 2nd Division, April 28, '55, to end of siege.
2078	2nd Capt. E. Taswell	L	Dec. '54	Commissary of Siege Train Stores, Oct. to Dec. 29, '54. Invalided.
2081	2nd Capt. W. E. M. Reilly	Nov. '54	P	Adjutant Siege Train, Feb. '55 to April '55. Appointed Brigade-Major Siege Train, April 26, '55. D.A.A.G. of Siege Train after fall of Sebastopol.
2083	2nd Capt. C. H. Smith	May '55	P	Adjutant R.A., 1st Division; subsequently Adjutant R.A., Highland Division.
2120	2nd Capt. G. C. Henry	L	P	Adjutant of Siege Train, Nov. '54 to Feb. '55; Adjutant R.A., 4th Division, Feb. '55.
2136	2nd Capt. W. J. Williams	May '55	P	A.D.C. to G.O.C. 1st Brigade Light Division, Sept. 8.
2144	2nd Capt. N. O. S. Turner	March '55	P	Adjutant Reserve Artillery, March '55 to Aug. 31, '55; then Adjutant Left Attack.
2152 2178	2nd Capt. P. J. Campbell 2nd Capt. W. J. Bolton	June '55 L	P P	Adjutant R.A., Light Division, from June '55. Brigade-Major Siege Train in succession to Capt. Reilly (appointed A.A.G.) after fall of Sebastopol.
2185	2nd Capt. W. J. Wilson	May '55	P	Adjutant Left Attack, May 25, '55, to Aug. 31, '55; then Adjutant Reserve Artillery.
2214	2nd Capt. R. Boyle	July '55	P	Adjutant R.A., 3rd Division, July to Aug. 31, '55.
2276 2299	Lieut. A. H. King Lieut. J. Lyons	L L	P June '55	A.D.C. to G.O.C. 2nd Division, Sept. '55. Adjutant Right Attack. Ordered to England on being posted to R.H.A.
2337	Lieut. J. E. Ruck-Keene	L	P	Adjutant Left Attack some time subsequently to May 25, '55.

TABLE LXIV

ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY

A TROOP R.H.A. (A Battery R.H.A.)

Landed in Crimea, June '55

Number in Rane's List.	Name and Rank on Arrival in Crimea.	Present in Crimea with Troop or Battery		Remarks.
		From	To	
1848	Capt. A. T. Phillpotts	June '55	P	
2092	2nd Capt. E. E. R. Dyneley	June '55	P	
2288	Lieut. W. Booth	June '55	P	
2291	Lieut. C. B. Brackenbury	June '55	P	
2297	Lieut. R. Gore	June '55	P	
DETACHMENT OF R.H. ARTILLERY AFTERWARDS EXPANDED TO B TROOP R.H.A. (B Battery R.H.A.)				
<i>Landed in Crimea, June '55, to act as a Cavalry Ball Cartridge Brigade</i>				
2082	2nd Capt. W. B. Saunders	June '55	P	
2249	Lieut. A. H. W. Williams	June '55	P	
2306	Lieut. A. W. A. Ogilvie	Aug. '55	P	Posted from F Battery.
C TROOP R.H.A. (C Battery R.H.A.)				
<i>Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged at Affair of the Boulganac, the Alma, Capture of Balaklava, Battle of Balaklava, the Tchernaya, and Skirmishes round Eupatoria ('55)</i>				
1877	Capt. H. J. Thomas	Dec. '54	P	Rejoined Troop from sick leave.
1921	Capt. J. J. Brandling	L	Dec. '54	Attached to Troop from No. 1 Company, 12th Battalion R.A.
1999	2nd Capt. the Hon. D. M. Fraser	L	Dec. '54	To England on promotion, Dec. '54.
2077	2nd Capt. D. E. Hoste	Dec. '54	Aug. '55	(Posted from P Battery.) Invalided.
2147	Lieut. A. Y. Earle	L	Feb. '55	To England on promotion.
2225	Lieut. S. M. Grylls	L	July '55	(Posted from H Battery.) Invalided.
2276	Lieut. A. H. King	Nov. '54	Aug. '55	Appointed A.D.C. to G.O.C. 2nd Division.
2283	Lieut. W. A. Fox-Strangways	L	P	
2366	Lieut. W. Stirling	Aug. '55	P	Posted from E Battery.

I TROOP R.H.A. (O Battery R.H.A.)

<i>Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged at Affair of the Boulganac, the Alma, and Balaclava</i>		<i>Severely wounded at Balaclava. Invalided. Posted from No. 1 Company, 12th Battalion.</i>	
1862	Capt. G. A. Maude	Dec. '54	
1921	Capt. J. J. Brandling	P	
1995	2nd Capt. J. D. Shakespear	Jan. '55	
2072	2nd Capt. G. L. Tupper	P	
2149	Lieut. A. Vandeleur	May '55	
2167	Lieut. H. W. J. Dashwood	March '55	
2229	Lieut. T. L. Dames	P	
2232	Lieut. W. G. Andrewes	P	
2264	Lieut. F. T. Whinyates	P	

TABLE LXV

FIELD BATTERIES R.A.

No. 2 COMPANY, 8TH BATTALION, A FIELD BATTERY (38th Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged at the Alma, Balaclava, and Inkerman

1845	Capt. D. W. Paynter	L	Jan. '55	Invalided.
1992	2nd Capt. P. G. Pison	L	Dec. '54	Promoted. Appointed Commissary of Siege Train Stores.
2039	Capt. H. Mercer			Invalided.
2157	2nd Capt. F. S. Seale	June '55	Aug. '55	
2199	Lieut. E. Taddy	Feb. '55	P	
2238	Lieut. W. G. Le Mesurier	L	April '55	Promoted.
2256	Lieut. W. W. Hagan		P	
2363	Lieut. Sir G. J. Young, Bt.	May '55	Oct. '54	Died Oct. 22, '54
2448	Lieut. A. S. Hunter	May '55	P	

No. 8 COMPANY, 3rd BATTALION, B FIELD BATTERY (14th Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged at the Alma, Balaclava, Repulse of Russian Reconnaissance, Oct. 26, '54, and Battle of Inkerman

1967	Capt. C. T. Franklin	L	P	Invalided after the Alma. Rejoined June '55.
2074	2nd Capt. A. Dew			
2131	2nd Capt. H. P. Yates (attached)	L	Sept. 20, '54	Killed at the Alma.
		L	Dec. '54	Invalided.

FIELD BATTERIES R.A.—Continued

Number in Kane's List.	Name and Rank on Arrival in Crimea.	Present in Crimea with Battery		Remarks.
		From	To	
2140 2292 2364 2382 2411	2nd Capt. J. F. Pennycuik Lieut. E. Markham Lieut. H. T. Arbuthnot Lieut. L. D. Broughton Lieut. H. A. D. de Vismes	Nov. '54 L L L Feb. '55	P Jan. '55 P P P	To England on appointment to R.H.A.
<p style="text-align: center;">No. 1 COMPANY, 3RD BATTALION, E FIELD BATTERY (12th Battery R.F.A.)</p> <p><i>Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged at Affair of the Boulganac, the Alma, Balaklava, Repulse of Russian Reconnaissance, Oct. 26, '54, and Battle of Inkerman</i></p>				
1950	Capt. J. R. Anderson	L	Oct. '54	Invalided. Returned to Crimea and acted as Commissary of Stores, Dec. '54 to July '55.
1975	Capt. C. H. Morris	Oct. '54	P	Attached during '55 to French Headquarters.
2080 2129 2314 2366 2370 2379 2395	2nd Capt. J. Singleton 2nd Capt. C. H. Ingilby (attached) Lieut. R. C. Longley Lieut. W. Stirling Lieut. C. L'Estrange Lieut. R. H. Cockerell Lieut. L. Griffiths	L L L L May '55 L Nov. '54	March '55 June '55 Aug. '55 P Sept. 20, '54 P	Severely wounded at Inkerman. Invalided. To England on appointment to R.H.A. Posted to C Troop. Killed at the Alma.
<p style="text-align: center;">No. 3 COMPANY, 11TH BATTALION, F FIELD BATTERY (7th Battery R.F.A.)</p> <p><i>Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged at the Alma, Balaklava, and Inkerman</i></p>				
1887 2007 2097 2192 2306 2367 2389	Capt. W. Swinton Capt. G. H. Vesey 2nd Capt. W. W. Barry Lieut. W. Morris Lieut. A. W. A. Ogilvie Lieut. P. E. Hill Lieut. J. Tucker	L March '55 L L L L Oct. '54	Jan. '55 P P Nov. '54 Aug. '55 P March '55	Died in camp, Jan. 2, '55. To Malta. Posted to Cavalry Ball Cartridge Brigade. Invalided.

No. 4 COMPANY, 11TH BATTALION, G FIELD BATTERY (19th Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged at the Alma, Repulse of Russian Reconnaissance, Oct. 26, '54, and Battle of Inkerman

1932	Capt. J. Turner	L	April '55	To England on appointment to R.H.A.
2024	Capt. H. A. Synth	June '55	P	
2054	2nd Capt. J. G. Boothby	L	July '55	To England on leave.
2168	Lieut. A. Brendon	L	March '55	To England on promotion.
2272	Lieut. H. P. P. Phelips	L	Oct. '54	Invalided.
2334	Lieut. F. L. H. Lyon	Dec. '54	P	
2368	Lieut. A. Walsham	L	Sept. 20, '54	Killed at the Alma.
2419	Lieut. C. R. Franken	March '55	P	
2423	Lieut. L. P. Walsh	March '55	July '55	Invalided.

No. 5 COMPANY, 11TH BATTALION, H FIELD BATTERY (64th Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged at the Alma, Balaclava, Repulse of Russian Reconnaissance, Oct. 26, '54, and Battle of Inkerman

1861	Capt. E. Wodehouse	L	P	Invalided.
2059	2nd Capt. G. Barstow	L	Jan. '55	Invalided.
2154	2nd Capt. A. W. Twiss	May '55	July '55	To England on promotion.
2165	Lieut. W. P. Richards	L	March '55	
2276	Lieut. A. H. King	L	Nov. '54	Posted to C Troop.
2315	Lieut. E. Keate	March '55	Aug. '55	
2324	Lieut. H. Thornhill	May '55	P	
2369	Lieut. S. J. M. Maxwell	L	P	

No. 5 COMPANY, 3RD BATTALION, J BATTERY OF POSITION (13th Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, April '55

1920	Capt. F. B. Ward	April '55	P
2047	2nd Capt. W. C. L. Blossie	April '55	P
2335	Lieut. C. L. Tredcroft	April '55	P
2348	Lieut. H. C. S. Dyer	April '55	P
2417	Lieut. F. A. Whinyates	April '55	P

FIELD BATTERIES R.A.—Continued

No. 4 COMPANY, 12TH BATTALION, P FIELD BATTERY (63rd Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged at Balaklava and Inkerman. Went with Expedition to Kimburn after fall of Sebastopol

Number in Kane's List.	Name and Rank on Arrival in Crimea.	Present in Crimea with Battery		Remarks.
		From	To	
1787	Capt. (Brev.-Major) S. P. Townsend	L	Nov. 5, '54	Killed at Inkerman.
1797	Capt. G. V. Johnson	Dec. '54	P	
2077	2nd Capt. D. E. Hoste	L	Dec. '54	Posted to C Troop.
2162	2nd Capt. Æ. Clarke	Jan. '55	P	Promoted from No. 2 Company, 11th Battalion.
2172	Lieut. W. W. A. Lukin	L	Feb. '55	Posted to Siege Train on promotion.
2210	Lieut. F. Miller	L	May '55	To England on promotion.
2331	Lieut. F. Temple	June '55	P	Died on passage home, April '56.
2344	Lieut. M. F. Downes	May '55	Aug. '55	To England on leave.
2426	Lieut. S. A. Bazalgette	April '55	P	

No. 5 COMPANY, 12TH BATTALION, Q FIELD BATTERY (8th Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, May '55

1949	Capt. J. R. Gibbon	May '55	P
2084	2nd Capt. H. T. Fitz-Hugh	May '55	P
2268	Lieut. A. C. Johnson	May '55	P
2408	Lieut. A. D. Burnaby	May '55	P
2412	Lieut. V. D. Majendie	May '55	P

No. 1 COMPANY, 6TH BATTALION, V BATTERY OF POSITION (25th Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, April '55. Engaged at the Tchernaya

2026	Capt. E. Moubray	April '55	P	Promoted from No. 6 Company, 11th Battalion.
2063	2nd Capt. J. E. Thring	April '55	P	
2332	Lieut. F. G. Ravenhill	April '55	P	
2352	Lieut. F. W. E. Savage	April '55	P	
2391	Lieut. M. Tweedie	April '55	P	

No. 1 COMPANY, 11TH BATTALION, W FIELD BATTERY (62nd Battery R.F.A.)

<i>Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged at the Alma and Balaklava. Went with Kerich Expedition, June '55</i>			
1846	Capt. G. R. Barker	L	June '55
2042	Capt. T. W. Milward	Aug. '55	P
2119	2nd Capt. J. E. Michell	L	May '55
2161	Lieut. P. Dickson	L	Dec. '54
2169	Lieut. J. de Havilland	L	March '55
2198	2nd Capt. T. E. Byrne	May '55	P
2365	Lieut. R. Biddulph	L	P
2416	Lieut. J. C. F. Ramsden	Feb. '55	Aug. '55
2424	Lieut. P. De le P. Trench	March '55	P
		Promoted Lieut.-Col. and joined Siege Train. Transferred from No. 4 Company, 3rd Battalion.	
		To England on appointment to R.H.A. Promoted. Posted to No. 6 Company, 12th Battalion.	
		To England on promotion. Returned to the Crimea with No. 6 Company, 3rd Battalion.	
		Invalided.	

No. 8 COMPANY, 1ST BATTALION, X FIELD BATTERY (11th Battery R.F.A.)

<i>Landed in Crimea, June '55</i>			
1980	Capt. A. F. Connell	June '55	P
2133	2nd Capt. H. A. Thrupp	June '55	P
2328	Lieut. G. J. Shakerley	June '55	P
2343	Lieut. F. T. A. Law	June '55	P
2390	Lieut. B. F. Schreiber	June '55	P
		Promoted from No. 1 Company, 1st Battalion.	

No. 2 COMPANY, 3RD BATTALION, Y FIELD BATTERY (23rd Battery R.F.A.)

<i>Landed in Crimea, May '55</i>			
2004	Capt. A. C. Gleig	May '55	P
2094	2nd Capt. J. Godby	May '55	P
2350	Lieut. J. Hanwell	May '55	P
2383	Lieut. G. A. A. Walker	May '55	Aug. '55
2394	Lieut. H. C. Lyle	May '55	P
		Promoted from No. 1 Company, 1st Battalion.	
		Invalided.	

TABLE LXVI

BALL CARTRIDGE BRIGADES ATTACHED TO INFANTRY DIVISIONS
No. 5 COMPANY, 6TH BATTALION (33rd Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, May '55

Number in Kane's List.	Name and Rank on Arrival in Crimea.	Present in Crimea with Brigade or Company.		Remarks.
		From	To	
1916	Capt. A. Thompson	May '55	P	
2339	Lieut. J. T. Daubuz	May '55	P	
2386	Lieut. E. C. Cuthbert	May '55	P	

No. 6 COMPANY, 2ND BATTALION (6th Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, June '55

1998	Capt. A. C. Pigou	June '55	P	
2254	Lieut. H. Strover	June '55	P	
2316	Lieut. T. W. Blakiston	June '55	P	

No. 2 COMPANY, 5TH BATTALION (27th Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, July '55

1883	Capt. J. Travers	Aug. '55	P	
2176	2nd Capt. G. Davis	July '55	P	
2333	Lieut. T. H. Pitt	July '55	P	
2425	Lieut. W. Rooke	Aug. '55	P	
2443	Lieut. J. H. P. Anderson	Aug. '55	P	

No. 7 COMPANY, 6TH BATTALION (24th Company R.G.A.)

Landed in Crimea, July '55

2217	2nd Capt. L. H. Denne	July '55	P	
2361	Lieut. H. Cardew	July '55	P	
2415	Lieut. Æ. de V. Tupper	July '55	P	

No. 8 COMPANY, 9TH BATTALION (45th Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, Aug. '55

2251	Lieut. C. F. Cockburn	Sept. '55	P
2317	Lieut. A. L. Kaye	Aug. '55	P

TABLE LXVII

SIEGE TRAIN COMPANIES

No. 1 COMPANY, 1ST BATTALION (1st Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, Dec. '54. Engaged in 2nd Bombardment, was represented by a Detachment only in the subsequent Bombardments, and took part in Kertch Expedition

1878	Capt. G. Graydon	Dec. '54	May '55	Remained at Kertch.
2004	2nd Capt. A. C. Gleig	Dec. '54	May '55	Posted to Y Field Battery.
2196	2nd Capt. J. M. Savage	May '55	June '55	Died June 22, '55.
2250	Lieut. W. S. M. Wolfe	Dec. '54	May '55	Remained at Kertch.
2279	Lieut. R. R. Jones	Dec. '54	May '55	Remained at Kertch.

No. 2 COMPANY, 1ST BATTALION (2nd Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, July '55. Engaged in 5th and 6th Bombardments

2003	Capt. H. P. Newton	July '55	P	
2155	2nd Capt. R. Curtis	July '55	P	
2240	Lieut. H. Heberden	July '55	P	
2318	Lieut. J. J. Smith	July '55	P	
2452	Lieut. E. P. Marshall	July '55	P	Died Nov. 29, '55.

No. 3 COMPANY, 1ST BATTALION (No. 1 Mountain Battery)

Landed in Crimea, July '55. Engaged in 5th and 6th Bombardments

1962	Capt. M. Clifford	July '55	P
2349	Lieut. T. L. Still	July '55	P
2434	Lieut. H. Y. Wortham	July '55	P

SIEGE TRAIN COMPANIES—Continued

No. 6 COMPANY, 1ST BATTALION (32nd Company R.G.A.)

Landed in Crimea, July '55. Engaged in 5th and 6th Bombardments

Number in Kane's List.	Name and Rank on Arrival in Crimea.	Present in Crimea with Company		Remarks.
		From	To	
1987	Capt. A. F. F. Lennox	July '55	P	
2156	2nd Capt. A. Sievwright	July '55	P	
2406	Lieut. C. D. Gilmour	July '55	P	
2451	Lieut. T. A. de Moleyns	July '55	P	

No. 4 COMPANY, 2ND BATTALION (5th Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, Dec. '54. Engaged in 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments

1889	Capt. S. D. Broughton	Dec. '54	P	To England on promotion. Returned to
2011	2nd Capt. H. A. Vernon	Dec. '54	Jan. '55	Crimea, Sept. '55, with No. 6 Company,
				3rd Battalion.
2174	2nd Capt. C. E. Walcott	March '55	Sept. '55	Invalided Sept. 3, '55.
2229	Lieut. T. L. Dames	Dec. '54	Feb. '55	Posted to I Troop.
2322	Lieut. J. L. Clarke	Dec. '54	June '55	Invalided.
2334	Lieut. F. L. H. Lyon	Dec. '54	Dec. '54	Posted to G Battery.
2402	Lieut. W. G. Martin	Dec. '54	Jan. '55	To Malta.
2422	Lieut. F. A. Anley	March '55	P	

No. 4 COMPANY, 3RD BATTALION (101st Company R.G.A.)

Landed in Crimea, July '55. Engaged in 5th and 6th Bombardments

1965	Capt. M. Adye	Aug. '55	P	Transferred from No. 6 Company, 11th
2042	Capt. T. W. Milward	July '55		Battalion.
2214	2nd Capt. R. Boyle	Aug. '55	Aug. '55	Posted to W Battery.
2302	Lieut. C. J. Tyler	July '55	P	From Adjutant R.A., 3rd Division.
2455	Lieut. F. J. G. Hill	July '55	P	

No. 6 COMPANY, 3RD BATTALION (No. 3 Mountain Battery)
Landed in Crimea, Sept. 6th, '55, and was posted to Right Attack

2011	Capt. H. A. Vernon	Sept. '55	P	
2169	2nd Capt. J. de Havilland	Sept. '55	P	
2346	Lieut. F. H. W. Nisbett	Sept. '55	P	Served previously with W Battery.
2427	Lieut. C. D. Bevan	Sept. '55	P	

No. 5 COMPANY, 4TH BATTALION (16th Battery R.F.A.)
Landed in Crimea, May '55. Engaged in 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments. Sent a Detachment to Kertch

2013	Capt. G. H. L. Milman	May '55	P	
2045	2nd Capt. R. E. F. Craufurd	May '55	P	
2341	Lieut. E. C. Vaughan	May '55	P	
2387	Lieut. E. A. M. Lloyd	May '55	P	Went to Kertch, May '55; returned June '55.

No. 7 COMPANY, 4TH BATTALION (14th Company R.G.A.)
Landed in Crimea, July '55. Engaged in 5th and 6th Bombardments

1933	Capt. A. C. L. FitzRoy	July '55	P	
2301	Lieut. J. T. B. Brown	July '55	P	
2325	Lieut. A. T. G. Pearse	July '55	P	Died Sept. 10, '55, of his wounds on Sept. 6.

No. 8 COMPANY, 4TH BATTALION (17th Battery R.F.A.)
Landed in Crimea, Dec. '54. Engaged in 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments

1879	Capt. A. Oldfield	Dec. '54	Aug. '55	Killed Aug. 17, '55.
2091	2nd Capt. F. J. Soady	Dec. '54	July '55	To Adjutant at Scutari.
2227	Lieut. R. H. Champion	Dec. '54	P	Severely wounded, Sept. 8, '55.
2401	Lieut. H. W. Briscoe	Dec. '54	Aug. '55	Invalided.

No. 1 COMPANY, 5TH BATTALION (26th Battery R.F.A.)
Landed in Crimea, Dec. '54. Engaged in 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments

1912	Capt. H. A. B. Campbell	Dec. '54	P	
2109	Lieut. E. J. Carthew	Dec. '54	P	
2219	Lieut. P. W. L'Estrange	Dec. '54	P	
2384	Lieut. F. W. de Winton	Dec. '54	P	

SIEGE TRAIN COMPANIES—Continued

No. 7 COMPANY, 5TH BATTALION (20th Battery R.F.A.)
Landed in Crimea, March '55. Engaged in 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments

Number in Kane's List.	Name and Rank on Arrival in Crimea.	Present in Crimea with Company.		Remarks.
		From	To	
1931	Capt. H. Rogers	March '55	Aug. '55	Invalided.
2135	2nd Capt. A. Gordon	May '55	July '55	Killed July 5, '55
2216	Lieut. E. Luce	March '55	April '55	Killed April 11, '55.
2223	Lieut. H. Irvine	March '55	Aug. '55	Invalided.
2407	Lieut. E. J. Ward (Ashton)	May '55	P	

No. 4 COMPANY, 6TH BATTALION (32nd Battery R.F.A.)
Landed in Crimea, Dec. '54. Engaged in 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments

1923	Capt. A. R. Wragge	Dec. '54	May '55	To Corfu.
2020	Capt. C. G. Arbuthnot	May '55	P	
2136	2nd Capt. W. J. Williams	May '55	P	
2158	2nd Capt. J. Boulton	March '55	June '55	
2213	Lieut. G. A. Milman	Dec. '54	July '55	To England on promotion.
2275	Lieut. J. A. Price	Dec. '54	P	
2281	Lieut. J. H. Brown	Dec. '54	P	

No. 8 COMPANY, 6TH BATTALION (3rd Company R.G.A.)
Landed in Crimea, May '55. Engaged in 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments

2023	Capt. F. W. Hastings	May '55	P	
2051	2nd Capt. A. E. H. Anson	May '55	P	
2313	Lieut. M. Le F. Taylor	May '55	P	
2338	Lieut. H. A. Doyne	May '55	P	

No. 1 COMPANY, 7TH BATTALION (3rd Battery R.F.A.)
Landed in Crimea, Sept. '55. Engaged in 6th Bombardment

1934	Capt. E. H. Fisher	Sept. '55	P	
2253	Lieut. W. C. Nangle	Sept. '55	P	

No. 8 COMPANY, 7TH BATTALION (28th Battery R.F.A.)
Landed in Crimea, March '55. Engaged in 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments

1968	Capt. A. C. Hawkins	March '55	P
2252	Lieut. H. H. Conolly	March '55	P
2414	Lieut. Sir J. Campbell, Bt.	March '55	P

No. 6 COMPANY, 8TH BATTALION (40th Battery R.F.A.)
Landed in Crimea, Sept. '55. Engaged in 6th Bombardment

1976	Capt. N. McL. Mackay	Sept. '55	P
2195	2nd Capt. C. P. Rotton	Sept. '55	P
2360	Lieut. C. G. Johnson	Sept. '55	P
2445	Lieut. H. C. Farrell	Sept. '55	P

No. 1 COMPANY, 9TH BATTALION (41st Battery R.F.A.)
Landed in Crimea, Sept. '55

2006	Capt. the Hon. W. C. Yelverton	Sept. '55	P	Previously served as Adjutant R.A., 2nd Division.
2086	2nd Capt. W. N. Hardy	Sept. '55	P	
2259	Lieut. F. C. Griffin	Sept. '55	P	
2375	Lieut. O. H. A. Nicolls	Sept. '55	P	

No. 5 COMPANY, 9TH BATTALION (92nd Company R.G.A.)
Landed in Crimea, March '55. Engaged in 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments

1929	Capt. M. C. Dixon	March '55	P	Appointed Adjutant R.A., 2nd Division.
2073	2nd Capt. H. Heyman	March '55	May '55	
2220	Lieut. C. E. Burt	March '55	P	
2380	Lieut. B. G. Humfrey	March '55	P	

No. 2 COMPANY, 11TH BATTALION (42nd Company R.G.A.)
Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged in all Six Bombardments

2087	2nd Capt. J. L. Bolton	{ Feb. '55	{ April '55	Invalided.
2162	Lieut. Æ. Clarke	{ June '55	{ Sept. '55	
2178	Lieut. W. J. Bolton	{ Nov. '54	{ Jan. '55	
		L	P	Posted on promotion to P Battery.

SIEGE TRAIN COMPANIES—Continued

Number in Kane's List.	Name and Rank on Arrival in Crimea.	Present in Crimea with Company		Remarks.
		From	To	
2418	Lieut. F. C. Elton	March '55	P	Joined after fall of Sebastopol. Killed in magazine explosion, Nov. 11, '55.
2432	Lieut. C. E. S. Scott	May '55	P	
2470	Lieut. J. W. J. Dawson	Oct. '55	Nov. '55	

Note.—Only a detachment of this company landed with Siege Train; the main body joined under Capt. J. L. Bolton, Feb. '55.

No. 6 COMPANY, 11TH BATTALION (65th Battery R.F.A.)

Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged in all Six Bombardments, and manned the 18-pounder Guns of Position at the Battle of Inkerman

1911	Capt. C. L. D'Aguilar	L	March '55	To England on appointment to R.H.A.
1965	Capt. M. Adye	May '55	June '55	Severely wounded, June 5, '55. Transferred to No. 4 Company, 3rd Battalion.
2026	2nd Capt. E. Moubray	L	March '55	Posted on promotion to V Position Battery.
2166	Lieut. J. E. Hope	L	P	
2286	Lieut. G. S. Harward	L	May '55	Invalided.
2421	Lieut. R. A. Mitchell	March '55	April '55	Killed April 14, '55.

No. 7 COMPANY, 11TH BATTALION (74th Company R.G.A.)

Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged in all Six Bombardments, and manned the 18-pounder Guns of Position at the Battle of Inkerman

1977	Capt. W. J. E. Grant	Jan. '55	P	Invalided.
2078	2nd Capt. E. Taswell	L	Nov. '54	Severely wounded, April 10, '55. Invalided.
2183	Lieut. J. Sinclair	L	June '55	To England on appointment to R.H.A.
2299	Lieut. J. Lyons	L	June '55	
2371	Lieut. A. K. Rideout	L	P	
2435	Lieut. H. B. Maule	May '55	P,	

No. 8 COMPANY, 11TH BATTALION (78th Company R.G.A.)

Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged in all Six Bombardments

1955	Capt. H. F. Strange	L	P	To Electric Telegraph Department.
2116	2nd Capt. J. Spurway	L	May '55	To England on promotion.
2177	Lieut. E. G. Bredin	L	March '55	
2197	2nd Capt. D. Jones	June '55	P	
2372	Lieut. W. H. Watson	L	Feb. '55	Invalided.
2397	Lieut. H. J. F. E. Hickes	Nov. '54	P	
2430	Lieut. C. O. Browne	April '55	P	

No. 1 COMPANY, 12TH BATTALION (67th Company R.G.A.)

Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged in all Six Bombardments

2212	Lieut. C. H. Owen	L	P	Promoted May '55, but retained command of Company.
2309	Lieut. C. E. Stirling	April 6, '55	April 27, '55	To England on appointment to R.H.A.
2373	Lieut. H. P. Tillard	L	July '55	
2447	Lieut. C. F. Roberts	March '55	P	

No. 2 COMPANY, 12TH BATTALION (80th Company R.G.A.)

Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged in all Six Bombardments

1859	Capt. (Brev.-Major) C. C. Young	L	Jan. '55	To England on appointment to R.H.A.
1986	Capt. G. Shaw	Jan. '55	P	
2120	2nd Capt. G. C. Henry	L	Feb. '55	Appointed Adjutant R.A., 4th Division.
2186	Lieut. W. H. R. Simpson	L	April '55	To England on promotion.
2236	Lieut. R. McKenzie	L	P	
2438	Lieut. H. L. Geary	May '55	P	

No. 3 COMPANY, 12TH BATTALION (Reduced '71)

Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged in all Six Bombardments

1803	Capt. (Brev.-Major) A. Irving	L	Dec. '54	To Scutari; and then to England on promotion.
1988	Capt. C. S. Henry	Jan. '55	Aug. '55	Severely wounded, Aug. 17, '55.

SIEGE TRAIN COMPANIES—Continued

Number in Kane's List.	Name and Rank on Arrival in Crimea.	Present in Crimea with Company		Remarks.
		From	To	
2172	2nd Capt. W. W. A. Lukin	March '55	P	Promoted from P Battery.
2187	Lieut. L. W. Penn	L	P	Some time Assistant Engineer.
2232	Lieut. W. G. Andrewes	L	March '55	Posted to I Troop.
2376	Lieut. D. G. C. MacLachlan	L	Nov. '54	Died Nov. 29, '54.
2404	Lieut. W. J. Hall	Jan. '55	P	Invalided.
2439	Lieut. W. B. Rice	May '55	Aug. '55	
No. 6 COMPANY, 12TH BATTALION (17th Company R.G.A.)				
<i>Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged in all Six Bombardments</i>				
1808	Brev.-Major H. S. Rowan	L	Jan. '55	To England on promotion.
2161	2nd Capt. P. Dickson	Jan. '55	P	Promoted from W Battery.
2300	Lieut. C. E. Torriano	L	Aug. '55	To England on appointment to R.H.A.
2329	Lieut. H. J. Alderson	L	P	
No. 7 COMPANY, 12TH BATTALION (Reduced '71)				
<i>Landed in Crimea, Sept. '54. Engaged in all Six Bombardments</i>				
1809	Brev.-Major J. N. A. Freese	L	Jan. '55	To England on promotion.
2001	Capt. C. J. Strange	March '55	P	
2123	2nd Capt. S. P. J. Childers	L	Oct. '54	Killed Oct. 23, '54.
2142	Lieut. W. D. Guille	L	Oct. '54	Died Oct. 28, '54.
2143	2nd Capt. C. E. Oldershaw	Jan. '55	April '55 (?)	To Electric Telegraph Department.
2189	2nd Capt. E. G. Snow	May '55	P	Killed Sept. 6, '55.
2337	Lieut. J. E. Ruck-Keene	L	P	
2399	Lieut. N. H. Harris	Dec. '54	P	

ATTACHED OFFICER

1907	Capt. C. W. Younghusband	Oct. '54	Nov. '54	In charge of draft from England. Attached to Left Attack temporarily.
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TABLE LXVIII
MEDICAL OFFICERS

The rank, rotation, and duration of service in the Crimea of the following Officers are taken from Aclay's Order Book.

Number in Kane's List.	Name and Rank on Arrival in Crimea.	Present in Crimea with Royal Artillery		Remarks.
		From	To	
265	Surgeon R. C. Elliot	L	P	
264	Surgeon John Bent	May '55	P	
274	Surgeon J. M. S. Fogo	April '55	P	
275	Surgeon E. Gilborne	L	Nov. '54	
276	Surgeon E. S. Protheroe	Nov. '54		
288	Assist.-Surgeon W. Perry	L	P	
279	Assist.-Surgeon W. Combe	L	P	
273	Assist.-Surgeon H. C. Walsh	Jan. '55	P	
290	Assist.-Surgeon T. Park	L	P	
294	Assist.-Surgeon G. P. M. Woodward	March '55	P	
295	Assist.-Surgeon A. S. Fogo	L	P	
296	Assist.-Surgeon J. C. H. Wright	L	P	
297	Assist.-Surgeon J. A. McMunn	L	P	
298	Assist.-Surgeon E. Bowen	L	P	
319	Assist.-Surgeon R. A. Chapple	L		
304	Assist.-Surgeon W. Haughton	L	P	
313	Assist.-Surgeon A. H. Taylor	Oct. '54	P	
307	Assist.-Surgeon A. M. Humphrey	April '55	P	
315	Assist.-Surgeon T. Tarrant	Oct. '54	P	
301	Assist.-Surgeon J. Barker	May '55	P	
302	Assist.-Surgeon H. Clifford	June '55	P	
314	Assist.-Surgeon J. H. Hearne	Nov. '54	P	
309	Assist.-Surgeon S. Roch	Jan. '55	P	
310	Assist.-Surgeon R. Webb	May '55	P	
311	Assist.-Surgeon E. Bubb	Aug. '55	P	
308	Assist.-Surgeon W. G. N. Manley	June '55	P	
312	Assist.-Surgeon N. P. Betts	July '55	P	
317	Assist.-Surgeon G. Sharp	June '55	P	
327	Assist.-Surgeon J. F. Loughheed	Nov. '54	P	

MEDICAL OFFICERS—Continued

Number in Kane's List.	Name and Rank on Arrival in Crimea.	Present in Crimea with Royal Artillery		Remarks.
		From	To	
322	Assist.-Surgeon T. J. Orton	L	P	
331	Assist.-Surgeon J. W. Rimmre	July '55	P	
*	Assist.-Surgeon G. Finlay	Aug. '55	P	
330	Assist.-Surgeon C. O. Daniell	June '55	P	
*	Assist.-Surgeon G. Wiley	Sept. '55	P	
*	Assist.-Surgeon J. Farley	Sept. '55	P	
*	Assist.-Surgeon G. Hayward	Sept. '55	P	
338	Assist.-Surgeon W. Fletcher	Aug. '55	P	
*	Assist.-Surgeon F. Reynolds	Feb. '55	P	
*	Assist.-Surgeon F. de Chaumont	†	†	
278	Staff-Surgeon R. Thornton	L	P	
283	Staff-Surgeon W. P. Ward	L	P	
277	Staff-Surgeon S. H. Fasson	L	P	
277	Staff-Surgeon G. Peacock	L	Sept. '55	Invalided.
281	Assist.-Surgeon E. D. Allinson	L	Oct. '54	Invalided.
299	Assist.-Surgeon R. W. Cockerrill			Not in the list in Adye's Order Book. He was wounded in the trenches April 14, '55.

TABLE LXIX

VETERINARY SURGEONS

16	Vet.-Surgeon J. S. Stockley	L	P	To England on leave.
17	Vet.-Surgeon H. Withers	L	July '55	
18	Vet.-Surgeon M. J. Harpley	L	May '55	
19	Vet.-Surgeon J. T. Cochrane	March '55	P	Invalided.
20	Vet.-Surgeon F. Cotterell	L	P	
21	Vet.-Surgeon W. B. Lord	Sept. '55	P	
22	Vet.-Surgeon J. Brennan	June '55	July '55	
24	Vet.-Surgeon J. Mason	May '55	Aug. '55	
26	Vet.-Surgeon W. Huke	June '55	P	
27	Vet.-Surgeon C. Sanderson	Aug. '55	P	
29	Vet.-Surgeon J. Cleaveland	Sept. '55	P	

* Not in Kane's List.

† No dates given in Adye's Order Book.

TABLE LXX

FIELD TRAIN OFFICERS

80	Comry, W. L. M. Young	L	P	
85	Assist.-Comry. H. Blakeney	L	P	
87	Assist.-Comry. H. A. Russell	L	P	
76	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. G. A. Ayngge	L	P	
86	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. C. W. E. Holloway	L	P	
88	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. H. Hewitt	L	P	
89	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. G. Greensill	L	P	
90	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. J. Rogan	L	P	
91	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. G. Yellon	L	P	
92	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. W. Hayter	L	P	
78	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. R. Garrard	L	P	
93	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. J. M. Hill	L	May '55	Killed Nov. '55.
94	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. J. Lilley	L	P	Killed Sept. 8, '55.
96	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. D. Doherty	L	May '55	
98	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. J. McGillivray	L	P	
99	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. W. Gair	L	P	
100	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. A. Hunt	Jan '55	P	
101	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. R. O. Day	Jan. '55	P	
102	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. J. Bruce	May '55	P	
103	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. G. C. Clarke	April '55	P	
104	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. W. Ker	May '55	P	
105	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. E. Laniland	April '55	P	
106	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. J. S. Addams	Aug. '55	P	
107	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. M. Keir	L	P	
108	Dep.-Assist.-Comry. J. O'Connor	L	P	

APPENDIX No. 9

AN EPISODE IN B BATTERY DURING
THE SIEGE

THE historical services of the field artillery practically terminated with the battle of Inkerman, and the author fears that the work of the troops and batteries during the months that followed has been but lightly touched upon, owing to lack of information. The following episode is therefore inserted here as an instance of what they were called upon to do, and as an example of the tardiness with which reward sometimes follows performance:

"We were arming the batteries preparatory to the 3rd Bombardment in June, when the nights were very short. I was in charge of a team of ten horses, and we made two journeys to the trenches on that particular night, but by the time we returned to the siege park it was broad daylight, so we were an easy mark for the Russians; I had lost 2 horses and 1 man, and thought I had reached a spot out of the zone of fire, when a shell burst right in the middle of the leaders, and the driver—Porter by name—and his two horses were knocked over all in a heap. I thought they were all killed, but Porter picked himself up, and we got him and his horses back to camp. Although badly hurt, he refused to report himself sick, so that he might look after his own horses. He brought them both round, and had the satisfaction of bringing them back to Woolwich, in June, 1856. They were the same pair that he had taken out in March, 1854. With General E. B. Coke's assistance, I was enabled, nearly 50 years afterwards, to get Porter the Meritorious Service Medal, with accompanying pension, for his action on that occasion" (Major-General H. T. Arbuthnot to author).

APPENDIX No. 10

KEY TO CRIMEAN SERVICES OF EXISTING
BATTERIES AND COMPANIESTABLE LXXI
ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY

Designation		Employment in Crimea.	Actions, etc.
In 1911.	In 1854.		
A Batty., R.H.A.	A Troop, R.H.A.	Troop, R.H.A.	..
B " "	B " "	Cavalry Ball Car- tridge Bgde.	..
C " "	C " "	Troop, R.H.A.	Boulganak, Alma, Mc- Kenzie's Farm, Bala- clava, Tchernaya, Eupatoria
O " "	I " "	" "	Boulganak, Alma, Mc- Kenzie's Farm, Bala- clava


ROYAL ARTILLERY

Designation			Employment in Crimea.	Actions, etc.
In 1911.	In 1854.			
	Comp.	Battn.		
1st Batty., R.F.A.	I	I	Siege Company, Right Attack	2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Bombardments, Kertch Expedition
2nd " "	2	I	Siege Company, Right Attack	5th and 6th Bombard- ments
3rd " "	I	7	Siege Company, Left Attack	6th Bombardment
5th " "	4	2	Siege Company, Left Attack	2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments
6th " "	6	2	Ball Cartridge Bgde., 2nd Div.
7th " "	3	II	F Field Batty.	Alma, Balaclava, Inker- man
8th " "	5	12	Q " "
11th " "	8	I	X " "
12th " "	I	3	E " "	Boulganak, Alma, Mc- Kenzie's Farm, Bala- clava, Repulse of Re- connaissance, Oct. 26, Inkerman
13th " "	5	3	J Position "

ROYAL ARTILLERY—*Continued*

Designation			Employment in Crimea.	Actions, etc.
In 1911.	In 1854.			
	Comp.	Battn.		
14th Batty., R.F.A.	8	3	B Field Batty.	Alma, McKenzie's Farm, Repulse of Reconnaissance, Oct. 26, Inkerman
16th " "	5	4	Siege Company, Left Attack	3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments
17th " "	8	4	Siege Company, Left Attack	2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments
19th " "	4	11	G Field Batty.	Alma, McKenzie's Farm, Repulse of Reconnaissance, Oct. 26, Inkerman
23rd " "	2	3	Y " "
25th " "	1	6	V Position "	Tchernaya
26th " "	1	5	Siege Company, Right Attack	2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments
27th " "	2	5	Ball Cartridge Bdge., Light Div.
28th " "	8	7	Siege Company, Left Attack	2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments
29th " "	7	5	Siege Company, Right Attack	2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments
32nd " "	4	6	Siege Company, Right Attack	2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments
33rd " "	5	6	Ball Cartridge Bdge., Highland Div.
35th " "	2	8	A Field Batty.	Alma, McKenzie's Farm, Inkerman
40th " "	6	8	Siege Company, Left Attack	6th Bombardment
41st " "	1	9	Siege Company, Right Attack
45th " "	8	9	Ball Cartridge Bdge., 4th Div.
62nd " "	1	11	W Field Batty.	Alma, Balacava, Kertch Expedition
63rd " "	4	12	P " "	Balacava, Inkerman, Kinburn Expedition.
64th " "	5	11	H " "	Alma, McKenzie's Farm, Repulse of Reconnaissance, Oct. 26, Inkerman
65th " "	6	11	Siege Company, Right Attack	1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments, Inkerman (18-prs.)
1st Mountain Batty.	3	1	Siege Company, Left Attack	5th and 6th Bombard- ments
3rd " "	6	3	Siege Company, Right Attack
No. 3 Co., R.G.A.	8	6	Siege Company, Left Attack	3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments.
" 14 " "	7	4	Siege Company, Left Attack	5th and 6th Bombard- ments
" 17 " "	6	12	Siege Company, Left Attack	1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments.

Designation			Employment in Crimea.	Actions, etc.
In 1911.	In 1854.			
	Comp.	Battn.		
No. 24 Co., R.G.A.	7	6	Ball Cartridge Bgde., 3rd Div.
" 32 " "	6	1	Siege Company, Right Attack	5th and 6th Bombard- ments
" 42 " "	2	11	Siege Company, Left Attack	1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments
" 67 " "	1	12	Siege Company, Right Attack •	1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments, Repulse of Reconnaiss- ance, Oct. 26, (rock- ets), Inkerman (rockets)
" 74 " "	7	11	Siege Company, Right Attack	1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments, Inkerman (18-prs.)
" 78 " "	8	11	Siege Company, Right Attack	1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments
" 80 " "	2	12	Siege Company, Left Attack	1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments
" 92 " "	5	9	Siege Company, Right Attack	2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Bombardments
" 101 " "	4	3	Siege Company, Right Attack	5th and 6th Bombard- ments



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
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
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


Map of the
SOUTH OF THE CRIMEA

NOTE.

- A Approximate position taken up by Lord Raglan when he first crossed the River Alma.
- B C Approximate positions of Causeway Batteries.







THE DEFENCES OF SEBASTOPOL

17th October 1854.

- A N^o 1 Bastion (Point Battery)
B N^o 2 Bastion (Little Redan)
C The Malakoff
D N^o 3 Bastion (The Redan)
E N^o 4 Bastion (The Flagstaff Battery)
F N^o 5 Bastion (The Central Battery)
G N^o 6 Bastion (The Land Quarantine Battery)
H N^o 7 Bastion (Artillery Fort)





NOTE.

The map shows the defences of Balaklava as they existed on October 25th, 1854.

When the Battle of the Tchernaya was fought August 16th, 1855, the extensive Lines of Balaklava had been made.

PARALLELS.

FRENCH RIGHT ATTACK.

- First Parallel.* The trench connecting Batteries 9, 8, 7 and 12.
Second Parallel. The trench connecting Batteries 12 and 10.
Third Parallel. The trench forming a re-entering angle in front of the Second Parallel.
Fourth Parallel. The trench in rear of the Brancion Redoubt on the Mamelon.
Fifth and Sixth Parallels. The trenches in front of the Brancion Redoubt.

BRITISH RIGHT ATTACK.


- First Parallel.* The trench containing Batteries 1 to 6.
Second Parallel. The trench containing Batteries 9, 14, 13, 12 & 15.
Third Parallel. The trench in front of the Second Parallel which runs across the ridge and contains Battery 8.
Fourth Parallel. The trench extending to the right of Battery 20.
Fifth Parallel. The trench running across the ridge in front of the Fourth Parallel.

BRITISH LEFT ATTACK.

- First Parallel.* The trench containing the Mortar Batteries and Batteries 1 to 5.
Second Parallel. The trench containing Batteries 18, 16, 10, 12 M.B. and 9.
Third Parallel. The Trench containing Batteries 15, 14, 8, 13 and 7
Fourth and Fifth Parallels. The trenches in front of the Third Parallel.

FRENCH LEFT ATTACK.

- First Parallel.* The trench containing Batteries 11, 10, 8, 7, 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1.
Second Parallel. The trench containing Batteries 25, 12, 12 (bis), 13, 14, 20, 19, 18, 17 and 16.
Third Parallel. Trench extending from the neighbourhood of Battery 25, westward to Battery 28.





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